

LANGUAGE IN ART EDUCATION

A theoretical and empirical study of the relations between
the visual and the verbal in art and art education.

RAYMOND VERNON DUNNING

PH.D. THESIS

LONDON UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

A B S T R A C T

Since the Newsome Report (1963) much has been made of the importance of language throughout the curriculum, but comparatively little interest has been shown in the role of language in art education, possibly because visual art and verbal language are usually characterised as distinct symbol systems which generate different forms of experience, thought, knowledge and communication.

Even were it possible to distinguish this sharply between art and language, art teaching, like all teaching is a predominantly verbal operation, and this should be reason enough to research into the role of language in art education. But the present study goes further than this and questions the validity of a distinction which must distort what is, in effect, an integrated and holistic system. It proceeds on the assumption that language and art are not incidental to one another, but they are indissolubly and dialectically entwined; consequently language must have a role to play in the production and consumption of art in general and not only in an educational context.

The work is divided into three parts; the first is a review of the literature on language and art, and it attempts to show how important a contribution language makes to art, not only in the more obvious fields of art criticism, art history and art education, but also at the level of the practising artist.

Whereas Part One speculates in general terms on the relations between language and art, Part Two reports some original, naturalistic, research which concentrates on the art teachers' use of language, and its implications. It takes the form of an exhaustive analysis of tape-recordings of two complete art lessons, given by different teachers at a North London comprehensive school.

Part Three comprises three relatively short chapters: the first is a critique of prevailing art educational thinking which inhibits enquiry into the role of language in that field; the second begins to map the verbal context of art education; and the concluding chapter presents ideas for extending and developing the empirical work described in Part Two.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am particularly grateful to the Head Teachers, the Art teachers, and the pupils who allowed me to observe and record the lessons discussed in Part Two of this work and in the Appendix. I must also thank John Newick, my supervisor at the Institute of Education, for his advice and support, and my wife whose help with the typing has been invaluable. My fees and travelling expenses as a post-graduate student at the Institute were paid by my employer, the London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames Education Department, and for this I am also very grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>General Introduction</u>	10.
-----------------------------	-----

PART ONE : ART LANGUAGE

<u>Chapter 1 : The Language of the Artist</u>	17.
1.1 Introduction	17.
1.2 Form and Function in the Language of Paul Klee	18.
1.21 The Private Writings	19.
1.22 The Professional Writings	23.
1.23 The Public Writings	27.
1.24 Summary	29.
1.3 The Visual and the Verbal in Twentieth Century Art	29.
1.31 The Use of Words in the Visual Product	31.
1.32 The Use of Words as the Visual Product	32.
1.33 The Use of Words in the Creative Process	33.
1.331 Language in the work of Marcel Duchamp	33.
1.332 The Influence of Duchamp	38.
1.333 Book Art	40.
1.4 Post-script	42.
 <u>Chapter 2 : Art Criticism</u>	 43.
2.1 Introduction	43.
2.2 The Prescriptive Literature on Art Criticism	43.
2.21 Ducasse	43.
2.22 Venturi	44.
2.23 Osborne	45.
2.24 Stolnitz	47.
2.25 Reid	48.
2.26 Discussion	48.
2.3 The Reflective Literature on Art Criticism	50.
2.31 The Painted Word	52.
2.32 Discussion	56.
2.4 Conclusion	62.
 <u>Chapter 3 : Art History</u>	 64
3.1 Introduction	64.
3.2 A Short History of Art History	65.
3.21 Art History Before the Nineteenth Century	65.
3.22 Art History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries	66.

3.3	Art History and Present Interest	71.
3.4	Art History and Present Purpose	75.
3.5	The Effects of Art History on the Production and Consumption of Art	78.
3.51	The Direct Influence of Marxist Art History on Artistic Production	80.
3.52	The Indirect Influence of Marxist Art History on Artistic Production	82.
Chapter 4 : <u>Language in Art Education</u>		86.
4.1	Introduction	86.
4.2	The Language of Art	87.
4.3	John Hayes on 'Language and Art'	93.
4.31	The Effect of Art Language on the Production of Art	94.
4.32	The Effect of Art Language on Artistic Consumption	95.
4.33	Summary and Conclusion	97.
4.4	Art History and Art Criticism as Social Constraints Upon The Consumption of Art in Education	98.
4.41	The Teaching of Art History	98.
4.42	The Teaching of Art Criticism	102.
4.5	Post-script	105.

PART TWO : EMPIRICAL WORK

Chapter 5 : <u>Two Case Studies : Context and Method</u>		108.
5.1	Introduction	108.
5.2	Language and Education : A Brief Survey	108.
5.21	Language and Thought	109.
5.22	Language and Social Structure	109.
5.23	Language in the Classroom	111.
5.24	Language Studies and Art Education	114.
5.3	Background to the Present Project : The Pilot Study	115.
5.4	Aims and Objectives of the Present Project	116.
5.5	Method	117.
5.51	Educational Connoisseurship	117.
5.52	Educational Criticism	118.
5.521	Description	118.
5.522	Interpretation	118.
5.523	Evaluation	119.
5.53	Validity of the Method	119.
5.54	Generalisation of Results	120.
5.6	The Appropriateness of Eisner's Method for the Present Project	120.
5.7	Application of the Method	121.
5.71	Description	122.
5.72	Interpretation	122.
5.721	Situation	123.
5.722	Language Registers	124.
5.723	Teacher Evaluations	124.
5.724	Questions	124.
5.725	Structure	126.

5.73	Evaluation	126.
5.8	The Source of the Data	127.
Chapter 6 : <u>Lesson A</u>		130.
6.1	Description	130.
6.11	The Room	130.
6.12	The Lesson	131.
6.2	Interpretation	138.
6.21	Situation	138.
6.211	Setting	138.
6.212	Participants	139.
6.213	Topic	140.
6.22	Language Registers	140.
6.221	Specialist Language Presented	141.
6.222	Specialist Language Not Presented	142.
6.223	The Language of Secondary Education	150.
6.224	Language used with Visual Presentations	153.
6.23	Teacher's Evaluations	155.
6.231	Teacher Evaluations in the First Phase of the Lesson	155.
6.232	Teacher Evaluations in the Second Phase of the Lesson	159.
6.24	Teacher's Questions	163
6.241	Rhetorical Questions	165.
6.242	'Closed' or 'Pseudo' Questions	166.
6.243	Confirming Questions to do with Observation	168.
6.244	Confirming Questions to do with Actions	170.
6.245	Control Questions	170.
6.246	Socialising Questions	171.
6.247	Open Questions	173.
6.248	The Teacher's Attitude to Questions	174.
6.25	Pupils' Questions	176.
6.26	Structure	177.
6.3	Evaluation	180.
6.31	The Hidden Curriculum	181.
6.32	The Secondary Content	185.
6.33	Conclusion	187.
Chapter 7 : <u>Lesson B</u>		188.
7.1	Description	188.
7.11	The Room	188.
7.12	The Lesson	189.
7.2	Interpretation	198.
7.21	Situation	198.
7.211	Setting	198.
7.212	Participants	199.
7.213	Topic	200.
7.22	Language Registers	201.
7.221	Specialist Language Presented	201.
7.222	Specialist Language Not Presented	204.
7.23	Evaluations	210.
7.231	Positive Evaluations	211.
7.232	Negative Evaluations	214.

7.233	Ambiguous Evaluations	215.
7.234	Pupil Evaluations	215.
7.24	Questions	216.
7.241	Pupil Questions	216.
7.242	Teacher Questions	219.
7.243	Questions Calling for Information	219.
7.244	Rhetorical Questions	220.
7.245	Control Questions	220.
7.246	Confirming Questions	221.
7.247	Open and Closed Questions	222.
7.248	Socialising Questions	226.
7.249	The Question as Method	227.
7.25	Structure	228.
7.3	Evaluation	231.
7.31	Phase I	231.
7.32	Phase II	234.
7.33	Phase III	235.
7.34	Conclusion	236.

PART THREE : THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE IN ART EDUCATION

Chapter 8 :	<u>A Critique of Art Educational Theory</u>	241.
8.1	Introduction	241.
8.2	Rationales for Art Education	244.
8.21	The Sensory School	245.
8.22	The Affective School	246.
8.23	The Cognitive School	246.
8.3	Contradictions Implicit in the Three Main Schools of Art Educational Thought	248.
8.31	Educating the Senses	248.
8.32	Educating the Emotions	251.
8.33	Educating the Intellect	253.
8.4	Conclusion	257.
Chapter 9 :	<u>The Linguistic Context of Art Education</u>	259.
9.1	Introduction	259.
9.2	School, College and Teacher Training	261.
9.3	Examination Syllabuses, Examination Papers, and Examiners' Reports	262.
9.4	Prepared Teaching Materials	266.
9.41	Books	266.
9.42	Film-Strip Notes	267.
9.43	Projects	268.
9.44	Museum and Gallery Catalogues	268.
9.45	Radio and Television	269.
9.46	Commercial Catalogues	269.
9.5	The Press	270.
9.6	Research Reports and Philosophical Publications	271.
9.7	Conferences and In-Service Training Courses	272.
9.8	Government Policies and Reports	272.
9.9	Postscript	273.

Chapter 10 : The Value of Studying Language in Art Education

10.1	Introduction	275.
10.2	A Theoretical Basis for Studying Language in Art Education	275.
10.21	The Symbolic Nature of Experience	276.
10.22	The Symbolic Nature of Art	277.
10.23	The Study of Language in Art Education	278.
10.3	Purpose and Method	278.
Appendix : <u>Feasibility Study : Autumn 1978</u>		285.
References and Bibliography		328.
Selected Works of Art Referred to in the Text		342.
ADDENDUM		343

I shall always be grateful to the
radio for telling my ears how to
use my eyes (Richard Cork, 1977b).

INTRODUCTION

I was trained initially as a painter and as an art teacher, and I have been teaching art and design almost continuously in schools and colleges since 1970. Between 1972 and 1973, however, as a post-graduate sociology student, I co-directed an action-research project designed to study the use of audio visual media in social action (see Dunning, 1974).

The experience introduced me to sociological theory and in particular to the social- or existential-phenomenology of writers such as Sartre (1963; 1972; 1960), Berger (1966), Garfinkel (1967), Schutz (1964; 1970; 1971), Phillipson (1972) and Cicourel (1973), with its emphasis on language (verbal language) as the prime mediator of social experience, feeling, knowledge, values, attitudes, beliefs, behaviour and so on. It was almost inevitable that I should apply this kind of thinking to art and art education when I returned to art teaching in 1973 and the present project, which I began at the London University Institute of Education in January, 1978, is the result.

According to social-phenomenological thought, our experience of the 'real' world is necessarily mediated by symbols. We are no more aware of the symbolic fabric of experience, however, than we are, say, of our eyes in the act of seeing. We are induced, therefore, to regard the existence and characteristics of objects and events as if they were independent of the symbols by which they are construed.

The persistence in society of the numerous symbols by which reality is construed is due primarily to the evolution and use of language. What is taken as 'real' in commonsense experience is grounded in various kinds of knowledge and language is the chief instrument by which knowledge is acquired, organised and applied. Language imposes on experience the frames of reference or cognitive 'maps' within which the rules of action are maintained and repeated. Language, which is socially contrived and maintained, embodies implicit exhortations and values. When we acquire the categories of language we acquire the structured habits of a group and, along with the language, the values implicit in those habits. Thus language controls our perception and behaviour, our logic and thought, and even to some extent our emotions.

The activities and rules of social life, acquired and maintained through

the use of language are habitualised and taken for granted. People are oblivious to the origins of these rules and of their consequences. But our language habits, and hence our constructs of reality, are acquired originally, and subsequently modified, by continuous interaction with family, friends, teachers, the media, and other social institutions.

Applying the tenets of social-phenomenology to art, one arrives at the view that art is not a 'real', 'objective' or 'natural' force, independent of its particular manifestations in individual artefacts, artists, societies, theories, and so on, but a social fact or artefact, a myth in the sense intended by Barthes (1957), which is created and sustained collectively by those who subscribe to the idea. Complicity in the construction, reconstruction, and perpetuation of this myth is effected through language. Thus, for the social-phenomenologist, the root of artistic experience and behaviour (consumption and production) lies not in nature but in habitualised values, actions and rules which are taken for granted so completely by those who have acquired the language that they appear to have an independent existence.

This is all very well, one might say, but surely art really does have independent roots in nature; surely it satisfies our aesthetic sensibilities and these are not socially received; the aesthetic is natural and universal. This may well be so, but we should not confuse art with the aesthetic. 'Art' is a generic term under which we collect a variety of experiences, objects, activities and behaviours. Artistic experience is not necessarily aesthetic, neither is art a necessary condition for aesthetic experience. The 'aesthetic' refers to physiological or psychological, or even spiritual processes which may be triggered by various experiences besides those which, by social custom or praxis, we agree to be 'artistic'. We may adopt an aesthetic attitude in respect of almost anything and not only works of art.

If there is a special relation between art and the aesthetic then it arises from the fact that 'art' is the label under which we collectively agree the socially acceptable or appropriate means by which the aesthetic may be approached, such agreement being relative, of course, to the real and present conditions, both ideological and material, of the historical moment. Thus, for example, while it may always have been aesthetically pleasing to contemplate the accidental effects of colour and texture

created by the arbitrary and violent application of paint to a surface, it was not 'authorised' as an 'artistic' experience until the conditions were right - the intellectual and emotional climate was right - to admit Abstract Expressionism as a valid form of art in the first half of the twentieth century.

Art, then, mediates the aesthetic. In turn, art is mediated by social values and forces and these are mediated, ultimately, by language. Such was the kind of thinking which motivated the present work which may be seen to some extent as the result of my attempts over the past four years to substantiate these ideas, firstly by reviewing the literature on the relations between art and language, and secondly by studying first-hand the use of language in art education.

My initial examination of the literature on art and language showed that it divides roughly into three groups. The smallest includes the work of those writers, most notably Gauss (1949); Noszlopy, Finke, Greet and Cardinal (all in Higgins, 1973), and Meyers (1975), who recognise a mutually effective or functional relation between literature and visual art and who demonstrate this relation in specific instances. Meyers, for example, shows how certain novelists have used paintings as inspiration for their writings (op. cit.).

A larger group of writers concerned with art and verbal language see them as distinct and discrete areas of activity which may, to some extent, reflect upon each other (see, for example, Maritain, 1953; Hagstrum, 1958; Chipp, 1968; Cecil 1969; Pickering, 1970; Praz, 1970; Sorell, 1970; and Hunt, 1971). Chipp is typical inasmuch as he presents the writings of visual artists not as integral to their visual work, but as an adjunct to it in the form of a verbal transposition, or by way of explanation.

By far the largest group of writers who mention 'language' in the context of art, however, are those such as Rowland (1965), Carpenter and Graham (1971), Hirst (1973), Green (1978), and Cumming (1980), who are concerned mainly with art in education and who tend to assume that art is itself a kind of language which expresses a unique form of knowledge; that is, 'visual' knowledge. No-one seems particularly interested in the relations between art and verbal language in education except, that is, in the elements of art history and art criticism which are more obviously verbal.

In the last few years periodicals such as Art-Language (the journal of the Art and Language group), and Block (produced by the Art History Department at Middlesex Polytechnic) have emerged, but on the whole there seems to be a tacit agreement among art educationists that verbal language has no place in their particular area of interest.

On the strength of this preliminary assessment I set out in Part One of the present work to show that verbal language does play an important part, not only in art education, but in the production and consumption of art in general. I begin by distinguishing between 'the language of art' (the notion that art is itself a language) and 'art language' (the language used to talk and write about art). I am not really concerned with the former, although I do devote some space to the notion in Chapter 4. My main interest lies in art language in its various forms and in its effects upon artistic production and consumption. This in itself is a very broad subject and for convenience I break it down into four main areas in which language may be seen to influence the ways art is conceived and practised. Firstly there is the domain of the artist, who, besides working with visual media, is himself a language user. Secondly, there is the domain of the art critic whose function it is to verbalise upon art and to mediate artistic values and attitudes in society. Thirdly there is the domain of the art historian who, by means of words, imposes order retrospectively upon the objects and events which have passed for art in history. And fourthly, there is the domain of the art educationist who uses words to pass on to his pupils the artistic values, attitudes, concepts, beliefs, interpretations and practices of his society and class.

In reality it is no easy matter to distinguish between these domains: the artist may well be a critic or an historian, and the teacher is in many instances a practising artist. Thus the domains overlap, they merge into one another and they interact in complex ways. It might be better to think of them therefore not as distinct areas, but as what Sartre might call a 'hierarchy of mediations' (see Laing and Cooper, 1964, 44). At the centre is the artist and his work, the language he uses and the linguistic environment in which he works. The critic is part and parcel of the art scene, but he stands outside the work of individual artists in a position to take an overview, or what Sartre would call a 'totalisation' (Sartre, 1960, 45), of current events in the art world and the

relations between them. This perspective, in Sartre's terms, represents the art scene in its 'horizontal complexity' (Sartre, 1963, 51), and when published it is reflexive inasmuch as it contributes to the conditions or the context under which and within which art is consumed and subsequent work is done. The history of art represents art in its 'vertical complexity' (ibid.), and it is reflexive in the same sense as art criticism. It subsumes the work of the artist and that of the critic and it transcends the present in an attempt to make sense of, or to 'totalise' events and relations over a period of time. If art, art criticism and art history may be envisaged as a series of concentric spheres of operation, each successively transcending and totalising the other, then art education may be represented as an all-embracing sphere, comprehending the other three. The language of art education draws upon and attempts to make sense of the mass of objects, events, concepts and relations they represent and to relate it to more general educational, social and economic demands.

My discussion on language in art education in Part One is very general and while it is mainly directed at the language of secondary education it also refers to the tertiary sector. In Part Two, however, attention is focussed specifically on art language in the secondary school and here it remains for the rest of the thesis.

Part Two is an account of my empirical work which I began in the Autumn of 1979 (the pilot study for this work was carried out during the previous Autumn - see Appendix). This work is introduced in some detail in Chapter 5, so I will not go into it here, except to say that it was carried out in the spirit of social-phenomenology which is not only a philosophy but also a guide to method. As such it indicates an approach which is essentially descriptive, its object being to discover what is happening, at a fundamental level, in a given social situation, and to explicate the forces behind the phenomena encountered. It acknowledges that the researcher becomes part of the situation he is observing and it seeks to restrain him from joining in the 'game' too soon with premature evaluations. Thus, the social-phenomenologist is encouraged to approach even the most familiar situations as if he were an explorer learning the customs of a recently discovered tribe. He holds everything he encounters in brackets, so to speak, and treats it as problematic (see Filmer et al, 1972). It was in this spirit that I chose and adapted

the particular method explained in Chapter 5, and in which I approached my study of the language of two secondary school art teachers, presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

Having established in Parts One and Two that language plays an important part in art and art education, I turn my attention in Part Three firstly to the question why, at a time when the study of language in education generally has been taken so seriously, has the study of language in art education been neglected? My suggestion is that the climate created by the dominant theories, with their associated language, which underlie the various approaches to art education is such that it is very difficult even to conceive of a relation between art and verbal language at this time. I go on to identify and to criticise the dominant theories in an attempt to remove the obstacles to the study of language in art education. This done, I begin to map the linguistic context of art education and, finally, to construct a theoretical platform on which to base further work on language, art and art education.

PART ONE

A R T L A N G U A G E

CHAPTER 1

THE LANGUAGE OF THE ARTIST

All the arts live by words. Each work of art demands its response; and the urge that drives man to create - like the creations that result from this strange instinct - is inseparable from a form of 'literature', whether written or not, whether immediate or pre-meditated. May not the prime motive of any work be the wish to give rise to discussion, if only between the mind and itself? (Valery, quoted in Kozlof, 1961, 301-2)

1.1 Introduction

In his introduction to Artists on Art Goldwater rightly says that while the artist may openly express little faith in the power of words to explain art, 'nevertheless he has written and talked a great deal about it' (Goldwater, 1945, 7). This is particularly the case, he says, in the present century when artists have seemingly striven to 'purify' visual art of its literary associations. Goldwater identifies three main forms of written and spoken language used by artists since the Middle Ages: 'private', 'professional', and 'public', and he says that each period of art within the last seven centuries or so is characterised, in very general terms, by the dominance of one or other of these forms. By 'private' talk and writings Goldwater means the discussion of problems (moral, material, psychological, and so on) by the artist for himself (for example, in a journal) or with friends (in letters or reported conversations). 'Professional' language, he says, deals with technique or aesthetics, and it is directed to other artists or to pupils, while 'public' language may be associated with the artist's business addressed perhaps to prospective patrons or to society or to posterity, as a defence of his work or of art in general.

Goldwater is alone among editors of collections of artists' writings inasmuch as he attempts, within the limits of a short introduction, to categorise the language of the artist, and to attribute different functions to its different forms. For example, the 'professional' language of Cennini's The Book of the Art, written in the fourteenth

century, is technical, and this he says reflects its function as a textbook for pupils and fellow artists. Vasari's Lives (1550), however, is written in a more popular style which reflects a quite different function; Vasari was writing for the enlightened amateur and his aim was to popularise or publicise a particular view of the artist in sixteenth century society. Editors other than Goldwater, notably Holt (1947 and 1966); Friedenthal (1963); Herbert (1964); and Chipp (1968), take it for granted that all artists' writings serve only to explain their work or to explain the artistic process as a self-contained phenomenon. For them it is as if the artist and the writer are two separate persons within the same body: the one is a medium in and through which art works as a kind of natural force, while the other is able to observe this process and to comment upon it with inside information.

There is no denying of course that the artist's language does help to explain his visual work, but this is only one of its possible functions in respect of that work. In order to demonstrate this I shall use the work of one artist - Paul Klee - who is a particularly suitable subject, not only because so much of his writing has been published, but also because he is so often portrayed as a supremely 'visual' artist. If it can be shown that language played more than an incidental role in the work of such an artist then the exercise will be that much more valuable.

1.2 Form and Function in the Language of Paul Klee

Lynton reminds us of Klee's considerable literary output:

In 1898 he wrote a group of stories; in 1900 he tried his hand on some dramatic scenes; in 1903-4 he wrote newspaper reviews for the Swiss paper Die Alpen. In addition to this there are his professional writings as artist and teacher, particularly the Creative Credo of 1920, the Pedagogical Sketchbook of 1925, and the lecture he gave in Jena in 1924 in connection with an exhibition of his work (an English translation was published in 1947 as Klee on Modern Art) (Lynton, 1964, 33).

To this list of 'public' and 'professional' writings may be added Klee's collected teaching notes, published in two volumes as The Thinking Eye (1961) and The Nature of Nature (1973). Also his 'private' writings in the form of poems (trans. Hollo, 1962; and Watts, 1974), and diaries

(ed. Klee, F., 1964) which he kept from 1898-1918. Among his 'private' writings may also be included the 'poetic' titles Klee gave to his pictures.

There is no question that the whole range of Klee's writings help to explain his visual work after the fact, as it were, and in this way it conditions one's experience of it. There is no question either that Klee set out to do just this in much of his writing. What I am concerned to do here however is to reveal some of the ways, both direct and indirect, in which the artist's language may have been instrumental in the actual production of his work.

1.21 The Private Writings

In his introduction to The Diaries of Paul Klee (1964) Felix Klee says that 'during his lifetime my father allowed no-one, not even myself, access to his most personal confession', which he wrote 'merely for his own reflection'. When he kept his journal Klee could not have known how important he was to become and how widely read his private writings would be after his death. Clearly then the prime function of these writings was not to explain anything to anyone, unless it was to the artist himself. Indeed, there are entries in which Klee seems to be doing just this; that is, he is using his writing as a means of assimilating and accommodating (see Piaget, 1952, 3-9) new ideas and experiences, gained as a student and as a young professional, into his concept of art and into his self-image as an artist and as a man. In this respect the Diaries, which soar between the trivial and the profound, come over very strongly as a means of self-dramatisation for an artist as yet unsure of himself, seeking emotional fulfilment and professional success:

Childhood was a dream, some day all would be accomplished. The period of learning, a time for searching into everything, into the smallest, into the most hidden, into the good and the bad. Then a light is lit somewhere, and a single direction is followed (that stage I now enter; let us call it the time of wandering) (Klee, 1964, 50).

This would seem to be born out by the fact that Klee's journal ends in 1918 when, as Lynton says, 'as an artist he was now fully mature' (1964, 20). By this time he had achieved emotional stability in his marriage,

and he had begun to make such a reputation for himself that in 1919 he was able to say with some justification in a letter to Schlemmer that, 'Anyone who has seriously concerned himself with art in the last few significant years is bound to know perfectly well who I am' (Klee, 1961, Intro. 26). It was in 1920 that Klee took up his post at the Bauhaus and it may be said that at this point in his career his students and his public took over the role which had been played previously by his Diaries. As his private writings show, Klee longed for public recognition, and when he achieved it he no longer needed to posture before a metaphorical looking-glass.

The Diaries then, contributed to Klee's artistic output indirectly by helping him to come to terms with himself, and by providing a means of support in the years before he achieved complete public recognition. The poems however had a more direct relationship with Klee's visual work. They were discovered after his death dispersed in a notebook and in the Diaries. Like many of the diary entries they too served as a means of self-dramatisation, but they have more in common with the paintings and the drawings he was doing at that time. Like his pictures Klee's poems observe, analyse, muse, play, joke, explore, construct, exclaim, and so on. In this respect they may be said to complement the visual work in the sense of completing it. They are not merely something else which the artist did when he was not painting or drawing; the poems and the pictures are two sides of the same coin; they are both the product of the artist's involvement with himself and his world. Put another way, the poems are the verbal element in Klee's work, filtered out or precipitated.

This idea will become clearer after we have considered the third aspect of Klee's private writings - the titles he attached to his pictures. Although these titles were intended for publication along with the pictures, as a guide to the viewer, their prime function was a private or personal one. Watts (1974, 21) compares Klee's titles to Arp's, 'which were often organic extensions of his visual work'; they serve, she says, 'as further crystallisation of his paintings'. Her use of the words 'extension' and 'further' here give the impression that the titles are something tacked on at the end of the process; a kind of finishing touch rather than a constituent of the finished work. It is true of course that Klee's titles were sometimes added long after the works were

completed, but this does not necessarily mean that they were not present in some embryonic form in the artist's mind while he was engaged in the work. A closer look at Klee's working method, and his ideas on the creative process, confirms that words played a central part in the completion of his pictures.

Lynton (1964, 23) points out that Klee's generation was profoundly interested in the writings of German Romanticism, and that while there is no mention in Klee's published writings of the modern creators of psychology he was fully aware of 'the unconscious' which, as a concept, he inherited as part of the German cultural tradition. Indeed, his writings do betray his grasp of the concept, and a Romantic view of art as an interaction between conscious and unconscious, intelligence and nature, necessity and freedom:

Half winged - half imprisoned, this is man (Klee, 1925, 54).

Klee portrays the creative process as an interaction between the conscious and the unconscious in his Creative Credo (1920) and in the Jena lecture (1924). In both of these he describes a process which begins on a purely formal plane and in which the artist relinquishes conscious control over his creation. In the Credo he pictures this phase as 'a little trip into the land of deeper insight, following a topographical plan', and describes it accordingly as a kind of aimless wandering over metaphorical fields and rivers, following where they lead. In the Jena lecture he describes how this formal phase, which is concerned with the spontaneous arrangement of dots, lines, planes, tones and colours, gives way to conscious ordering. Through free association of ideas certain elements 'are brought out of their general order, out of their appointed array, to be raised together to a new order and form an image which is normally called the subject' (op. cit., 29). In the Credo Klee refers to this moment when the subject begins to emerge, in the following way:

It may be true that 'in the beginning was the deed', yet the idea comes first. Since infinity has no definite beginning, but like a circle may start anywhere, the idea may be regarded as primary. 'In the beginning was the word' (op. cit., 184).

Here he is clearly implying that the ordering or structuring of an otherwise arbitrary arrangement of formal elements into a meaningful composition depends upon the intervention of 'the word'; that is, he is equating consciousness with verbally mediated experience and thinking. The artist works over and into the marks produced in the first, 'unconscious' phase of the process, infusing the whole, and structuring it, with ideas suggested by conscious or verbal associations.

I should mention that the passage from the Credo quoted above is studiously ignored by many writers on Klee, and it is even omitted in some translations and commentaries (see, for example, San Lazzaro, 1957, 105 et seq.). Perhaps this is because it does not fit into the generally accepted view that Klee was concerned with pure 'visual' form, unsullied by things verbal, and it is considered therefore to be an incomprehensible lapse in an otherwise consistent argument. A notable exception is Read who seems to share my understanding of what Klee means when he speaks of the primacy of the word:

We are concerned here with the preconscious, for that is the great reservoir of verbal images or memory residues from which an artist like Klee draws his fantasy. We all know that the mind is stored with countless records of past perceptions, which may, when the right association is accidentally struck, be brought to the surface again (Read, 1931, 169).

I would argue that Klee's reference to 'the word', far from being an incomprehensible lapse, is a necessary link in the Credo between his description of 'a little trip into the land of deeper insight' and the next section on the relation between time and space in art. Here Klee makes the point that a work of art does not happen instantaneously; it comes about sequentially over a period of time, and the beholder's activity too is essentially temporal. 'The eye', according to Klee (op. cit., 185) 'is made in such a way that it focuses on each part of the picture in turn.' Thus, 'the pictorial work (is) born of movement, is itself recorded movement, and is assimilated through movement.' But the eye of the beholder is not completely free, he says, it 'follows paths prepared for it in the picture', paths sign-posted, I would add, by the title attached to the picture. The title is a clue to the viewer as to how he should address the picture - what associations he should make. It is at once a constraint acting upon the viewer's experience, and an insight into the experience of the artist, and as such

it is very much part of the work.

This is not to suggest that meaning in Klee's work is literary or referential. It is true that the titles of many of his works refer to objects in the natural world (e.g. The Rhine Near Duisberg, 1937, and Fruit on a Blue Ground, 1938). But Klee himself is at pains to point out (1924) that if one approaches these pictures as representations of scenes or objects, one misses the real meaning which resides more in the compositional unity of the formal, pictorial elements. It does suggest however that Klee achieved the compositional unity through, among other things, a tension between the visual and the verbal in his work. To put it another way, the particular compositions which grew out of Klee's 'stream of consciousness' method depended very much upon the words which sprang to mind - the verbal associations - which he 'painted' into his pictures to bind the disparate elements and to raise them to a 'higher order' as he puts it. Thus it is not a case of the titles explaining the pictures any more than the pictures might be said to illustrate the titles. The visual and the verbal work together in Klee's work to produce what might best be described as 'visual poems'.

It is interesting to note, in the light of what has been said, that many of Klee's pictures are calligraphic, or reminiscent of hieroglyphics, and some of his images (e.g. Let Him Kiss Me with the Kiss of His Mouth, 1921; and Once Emerged from the Grey of the Night, 1918) are actually formed out of passages of writing. This implies that Klee did indeed make a connection between the sequential character of writing and reading, and that of pictorial composition and appreciation.

1.22 The Professional Writings

These include the Jena lecture and the Credo, and the great mass of pedagogical writings published as The Thinking Eye (1961) and The Nature of Nature (1973). A distinction may be made between such works as the Credo and the Bauhaus teaching notes inasmuch as the former was intended primarily to explain and, consequently, it is more polished; it represents a consolidation of Klee's artistic theory rather than writing which was instrumental in developing that theory. The teaching notes however were instrumental in several respects; they were not

merely a means of communicating pre-formed ideas to the students.

Klee's teaching and his own artistic output were closely linked. While at the Bauhaus in Weimar he wrote to his wife, 'Here in the studio I am working on half a dozen paintings, drawings, and thinking about my course, all at once, for everything must go together or it wouldn't work at all' (Klee, 1961, 21). This has been interpreted to mean that 'Klee's teaching activity ... helped him become aware of his own way of working' (ibid.), as if his way of working were a kind of compulsive or natural behaviour which preceded his knowledge of it. I would argue however that his own work and his teaching were related dialectically, as were his pictures and the titles he attached to them, and thereby his teaching actually had an effect upon his work.

One effect of teaching on Klee's work was a move to a purer abstraction in the 1920's. Before he began at the Bauhaus Klee's work had retained a child-like symbolism and literal associations. His written work, too, displayed a more concrete use of metaphor. In the Credo, written in 1920 - the year before he took up his post, Klee compares pictorial elements to the elements of landscape: he compares 'a plane traversed by lines' to a ploughed field, and he compares scattered dots to 'stars overhead'. By 1924 however, when he delivered his Jena lecture, he was using metaphor in a more abstract way. Here he uses the tree to symbolise the process of artistic creation, not because of the tree's appearance, but because he sees the process of growth which results in tree-like forms as analogous to the process underlying art. Here he is not comparing the visible to the visible; he is, to use his own phrase, making visible the invisible - a set of abstract relations.

The move to purer abstraction in Klee's visual work at this time is attributable in no small part to his need as a teacher to talk and write about art, not for himself as he had done in his Diaries, but for an actual audience. Britton (1970) points out that one's use of language, or one's spoken and written style, is very much conditioned by the audience to which it is addressed; and Rosen (in Barnes, 1969) warns that public language of the kind used in an educational context may lapse into 'empty verbalism' if it concentrates on its own formality. Klee, we know, centred his teaching on his own work which he used in his lectures as visual aids. We also know, from his students and from the

heavy volumes of his teaching notes, that the essence of his teaching was to derive formal rules and principles from his work, and to elaborate them into an obscure and complex system. It is my contention that in Klee's teaching this increasingly complicated formal system of thinking about art became less of an analysis and an exposition of 'natural laws', and more of an end in itself. As Klee became more and more caught up in it, his pictorial work changed accordingly, and this meant a move to purer abstraction. In effect, the subject of Klee's pictorial work changed from the natural world to the nature of art itself; that is, to the abstract world of the dot, the line, and the plane.

But this change in subject-matter cannot be accounted for completely by the necessities of teaching. Klee had taught before he joined the Bauhaus without there being such a marked effect upon his visual work. To understand how Klee became so involved in the formal language of teaching at the Bauhaus one must understand something about that institution and the power it exerted over its members. We are told that the Bauhaus had a definite programme: 'to restore production, which industrial techniques had developed only in a quantitative sense, to the search for quality values, in this way preserving autonomy, the creative possibility of a real existence, and finally, the freedom of the individual in a society which was tending, more and more, to become a compact and uniform mass' (Argan, in Klee, 1961, 15). However, the attitude of the Bauhaus to 'quality values' was ambiguous. In its first period, at Weimar, it attempted to reduce traditional craftsmanship and aesthetic values to a schematic system which could be applied to new industrial techniques. In its second period, at Dessau, it sought quality in formal, abstract concepts: 'in a mathematical realisation of the form selected as the image of the supreme rational quality of the human being' (ibid.). But, we are told, research at the Bauhaus 'remained dialectically linked with the question of quantities; in the first instance attention was concentrated on an attempt to preserve certain traditional aesthetic values, whilst increasing the quantity of production; in the second instance, quality was transposed to the level of conceptual abstraction, leaving to production the task of mass-producing the model' (ibid., 16).

Now, how did Klee fit in to all this? Once again we are told:

Klee was in fact the man who gave the search for quality a completely new basis, and made it a search for an autonomous and absolute value which, though derived from quantity, is irrelevant to quantity itself. Quality for him was the ultimate product of the individual's unrepeatable and unique experience; one achieves it by descending into the depths and by progressively clarifying the secret springs of one's actions, the myths and recollections working in the unconscious which strongly influence consciousness and action (ibid.).

In other words, Klee is said to have clung, more or less, to the views put forward in the Credo, rejecting the preoccupation of the Bauhaus with 'generality', 'quantity', and 'schematic systems', for 'autonomy', 'quality', and 'unrepeatable and unique experience'. Thus he is supposed to have slotted into the Bauhaus programme unchanged in himself and in his work. But is it reasonable to believe that anyone could have remained impervious to the aims, objectives and methods of an institution such as the Bauhaus, and to have survived on the staff for twelve years? This was an institution, one must remember, which was subject to many pressures from the outside, mainly political, which, quite early on, caused it to move from Weimar to Dessau, and later, during the rise of National Socialism, caused it to close down altogether. Under such pressures one would expect its members to identify more closely with each other and with their collective project - to reduce traditional craftsmanship and aesthetic values to a schematic system which could be applied to new industrial techniques, and to transpose quality to the level of conceptual abstraction as a model for mass-production. Also one would expect the institution as a whole to modify its ways, at least to some extent, to placate hostile agents on the outside if it wished to survive. This the Bauhaus did by moving away from the esoteric methods of Expressionism, which would have been seen in that political climate as degenerate and self-indulgent, to a more rational and 'realistic' approach relative to the prevailing technological and economic conditions.

It is inconceivable that under these circumstances Klee could have remained untouched. This is not to say that he did not continue in his search for 'autonomy', 'absolute quality', and so on, but paradoxically and in response to the conditions under which he was teaching, he sought these things in generalisations and schematic systems in accordance with the collective Bauhaus project. This amounted to reducing the 'unique' and 'unrepeatable' to a formal 'language' of design which would transpose easily into the idiom of mass-production. Klee effected this reduction in his didactic writings of the period, which may be seen therefore as

his way of assimilating and accommodating the conditions under which he was working, and of resolving the contradictions between his private and professional worlds. In the teaching notes he achieved a new synthesis, a new rationale which had an effect not only on the work of his students but also on his own work, leading him to a purer abstraction.

In the light of this interpretation it is interesting to note that after 1933 when Klee returned home to Switzerland to devote himself to his work in a more relaxed and introspective mood, his pictures lose the severe, architectonic quality characteristic of his Bauhaus period, and display something of the freedom and whimsy so typical of his work before the nineteen-twenties. This is so despite the fact that he was ill and depressed from 1935 until his death in 1940, and I take it as a measure of proof that the values of the Bauhaus did indeed impose themselves upon his work while he was there.

1.23 The Public Writings

Klee's public writings include the Credo and the Jena lecture (On Modern Art) which, although didactic in spirit, were intended as much for public as for professional consumption. The public writings also include the letters and articles Klee wrote in Die Alpen (1911-12), Der Sturm (1912), and Der Ararat (1921), and introductions for exhibition catalogues such as that for Kandinsky (1926).

If Klee's didactic writings of the Bauhaus period reflect the dialectic between his private and professional worlds, then his public writings reflect the struggle which was particularly fierce at that time between factions within the artistic community, and between the artistic community as a whole and the rest of society. In this respect they represent not only an attempt to explain and to rationalise what was going on in the art world, but also to promote and to publicise the theoretical approach of a particular faction. Let us take for example the article Klee wrote for Die Alpen in 1912, on the occasion of the third exhibition of Kandinsky's New Arts Association at the Thannhauser Gallery in Munich.

The exhibition, according to Klee, included work by the 'radical splinter

group known as the Blaue Reiter', and the gist of his article (reprinted in Friedenthal, 1963, 205-6) is that it is useless to seek the origins of the works exhibited (broadly classed as Expressionist) in the art of the past, and that it would be better to compare it to the spontaneous work of children or primitive peoples, or lunatics. This comparison, Klee says, is not made in order to ridicule the exhibition; it is one which should be taken seriously if art is to be reformed. It is time, he says, that 'all the trends of the recent past are sinking into oblivion and that what are known as the undeviating followers of tradition have only an outward appearance of glowing health but are seen in the light of serious history as the embodiment of lassitude'. He concludes, 'a great moment has arrived and I greet those who are contributing to the approaching reformation'.

Klee's article is something more than an explanation of Expressionism and of the work of the Blaue Reiter in particular. It is a public statement of allegiance to the values and attitudes of the Blaue Reiter. Klee's choice to align himself with this group may have been made for several reasons. The group was based in Munich where Klee was living and working, and he knew its members. Also, the Blaue Reiter's brand of Expressionism was analytical and constructive, unlike its Dresden counterpart, Die Brücke, and it suited Klee temperamentally. But, whatever his reasons, Klee became a peripheral member of the Blaue Reiter, and in his article in Die Alpen he commits himself publicly to its values and objectives. Like his private and professional writings, then, this particular example of Klee's public writing had a material effect upon his work because, having stated in public that art in general should be going in a particular direction (that indicated by the work of the Blaue Reiter), he was also directing his own work along a path which it was to follow for the rest of his life.

Subsequent public writings such as the Credo and Klee on Modern Art may also be seen to do more than explain the Expressionist position. They represent a continuing rationalisation and justification of Klee's original choice, helping to confirm and sustain his belief in that choice.

1.24 Summary

I have tried to show something of the range of functions fulfilled by language in the work of one artist - Paul Klee. I have suggested that in the private sphere his poetry served to complement or complete his visual output; his Diaries helped him to accommodate and assimilate new ideas and experiences, as well as providing a mirror to reflect his developing self-image; and the titles he attached to his pictures reveal the verbal associations which he himself believed to be so much part of picture-making.

I have suggested that in the professional sphere Klee's teaching notes were instrumental in resolving the contradictions between his autonomous and expressionistic private world, and the institutional demands of the Bauhaus (which itself was subject to external political, social and economic constraints). I have also suggested that the synthesis represented by his professional writings reacted upon his visual work producing, in particular, a move towards a purer abstraction.

In the public sphere I have said that, as well as explaining his own approach and that of Expressionism to a larger audience, Klee's writings represent a declaration of allegiance to a particular ideology and a particular way of working which, once chosen, directed his life's work.

Thus I would argue that in the work of Klee - an artist whose pictures are popularly conceived as being supremely 'visual' - we have a good example of the ways in which language may effect artistic production. In his work the word is seen to play a part not only in creating the milieu within which crucial choices are made, and in which private, professional and public issues may interact, but also in the artist's 'internal dialogue' which attends and conditions the private processes of visual creation.

1.3 The Visual and the Verbal in Twentieth Century Art

So far in this chapter I have been discussing ways in which language may have a less obvious effect upon artistic production. There are ways however in which the visual artist openly uses words in his work. Indeed, until

the nineteenth century the visual and the verbal were generally recognised to go hand in glove in the sense that artists more often than not looked to literary sources for their subject-matter. Late in the nineteenth century however the philosophy of 'pure visibility', which Venturi (1936, 267) traces to Kant, came to fruition with the effect that artists began to reject literary subject-matter, assuming that in so-doing they were relinquishing the world of words for one which was uniquely 'visual'.

But, as Lucie-Smith says (1968, 177), in spite of 'the modern prejudice against the literary in painting', many leading artists have still chosen to base their work on literature in the twentieth century. The whole course of the Modern Movement is littered with splendid suites of illustrations, he says, and he gives as some examples those of Picasso and Matisse based on the books of Vollard; Sutherland's romantic illustrations of Gascoyne's Poems: 1937-1942; Lucien Freud's strange illustrations for Nicholas Moore's wartime volume of poetry, The Glass Tower; the Ganymede Press edition of King Lear illustrated by Kokoshka; Bridget Riley's designs to accompany Ad Reinhard's text in the literary magazine Poor . Old . Tired . Horse; the collaboration between Kitaj and the poet Jonathan Williams; Hockney's etchings based on the poems of Cavafy (also I would add Hockney's costume designs for Jarry's Ubu Roi, and his etchings for six fairy tales from the Brothers Grimm); Paolozzi's series of screen-prints on the theme of Wittgenstein; and Rauschenberg's series of drawings based on Dante's Inferno.

As well as illustrating and interpreting literature, many Modern artists have themselves taken up the pen. Some, such as Arp and Schwitters, have written poetry; Picasso wrote plays, and many have been critics. Indeed, artists themselves have contributed much to the influential writing on art in this century; in particular one thinks of Maurice Denis, Juan Gris, Wassily Kandinsky, F.T. Marinetti, and Robert Motherwell. But there are other, more direct ways in which visual artists have used words in their work, and I shall concentrate on these in the remainder of this chapter. They fall roughly into three categories: the 'use of words in the visual product; the use of words as the visual product; and the deliberate use of words in the creative process.

1.31 The Use of Words in the Visual Product

Broadly speaking there are three ways in which words have been used in the visual product. Firstly, there are those occasions in which artists have included words in their images to function as words. An example of this would be Gauguin's Nevermore (1897) in which he includes the title in the painting, not merely as a label, but as something intended to contribute to the viewer's experience of the work. Another example would be Magritte's painting of a pipe with the words 'Ce n'est pas une pipe' added. Here one's experience of the image is dominated by the contradiction between the painted words and those which would normally spring to mind in the presence of a realistically painted image of a pipe. By confounding the viewer's expectation's in this way, Magritte focuses attention on the role tacitly played by words in the comprehension of visual imagery.

Secondly, there are those works in which words or parts of words play an aesthetic role. Examples of this would be the collage and decollage of Schwitters, or the Cubists, where the conventional meanings of the words on, say, torn pieces of newspaper or poster gives precedence to their spacial and textural qualities. In such works, however, it is still important that the words should be recognised as words because the artistic effect relies to some extent upon the realisation that they are being used in such a way as to negate or contradict their conventional function.

The third use falls somewhere between the first two; it includes works as diverse as those of Jan Bons, Robert Brownjohn, Jasper Johns, Roy Lichtenstein, Eduardo Paolozzi, Tom Phillips and Joe Tilson, and the poster-poems of Christopher Logue. From this list Phillips and Tilson may be used to illustrate the point. Take, for example, Tilson's Vox Box (1963). This relief is shaped like a mouth which is open to reveal a set of tooth-like objects which may also be seen as piano keys or exclamation marks carved out of wood. Beneath the mouth, again carved out of plain wood, are the letters V.O.X. Here the word 'vox' enters into the composition both as an object to be enjoyed aesthetically, and as a reference to the voice. It fulfils both an aesthetic and a semantic function, and it is ironical in a way which is typical of the Pop Art genre.

The other example is A Humument (1980) by Phillips. This is a series of miniatures painted onto the pages of W.H. Mallock's A Human Document (1892). Phillips allows snatches of the words underneath to show through the paint, like voice bubbles in a cartoon. The contents of each bubble makes no sense, and in the first instance therefore it is understood as an aesthetic element in the picture rather than a semantic one. But, we are told (in Kenedy, 1970), that Phillips also intends the exposed words to be a ruthless precis of Mallock's book, creating an impression similar to that which one gets listening to someone searching an L.P. for a particular passage.

1.32 The Use of Words as the Visual Product

We find examples of the use of words as the visual product in the typographical experiments of Dada and Futurism, and in the 'concrete poetry' of artists such as Bob Cobbing and Ferdinand Kriwet:

(Kriwet) has taken concrete poetry from the conventional 'private press' format to the scale of a full theatrical event ... His method of work is as follows: He begins by composing brief basic texts, constructed from composite words ... Having collated a series of texts, he proceeds to channel them through any available medium: film (with animated lettering), tapes, books (using positive and negative images), embossed metal, or letter forms silk-screened on to balloons or PVC cushions. Finally, all the elements are assembled in his 'text-rooms', in which he creates a kind of 'think-tank', with texts occupying the floor, the walls, the ceiling, and even free-standing objects. The basic text is repeated and repeated until, at saturation point, we begin to grasp its meaning (Woods et al, 1972, 140).

There may be some doubt as to whether concrete poetry should be used as an example of visual art. I would refer, however, to Lucie-Smith's article in which he says:

My own inclination is to see concrete poetry as somewhat closer to painting than it is to writing ... Its ancestry is very distinguished. It includes the Italian Futurists and Dada. In the guise that it now presents itself, however, concrete poetry seems to be the meeting ground of a number of absolutely contemporary ideas. It is, for example, a branch of abstract painting of the severe and geometrical sort. But the image creeps in at the back door, through the word which forms the unit of pattern (Lucie-Smith, 1968, 174-5).

This is not to say, of course, that concrete poetry is not literary. As Lucie-Smith says, 'a topic which fascinates the concrete poets, as indeed it does many modern painters, is the relationship to be found between the word and the actual thing it stands for' (ibid.). But, he continues, sometimes it is 'genuinely abstract. Letters become the basis for experiments in form - a ready made vocabulary of shapes from which interesting patterns and rhythms can be built up ... The work of poets and typographical designers here finds a point of contact with what is being done by one or two of the most highly regarded American painters, notably Jasper Johns. Some of Johns' most beautiful paintings are based upon sequences of numbers or of letters' (ibid.).

1.33 The Use of Words in the Creative Process

To exemplify work in this category I shall concentrate on one artist, Marcel Duchamp, whose ideas pervade many aspects of twentieth century art from Dada and Surrealism to Assemblage, Pop, Op, Minimal and Conceptual Art.

1.331 Language in the work of Marcel Duchamp

Duchamp came from a bourgeois family of artists. His grandfather had been a highly talented engraver, and his prints adorned the family home. Three of Duchamp's siblings (he was one of six children) chose art as a career, and his father, a notary, readily agreed to support them. One gets the impression that Duchamp chose art because it was the easiest choice open to him and because, by the time he went to Paris, his brothers had already paved the way. Much later he was to admit, 'I'm not interested in art per se. It's only one occupation and it hasn't been my whole life, far from it' (in Tomkins, 1965, 21).

Duchamp maintained that before Courbet European art was predominantly literary and this, to him, meant intellectual. Courbet, he believed, introduced the 'physical emphasis' which came to replace the intellectual in art. According to Duchamp, 'the more sensual appeal a painting provided - the more animal it became - the more highly it was regarded' (in Sweeney, 1946, 19), and this is why there was a saying, common in France in his formative years: 'stupid (animal) as a painter'. He felt

himself to be more intelligent, more intellectual than his fellow 'retinal' or 'physical' artists, as he called them, and he preferred the company of the literary minded and the academic. Questioned about the people he admired, he said, 'I am always astonished by people who can talk about things I know nothing about, and do it well. This isn't the case with artists in general, who are limited' (in Cabanne, 1971, 95).

He looked down on most of his fellow painters whose critical capacities seemed only to extend to being either for or against Cezanne, and he rejected their 'cafe and studio platitudes' (Sweeney, 1946, 20). But he was not able to compete at first with the wit, knowledge and experience of those whose company he sought. Of the literary set he said, 'When you met two authors, you couldn't get a word in edgewise. It was a series of fireworks, jokes, lies, all untoppable because it was in such a style that you were incapable of speaking their language, so you kept quiet' (in Cabanne, 1971, 24). When it came to academic matters, such as the fashionable preoccupation with the fourth dimension, to which Duchamp was introduced by a teacher of mathematics, he had to admit it was 'a thing you talked about without knowing what it meant' (ibid.).

Duchamp must have been very self-possessed as a young man, and somewhat dilettantish. He was certainly not renowned for serious reading or academic study, and it is quite likely that his admiration of the intellectual skills and knowledge of others was tinged with more than a little resentment. It is understandable, therefore, that he 'refused to accept anything, doubted everything' (Tomkins, 1965, 21) and that he set out 'to find something that had not existed before' (ibid.); in many respects it was again the easiest choice to make; rather than making an effort to understand those whose knowledge he admired, Duchamp set out to create his own body of knowledge, his own world, no less, which he intended to be as baffling to the rational mind as the academic world was to him. It must have been gratifying in later life, therefore, to have it said, in connection with his Large Glass, that he 'invented a new physics to explain its laws, a new mathematics to fix the units of measurement of the new physics, and a condensed, poetic language to formulate its ideas' (ibid., 28).

Thus it came about that Duchamp 'moved his work through the retinal boundaries which had been established with Impressionism into a field

where language, thought and vision act upon one another' (Johns, 1968). At first this meant little more than a return to literary subject-matter treated in a Cubist or proto-Futurist manner. Duchamp felt that 'it was much better to be influenced by a writer than by another painter' (Sweeney, 1946), and his main influences at that time included Laforgue, Roussel, Brisset, Lautréamont, and Mallarmé. Laforgue and Roussel had a particularly strong influence. He tells how he was especially interested in the humour of Laforgue's prose poems in Moralités Legendaires, from which he did about ten illustrations. These included a Nude Ascending a Staircase, from the poem 'Encore à Cet Astre' which, Duchamp says, gave him the idea for his first important paintings of 1911-12: Nude Descending a Staircase 1 and 2 (he found the idea of 'descending' more pictorial and majestic than 'ascending').

Duchamp's major work, the Large Glass, also had literary origins: 'It was fundamentally Roussel who was responsible for my Glass', he said, 'From his Impressions d'Afrique I got the general approach. This play of his helped me greatly on one side of my expression' (Sweeney, 1946). In particular he was struck by 'the madness of the unexpected' in the play (Cabanne, 1971, 33), and he saw in the way Roussel challenged language a correspondence with his own challenge to painting.

With the Large Glass Duchamp's work moved into a new and original phase. It was not just an object to be looked at, but 'a wedding of mental and visual elements' in which 'the ideas ... are more important than the actual visual realisation' (Tomkins, 1965, 56). The ideas were developed in working notes from 1911 until 1923 when Duchamp left the work 'definitively uncompleted'. So important were they to him that he gathered them together and published them in perfect facsimile in 1934, in a copy of the original green cardboard box in which he kept them. The publication became known as the Green Box and thereafter Duchamp insisted that the Glass should 'not be looked at in the aesthetic sense of the word. One must consult the (Green Box) and see the two together' (Cabanne, 1971, 43).

The notes for the Large Glass had two main functions corresponding to the production and the consumption of the work. They were instrumental in the conception and the organisation of the work at every stage, and they were intended to effect the viewer's experience and comprehension of the work.

This is not to say that they were meant to explain the work to the viewer by revealing the thinking that went into it or by giving him an insight into its intended meaning; far from it. Duchamp presented the notes jumbled up, in no special order, implying that their purpose was not to clarify but to act as pieces in a complex intellectual game. The game is not a puzzle, however; there is no correct answer which Duchamp invites us to seek: 'There is no solution', he said, 'because there is no problem' (in Tomkins, 1965, 58), and this means that it is up to the spectator to make of it what he can.

Duchamp was particularly concerned with the relation between the viewer and the viewed. He believed that it is the spectator who creates the image (see d'Harnoncourt and Hopps, 1969, 23), and he became 'the first to paint the image per se, to be completed by an act in consciousness on the part of the spectator' (Dreier and Echaurren, 1944). In this sense he initiated the idea of art as a dialogue between the artist and his audience, which was to be explored by Dada and Surrealism, and developed in Happenings, Performance Art and, more recently, Street Art.

Language was central in Duchamp's scheme of things. He recognised that the visual is always construed within a meaning context which is created, sustained, altered and even destroyed predominantly by means of words. He was intrigued by the effects he could achieve by manipulating the verbal frame within which objects are viewed and he particularly enjoyed using words to contradict the viewer's expectations and to mystify otherwise familiar situations. The notes for the Large Glass acted as a kind of seed-bed for ideas which found expression in a variety of ways; for example, in his 'ready-mades' and in the pun-based world of 'Rose Selavy'. His 'corrected ready-mades' in particular demonstrate his interest in the play between the visual and the verbal. These include the advertisement for Sapolin Enamel which he 'corrected' in 1916 or 17 to read: 'Apolinère Enameled', and the reproduction of the Mona Lisa to which he added a moustache and beard and the title: 'L.H.O.O.Q.'.

In a similar vein, but not a ready-made as such, is the model of a french window which Duchamp made in 1920 and which he called Fresh Widow Copy-right Rose Selavy. The pun in Fresh Widow is obvious, but the name Rose Selavy needs explaining. In his catalogue entry for this item Hamilton says:

Duchamp clearly regarded the ready-mades as another art, divorced from his main artistic production. As an extension of the ready-made idea it was logical to create a new personality, as different from his own as possible, to whom the ready-mades could be attributed. He looked for a name and at first considered a Jewish pseudonym; then came the real break-through - the extreme from himself would be a woman. The name Rose was chosen for its banal simplicity ... Selavy is a typical Duchampian pun. Fresh Widow shows the first use of this pseudonym (Hamilton, 1966, 61).

The pun in Rose Selavy comes from two sources: 'Eros c'est la vie' (love is life), and 'arroser la vie' (to celebrate with a drink). Duchamp liked the double 'r' in the second source, and Rose soon became Rrose. Having invented Rrose Selavy he felt he needed to build the character into a rounded personality. As a result he published a short book of puns and word-games under the name, and a series of objects related to the character. One example, besides Fresh Widow, is his Belle Haleine bottle. This was part of a chain of activity leading to a cover for New York Dada in April, 1921, a unique issue edited by Duchamp and Man Ray:

Duchamp dressed convincingly as a woman to become his alter ego for a group of photographs by Man Ray. A label, lettered by Man Ray according to Duchamp's instructions, was surmounted by a photograph of Rrose Selavy and that collage was photographed and reduced to make a label for the bottle of Rigaud perfume ... This modified bottle was, in its turn, photographed to make a print used on the cover of New York Dada (ibid., 64).

As for the short book of puns and word-games published under the title Rrose Selavy, three characteristics stand out, according to Sanouillet and Peterson (1975): surprise, frequent complexity, and gaminess.

The surprise comes from a use of words which has nothing to do with ordinary logic. A letter disappears or is displaced and everything goes haywire, suggesting one or several new meanings. The word-play is often complex and shows Duchamp's kinship with the playwright Raymond Roussel ... Duchamp once called some of his sayings 'morceaux moisis' or 'wrotten writtens', and there is a certain amount of gaminess in many of his short sayings. The Surrealists had proclaimed in the twenties that words were no longer playing around but had started making love. This description seems to fit the sayings of Rrose Selavy and other collected puns and word games, where we find some of the most joyous and ingenious couplings and uncouplings in modern literature (loc. cit., vi-vii).

1.332 The Influence of Duchamp

Pincus-Witten (1973) has outlined some of the important consequences of Duchamp's use of language and his linguistic devices. In particular he traces the origin of Pop Art to the title Duchamp gave to one of the objects belonging to Etant Donnés, the work he left unfinished when he died in 1966. Significant to the development of this work are three, small, erotic objects called the 'Objet-Dard', the 'Female Figleaf', and the 'Wedge of Chastity'. These date from 1951 and they correspond, respectively, to masculinity, femininity, and the androgenous. Pincus-Witten argues that the 'Objet-Dard' (a pun which bridges the notions of 'art-object' and 'dart-object' - 'dard' meaning 'dart' in French) caught the imagination of Jasper Johns when he became familiar with Duchamp, and with Etant Donnés in 1955. Duchamp acknowledged the phallic implications of the conundrum, but Johns picked up other implications; he took the pun literally and asked what is the 'object' of a 'dart'? The answer, of course, is a 'target', and this became a central theme in Johns' painting from that moment. Thus, says Pincus-Witten, 'from the implicitly ironical attitude toward the pun and language in Duchamp's work, Johns made an imaginative leap which further transposed these implications into an oblique, conceptually multivalent iconography wholly different in type from the character of much American abstraction between 1950 and 1955' (Pincus-Witten, 1973, 163).

Johns was not the only artist to come under the influence of Duchamp's word-play, according to Pincus-Witten (loc. cit.). In the Bay area of California Fred Martin, Jeremy Anderson, and William Wiley, in particular absorbed his ideas, and through them Bruce Nauman was introduced to the pun as a creative device. Particularly significant among his works is his Wedge-Piece (1968) which recalls Duchamp's 'Wedge of Chastity' in the Etant Donnés. Nauman has produced other works on a similar theme, and one in particular incorporates some quite obviously Duchampian word-play. Nauman 'found two red wedges and inscribed the English word "like" on them ... "Like" has the same number of letters and incorporates the same letters, but in a different sequence, as the German word for wedge, "kiel". On the basis of this "likeness" Nauman formulated the palindromic relationship between the words and the shapes of the wedges' (ibid.).

Pincus-Witten traces Duchamp's 'circumlocutory process stemming from literary concepts' (ibid.) through Minimal Art in the work of Robert Morris and Donald Judd, with their wedge forms, ramps, and architectural elements, to what he calls 'recent elaborations of this art manifested ... in the rise of theatricality'. Here he cites the work of the so-called 'body artist', Vito Acconci, and in particular his performance entitled Seedbed (1970-72). The wedge comes in to this again. Acconci isolates himself beneath an enclosed (wedge-shaped) ramp and proceeds to masturbate, the sounds being picked up by a microphone and transmitted through speakers. Seedbed takes as its metaphor the one Duchamp attributed to the Large Glass. The sub-title for the Glass is 'an agricultural machine', and in the sense that Acconci casts his seed on the ground, Seedbed is also such a machine.

The connections between the implications of this performance and Duchamp's personal mythology do not end there. The Glass records a series of physical changes effected through the actions of complex mechanomorphic machinery. Pincus-Witten reminds us that, 'in arcane lore, the person capable of enforcing the change of physical matter from one state to another is the alchemist or the androgyne ... He/she corresponds to a notion of God, that is, a coincidence of opposites. Throughout highly disparate cultures, such a person is often assigned the role of Sharman or seer ... like Tiresias of Greek tragedy, or the Seller of Salt, the Salt Merchant of Kabbalism and alchemy' (ibid., 167). He goes on, 'the "Salt" of the salt merchant may well be symbolised by the philosopher's stone of the alchemist - the esoteric catalyst without which such changes in matter cannot be made. The arcane knowledge ... needed to effect this change - say, for example, the secret name of God - and the actual enactment of these changes constituted for the alchemist, the Kabbalist, or the magus, "le grand oeuvre", the great work of magic. Duchamp's Glass, as completed by Étant Donnés is his great work of magic and his life work as well' (ibid.).

This comparison between Duchamp's work and the 'great work' of the alchemist is not a new one. It was first suggested by Sanouillet in his book Marchand du Sel (1959). Neither is it as far-fetched as it might first appear because there is in Duchamp's esotericism a strong hint that he favoured the comparison even if he did not actively pursue it. Not only this, but it could not have escaped such a master of the

word-game that the French for salt merchant, 'Le Marchand du Sel', is a transpositional pun on the four syllables of his own name. It could be said, too, that in creating the character of Rose Selavy he was confirming his view of himself as the androgynous magus, the Seller of Salt.

But even if Duchamp had never consciously intended this, or if he had never recognised the pun on his own name, it is typically Duchampian, and the idea had been in the air, so to speak, since Sanouillet's book was published. Whether it was Duchamp's own or Sanouillet's creation it may be said to have emanated from Duchamp, and it influenced Acconci's Seedbed performance and, indeed, some of his earlier ones. For in these performances Acconci projected the notion of the androgyne, the artist as alchemist, which Duchamp had inspired with his mythical alter-ego, Rose Selavy.

One last word on this: the full title of the Large Glass is The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even. In its original French form it reads, La Mariée Mise à Nu par les Celibataires, Meme. This, Pincus-Witten claims, conceals the final proof that Duchamp wished to project himself as the mythical personage of the androgyne in his work. The first three letters of the french word for 'bride' (Mar) and the first three letters of the french word for 'bachelors' (cel) comprise the letters of Duchamp's christian name. Hardly accidental, one must admit, and indicative that Duchamp saw himself as both Bride and Bachelor in his master work. Such an insight, according to Pincus-Witten, 'allows one to recognise something of the mythical core in, say, Accanci's work as well as to understand why Nauman may have used his name as a 'ready-made': My Name As If It Were Bounced Off the Surface of The Moon, or My Name Enlarged Vertically 14 Times.

1.333 Book Art

Duchamp's influence manifests itself also in ways which are less direct than those revealed by Pincus-Witten. In particular his decision to publish the contents of the Green Box has been responsible in no small part, for a fairly recent development called 'Book Art'. Book Art, or 'book work', has been described as 'a genre of mass-produced original art conceived for the book form (Linker, 1980), and it is hailed by some as

an alternative means of distribution of art to that of the gallery system with its limited space, limited audience and implications of exclusiveness, uniqueness and monetary value. But there is another more specifically Duchampian aspect which is demonstrated most clearly in the book work of the South London artist, David Barton (see Barton, 1977; 1979a; 1979b; and Ehrenzweig, 1967, 151).

In his work Barton openly acknowledges and exploits something which is implicitly true, probably, of the work of most artists; that is, individual works of art, even those which are commissioned, are not isolated events, they are linked by the artists' continuous involvement with ideas, media and techniques. Barton like Duchamp, chose to shift the emphasis in his work from the occasional 'finished piece' to the process of thought and experimentation out of which such pieces emerge:

I began to keep a record of my search for ideas in 1964 ... Originally these notes were a testing ground for theses which were later carried out in large paintings and three dimensional constructions. Very quickly, however, this initial process of wrestling with the content of my work in words, drawings and watercolour paintings began to demand all my time ... I became certain ... that a complete involvement in, and investigation of, my working process over an indefinite period of time would be the most thorough way of clarifying my imagery; each new growth being related to, dependent on, and justified by the family tree from which it continually springs (Barton, 1977).

The combination of words and visual imagery in Barton's books is not unlike Hamilton's (1960) typographical version of Duchamp's Green Box in appearance. But, as he himself indicates, it differs from Duchamp's work inasmuch as the intention is not to intrigue or to mystify but to clarify. When he exhibited one of his original notebooks in the 'Young Contemporaries' at the Tate in the early seventies, a visitor left a note inside thanking him for the insight into his creative process. This is not to say that the verbal passages in Barton's books merely annotate the developing visual imagery. The words are not added after the event, they are an integral part of the development. The words and the drawings act and react upon each other dialectically and the books reveal this process as it unfolds. The usual methods of exhibiting visual art deny the active part played by the word in the development of visual ideas, and they imply that the visual may speak for itself. In the book work of artists such as Barton, who adopt Duchamp's view that the process is at least as important as the product, the role of the word is openly recognised.

1.4 Post-script

In this chapter I have tried to show that, in spite of the modern prejudice against the literary in visual art, the word has continued to play an important part in the work of the artist. On the surface artists have continued to derive inspiration from literature, and they have openly used the word as part of their method of creation or, indeed, in the visual product itself. Less obvious are the ways in which the artist's language, most readily examined in his private, professional and public writings, effects his visual output and I have attempted to reveal some of these in the work of Paul Klee.

I shall close the chapter with a point which emerges from the supposed explanatory role of the artist's language. There is no denying that artists do set out very often to explain their work or to explain art in general. But, I would argue, such explanations should not be taken at their face-value. This is not to suggest, as does Ducasse (1929,2), that the artist's business is to practice art and not to talk about it' (although he may have a point when he says that the study of aesthetics properly belongs to the philosopher). But an adequate explanation of art, whether it be in an historical, or a critical, or a psychological, or a sociological perspective, is beyond the ability of the artist himself. His involvement in art is too great; his words are as much an artefact as his drawings, paintings or whatever. The art and the language of the artist are two sides of the same coin; they are both determined by the same cultural, social, material and ideological conditions and they are conditional upon each other. This being so the artist's language cannot be sufficiently distanced from his visual work to explain it adequately or objectively.

In making this point I am not implying, with Ducasse (ibid.) that artists should not expound upon art and that we should take no notice of them if they do. On the contrary, as Gauss says, we do not look to the words of the artist for illumination, but as 'materials for philosophic study' (Gauss, 1949, 6). That is, wherever the material is available, the art and the language of the artist should be taken together as source material for a fuller and more profound explanation of his work. Such an explanation, I would add, must rest upon an understanding or explication of the functional relations between the words and the visual work of the artist as they interact and unfold dialectically.

CHAPTER 2

ART CRITICISM

The artist speaks; the critic interprets. The trouble is that no one is quite certain that the critic has not previously given instructions as to what is to be said (Lucie-Smith, 1968, 154).

2.1 Introduction

The literature on art criticism may be divided roughly into two categories. The first contains literature which is prescriptive in the sense that it attempts to lay down the ground rules of criticism as a discipline, and to distinguish the function of criticism from that of art history and aesthetics. Literature in the second category reflects upon criticism as it is practised. In the present context the most important distinction between the two categories is that the prescriptive literature concerns itself mainly with the effects of criticism on the consumption of art, while the reflective literature recognises that critics, as active and interested members of the artistic community, also exert an influence upon what is produced in the name of art.

2.2 The Prescriptive Literature on Art Criticism

2.21 Ducasse

Ducasse (1929) suggests that art criticism might properly be seen as 'applied philosophy of art' were it fully and 'explicitly aware of the meaning of the assertions it makes'. But the people who are commonly referred to as art critics, in the vast majority of instances, may be described simply as persons who criticise works of art in public:

They do this, for the most part owing to the possession not of greater capacities, but of fewer inhibitions than the man of average ignorance. Their equipment in the main consists of what

the French call a well-hung tongue, or pen; and the very ease and abundance of their adjectives hide the fact that what they say is neither important nor authoritative (Ducasse, 1929, 6).

But, given this ignorance, or partial ignorance of the meaning of his assertions, according to Ducasse, there is a legitimate function which the critic, if properly equipped, can discharge. This is a function analogous to that of the professional guide:

If the critic possesses an extensive and intimate acquaintance with works of art, and his faculties, through much observation and comparison, have become sensitive to facts and differences which would pass unnoticed by others, he may then similarly be able to take the plain 'consumer' of art upon a personally conducted tour of a given canvas or symphony, and call his attention to features which he might otherwise overlook, or which it might take him much time to discover for himself (ibid.).

Thus, as far as Ducasse is concerned, the language of the critic should concern itself mainly with describing, analysing, and interpreting works of art, but it should not attempt to evaluate art, at least not in aesthetic terms. This is something that the consumer must do for himself in the light of what he gains from the critic:

The critic's judgement of it represents neither more nor less than the judgement of anyone else; namely, it represents his own preferences only, and is in no sense to be regarded as 'authoritative' or binding on anyone else ... The critic, however well and abundantly trained he may be, must ... not for a moment be thought of as an authority on matters of aesthetic worth (ibid., 8).

2.22 Venturi

Venturi (1936) agrees with Ducasse that criticism without an explicit theory cannot be authoritative on matters of aesthetics, but he is wary of sharp distinctions between the work of the philosopher, the critic, and the historian. In particular he argues against the view that, 'the history of art should present works of art - all the works of art - without judging them, without commenting upon them, with the richest possible documentation of the facts. Art criticism should judge works of art in conformity with the aesthetic feeling of the critic. Aesthetics should formulate the definition of art in its universal meaning' (Venturi, 1936, 9). Such distinctions, according to Venturi, empty the

three of all sense. For art history needs a theory which will allow it to distinguish whether a picture or statue is a work of art or a rational, economical or moral fact. Similarly, if the critic is to obey only his own feeling, without theory, he cannot compare his aesthetic feeling with that of the layman. As for aesthetics, if it were to ignore all the concrete artistic creations, it would be nothing but an intellectual game, not a science and not a philosophy.

Venturi is particularly concerned with the relation between criticism and history, and takes the aesthetic rather for granted. His view is that criticism and history are two sides of the same coin; that critical judgement is dependent upon historical fact for its authority:

If a fact referred to is not considered as a function of judgement, it is perfectly useless; if a judgement does not rest upon a knowledge of the historical facts, it is completely false (loc. cit. 20).

Thus, for Venturi, criticism is an integral part of the historical method:

Criticism is our only means of understanding a work of art as art. And because the history of art aims at the understanding of a work of art as art, the final step in the history of art must be and is art criticism (ibid.).

2.23 Osborne

Osborne (1955), too, feels that it is the purpose of criticism to understand a work of art as art. But he goes further and suggests that it is the job of the critic to discriminate 'genuine works of art within the class of all putatively artistic artifacts' (loc. cit., 291), and to exhibit 'a true order of merit among them in respect of those qualities of excellence which they possess specifically as works of art' (ibid.). Insofar as criticism describes works of art, according to Osborne, it does so in a special way, 'calling attention in its descriptions not to any and every characteristic which they possess, but signalling those characteristics in virtue of which they are judged to be excellent or indifferent works of art' (ibid.).

Whereas Ducasse claims that the critic has no authority to evaluate works of art, because he does not grasp explicitly the theories which

he employs, it is enough for Osborne that such theories are implicit in the language of the critic. All that concerns Osborne is that one should distinguish between real and pseudo criticism according to the criteria used by each. Real criticism, he says, uses 'intrinsic' criteria and 'assesses or describes works of art in respect of the qualities in virtue of which they are good or bad works of art' (ibid., 302).

Examples of such criteria would be the veracity with which the work of art represents an object or objects other than itself, or the exactness with which the work of art communicates ideas or feeling. Pseudo criticism, according to Osborne, professes to 'clarify and assess works of art in accordance with criteria which cannot ... be thought to be specific to works of art and whose acceptance is logically incompatible with any classification of artefacts into art and non-art' (ibid., 294). This kind of criticism he associates with the psychological, biographical, historical and sociological approaches to art which consider the 'ulterior functions which a work of art may be induced to fulfil' and which must, therefore, 'be held separate from the assessment of its excellence as a work of art' (ibid., 313):

The ulterior purposes of an artist may be recorded by him, and the critic may decide how far he has fulfilled them. But these are the adscititious utility values of the work of art, which are not integral to its excellence (ibid., 307).

Osborne reasons that anyone who claims that knowledge of the artist's psychology is useful to criticism would have to admit that critical assessment of the excellence of anonymous works is less effective, more tentative, than critical assessment of works of which the author is known; and that when a great deal is known independently about the artist's psychology, assessment of his work must be more effective. No one would freely admit these things, according to Osborne, and so psychological criticism should not be seen as 'real' criticism.

Similarly, he says, one should relegate historical or sociological criticism to the realm of pseudo criticism:

It is entirely certain that if knowledge of the psychology of the artist is not able to offer guidance to the critic in assessing the artistic merits of what he has produced, knowledge of more remote causes which supposedly made the artist what he was will be unable to offer guidance to criticism either ... The same general causes determine the good and the bad art of any age and no difference of

historical or sociological causation has ever been adduced between works of art which are good and works of art which are bad (ibid.).

It would seem, then, that Osborne disagrees not only with Ducasse over the question of whether or not the critic should be explicitly aware of his theoretical premises, but also with Venturi's view that criticism and history are two sides of the same coin. He does admit, however, that the various criteria of real criticism depend for their ascendancy upon 'continual swings of fashion or alterations in sensibility from one generation to another' (ibid., 291), but it is Osborne's real aim to distinguish criticism as a discipline from the disciplines of history or philosophy - to give the critic his own slice of the cake. In order to do this he makes the object of criticism a rather elusive, yet apparently constant quality in the appreciation of the true work of art; that is, a 'heightening of awareness which derives from intense synoptic perception of its organic unity' (ibid., 313).

Such an object brings with it particular difficulties in relation to critical language because, as Osborne says, 'works of art cannot be described or explained. They must be perceived' (ibid., 320). In other words, the specific concern of criticism - the 'organic unity' of the particular work of art - which is supposed to be independent of biographical and cultural considerations, is beyond the scope of the basic tool of criticism (i.e. verbal discussion), and the most the critic can hope to do in words, according to Osborne, is 'to offer hints and directions for focusing the attention in the very difficult art of exercising and cultivating the skill to perceive' (ibid.).

2.24 Stolnitz

Stolnitz (1960) is another who recognises the inability of words to re-create the experience of a work of art but, in this, he finds the critic's work no different from that of the historian or the philosopher. However, he does agree with Osborne that the critic differs from the philosopher inasmuch as he 'busies himself with particular works of art ... trying to analyse and explain it and to decide whether it is of value and to what extent. Hence the abstract questions of aesthetics are of no interest to him' (loc. cit., 10-11).

To the extent that Stolnitz sees the critic's task as one of evaluating

particular works of art, he is again in agreement with Osborne, but he also feels, with Ducasse, that 'the critic's judgement is of little significance ... unless we know his reasons for making it ... He must make explicit the criteria or yardsticks of value in the light of which he arrived at his judgement. If he fails to do so, his criticism is helplessly vague and we literally do not know what he is talking about' (ibid.). So, according to Stolnitz, the critic, 'like everyone else concerned with art ... must examine the underlying beliefs which govern his approach to art' (ibid.).

2.25 Reid

Reid (1969) is one who distinguishes between the work of the critic and that of the philosopher, and he addresses himself to the problem of how critical language relates to artistic experience.

The language of criticism, and the language of aesthetics, although both have to employ general words and ideas, are different yet complementary. The critic works within general aesthetic categories but most of his emphasis is upon a skilful fusing of many kinds of concepts, images and metaphors in a way which is relevant to the particular work and which draws us into seeing it with greater aesthetic penetration. The aesthetician goes back, through criticism to attempted universalisation or generalisation (loc. cit., 35-36).

For Reid, again, the critic is concerned with the particular work of art while the philosopher is concerned with art in general, and whereas the philosopher proceeds according to reasoned argument, the critic's language is necessarily 'vague', 'metaphorical', 'evocative' or 'figurative'. If the critic can be said to make an argument, he does not do so in the usual sense. His case does not rest on the logic of his argument but on the relation between his language and the work to which it refers. In other words, he talks skilfully around the experience in different ways in an attempt to focus attention on the experience of which he cannot speak directly.

2.26 Discussion

I am not particularly concerned here with the differences between these writers, which revolve mainly around the relations between art criticism, art history and aesthetics; the writers have certain essential things in

common which are of more interest in the present context. In particular they all take for granted a class of objects which are by nature or by agreement 'works of art', and which induce in the viewer an 'artistic experience'. They infer from this that it is the role of the critic, with his specialised use of language, to mediate between the viewer and the viewed to effect or enhance artistic experience. In other words, art criticism takes place after the fact; it is concerned only with artistic consumption and not with production in any way. While they may disagree over the extent to which the work of art and the artistic experience may be affected by the material, intellectual and social conditions which surround them, none of the writers would accept that a work of art may be explained or represented by the conditions of its production. And they agree that, ultimately, the critic must labour under the handicap of trying to represent an essentially 'visual' and emotional experience in words by which he can at best be expected only to suggest or to evoke the experience to which he alludes.

My own view on this, and one which derives from social phenomenology, is that the notion of 'art as art' which pervades the work of writers in this category is fundamentally misconceived; it is a mistake to suppose that there can be a form of experience as distinct from general experience (with its considerable dependence on verbal knowledge) as this notion suggests. It is impossible to perceive an object as a work of art, and to have an artistic experience thereby, without having already formed a concept of 'art'; and such concepts are socially and culturally received mainly by means of words. Works of art, and the experiences they afford, are thus necessarily social products, and the possibility of 'artistic' experience is dependent upon the application of appropriate, verbally received attitudes and criteria. There is, therefore, an essential and necessary verbal element built in to any actual example of 'visual' art, which enables the viewer to make sense of it as a work of art. Thus, the critic, if he is mainly concerned with mediating between the viewer and the viewed as these writers seem to think, is not simply in the business of translating or transposing a purely visual experience into a verbal one, but of acting upon the verbal component which is necessarily part of the experience of 'visual' art, to influence the ways in which the viewer may attend to it.

To differentiate too sharply between the visual and the verbal in experience leads to mystification and contradiction, with the result that Stolnitz, for example, can contradict himself on consecutive pages without realising it: on one page he can warn that 'the great danger to avoid is that of confusing the experience of direct appreciation with reflective knowledge about art ... To approach art with such an intellectual interest is not the way to appreciate it' (Stolnitz, 1960, 15); then, on the next page, he can say that 'our beliefs about art and what makes it valuable determine how we approach works of art and what we try to get out of them' (ibid., 16). Surely our 'beliefs about art' are the same as our 'reflective knowledge' about it, yet Stolnitz warns us against the latter and then points to the essential part played by belief in the appreciation of art. The idea, often doggedly pursued by writers such as those discussed above, that artistic experience is an immediate or direct affair is simply untenable - it is a logical impossibility - and, as in the case of Stolnitz, these writers must inevitably contradict themselves when they move on to address themselves to the necessary mediating factors implicit in artistic experience; that is, the socially and verbally received values, attitudes, ideas and beliefs which characterise it.

2.3 The Reflective Literature on Art Criticism

By and large the reflective literature comes from practising art critics with more than an academic interest in the subject. Unlike the prescriptive literature which seeks to define and confine the work of the critic, it reports on the various ways in which the critic as an active and interested member of the artistic community (Bannard, 1975, says, 'My feeling when I do criticise is that I am writing for a community') involves himself in its affairs. Beke (1979), for example, provides us with the following list of guises adopted by the critic in actual practice:

In the course of my one decade spent in art criticism, I have met the following functions (or roles?) of criticism: the critic as art historian (a scholar, a spectator from without, judging new phenomena by an absolute measure of the great achievements of the past); the critic as a judge (passing judgements in juries, and elsewhere, mostly in the name of 'quality'); the critic as politician or an ideologist (determining the fate of art works, or trying to control their making, from the point of view of a given ideol-

ogy); as an aesthetician (an outsider, inserting works of art into his own system of ideas); as a journalist (informing the public about events; he must write something day after day, week after week); as parasite (using art works for building his own financial or spiritual career); as an art collector (writing appraisals in the hope of receiving art works in return); as a non-expert connoisseur (representing the 'man in the street'); as a manager (either as an active artist himself, knowing all the 'tricks of the trade', or as a person who regards thinking about art as a genuine work of art).

This list, compiled by a practising art critic, shows that in reality the critic may be active in all areas of the art scene. It shows that he does not in fact restrict himself to responding to particular works or to particular exhibitions. Lucie-Smith bears this out when he says that, as art critic for The Times, his brief 'was to think about and around the visual arts; sometimes choosing a current exhibition as (his) starting point, and sometimes not' (Lucie-Smith, 1968, 9). The list also shows that the critic may exert an influence not only on the way art is consumed, but also on the conception and production of art. We need only look to Apollinaire, one of the most famous of art critics, to see that this is so:

It is true that Apollinaire's great hope during these years (1910-1914) was to lead the battle of the entire avant-garde under a single flag, and his acrobatics with the terms Cubism, Orphism, Dramatism, Futurism, and New Spirit represent successive efforts, by extending the limits of each definition, to make it the new catchcall (Breunig, 1970, xxiv).

Again, Beke's list shows that the critic may also serve as an agent not only for ideological forces within the artistic community, but also for economic and political forces. On this issue Krauss (1975) says of her profession:

Unfortunately I think it's about power and influence ... What it means is that certain commissions will go to certain people, because certain people have influence.

And Rosenberg (1975) concurs:

In art today, sales-promotion strategies developed by galleries or artists' agents involve retaining critics to write articles and books about the artist. Assuming that the critic is completely honest, and that he will not write in favour of an artist unless he really admires him, the fact remains that the use made of his writing is not to create a better understanding of the artist but to stimulate his market.

Having established that the critic may be actively involved in a variety of ways in the life of the artistic community, besides mediating between completed works of art and the public, let us now consider in some depth the ways in which he may influence the production of art.

2.31 The Painted Word

Wolfe (1976) reveals the role of the critic in artistic production, mainly in relation to American art in the mid-Twentieth Century, in a splendidly irreverent piece which he was prompted to write by an article in the New York Times by its art critic, Hilton Kramer, who wrote:

Given the nature of our intellectual commerce with works of art, to lack a persuasive theory is to lack something crucial - the means by which our experience of individual works is joined to our understanding of the values they signify (loc. cit., 4).

Wolfe claims that Kramer's remark shows that, in spite of everything that has been written by critics, and even artists such as Braque and Stella, to the effect that in Modern Art 'seeing is believing', Modern Art has become completely literary; 'the paintings and other works exist to illustrate the text' (ibid., 6). In the light of this revelation Wolfe proceeds to trace the development of 'the painted word' since the French Revolution.

After the Revolution, he says, artists began to leave the salons of the wealthy bourgeoisie to form fraternities of like-minded souls, gathering at a cafe or around some romantic figure, an artist, such as Hugo, Gautier, or Manet. These cenacles were mediated by a common aim: to shock the Middle Class. By 1900 the conventional view of the modern artist had emerged, as a poor but free and classless spirit - a bohemian.

This left the artist in an ambiguous position. On the one hand he was supposed to reject bourgeois values, while on the other he needed the patronage of the bourgeoisie. He had to catch the eye of the Middle Class patron with ever new and titillating work, while appearing to be sincere and disinterested, working detached in his garret. The patron too found himself in an ambiguous position: by associating himself with the artist (by supporting him) he could appear to dissociate himself from bourgeois values while, in effect, consolidating his position as one of the fashionable set within the bourgeoisie. By the 1920's

Modern Art had achieved social chic in Paris, London, Berlin and New York. From then on art and fashion became a two-backed beast.

By the 1960's a system had fully developed whereby talent scouts from the art establishment invaded bohemia annually to select the most exciting and original work. The public, as such, played no part in the process. It was a community of some ten thousand artists, critics, gallery owners, dealers, and collectors, scattered among the major cities, which decided which styles and which artists were to be successful.

According to Wolfe it was to be expected that the demands of fashion should put a heavy burden on theory:

A hundred years before, art theory had merely been something that enriched one's conversation in matters of culture. (By 1960) it was an absolute necessity ... To get the word was to understand ... Even an explanation of why one couldn't accept something, including Dada, was explanation enough to accept it (ibid., 37-38).

What effect did all this theory have on the work itself? Wolfe says that if we bear in mind, a) that the world of art is a small community, b) that part of this community, the 'culturati', always looks to bohemia for novelty, and is primed to accept it, and c) that bohemia is made up of cenacles, we can see that should one cenacle come to dominate bohemia, its views might well dominate the whole community. And this, according to Wolfe, is precisely what happened in New York after the Second World War. At this time New York replaced Paris as the centre of the art world, and at the same time the various New York circles came together to form the New York or Tenth Street School which created Abstract Expressionism.

The great theorists to come out of this 'cenacle des cenacles' were Greenberg and Rosenberg. Both had been friends of various abstract artists during the Depression. Greenberg had been a regular in the most influential circle in New York during that period, which centred around Hoffman, and it was essentially Hoffman's ideas and emphasis on 'purity' that dominated the New York School. The secret of the success of Greenberg and Rosenberg was, then, that they spoke the language of bohemia.

Most of the theory up to 1950 was Greenbergian in origin, according to

Wolfe. He saw the specific destination in the quest for purity as 'flatness', and as a result of his mediation the question of what an artist could or could not do without violating 'the integrity of the picture-plane' became obsessive. During the Fifties Rosenberg came up with a higher synthesis which combined Greenberg's formal purity with the element of emotion which had been missing since the early days of Synthetic Cubism. As a result, Action Painting became the single most famous phrase of the period.

It is important to clarify here that Wolfe is not suggesting that Greenberg and Rosenberg created their theories in a vacuum; they derived them mainly from particular artist friends such as de Kooning and Pollock. Neither is he suggesting that these critic/aestheticians created the reputations of the artists they supported. This was done by the patrons; for example, Pollock was promoted by Peggy Guggenheim who was at the centre of the most chic, Uptown art circle in New York in the 1940's. Wolfe is saying, however, that a critic such as Greenberg did much more for an artist than to discover him and support him: in the case of Pollock, for example, he used his certified success to put over 'flatness' as the theory of the entire new wave of the New York School. As a result, other artists picked up his theories by reading them in the journals or through conversation. Morris Louis, for example, visited Greenberg, was 'converted', and went back to start what was to become the Washington School.

By 1949 Pollock and Abstract Expressionism had reached Life, Time, and Newsweek, but even so, they never really caught on with more than a hundred or so people who were directly involved as makers, critics, or patrons, with the Tenth Street scene. The reason for this was that without the word, without knowing about 'flatness' and its associated theorems, it was almost impossible to appreciate. So Abstract Expressionism was quickly supplanted by a yet higher synthesis incorporating an element of realism to make it universally acceptable while remaining true to the ideal of 'flatness'. This new synthesis - Pop Art - originated in the cenacle of the succeeding generation which included artists such as Rauschenberg and Johns.

The critic Steinberg supplied the theory for this cenacle. He maintained that, compared with a painting by Johns, Abstract Expressionism contained as much aerial illusion as anything which had come before.

But whereas you could, metaphorically speaking, walk into, say, a Rembrandt, you would need a space-craft to penetrate the atmospheric blobs and dribbles of a de Kooning. Thus, according to Steinberg, Pop was a comment on Abstract Expressionism just as the latter had been a comment on early modernism which was, in turn, a comment on academic realism. And this discovery prompted him to formulate one of the great maxims of the period: 'whatever else it may be, all great art is about art'.

Next came Minimal Art; this was part of a comeback which abstract art began to make even while Pop Art was still going strong. This time around theory was more dominant than ever. First there was Op Art or, as the artists preferred to call it, Perceptual Abstraction. It was enjoyed for literary reasons, basically, the argument going as follows:

Cubism freed art from the Nineteenth Century view of a painting as a window through which you saw an illusion of the real world. Earlier abstract work, such as De Stijl or Abstract Expressionism, had advanced this good work by establishing the painting as ... an independent object as real as a chair or table ... We Perceptual Abstractionists complete the process by turning this art object into a piece of pure perception. By creating special optical effects (but on a flat surface!) we remove it from the outside world and take it into that terra incognita ... between the cornea and the brain (ibid., 95).

During the Sixties, Wolfe continues, the theory which had begun with Greenberg's demands for purity, flatness, and the obliteration of distinctions between figure and field, gathered momentum and moved in the direction of reductionism; real art was becoming nothing but what happens in your brain. One after another the traditional elements of painting were removed by the process of reduction. Hard Edge and Colour Field Abstract did away firstly with brush-strokes and then with colour used in any way that might give rise to sentimental associations. Then Stella removed the frame of the painting by introducing shaped canvases. Next, artists began painting directly on gallery walls, thus dispensing with the idea of hanging pictures. Then walls came in for the treatment when artists began dividing up the entire gallery into spaces by installing huge geometric sculptures, and then the gallery itself was dispensed with when someone came up with the idea of Earth Art. Finally, by the late Sixties, Conceptual Art objected to the very idea of a permanent work of art, or even a visible one. Conceptual Art divided into two

sorts: things you could see temporarily and things you couldn't see at all. Either way, the only permanent record was a photographic and verbal account. With Conceptual Art, Modern Art had fulfilled its destiny: it had become nothing less than literature, pure and simple.

Following this disappearing act, the Seventies witnessed an apparent return to pre-Modern realism which has been received by critics in much the same way as their unenlightened predecessors received early Modernism half a century before. But according to Wolfe they needn't concern themselves; the fundamental premise of Modern Art which states that a painting cannot be seen if it doesn't have a theory remains intact. The most successful among the realists are the Photo Realists who work directly from, and sometimes over, photographs. This is not a return to bourgeois sentimentalism, they say; they are not painting real scenes but camera images. Thus, Photo Realism is related to Pop; it is concerned with photo systems. What is more, the scenes represented in their pictures are in bland, unevocative, midday sunlight, and the paint is applied evenly and flat. Theoretically, therefore, Photo Realism remains within the spirit of Modern Art.

2.32 Discussion

One or two points arise from Wolfe's thesis which, broadly stated, runs as follows: Contrary to the explicit statements of artists and critics, Modern Art has become increasingly literary. In the cases of Minimal Art and Conceptual Art this trend has culminated in works which endure often in reported form only. The development of the 'painted word' is attributable largely to a system of patronage which originated in the last century and in which artist and patron have become locked in an almost ritualistic search for novelty. Participation in this ritual, and membership of what amounts to a small and localised world of art requires a mastery of the language of the artistic community. This language may originate among the artists themselves, but it is mediated and generalised throughout the community by the most influential critics, who thus provide the theoretical conditions - the framework of possibilities - for subsequent artistic production and consumption.

It is worth taking up the point here that the verbal mediation of visual art is not peculiar to Modern Art. Before the Nineteenth

Century the interdependence of the visual and the verbal in art was generally accepted. In the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Baroque visual art was most commonly literary, anecdotal or philosophical. Artists illustrated the Bible and religious legends, the work of literary giants such as Dante, classical mythology, and Neoplatonic themes. The image and the word were inseparable in the illuminated manuscript and the Book of Hours. Painted altarpieces were scattered with verbal inscriptions, and it was not uncommon for words to be worked in to the picture as, for example, in Martini's Annunciation (1333), now in the Uffizi, which shows the angel's words passing from its lips to the Virgin. Many artists, particularly since the Renaissance, have been equally at home writing as painting or sculpting. Michelangelo, for example, was a poet; Alberti, Piero della Francesca and Leonardo wrote theoretical treatises on art; and Ghiberti and Vasari were among the first art historians.

This open recognition of the affinity between the visual and the verbal in art continued throughout the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, and for the greater part of the Nineteenth. Neoclassicism was doubly dependent on the word; not only did its painters preach on literary themes (e.g. David's The Oath of the Horatii preaches 'the State before self'), but also the tenets of Neoclassicism were laid down by writers and critics such as Winckelman, rather than by the painters themselves. It was the critic who cast the artist in the role of spokesman for the people, and it was the critic who 'forced the artist to play it' (Lucie-Smith, 1968, 155).

Romanticism too was primarily a literary movement, and Romantic painting was commonly based on literature. Delacroix, a formidable writer himself, took many of his subjects from the great writers. He even depicted some of these writers, such as Ovid, Virgil, and Dante, thereby acknowledging his debt to literature. Some of his work, and that of Gericault, preaches social and political sermons equally as literary as the visual documents of the Neoclassicists. In order to appreciate fully such paintings as Gericault's The Raft of the Medusa (1819), or Delacroix's Liberty Guiding the People (1830), both in the Louvre, one must be familiar with the stories behind them.

In England, as in France, Nineteenth Century Romanticism was openly

'verbal'. One would find it difficult to name an artist in whose work the verbal and the visual are more closely entwined than Blake, and the mid-century medieval revivalism of the Pre-Raphaelites drew heavily on literary sources. The Social Realists, too, not only in England but in France as well, produced paintings which with a literal message, a good example being Ford Maddox Brown's Work (1852-63) and the paintings of Millet or Courbet whose work was blatantly political.

By the end of the Nineteenth Century, however, there were moves to extricate the visual from the verbal in art, particularly with the advent of Impressionism and Symbolism. Monet was described by Cezanne as 'only an eye', implying that he recorded only what he saw without the intervention of verbal reasoning or motives. And Maurice Denis claimed in 1890 that it is the painted surface itself which produces the aesthetic effect, and not the literary content of the picture. (Chipp, 1968, 94 et. seq.).

Not only did artists begin to reject the word as content, at this time, but they also began to show some antagonism towards art criticism. For instance, in 1878 Whistler commented:

- The Attorney-General has said, 'There are some people who would do away with critics altogether'. I agree with him, and am of the irrationals he points at (Goldwater and Treves, 1945, 348-9).

Also, in 1904 Cezanne said, 'Do not be an art critic, but paint; therein lies salvation' (ibid., 365). The implication here is that the production and consumption of art goes on in the realm of the 'visual', independent of the world of words. Inevitably this sentiment was to lead in the early Twentieth Century to paintings which were supposed to be 'purely visual'. In 1910 Kandinsky produced the first completely abstract painting and this is seen as the moment when the visual emancipated itself from the verbal in art. Henceforth even the title of a painting was thought to be of no significance, as Apollinaire was quick to point out in 1912:

The new painters paint works that do not have a real subject, and from now on, the titles in catalogues will be like names that identify a man without describing him ... Painters sometimes still condescend to use vaguely explanatory words, such as 'portrait', 'landscape', or 'still-life'; but many young painters simply employ the general term 'painting' (Apollinaire, 1972, 197).

But the process of extricating the visual from the verbal in art was an exercise in mystification, achieved by means of a kind of linguistic 'sleight of hand'; that is, the use of words to deny the use of words. For, as Wolfe shows, the word has remained as much a part of visual art as it ever was, and never more so, in fact, than in the Twentieth Century when, ostensibly, it was supposed to have been eradicated.

This is not to say that, in the main, visual art did not reject literature or the anecdote as the source of its inspiration in the early part of the century. This it most certainly did; but it substituted other forms of words, principally art theory and aesthetic theory, and in particular the philosophy of 'pure visibility'. The substitution was a slow and insidious process. It took over a century to complete and this is probably why the illusion was so effective when the final steps were taken in the first decade or so of the present century.

Venturi (1936) traces the idea of 'pure visibility' to Kant. This means that the idea was conceived in verbal terms something like a hundred years before the Impressionists and the Symbolists prepared the ground for abstract painting. It also means that the idea grew up with Romanticism which, one might say, was the first movement in art to respond to it. As a label 'Romanticism' covers diverse elements, but broadly speaking it began as a reaction against the rationalism and restraint of Neoclassicism. The Romantics rejected the rules of classicism, its style and its subject-matter, and defended the divine right of the artist to go his own way and to explore his own feelings. Thus the Romantic artist is said to have relinquished reason for feeling and direct, sensuous, aesthetic experience.

However, the Romantic project applied to visual art was contradictory because Romanticism, like Neoclassicism, was essentially literary. It was based on verbal concepts and themes which, although different from those of the classicists, nonetheless suggested appropriate subject-matter for paintings and served to rationalise and regulate Romantic art. The resolution of this contradiction between the supposed freedom of the artist and the constraints imposed by Romantic theory represents the first step in the process of mystification which led to the apparent eradication of the verbal from the visual in Twentieth Century art. It took the form of a shift of emphasis in the production and consumption

of Romantic art from its literary content to the aesthetic effect and the feeling evoked by its style. Thus it emerged that Romantic paintings were meant to be comprehended by 'feeling' rather than by 'knowing', and this became generally accepted even though it was indeed necessary to 'know' something - to have the word, as Wolfe puts it - before it was possible to 'feel' anything. It was necessary, more often than not, to know the story on which the painting was based, and it was necessary to know the key word - 'feeling' - in order to respond appropriately to the painting.

The Romantics effectively separated subject from form in art, the idea being that form may be appreciated in itself just by looking at the work. This step having been taken, the remainder of the century is the story of how the subject dissolved more and more into the abstract concept of 'nature', eventually to disappear altogether; while considerations of form took over as the central concern of the artist. The second half of the century saw Kant's ideas, and their development in the works of Herbart and Zimmerman, related directly to art by Feidler and his followers, Hildebrand and Reigl (see Venturi, 1936, 272 et. seq.). Consequently the notion of 'pure visibility' was openly embraced by artists and critics in that period and became, as it were, the dominant theme in art.

In different ways the idea of 'pure visibility' affected both Symbolism and Impressionism. The Impressionists and Neo-Impressionists, followed by the Cubists in the Twentieth Century, interpreted it in physiological or pseudo-scientific terms, qualified or modified by the work of writers such as Chevreul and by the new physics. The Symbolists, and following them the Fauves and the Expressionists, interpreted it in pseudo-psychological terms, linking it with developments in psychoanalysis and anthropology.

The notion of 'pure visibility' has dominated Modern Art in various ways, and couched in different terms (Hoffman's 'purity', for example, and Greenberg's 'flatness' are variations), and the implicit contradiction - the Romantic fallacy - remains. As Wolfe says, in Modern Art one is led to believe that 'seeing is believing', yet more words have been written and spoken about art by artists and critics during this period than ever before. These words have provided the theoretical climate which has generated the various forms of Modern Art and thus,

while the art of this century may not be literary in the accepted sense, effectively it embodies literature in the form of art theory and criticism. In retrospect some artists and critics have come to recognise this. For instance, Hockney (1976) is able to see that the abstract pictures he painted in the mid-Sixties, influenced by what was going on in the States, were not 'purely' visual in the sense that they had no content; they had as their subject the idea of 'pure visibility' or 'abstraction': 'I was using abstraction as my subject', he admits, 'commenting on it - I felt the need to use it as a subject' (loc. cit.). Among the critics Rosenberg also admits that, 'the liberation from "literary subject matter" boasted of by modern painting and sculpture has been accomplished by their transformation into literature. With images of genre and fable eliminated, the painting as a whole has become a word: one wants to know what the work says' (Rosenberg, 1965, 199).

Throughout history, then, visual art has embodied a verbal component whether it be found in the content of the work, or in the theory behind it, or the ideology reflected in the form of the work. If Modern Art is in any way special in this respect, it is because the art language of the Twentieth Century has been so self-conscious or introspective. Prior to this century there was no concerted attempt to extricate specifically 'artistic' values from what one might call the dominant 'life' values of the culture or society. Art was tacitly accepted as a means to some other end, whether it be religious, political, or whatever. In the present century, however, as Steinberg says, the subject-matter of art has become art itself, and the responsibility for this, as Wolfe suggests, lies in large measure with the creation of a specialised artistic community or sub-culture, mediated explicitly by the notion of art, and thus by the work of the critic. That is to say, the creation of a sub-culture with a need to carve out an area of activity and experience to call its own, and the need for a specialised language for the purpose. This is not to say, however, that art in the Twentieth Century does not reflect the broader cultural and social values of its day. In many respects the artistic community may be seen as an 'establishment' institution operating within, and helping to sustain, the socio-economic structures and customs of Western culture, and taking its cues from the prevailing material and ideological climate.

2.4 Conclusion

One should not get the impression, as does Fuller (1976), that Wolfe is saying that artistic theories formulated by critics necessarily precede the works of art which embody them. He may well be saying this in relation to the work of certain 'post-painterly' artists such as Stella and Noland who worked under the direct hegemony of the formalist critics, Rubin and Greenberg respectively. But he does make it clear that ^{this} is not necessarily the way things happen. In the case of Greenberg and Pollock he actually says that the work preceded the cloak of critical theory placed over it by the critic. Wolfe is really saying, contrary to the views of Ducasse, that the critic makes his comments and his assessments inevitably on the basis of a concept or a theory of what art is and where it is going. His response to any given work of art, therefore, will be mediated by this theory, and the work will either fit or it will not fit the critic's expectations.

Taking Wolfe's example: Greenberg's concept of 'flatness'. As Wolfe says, the critic would not have developed this idea spontaneously; he must have got it from somewhere, most probably from his acquaintance with early Modernism and its debt to the Japanese print. Having formed the idea, however, Greenberg found that it could be applied to the Abstract Expressionist work of Pollock, at the same time absorbing Hoffman's idea of 'purity'. Thus, in Greenberg's eyes, Abstract Expressionism became the natural successor to the more figurative (and hence less 'pure') work of the early Modern artists, and due to his professional efforts the style was generally accepted as such within the artistic community. The appearance of Pop Art, however, brought imagery which, although in a sense more figurative, made the work of Pollock look positively three-dimensional and so, within the framework of theory already established by the influential critics, Pop was accepted as the natural successor to Abstract Expressionism. This is not to say that the critics predicted it or laid down the specifications for it; they validated it on its appearance. To recognise this is to recognise also that there must have been other products of 'bohemia' which were not publicly recognised and which did not therefore come to fruition because they did not fit in with the prevailing theoretical requirements at that moment in history.

An important point to pick up here, and on which to end this chapter, concerns the idea of succession prevalent in Wolfe's thesis, and the role of the critic in mediating between successive artistic developments. When Wolfe says that Pop Art represents a 'higher synthesis' of the dominant theory of 'flatness', and that successive developments such as Minimal and Conceptual art represent even higher syntheses, he is implying a dialectic between the work of the artist (what one might call, for convenience, the 'visual' moments in the succession) and the work of the critic (the 'verbal' moments). More particularly, the implication is that there is a dialectical contradiction between the notion of 'purity' which is, first and foremost, an abstract, verbal concept, and the materiality of its successive realisations, resulting in further resolutions, syntheses, styles.

In retrospect Rosenberg (1975) recognises and generalises this point - that art and critical language relate dialectically - and his words may be used to sum up and to provide a fitting conclusion to this chapter. All painting in the Twentieth Century, he says, requires an 'ambience of talk', and he goes on:

There is no such thing as pure painting in the Twentieth Century - nor was there ever any pure painting. To say that a painting speaks for itself is sheer nonsense. A painting speaks within a context of thought, and that's what criticism is about ... the critic illuminates the thought context with the painting, and illuminates the painting with the thought context. A reciprocal, a dialectical, activity takes place (loc. cit. 87).

CHAPTER 3

ART HISTORY

Consciousness of art history rules the art of our time and is the key to what takes place in the galleries of New York, Los Angeles, Paris, Warsaw, Tokyo. It affects not only the objective status of new works, the conditions under which they are valued and acquired, but the impulses that enter into their creation, their aesthetic meaning, in fact, their very existence as works of art (Rosenberg, 1965, 25).

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I want to make and to illustrate a fairly simple point which is that, whatever else it may be, the history of art is a body of knowledge, verbally mediated, which has a material effect upon the production and consumption of art. The implication is that the history of art is not merely an account of 'what happened' in art in the past, but the product of attempts made by art historians, themselves socially, culturally and temporally 'situated', to reconstruct and interpret the past. Put another way, 'what happened in the past' does feature in the history-of-art-as-product, but only to the extent that the art historian uses the evidence of the past (i.e. artifacts, documents, etc.) in the making of his product. This varies with the different phases through which the history-of-art-as-product has passed since it was begun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by Ghiberti and Vasari. But even in its later, more scholarly and disciplined forms, the history of art, like the writing of history generally, cannot be described as completely objective; it is always conditioned by the experience and the project of the writer who has to evaluate and edit the evidence available, and provide a framework within which to comprehend the material thus processed. In his work the art historian inevitably responds to the prevailing intellectual and ideological atmosphere of his own time and place. In publishing his work he contributes to the conditions under which art is understood; not only the art of the past, but also that of the present, and consequently he contributes to the conditions under which the art of the future is conceived. It is in this sense that the

history of art may have a material effect upon the production and the consumption of art.

3.2 A Short History of Art History

Looking back over the attempts of art historians to describe, reconstruct and interpret the past we may identify certain trends. Broadly, art historical methodology may be divided into two periods: the first extending from ancient times, through the Renaissance, to the end of the eighteenth century; and the second from the nineteenth century to the present day. The former is characterised by an approach which was subjective and anecdotal, and the latter by an attempt on the part of art historians to carry out their work in a more scholarly and objective fashion, sticking to certain definite rules of establishing fact, interpreting evidence and dealing with source material.

3.2.1 Art History before the Nineteenth Century

Art history is usually said to begin with Ghiberti's Commentaries, which he wrote towards the end of his life and in which he expresses the opinion that the decline in art which preceded the Renaissance was due to the interruption of the Classical tradition. However, there were ancient writers who had something to say about art. But they did not devote books to the subject; they simply included comments on art in their writings on a succession of different subjects, natural and artificial. Such a writer was Pliny whose Natural History was written in the first century A.D. This remains our earliest encyclopaedic source of knowledge about the art of the ancient world and it served as a model for many writers of the Italian Renaissance. Ghiberti, for example, derives the material for his first Commentary on the ancient art partly from Pliny and partly from Vitruvius. When he came to write about the artists of the Trecento, having no authorities to draw on, Ghiberti wrote what he himself had learned and described what he had seen during his long life (which ended in 1455).

Vasari, like Ghiberti, was a practising artist. In his Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors and Architects, which appeared in 1550, he covers in considerable detail the period from Cimabue to Michelangelo, but he also has something to say about ancient and medieval art. In this

work Vasari states explicitly that it^{is} his desire to assist artists and art, since it is the true task of history to teach men how to live. To this end, he argues, it is necessary to distinguish good work from the mediocre and to discuss the causes of improvement and decline in the arts.

Vasari thought he knew what good art was; he had one idea of excellence, and that was Michelangelo. All progress in art, he thought, was leading up to the conditions which made it possible for Michelangelo to create great works based on the observation of nature and guided by rules first evolved by the ancients and perfected in his own time.

This idea of having one model which should be imitated was the spine of the academic system in Europe until the nineteenth century. Artists were trained in Academies which accepted that there was a single type of art worth emulating, and art history was little more than the study of accepted standards in the Academies of Europe. The Discourses of Reynolds, first published complete in 1794, are still art history in this sense, even though Sir Joshua extended the field to include the masters of the seventeenth century. A truly moral responsibility for tradition - apparent also in the act of founding the Royal Academy - permeates all Reynold's utterances; he concludes the 15th Discourse, by which he took leave of the Academy, with an eulogy of Michelangelo.

3.22 Art History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Reynolds was perhaps the last great writer in the line of Ghiberti and Vasari. The Germans were the first to diverge and give the study of art some academic scholarly edge and it is the archaeologist Winckelmann, a contemporary of Reynolds, who is said to have founded art history as a strict and objective discipline when, in 1764, he published his History of Ancient Art.

From a profound knowledge of antique works of art, from faith in their unique beauty, and from anxiety to justify their value theoretically, Winckelman found a relation between the work of art and its aesthetic value more rigorous than before. Influenced by contemporary philosophy he believed that art demonstrates not only the spirit of the age, but also the national spirit. He referred Greek beauty to a particular state of mind in Greek artists and he characterised it as a noble simplicity

and a quiet grandeur. This identification of what was essentially a personal ideal with those of the artists he admired most allowed Winckelman to impress a decisive progress on the history of art, to make it the history of art rather than the lives of artists. He divided the history of Greek art into four periods, inspired by the divisions of Scaligero for poetry, and of Floro for Roman history; the first to the third represent progress and the fourth decadence. Having 'identified' this sequence in Greek art he imposed it upon the history of art generally.

The idea of a national spirit expressed through art was to characterise much of the art historical writing in Germany in the nineteenth century. A tradition of serious research and publishing of art books was set up; the first university chair of art history was established in Berlin, for Gustav Freidrich Wagen, in 1844; and throughout the century art history was a staple of German education.

Winckelman stands at the great divide of art history and art criticism. He was the first to apply an expressive theory to the visual arts and in doing so he made the division possible. Henceforth the quality of a work of art did not need to be evaluated by aesthetic standards derived from tradition, but by the intensity of response evoked in the beholder. Paradoxically, therefore, the man who had set out to write a more or less scientific physiognomy of ancient art created the means whereby the work of art could be removed from its historical context and appraised in splendid isolation.

The most important consequence of this in German art history, towards the end of the nineteenth century, was the idea that works of art could be analysed in terms of pure form, irrespective of content. The two men most responsible for this, Wolfflin and Riegl, were both influenced by contemporary trends in psychology (i.e. the ideas of the so-called 'introspectionist' psychologists) and philosophy, particularly the philosophy of 'pure visibility' developed by Hegel (and discussed in the last chapter). Wolfflin was still convinced that the style of a work of art expresses the temper of an age, for which the artists' temperament provides the material element. However, his approach was predominantly formal and descriptive; he derived his stylistic categories - the polarities of style between which works of art appear to range in history - from what he observed in actual works of art (see Wolfflin, 1932).

As a result, for many of his pupils, a work of art is simply an arrangement of forms which can be analysed and explained by reference to itself and whose only links are with other forms created earlier.

Riegl's theory was not 'grounded' in the sense that Wolfflin's was. He began with the premise that there exists a 'will to form' which is the motive power of all artistic creation and he defined the work of art as an organisation of shapes and colours formed by this peculiarly artistic will. He divided art history into three periods which, in essence, correspond to the periods of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and Modern Times (see Riegl, 1893). According to Riegl, these three epochs express distinct 'visions of the world': anthropomorphic polytheism; Christian monotheism; and the vision of the world of natural sciences. Thus art history is closely linked to the history of religions in the first two periods, and to the history of the sciences and philosophy in the third. Paradoxically, however, Riegl with his theory of 'artistic will' did more than any other scholar to sever art from other historical studies. His theory denied the possibility of all value judgements, implying as it did that any work of art appears as it does because it was willed in this form; it is difficult to establish objective criteria for evaluating works of art when any scrawl may be taken to be 'expressive' of something.

Riegl did much to promote the proposition of 'pure vision' taken up by Berenson and the structuralist approach to art history which developed towards the end of the 1920's. Structuralism was an elaboration of the theory of 'artistic will'. Sedlmayr, one of the main exponents of this approach saw artistic will as the dependence of the appearance of a work of art on some central structural principles according to which works of art are shaped. These structural principles derive from the spiritual structure of a group of human beings, and any change in the principles corresponds to a change in the group's ideals. From this basic premise structuralism as applied to art history developed in two directions: an analysis of general structures pursued by Kaschnitz (see Kaschnitz, 1965) and an analysis of the structure of individual works developed by Sedlmayr (see Sedlmayr, 1929).

Riegl was also behind the a-historical approach to art history taken by Fry (see Fry, 1957) and Bell (see Bell, 1914). Pure vision, which is an end in itself, and Bell's 'significant form', signifying nothing but itself,

isolate the work of art from all tradition and imply the negation of all history. This approach was to lead to Malraux's 'museum without walls' (1953) and the utter dissolution of art history as a record of a continuous tradition.

Some time before this stage was reached, however, there was a sharp reaction against the purely formal, visual and emotional approach to art history. From it was to emerge a new type of art history which treated the individual work of art as a complex historical record, conditioned by its precise historical context and forming part of a wider tradition. This new approach was pioneered by Male in his study of medieval French Art (see Male, 1910) and by the Warburg Institute. Foremost among Warburg's followers were Saxl and Panofsky. The latter labelled the new method 'iconology'. This is not to be confused with 'iconography' which is nothing more than the description of subject-matter and therefore as one-sided as the analysis of a picture in purely formal terms. Iconology did not neglect the formal element in art in favour of its content. It approached form in a different way; instead of leaving it in a void the new approach treated form as the vehicle by which the content of the work of art is most effectively communicated. In this way form and meaning are understood to be mutually dependent, and the intrinsic meaning of any such work is apprehended by searching out the attitudes and beliefs which determined its shape. Treated in this way the work of art becomes much more concrete - an historical document, and consequently the art historian was required to understand more than changing modes of vision; he had to be familiar with methods of dating and attributing works of art, and so forth. Thus, Male, Warburg, Saxl, Panofsky and other scholars working along the same lines did much to bridge the gap which had been separating art history from other historical studies.

Among the more recent developments in art history there is that which followed the publication in 1960 of Gombrich's Art and Illusion. In this work Gombrich breaks new ground by making the psychology of perception the cornerstone of his enquiry, and by bringing theories of information and communication into the field of art historical studies. He takes the problem of style out of the nebulous realms of aesthetic speculation and Hegelian historicism, and he dispells the myths of pure vision and national spirit. For Gombrich 'style' is that which sets up a horizon of expectation, a mental set, which registers deviations and modifications

with exaggerated sensitivity. In noticing relationships the mind registers tendencies and the history of art, he holds, is full of reactions that can only be understood in this way. The suggestion that an artist makes a new image by matching his perception to an already existing 'schema' re-establishes tradition and, within it, relevance and value. What is more, the recognition of such a process means that the historian must make his judgements on an understanding of tradition rather than normative aesthetics and the standards he obtains in this way are, to some degree, verifiable or at least open to debate.

If Gombrich may be said to be seeking a more objective or scientific basis for art historical studies then his goal, if not his method, is similar to those writers who, since the 1930's, have adopted what has been called 'the Marxist approach' (see Wallach, 1981). These writers include Frederick Antal, Alick West, Francis Klingender, Milton Braun, Christopher Caudwell, George Thomson, Arnold Hauser, Max Raphael, Hanna Deinhard, Meyer Schapiro and others, and their work is rooted, theoretically, in Marx's analysis of the relations between a society's economic structures. The results have proven highly susceptible to mechanical over-simplifications in which artistic phenomena are directly attached to social and economic categories (such as that of 'class') and the approach has been unable to provide a theoretical grounding for a Marxist history of art distinct from other types of Marxist cultural and social history.

In Art History and Class Struggle (1978), Hadjinicolaou attempts a re-appraisal of this tradition and to formulate a Marxist theory of art history based on the concept of 'visual ideology'. This, in effect, is a mixture of Antal's (1948) definition of style and descriptions of ideology derived from Althusser and Paulant. Hadjinicolaou defines visual ideology as 'a specific combination of the formal and thematic elements of a picture through which people express the way they relate their lives to the conditions of their existence, or combination which constitutes a particular form of the overall ideology of a social class' (op. cit., 95-96). Hadjinicolaou aims to do away with almost all established artistic terms and categories, such as 'art', 'work of art', 'style' and 'aesthetic effect', which he sees as belonging to bourgeois or non-scientific art history and to replace them with his new category. He has been criticised, however, because without conventional terminology

the term 'visual ideology' becomes increasingly ambiguous and arbitrary as it must perform all the tasks of a more varied set of concepts. Also, the artist still tends to get lost in the new scheme of things in which virtually all the mediating factors between base and superstructure are eliminated (see, Berger, 1978; Tagg, 1978; and Wallach, 1981). In other words, the artist is seen as little more than an outlet for the visual ideology of a particular class at a particular moment in history.

3.3 Art History and Present Interest

Although the trend in the writing of art history, as we have seen, is towards greater objectivity, verification and the formulation of scientific principles, one should not lose sight of the fact that, ultimately, art history is the historian's interpretation of the past and, as such, it can never be completely objective. In this respect art history is no different from other forms of history which are generally accepted to be subjective, inevitably, to some degree. Meyerhoff writes of the historian's dilemma: on the one hand he must tell the truth and nothing but the truth, while on the other hand he is reminded that, 'this ideal may be unattainable; that, upon close inspection, history sets definite limits to any claims of truth and objectivity; that it is affected by subjective, emotional or irrational factors in its subject-matter and in the mind of the historian himself and that a historical work seems to be constructed according to a peculiar logic of its own' (Meyerhoff, 1959, 16).

The subjective element in history stems, to a great extent, from the fact that the historian is himself 'situated' in history and that his choices judgements, interpretations and methodology will be informed, or at least coloured by the current prejudices and pre-occupations of the age in which he lives. This is what Carr means when he writes that history is a 'dialogue between the present and the past' (in Marwick, 1970, 19-21), and what Croce means when he writes that 'all true history is contemporary history' (Croce, 1921, 12). Thus, in the nineteenth century when British political institutions (and above all the British parliament) were the admiration of the world, there was a very strong emphasis on political and constitutional history. Victorian historians of medieval England were obsessed with a desire to see in medieval institutions something analogous to a nineteenth century parliament, though it is now agreed that

the 'parliaments' of medieval England were vastly different from those of the nineteenth century. In their studies of the eighteenth century, and particularly of the reign of George III, Victorian historians and their successors interpreted the political intrigues of the time in terms of the rivalry between Gladstone and Disraeli; the liberals and the conservatives. This again has been discredited, particularly since the publication of Namier's great works on politics in the eighteenth century. In the twentieth century, as we ^{have} become more and more preoccupied with economic matters, the emphasis in historical writing has moved away from the affairs of royalty and political leaders towards economic and social developments. There is little disagreement, therefore, that each generation interprets history according to present interests and Popper even goes so far as to defend the right of historians to do this, to give 'meaning to history which, in itself, has no meaning' (Popper, 1957, 449-63).

That the art historian too looks at the past with an eye directed by current intellectual, ideological and emotional trends is illustrated well by the work of Vasari. In his introduction to the Lives of the Artists, Bull reminds us that the major themes in Vasari's history, that is, the idea of 'rise and decline in the affairs of men and the idea that a rebirth or renaissance of the fine arts had taken place in Tuscany were both common currency in the intellectual world of Vasari's time' (Bull, 1965, 15). As a historian, therefore, Vasari did not 'discover' these themes in the events he related so much as project them on to those events, and he was primed to do so, to some extent, by the social and political conditions under which he practised as an artist and art historian.

Vasari was a Florentine at a time when Italy was not a united nation but a collection of small provinces, each headed by a great city, with special dialects, customs, traditions and an exclusive patriotic pride. A man identified strongly with his city and the Lives may be seen as the product of intense Florentine patriotism. Indeed, the work represents not so much a history of Italian art as of Florentine achievement. Vasari neglects the achievements of Siena and he plays down the role of Roman art even though by the sixteenth century Rome was replacing Florence as the artistic centre of Italy. Also he writes somewhat disparagingly of Venetian art, as one can see in his biographies of Giorgione and Titian.

Thus, the rebirth he describes comes across as very much the achievement of Florence and Vasari uses Florentine art, with its emphasis on strong structure, accurate drawing and methodological preparation as the standard against which to judge all art.

The epitome of Florentine art for Vasari is that of Michelangelo. Vasari was a friend of Michelangelo and he was immensely proud of this. He devotes more space in the Lives to him than to any other artist and he presents him as the culmination of his whole history of art. Vasari was not alone in his admiration for Michelangelo who was generally seen as a colossus by his contemporaries. In this again Vasari may be seen as a mirror of his times, reflecting current feeling rather than dispassionately observing events. This involvement coloured his view of every artist before Michelangelo with the result that he presents them as subordinate, though necessary developers of the technical expertise which enabled Michelangelo to triumph. Also, he admires artists such as Giotto, Masaccio and Donatello because their grandeur, dramatic pathos and classicism make them ancestors of Michelangelo's style, but he practically ignores the more decorative and elegant work of artists such as Pisanello or Gentile da Fabriano who, although very popular and important in the fifteenth century, bore little relation to Michelangelo.

It may well be argued that bias of the kind found in Vasari's work would not be acceptable in more recent art historical writing and, this being so, Vasari is not a good example to make a general point about art history and its influence on the production and consumption of art. There is some truth in this; the aims and the methods of the art historian have changed, as we have seen, since the sixteenth century. But this is somewhat beside the point. Vasari's method may well be questionable; he does not refer to his sources; he does not verify his facts; and it has been discovered that he was not always accurate. In spite of this, however, most modern Renaissance art history still depends on Vasari's periodisation, his critical descriptions of the differences between styles and his evaluations. Modern disagreement with Vasari is usually quite slight. Some art historians would call Michelangelo the first Mannerist rather than the last Renaissance artist; some think of the Renaissance as beginning in the fifteenth century rather than the fourteenth and others emphasise the importance of classical influences on the Middle Ages, or the importance of medieval ideas in the Renaissance. But

in general Vasari's categorisation is retained. Thus, whatever his methods, he still exerts an influence on the ways in which the history of art is conceived and understood and this understanding continues to affect the consumption or appreciation of the art of that period.

But one does not have to go back to Vasari to find an art historian whose approach reflects the intellectual interests of his day. A good contemporary example would be Gombrich. In his preface to Art and Illusion he acknowledges his 'profound indebtedness to the self-denying work of those experts, who must have sacrificed years of their lives ... to make their knowledge available to non-specialists' such as himself (1960, viii).

These experts in the main represent the various schools of modern psychology. Gombrich refers in particular to Osgood on Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology (1953), Metzger (1953) on Gestalt psychology, Hebb on The Organisation of Behaviour (1949) and Vernon (1952) Gibson (1950), Hayek (1952) and Allport (1955) on perception. He also acknowledges the influence of Kris and his Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (1952) and of Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).

Gombrich admits to being something of an eclectic and in this respect he makes a particularly significant reference in the preface to a paper by Tolman and Brunswick (1935). The paper deals with the hypothetical character of all perceptual processes, a central theme in Art and Illusion. Gombrich informs us that he read this famous paper only after completing his book and he makes this point, he says, not to claim originality but 'to emphasise the part played by living traditions in the shaping of our selective interests' (op. cit., ix). This brings me to my point.

Gombrich is saying here that the interest which led him to write his book - his own selective interest - was directed to some extent by ideas which were, so to speak, in the air. In other words, in writing his book he was responding to a particular intellectual and ideological climate which favoured the line that perception, and experience in general, owe much more to the response of the experiencer, and less to the nature of the stimulus, than had previously been assumed. This is a line which originates in the thinking of Berkeley, Hume and Kant in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which came to fruition early in the twentieth century in the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl (see, for example, Husserl, 1913) and Gestalt psychology. By the mid-century the compelling idea that 'reality' is actively created by the individual, guided by the

senses and informed by experience, had pervaded most disciplines and most branches of science in one form or another, and further impetus was provided in the 1950's by the advent of neurophysiology. It was almost inevitable, therefore, than an art historian as intellectually acquisitive as Gombrich should, sooner or later, explore the implications of the idea for art and art history. In this sense, then, it may be said that Gombrich's approach to art history is, like Vasari's, compelled by present interest.

3.4. Art History and Present Purpose

While it may be generally agreed that history is indeed 'a dialogue between the present and the past', one should not take this to mean that historians, and art historians in particular, simply revise their images of the past in response to changes in the intellectual and emotional climate, as an exercise which is, so to speak, an end in itself. The writing of art history is deliberate and purposeful; the art historian chooses to embark on a study of art history; he makes further choices as to the particular objects, persons, events, etc. he will investigate within that field, and as to the ways in which he will realise his project. Croce writes that, 'only an interest in the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact' (1921, 12), which means that, in choosing his material and in presenting it in the way he does, the historian is seeking, tacitly or explicitly, to achieve something in the present. For example, he may be attempting to teach or to preach something about the present state of affairs by drawing lessons from the past, or he may be attempting to promote a cause by showing that it in some way fulfils the pattern of history.

To return to Vasari; he is a good example of an art historian who set out to preach and to promote a cause through his interpretation of past objects, people and events. He felt that history should have a moral function; ethics and philosophy provided a moral theory, history was supposed to provide examples:

This is the true spirit of history, which fulfils its real purpose in making men prudent and showing them how to live (trans. Bull, 1965, 83).

Vasari believed that history, like art, was supposed to teach a lesson and historians were less concerned with facts than with the way the past could be used to teach men 'how to live'. The Lives were explicitly written for Vasari's fellow artists and are full of advice and censure. The book is full of morally improving fictions (see, for example, the life of Donatello and his supposed attitude towards money and possessions).

As well as a didactic purpose, the Lives also had propaganda value in Vasari's time. In 1564 Vasari founded the first Academy of Artists, a professional association, where artists were supposed to meet and talk about their work. It was a landmark in the struggle for artistic independence and dignified position in society, a rejection of the manual status afforded by the Guild system and a claim for equality of rank with poets, musicians, intellectuals and scientists. The Lives are full of triumphant anecdotes about this revolution in status: Giotto was supposed to have snubbed the King of Naples; Raphael had lived like a prince; Donatello had bested the Cloth Guild; the Medici had set up memorials to Giotto, Filippo Lippi, and Michelangelo; and Michelangelo had sat down with a Pope. But it was not until 1571, in fact, that the Medici decreed that an artist need not belong to a Guild, and even after this time artists did not always achieve independent status without a struggle. In the Lives, then, Vasari was not reflecting a trend so much as helping to set and sustain that trend. In order to do this he gave the impression that the change in status of the artist had already been successfully effected and he played down the fact that the breakaway from the Guild system meant a loss of security as well as a new freedom.

Again, the point should be made that, although Vasari employed methods which would not be acceptable in more modern art historical studies, the effect of his writing is nonetheless marked, even today. He was instrumental in bringing about the idea that artists are not only intellectuals (because of their interest in mathematics, proportion, perspective and anatomy) but, like poets and philosophers, great artists may lay claim to Divine inspiration. This idea effectively removes the artist from the socio-economic hierarchy (a craftsman can learn his skill, but a genius has innate talent which cannot be taught) and hence from the general march of history. It remains, in one form or another, in what Marxists call 'bourgeois' art history which makes little attempt to interpret the work of the artist relative to the prevailing ideological and material con-

-ditions under which it is produced.

If we must refer to a more modern example of an art historian to make the point that art history is written with a present purpose (as opposed to a detached, academic interest), then it would be a good idea, having mentioned Marx, to choose an historian with an obvious socialist purpose. Just such an historian would be Klingender, the author of Marxism and Modern Art (1942), an approach to Socialist Realism, and Art and the Industrial Revolution (1947). In his introduction to the 1972 edition of Art and the Industrial Revolution, Elton quotes Klingender as saying that his theoretical and historical studies were 'designed to elucidate the role of art as one of the great value-forming agencies in the social structure and social change' (op. cit., ix). This, then, was Klingender's project and it derived directly from his socialist connections. As Elton informs us:

Klingender was a dedicated Marxist, an historian and economist who loved to illuminate his scholarship by disparate flashes of observation. It was typical of him to choose for special study that area of art history neglected by both artists and historians, the region where art and technology meet and interpenetrate. Till this day most art historians would have thought it a positive asset to be uncontaminated (as they might have put it) by industry and commerce. Most economic historians would have thought the study of the arts a frivolous interference with more serious preoccupations (loc. cit., vii).

Klingender was a pioneer in the field which has since become known as 'design history' and which is still struggling to emancipate itself from the body of art history (see Ashwin, 1978). The latter is recognised nowadays to be the history of Fine Art and Architecture and some would claim that it is more correct to see it as 'a subsection of the history of design, albeit a very important one, with a larger history of its own' (del Renzio, 1976, 7).

In some respects Klingender was doing for the designer what Vasari was doing for the artist/craftsman: he was attempting to elevate him from a secondrate position and to present him in the same class as the 'artist'. But whereas Vasari claimed the same Divine vision for the artist as the poet and the philosopher, Klingender tried to show that art and design proceed under the same economic, technological and sociological conditions which identify the work of the railway engineer with that of, say, Turner.

Like Vasari, Klingender did not necessarily originate the thesis behind his writing; as a writer he reflected the intellectual and ideological interests of his age. It is impossible, therefore, to gauge the effect of their works in particular on the production and consumption of art, although it is in the writings of such people that ideas endure from generation to generation and from age to age, contributing to a body of knowledge which influences further developments in art.

Nietsche wrote:

We have no idea what sort of things are going to become history one day. Perhaps the past is still largely undiscovered; it still needs so many retroactive forces for its discovery (quoted in Berger, 1972, 213).

This is true, but the impetus for these 'retroactive forces' comes, as I have argued, from present interest and present purpose, and this being so, what we think of as art history cannot be seen simply as an objective or disinterested reconstruction of the past. What we think of as art history is, as Berger puts it, a 'concentration upon the exceptional works of a couple of hundred masters' (1972, 213) selected to fulfil our particular view of history. This selection will be added to as new interests and purposes focus the historian's attention on different historic material, but as Benjamin reminds us, 'every image of the past that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably' (1973, 257).

3.5 The Effects of Art History on the Production and Consumption of Art

The effect of art history on the consumption or appreciation of art may be summed up quite simply. As Roskill says:

Changes of labels in works of art, and changes in what is known and said about them, are not simply a shifting kind of game, which goes on without altering the fundamental nature or value of the work itself. A work of art is affected in the way it is seen, by the label it carries, reflecting how it is rated and what is known behind that label. And if it is to give up its secrets, assuming it has some, it most often has to be worked at. Particularly if it is a great work of art, it does not spontaneously lay itself open to us (1976, 9).

This is an echo of what Gombrich was saying over ten years before:

If the history of an art is of any relevance to aesthetics it is precisely because it will help us in (the) first, rough and ready classifications on which all our subsequent understanding may hinge. Granted that a great work of art is so rich in structure that it remains potent even when misunderstood, if we are really out to receive its 'message' we cannot do without all the contextual aids the historian can unearth (1963, 67).

This is fairly unproblematic as far as it goes: whether it be thought of as 'aesthetic', 'cognitive', 'felt-knowledge', or whatever, our understanding and appreciation of art is conditioned by the work of the historian, who provides the verbal context in and through which the work of art may be approached. In this the work of the historian may be compared with that of the critic: indeed, this verbal mediation of the visual is the role traditionally attributed to critics and art historians. Much more of a problem and one which gets very little attention in the literature, is that of the effect of art history on the production of art and it is to this issue that I shall turn my attention for the remainder of this chapter.

My proposition is that art history, as the written product of the work of art historians, does indeed have an effect upon the production of art, and I shall try to demonstrate that this is so using Marxist art history as an example.

Sartre (1963) claims that Marxism is the dominant philosophy of our age and it is certainly the case that Marxist ideas have pervaded much of our thinking even if we are not consciously aware of it, and even if we do not accept the political implications of such thinking. Art history as a discipline has not escaped the Marxist approach and, indeed, Marx himself discussed art from a materialist perspective (see Marx and Engels, 1976). As I have said, earlier in this chapter, Marxist art history as such gained momentum in the thirties and forties, although the influence of Marx on art may be discerned earlier than this in, for example, the manifestos of the Futurists and the Surrealists (see Alquié, 1965; and Apollonio, 1973). It takes little imagination to see that the growth of such literature has been responsible to a considerable extent for many of the developments we have experienced in art in the ensuing decades.

3.51 The Direct Influence of Marxist Art History on Artistic Production

The most direct effect is obviously on those artists who have openly embraced Marxism as a political doctrine and who have, as a result, aimed to produce work of an overtly revolutionary nature. A good example of such work is that form of graphic presentation known as 'factography' (see Hunt, 1976) which originated in the 1920's and which experienced a revival in the 1970's. A 'factograph' is a documentary presentation with a critical and political import. This might include a political montage of the kind produced by Heartfield in Nazi Germany, or the juxtaposition of images for effect, either of which complies with Brecht's remark: 'a simple reproduction of reality tells us nothing about reality ... something has to be constructed' (quoted in Hunt, 1976, 98). According to Hunt (loc. cit.) 'factography' has been revived because the concerns of the twenties re-emerged in the sixties and are still with us. Among these he identifies a growing disaffection with the goal of material well-being:

In reaction against what was self-evidently the culture of the ruling class revolutionary art forms of the twenties were discovered, as were (sometimes by the same people) various Marxists of the earlier period, Lukacs, Karsch, the Frankfurt school, etc. The consequence has been a radical reappraisal of the forms of modern culture, even at its most professedly radical (read 'at its most fashionable') (ibid.).

The most important things to note here are the rediscovery of Marxist writings on art from the twenties and the 'reappraisal' of recent events in a Marxist perspective, the result of which is the current practice of 'factography' (among other things). A particularly topical example of 'factography' which Hunt cites is a piece by Hans Haacke called Shapolsky et al Manhattan Real Estate Holdings. This is a series of photographs of property in Manhattan, with short attached text-descriptions in real-estate terms of that property extracted from the files of the County Clerk's office. The work was too 'hot' for the Guggenheim Museum which, Hunt tells us, refused to show it. However, had it not been for the text, which gave various financial details and named various individuals (Shapolsky et al), the piece might well have gone unnoticed. The use of the text, Hunt continues, recalls a comment of Benjamin's:

Is not the task of the photographer-descendent of the augers and haruspices - to uncover guilts and name the guilty in his pictures? ... Must we not also count as illiterate the photographer who

cannot read his own pictures? Will not the caption become the most important part of the shot? (Benjamin, 1972).

Haacke himself has something to say in this respect. In an interview with Margaret Sheffield (Haacke, 1976) he comments on the relation between the verbal and the visual in his presentations:

I believe we have overblown expectations of the power of pictures. By now it is already old hat to quote Brecht's and Benjamin's recognition that a photograph of the Krupp or AEG industrial plants would reveal practically nothing of what is actually going on there. Photographers themselves, like W, Eugene Smith, are aware of these shortcomings and therefore insist on often extensive captions (1976, 120).

This is only one side of the coin, however, as Haacke goes on to say:

Having said this I would like to draw your attention to the imagery of the works that one might suspect of relying chiefly on language as a medium. I think neither the spoken nor the written word ever appears in a neutral fashion. Words are not just words. Invariably, although not necessarily, conscious typographical decisions give a printed text a very distinct look. Without careful attention to the appearance of copy, the Madison Avenue guys could never create an image for a product they want to sell us (ibid., 121).

By way of illustration Haacke refers to his piece entitled On Social Grease (1975) which is made up of six embossed, aluminium panels quoting the words of prominent political and business figures. He designed these, he says, not to be framed under glass but to have the look of solid objects with a certain amount of corporate aggressiveness. He chose Helvetica as the typeface because this is used on the annual reports of many banks, and he broke up the text into short lines, making a paragraph out of each sentence to imitate the technique of public image advertisements and to give them the ring of a major pronouncement.

In short, my aim was to produce commemorative plaques as they might have emanated from the public relations department of a company that wants to project an image of modernity, optimism, efficiency and reliability. This reminds me of a quote by Marx who said, 'These petrified (social) conditions must be forced to dance by singing to them their own melody (ibid.).

3.52 The Indirect Influence of Marxist Art History on Artistic Production

In order to give some idea of the ways in which a Marxist analysis of art may indirectly influence developments in contemporary art, I shall refer to that form which has become known as 'Outdoor Art' (see Cork, 1977). This is an urban phenomenon which emerged during the sixties and seventies and which may be distinguished from its rural counterpart, 'Land Art', which is more isolated and exclusive.

Outdoor Art appears in many guises, but it may be exemplified by the work of the various American mural groups (see Lippard, 1977, 84). On the whole these are community sponsored, although some are commercial, and some are outgrowths of the gallery and museum establishment. In New York, for instance, there are two major groups which represent very different approaches. 'City Walls' was originated by artists and then adopted by the Museum of Modern Art; most of its murals are easel paintings enlarged; they tend to be abstract and colourful, and made by establishment artists. 'City Arts Workshop', however, is a grass-roots organisation on the Lower East Side, whose murals are first and foremost public wall paintings both in style and subject-matter. They are designed and painted by members of the community, usually young people, with the help of community as opposed to establishment professionals. These murals serve as political as well as aesthetic outlets; their content ranges from social commentary (against inflation, absentee landlords, drugs, etc.) to pride in culture, race or sex. There are obvious Marxist implications in the approach taken by the Arts City Workshop, implications which Lippard (1977) reveals in the way she discusses the genre of Outdoor Art.

According to Lippard, taking art out of the home and gallery should be an expansive and democratic gesture, but all too often the result is the 'false monument - private, indoor art enlarged and plunked down outside - not in the streets, or in ordinary residential neighbourhoods, but in museum gardens, bank plazas and country estates'. This is more to do with property, ownership, and fashion, she says, than with any desire to provide the 'masses' with aesthetic experience related to 'their own real-life experience' (loc. cit., 83). This pseudo-public art remains private in another sense, she continues:

It is usually familiar only to a museum-going public. It has been espoused by a single class and imposed on the others. When Banks, corporations, institutions, municipalities risk money by erecting a 'monument' to their success, they are even more conservative than when they are playing the stock market. They buy the kind of art that reflects their relationship to the public - aloof and superior (ibid.).

In this sense, Lippard reminds us, Outdoor Art is nothing new, but in writing about it as a comparatively recent phenomenon she is not referring to the siphoning of 'high art' and elite information about that art down from the top; that is, from the arbiters of quality and taste down to the masses as has traditionally been the case. Neither is she talking about putting 'good' art in the factories where it will 'improve' the working environment while doing nothing to improve fundamental social problems: in these conditions, she says, 'art can be used as a distraction or a veil rather than a provocation (ibid., 84). What she means is a movement that has originated 'in response to a broad audience or to a section, a community, of that audience - an art that rises up from the experience of the people who are living with it rather than an art patronisingly imposed from above' (ibid.). Work made for the so-called masses, she says, 'should finally encompass a far broader spectrum of personal taste than that aimed at a single moneyed and educated class which has been trained to like only certain things' (ibid.). And such, according to Lippard, is the implicit aim of contemporary Outdoor Art.

All this talk of 'private ownership', the 'masses', 'class', 'elitism', and 'provocation' clearly owes much to the Marxist view of art and society, and if Lippard is correct in her assumptions, Outdoor Art is undoubtedly Marxist in origin. But this does not necessarily mean that it is Marxist in spirit. Certainly the City Arts Workshop seems socially and politically aware, but this is not always the case. Indeed, I would suggest from my own experience as an artist working in the field of community action that it is more likely to be the case that the community artist and the people with whom he works in the community are more concerned with the artistic aspects of the work than with the political or philosophical aspects. That is to say, they receive their ideas from other artists and from the work they see going on around them rather than from sociological or political literature.

This comes across quite clearly in an interview between Richard Cork and the community/outdoor artists, David Cashman and Roger Fagin (see Cork, 1979). These artists had taught in art schools, but they turned their backs on what they saw as the establishment-dominated approach to art practised at that level, to become community artists, shifting their role 'from that of traditional teaching to a more collaborative one, in which (they) worked with students and tried to make group decisions about what (they) were doing' (loc. cit., 105). The conversation centres on a project in which they worked with staff and pupils in a North London primary school to transform the school environment, with the result that the outside of the buildings were painted with huge murals and the playground was changed into something between an adventure playground and a children's garden.

The important thing about the interview is that when the two artists talk about their work and its implications they do so, not within an overtly political or materialist perspective, but within that of 'art'. They comment on the lack of ability of the general public to see what they do as 'art'; they comment on the lingering Renaissance tradition in which the artist is supposed to work in isolation; and they talk at length about the 'language' of forms and colours adopted by themselves and by their 'collaborators' in the school project. There is even some talk of Cashman having to reconcile himself to allowing the pupils to use their designs instead of his for the murals. If there is a 'revolutionary' element in what is said, then it is directed against 'artistic' traditions, as such, rather than at the structure of society or the capitalist system, and it reflects little more than the pre-occupation of the twentieth century artist with novelty and change. Here is an example of the language they use when talking about their approach:

People were relating to one another essentially on an individualistic basis, which tends to stress differences both in personal attitudes and in the language one uses. It also encourages a divisiveness among teachers and students which seemed very unproductive. Whereas the notion of collective activities, the sharing of experience, seemed to provide a basis for a new relationship, not only with fellow tutors, but with students too. And out of that relationship one could imagine a more positive enquiry taking place (ibid.).

There is no burning social purpose here; no conscious grasp of the political implications as expressed by Lippard. Quite crudely, the view being put forward is that, given the contemporary imperative to reject tradition in art, it seemed like a good idea to do it that way. When pressed both artists retreat completely into the language of bourgeois art criticism rather than that of sociology or politics. Fagin says that, 'what we are doing ... involves actually trying to break down (traditional) concepts and create something which is the end-product of a process involving the uniqueness, originality and creativity of lots of different people in interaction with one another' (ibid., 106); that is, his aims are those of traditional art, but his method differs inasmuch as it is collective rather than individual. And Cashman actually denies a political motive: 'When I was teaching at art school, I probably felt more strongly that I had to fight against the prevailing values and ways of working. But now I feel much more interested in going ahead with developing the way that we're working and making it seem to be viable to practice rather than preach it' (ibid.).

In other words, his interest is in the art work itself - in making it 'viable' - rather than in the ideology behind it, and this, I would argue, is not unusual among 'community' artists, whether they be mural painters, performance artists, or whatever.

To come to the point, Outdoor Art, inasmuch as it rejects the idea of private ownership and the supposed elitism of the gallery and museum system is conceived in terms borrowed from a Marxist analysis of art and society. Many exponents of the genre, such as the New York Arts City Workshop may well be consciously aware of the political implications and the Marxist origin of their work, and in these cases Outdoor Art may be seen, simply, as a form directly influenced by Marxist art history. But for many who take up the idea, the ideological or doctrinal aspects are secondary and remain, very often, a mystery. Like Cashman and Fagin, such artists and those who come within their sphere of influence simply like the idea as an 'artistic' possibility and they embrace it with little or no political understanding. In such cases, then, it may be said that Marxist art history has an indirect effect upon the work they produce.

CHAPTER 4

LANGUAGE IN ART EDUCATION

The language of (art) is like any other language: it can only be currently read by those who have learned it and are in the habit of hearing it spoken around them (Sickert, 1970, 91).

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall discuss three main issues: firstly I shall consider the widespread habit in art educational circles of calling art a 'visual language'. I shall try to show that there is no firm philosophical basis for such a belief; there is no agreement among academics as to whether or not it is proper to describe art as a language. I am considering the idea, therefore, not as a valid argument but as a specific example of the kind of language used by art educationists; that is, I am presenting 'the language of art' as an example of the art educationist's current received 'art language'.

Secondly I shall make the point that art language of this kind has a material effect upon the way art is produced and consumed in schools and colleges. I shall do this by recounting a lecture on the subject given by John Hayes at the London University Institute of Education in 1978.

Finally I shall argue that art language is a means whereby the teacher, as a representative of the artistic community, passes on to the student the values, attitudes and beliefs of that community, thereby imposing cultural and historical-specific constraints upon his artistic expression and appreciation. I shall concentrate here on the teaching of art history and art criticism in order to pick up on what has been said in previous chapters, and so that I do not stray on to ground which is to be covered in greater depth in subsequent chapters.

4.2 The Language of Art

Gombrich informs us that 'the Romantic idea that art is the language of the emotions has a long and complex history reaching back to the belief in spells and incantations' (Gombrich, 1963, 56). In more recent times one may trace it in the literature back to Veron and Tolstoy in the nineteenth century. While agreeing on the linguistic nature of art, these writers differed over whether it is a means of 'expressing' feeling (see Veron, 1878), or of 'communicating' feeling (see Tolstoy, 1898). Subsequent generations of writers on the subject included Croce, Santayana, Collingwood, and Dewey, who complicated the issue by bringing into the debate the question of how artistic meaning is transmitted through the language of art. 'Idealists' such as Croce saw artistic meaning as something which resides completely within the experience of the percipient, independent of the material art object (see Croce, 1909); while 'materialists' such as Santayana saw the art object as the necessary medium through which artistic feeling is communicated (see Santayana, 1896). Collingwood and Dewey were somewhat ambivalent, but both agreed that if feeling may be expressed or communicated by means of a material object, then this must happen within a context of shared or common experience and expectations between the artist and his public (see Collingwood, 1938, and Dewey, 1925; 1934).

In the first quarter of the twentieth century there arose an interest in the implications for art of the science of signs and symbols which was developing in the fields of anthropology, philosophy, psychology and religion. It was Cassirer who provided the theoretical basis for this (see Cassirer, 1923; 1929). He did not see art as a language, as such; for him 'language' was a special category of symbolisation set aside for speech and writing, and he distinguished between language and art as different symbolic forms expressing different kinds of experience, thought and knowledge. However, he did believe that different symbolic forms fulfil an essentially similar function, part of which is to concentrate or articulate the experience of the culture, thereby enabling communication. In this respect he echoed the thinking of Santayana, Collingwood and Dewey who held, respectively, that artistic communication depends upon a 'sympathy', a 'collaboration', or a 'community of interest'. That is, he held that if symbols are to be truly meaningful they must be, at least to some extent, conventional and cultural and historical-specific.

In order to grasp this meaning, therefore, one must live the life of the community by which and for which it is produced, or one must reconstruct the conditions of its production, for example, by documentary research.

This view of the artistic semantic was also favoured by Warburg and his followers, notably Panofsky who pursued the symbolic sub-structure of works of art through 'as many documents of civilisation historically related to that work ... as he (could) master, documents bearing witness to the political, poetical, religious, philosophical, and social tendencies of the personality, period, or country under investigation' (Panofsky, 1939, 16).

Others who have applied the theory of signs and symbols to art include Langer and Reid. Langer concludes that the analogy between art and language breaks down if it is carried beyond the general semantic function which they are supposed to share. This is because, she argues, art has no literal meaning; it is 'significant form' without conventional significances; it is an 'unconsum^mated symbol' (Langer, 1942, 240).

Reid, too, refuses to accept that works of art are comparable to signs which merely indicate to the viewer the appropriate choices of interpretation; art is not a language in this connotative sense. But neither does he believe that artistic meaning can exist independently of the work which expresses it. To describe the intimate and complex relationship between meaning and form he has coined the term 'embodiment' (see Reid, 1931; 1969); aesthetic embodiment, he says, is a fusion by imagination of content with form. A comparison may be made between the notion of embodiment and Bell's idea of 'significant form' (see Bell, 1914). Ducasse (1929) heavily criticises Bell's term on the grounds that it merely labels the problem it purports to explain; it does not really explain how artistic meaning adheres to the formed material. This criticism is true, to some extent, of Reid's term too. It purports to reveal something of the relation between form and meaning while, in effect, it conceals the paradox that aesthetic meaning is said to belong simultaneously to the unique form of the material and to the imagination of the viewer.

Also associated with the theory of signs and symbols are those semanticists, semioticians, or structuralists who aim to make art criticism into a positive science. These have been concerned mainly with poetry and literature which are unquestionably linguistic forms, but something of this work has rubbed off on the visual arts in recent years, particularly in the work of Barthes and Rouve. Over the question of whether or not art is a language, Barthes, for example, holds 'any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual' to be a kind of language (Barthes, 1973, 111), and this generic way of conceiving language enables him to apply structuralist thinking to a variety of cultural phenomena including the visual arts.

Gombrich too has called upon the theory of signs and symbols, in the form of communication theory, to bring together the ideas, still unresolved since the time of Veron and Tolstoy, that art is, on the one hand, a means of expression, and on the other hand, a means of communication (see Gombrich, 1963, 56-69). He presents expression and communication not as alternatives but as the poles of a continuum, and he says that most means of expression and communication, such as art, contain elements of both. Thus he accepts that works of art are expressive, but only insofar as they are structured. Shapes, colours, and so on, he says, cannot be expressive in themselves, except in a vague and rudimentary way. But when the artist structures his material, and the viewer interprets it, they do so within a framework of conventions and traditions which limit the possibilities open to them, and provide a context within which meaning may be manipulated and generated. This applies even where the artist chooses an unconventional treatment, and commits what Gombrich calls a 'breach of decorum'. His choice is meaningful because of its eccentric relation to the established alternatives, and not in spite of it.

As we can see, the theory of signs and symbols which has dominated the debate throughout the greater part of this century does not of itself indicate whether or not art is a language as such. Different adherents to the theory apply it differently with the result that some, such as Cassirer, Langer and Reid conclude that art and language differ in certain fundamental respects to do mainly with a belief in the immediacy of aesthetic perception. Others, however, such as Barthes and Gombrich lay more emphasis on the mediation of conventions in the transmission

of meaning, whether it be artistic or otherwise, and they are not quite so ready to make clear distinctions.

If there has been any agreement, however, since the mid-nineteenth century, among writers on the language of art, then it is that, whether or not it is proper to call art a language, it is different from natural languages both in form and function. The consensus seems to be that, while verbal language articulates and communicates thought, art expresses or communicates feeling; and that artistic symbols are not strictly connotative in the same sense as verbal language is said to be.

Some writers, such as Reid (1962; 1970; 1976), Broudy (1964; 1970) and Witkin (1974), have recognised that this distinction may contribute to what they see as the under-valuing of art in the curriculum compared with word-based subjects. Words express thought; thought is a vehicle for, if not a prerequisite of, knowledge; and knowledge is valued highly. If art is to be given its due, therefore, it must be shown that the feeling which it is said to express is also in some way cognitive.

Hirst (1973) also argues that art expresses a special form of knowledge, but he swims against the tide inasmuch as he feels that art and natural language may yet have much in common. His view is that the nature and function of ordinary, verbal language has been misconceived; it is not the case that the symbols of language in ordinary discourse have meaning because they either name or refer to objects or states of affairs which exist independently of these symbols. Hirst points out that, according to Wittgenstein, the connection between words and their meaning is not purely contingent; instead, meaning and intelligibility are necessarily tied to the employment of symbols in particular rule-governed ways; they exist in the use of language, in the public use of symbols.

In this respect Hirst's view echoes that of Gombrich who, as we have seen, believes that meaning is necessarily contextual and that art, like every other symbol system, including that of verbal language, must be understood within a framework of conventions if it is to have any significance. The possibility of treating art as a language, according to Hirst, depends upon whether the notion of truth or falsity is applicable to artistic statements. The idea that a work of art may be

true or false is unlikely if we cling to the simple 'correspondence' theory which suggests that some symbols happen to correspond with what is observed while others do not. There is no reason why we should cling to it, however; we do not restrict the idea of truth in this way in mathematics or in issues of morality. It is much more reasonable to suppose, he argues, that statements, meaning and truth are logically related functions of the symbol system itself, and since such systems are social products, the conditions for truth in any given system depend upon agreement.

Hirst's views have met with some criticism, notably that of Schrimshaw (1973) who provides the 'standard' arguments against the 'statement theory' of art. To do this he lists what he sees as the fundamental features of languages and statements, as discovered in accepted cases, and then he argues that art does not exhibit many of these features. For example, natural languages have basic units which can be combined, according to syntactic and semantic rules, into larger significant wholes; languages are conventional in the sense that their vocabularies and syntax may, within debatable limits, be modified to include wholesale borrowings from other languages, or to coin new terms as required (see Chomsky, 1971; Goodman, 1971); there is no reason in principle why a statement in one natural language should not be translatable into another (see Haas, 1968); and the relationship between any language and the materials used to convey or record messages in it is entirely contingent. As for statements, these may be negated, and they may be combined by using a variety of logical operators (e.g. 'and'; 'either/or'). If the statement theory is to hold any water, according to Schrimshaw, Hirst must be able to show that these features of languages and statements are not fundamental because none of them apply to art.

Hirst's reply to such criticisms (see Hirst, 1979) is that even if all the properties listed are possessed by all statements in all natural languages, it still has to be shown that these properties are logically necessary for the very notions of 'language' and 'statement'. We must not assume, he says, that natural languages exhaust all the possibilities, and it is not the case that any truth can, by convention, be expressed in any contingently available medium; certain truths can only be expressed in one form or symbolic structure because no other could be established

with the same relationship to what Wittgenstein calls 'the form of life'. Hirst reiterates the need to approach the problem of language and art from a general theory of meaning rather than from the niceties of natural language analysis.

Others, perhaps more understanding of what Hirst is trying to say, have also criticised his views. Reid (1974), for example, has some sympathy with his ideas, but he feels that if Hirst is right, and that art does have a propositional element, it is probably its least important characteristic. Hirst's theory hinges on there being a logical parallel between artistic judgements and those of mathematics, science, morals, and so on. Reid agrees that we constantly make statements about art, as we do, say, about morals, and in different ways we try to justify and assess works of art. We cannot therefore deny the background of experience influenced and partly formed by words and statements (i.e. by 'art language'). We are language-using animals and it enters into everything we feel and think and do, but accepting all this, there is an overwhelming aspect of art, according to Reid, which is ignored by Hirst. This is 'the dynamic exploration, the active felt-cognitive conative experience of living in and through art'; this is knowledge through 'direct sensational aesthetic perception of the formed materials' (Reid, 1974, 163).

Philosophers, it appears, are by no means agreed on whether or not art may be properly called a language, but at the coal-face of art education it seems to have been taken for granted that it may. One hears art referred to as a language frequently in the company of art teachers and administrators, and the notion is a commonplace in the professional press and in the kind of literature found in most school and college art departments and libraries. Rowland (1965), for example, devotes whole chapters to it, as do Carpenter and Graham (1971). Green (1978) uses terms such as 'visual literacy' and 'the language of seeing' in relation to art and design, and some writers, such as Cumming (1980), go so far as to suggest that this language has a vocabulary and a grammar. Visual Publications markets a set of educational film-strips under the title: 'The Language of Colour', and the expression has even found its way into G.C.E. examination papers in the History of Art: 'Discuss the way any specific artist has used the basic visual language of art, of point, line, texture, colour and form' (A.E.B., 1980).

Clearly the value of the term 'the language of art' lies more in its practical applications - its educational currency - within the art educational community than in its exact philosophical meaning, and if it may be taken as a typical example of the language used to talk and write about art in educational circles then it would seem that such language (art language) bears out Wittgenstein's often repeated dictum, 'the meaning is the use'.

4.3 John Hayes on 'Language and Art'

In this sub-section I wish to make the point that 'art language' does not simply reflect something of the nature of art, it is not merely 'background' as Reid would have it (above); such language has a material effect upon the production and consumption of art in education and in life generally, because it is not extra to what Reid calls 'the active felt-cognitive conative experience of living in and through art', but an essential ingredient of it. In order to make this point I shall summarise a lecture on the subject of 'Language and Art' given by John Hayes at the University of London Institute of Education on the 9th. March, 1978.

Hayes distinguishes, as I have done, between the idea of art as a language and the language used to talk and write about art; that is, between 'the language of art' and 'art language' respectively. It is with art language that he is concerned and, he says, such language is 'conventional' as opposed to 'natural', and 'historical-specific' as opposed to 'eternal'. From this he concludes that 'all aesthetic meaning is the result of conventions'. These he calls 'social coding devices' which, he says, 'are not biological or psychological or in any way innate'. Thus, there is no single art language shared by all in our society; a different coding device is used, say, in the family from that used in the school. Consequently, education and career can change the art language one uses.

The main point in Hayes' lecture is that art language has a material effect on the production of art objects and on the consumption or appreciation of such objects in education and hence in society.

4.31 The effect of art language on the production of art

He concentrates first on the effect of art language on artistic production, using Witkin's book, The Intelligence of Feeling (1974); as a specific example of a linguistic instrument for producing what he sees as certain 'unnatural curriculum practices' in the school. Witkin's explicit objective, he says, is to provide a language for teachers to understand and control their work, which is equally applicable to all the arts. Attendant upon the development of such a language would be an improvement, according to Witkin, in the status of the art teacher in the school; for among other things the language would be used to justify in appropriate terms the art teacher's role. But whereas Witkin believes that his language simply describes a natural process which must of necessity be recognised in the curriculum, Hayes sees it in different terms: his view is that the language itself generates a certain type of world and a certain type of individual to inhabit it.

The stress in Witkin's book is on feeling, affectiveness and immediate sensuousness, and on the respectable cognitive basis of these (a ludicrous position, according to Hayes, who believes that there is an irreconcilable dichotomy between knowing and feeling). The three main theses embedded in the book all attempt to give art a place in the world as the repository of feeling:

- a) The book distinguishes between the public, objective world and the private, subjective world. The public world is the shared world and it is represented in the curriculum by the natural sciences, maths., etc. The private world exists, however, only because the individual exists. This world is naturally the domain of art.
- b) The book distinguishes between Self and Being. Self shares in the public world, Being is in the private world. Being is the locus of 'sensate impulses'. Art education therefore develops the Being.
- c) The book distinguishes between two forms of knowledge: 'object forms' and 'feeling forms'. Object forms are the concern of science which is based on 'impressive action'. Feeling forms are the concern of the arts which are based on 'expressive action'. Thus, there are different relationships between the scientist and external objects, and

the artist and external objects. The object impresses itself upon the scientist. By contrast the arts are concerned with the direct sensate possibilities; there is an interaction here between the feeling of the artist and the sensate possibilities of objects, which creates a feeling form.

Language such as this, according to Hayes, has an effect by constituting a specific type of art world and a specific type of personal view. In the first place, it maintains the traditional division between the arts and the sciences in the curriculum and it justifies this arbitrary division as if it were natural and eternal; and in the second place, it dislocates the artist from the social world instead of integrating him with that world.

It is Hayes' view that Witkin's message is contradictory: he (Witkin) wishes to supply a language of art to raise the status of the art teacher in the school, yet that very language maintains the distinction between the arts and the sciences which creates the low status of such teachers in the first place. 'Cognition' goes to the scientist, and 'feeling' goes to the artist. This division of human experience is absurd, according to Hayes; it is a myth.

Hayes completes his criticism of Witkin's language with the view that it generates an idea of art as purely therapeutic, something which bolsters us in our journey through the public world. This idea, he claims, helps to perpetuate another myth, that art and feeling are 'feminine' or 'cissy', while science and knowledge are serious, independent and 'masculine'.

4.32 The effect of art language on artistic consumption

Next Hayes turns his attention to ways in which art language effects the consumption or appreciation of art. In this respect he says that the way teachers talk about art is 'a major determinant of the way art is consumed'. The discourse of art is part of artistic success. The use of a particular art language is a cultural or social technique enabling the consumer to approach an art object, to make an aesthetic response and a proper evaluation. Educational institutions maintain

linguistic traditions for making and evaluating art.

To demonstrate his point Hayes uses Art Students Observed by Madge and Weinberger (1973). The research in this book was done in an un-named art college in the Midlands, but Hayes claims that what the authors discovered there is representative of college life throughout the country. In particular they found that language plays a large part in the evaluation of students' work and ability, and that one of the criteria for assessing Foundation Course students seems to be their ability to defend their work verbally in seminars and criticisms. They also found that although tutors refuse to tell students in what style or manner to work (in the interests of creativity), students learn what staff prefer from implicit cues in their language, in the typical 'positive' and 'negative' evaluations they make. Typical positive evaluations made by staff at the time of this particular piece of research included terms such as 'logical', 'significant', and 'spacial', while typical negatively charged terms included 'woolley', 'arbitrary', 'preconceived', 'designed', and 'elegant'. The authors maintain that staff must have some visual reference or preconception in order to make such evaluations, for marks on paper or canvas cannot be, in themselves, significant or arbitrary, or whatever. Even though they may choose to deny it, therefore, staff must have an idea of what they expect to see in the successful student's work, and through their evaluations they implicitly transmit their preferred styles or manners of working and understanding.

Hayes supplements this evidence with an observation of his own. He recalls over-hearing an art teacher criticising a student because 'all of his work centred on illusion created by one-point perspective'. He says that, ostensibly, this statement is purely descriptive, but to a student who has learned the appropriate code it is a negative evaluation. It implies, according to Hayes, that artists should not work in traditional ways but in innovative ways. This is an example, therefore, of the way in which teachers may use language to influence their students ways of working and thinking about art.

4.33 Summary and Conclusion

The main points arising from Hayes' lecture may be summarised as follows:

- a) art language does not refer to a natural or eternal phenomenon; through education, in the broadest sense, it generates and perpetuates a 'world of art' which conditions artistic production and consumption
- b) art language in education has material effects on what passes for art in schools and colleges, on the relations between art and the other subjects in the curriculum, and on the career choices of students
- c) art language has an effect on the consumption of art in education insofar as artistic appreciation involves the learning and understanding of verbally mediated social conventions or codes.

Hayes' illustrative material, particularly that relating to teacher evaluations of student performance, gives a useful indication as to how one might pursue the study of language in art education. However, there is one reservation to which I should admit, which concerns Hayes' view of 'aesthetic' experience. He seems to equate 'art' and the 'aesthetic', seeing them both as culturally and socially occasioned phenomena. I am not convinced, as I say in my Introduction to the present work, that this is the case. While I would agree whole-heartedly that 'art', as such, is culturally and socially specific, there is some cause, I believe, to treat 'aesthetic' experience, which is not attendant upon any particular kind of object, activity or event, as a natural response. In any case, the sense of Hayes' argument is changed little if the words 'art' and 'artistic' are used instead of 'aesthetic' (e.g. 'artistic response' instead of 'aesthetic response') and, this done, I would fully accept his point of view.

4.4 Art History and Art Criticism as Social Constraints upon the Consumption of Art in Education

The teaching of art history and art criticism is an obvious way in which the student is exposed to art language. In this sub-section I shall refute the view that the teaching of these subjects equips the student to think for himself about art and to work out his own values, and I shall argue that, in the main, it imposes educationally and socially valid ways of thinking about artistic production.

4.41 The teaching of Art History

One is reminded that 'there is no genuine history of art; rather there are historians who have selected art objects from those that have remained within a society, and collected these together in such a way that others look upon these examples as typical of a period in history. Which of these examples are shown depends to a great extent upon the art historian. For example, ... Hieronymus Bosch is much more popular today than he was fifty years ago. And it is certainly the art historian who has rescued Van Gogh from obscurity. To some extent, then, a study of the history of art can provide the opportunity to follow the development of art styles as seen by an authority ... ' (Lowenfeld and Brittain, 1970, 319).

An 'authority', according to Chambers's dictionary, is one who derives power from office or prestige, and this means one whose views are socially validated. The history of art, as the work of this or that 'authority', may thus be described as a body of knowledge which is mediated indirectly by prevailing social conditions, and in teaching the history of art the teacher is, albeit unwittingly, passing on the norms and values of his society.

The value of teaching art history as a pre-digested body of knowledge, presented in chronological order, is questioned by some writers who propose certain alternatives. Sandler, for example, advocates a revised format for the teaching of art History, with the initial emphasis on contemporary art (see Sandler, 1970). He accepts the view that the past is continually revised and revaluated by the present, and he

recommends allowing the present to regenerate those aspects of the past that illuminate and enrich the present. He does not completely reject what he calls the 'scientific' approach to art history, although he feels that such an approach is not sympathetic to certain aspects of art such as its unpredictability, its revolutionary (as opposed to evolutionary) development, and its more personal and poetic sides. But he does claim that there is a need for a complementary approach for the purposes of art education, which begins with the present interests of the student. The common acceptance of a linear chronology that governs the teaching of art history, he says, inhibits authentic challenge in education and does not encourage teachers to question and renew values continually.

In effect, Sandler's revised format amounts to the study of Art History by means of a reversed chronology, the aim being to make the appreciation of art more personal and original, and to make art history more relevant to the studio work of the student who, it is believed, is enabled by this method to exercise greater control over his influences. This view is also professed by Rouve who holds that, if all art historical research is motivated by present interest and present purpose, then art history in the field of art education should proceed from the interests and purposes of the students (see Rouve, 1973). Unlike other forms of history, she maintains, the evidence (i.e. works of art) may be studied first-hand; thus, in some respects, the professional art historian is in no better position than the student to make criticisms and interpretations.

However, reversing the chronology of historical events, or allowing the student to organise his own expeditions into the history of art, does little to alter the fact that the study of art history in education is normative. The source material for art historical study, particularly in the schools, is almost inevitably second-hand or pre-digested. It is contained in books and other publications which, quite obviously, represent the selection and classification of objects, artists and events by particular socially and temporally situated authorities, and whether it is approached chronologically or otherwise its overall conception and organisation transmit the same implicit messages. This is also the case when works of art are confronted directly in galleries and museums; the selection and organisation of exhibits is a professional business and the process, again, has certain implications for the student

exploring the history of art. The conclusion must be that the study of art history in schools and colleges is, in the main, a means whereby socially validated knowledge, views, attitudes and values are transmitted to the student implicitly in the material he must use, and this is more or less true no matter how that material is approached.

Sandler and Rouve envisage the study of art history as something which may be controlled by the student, with each student conducting his own programme. In effect, however, the study of art history in a formal educational setting is controlled very much by syllabuses laid down by the examination boards. And even where such constraints are not imposed the course of study, and the attitudes, values and knowledge received by the student, are very much under the control of the teacher who is the mediator of socially valid views and ideologies. Walker (1979) illustrates well this role of the teacher in a description of two of his own lectures. These formed part of a history of art course at Middlesex Polytechnic intended 'to teach students the rudiments of pictorial rhetoric so that they can make articulate statements about the world in which they live' (loc. cit.). They were based on certain assumptions which Walker wished his students to adopt, in spite of an apparent reluctance on the part of one in particular to go along with him: 'I welcome the feedback', he says, 'but am put out by the seeming unwillingness to consider new ideas' (ibid.).

The main subject of Walker's lectures was the theory of 'binary montage'; that is, the generation of meaning in contemporary art by pairing images. He tried to show, by projecting a slide of Margaret Bourke-White's photograph of flood refugees in Kentucky in 1937, that binary montage juxtapositions are also to be found in a single-frame image whose composition is divided into two parts. This particular image shows a relief line of homeless black people queuing beneath a hoarding displaying a poster which proclaims that Americans enjoy the 'world's highest standard of living'. Apart from these words there are others in the picture which claim that 'There's no way like the American way', and there is a giant image of a white, well-fed, well-heeled, smiling family in a saloon car which appears to be bearing down upon the line of destitute blacks beneath. Walker tells us that he proposed in his first lecture that in an ironical way the photograph contrasts the conditions of affluent

white Americans and poor blacks at the time of the Depression, and that it was part of the photographer's skill to be able to recognise and to capture this adventitious juxtaposition, to make her political point. Most of his students accepted this interpretation, according to Walker, but there was one who refuted the view that the picture was originally intended as a general condemnation of American society in the 1930's, maintaining that it merely recorded the situation of a restricted number of flood victims whose adverse circumstances were local and temporary.

There is nothing in the photograph to suggest that the line of blacks is a line of flood victims. Walker says that he gave this information to his students when he first showed them the slide. Because of his difficulty in convincing the dissenting student Walker reflects that in future he will withhold such information until after the image has been discussed because it interferes with his main purpose which is to illustrate particular, already determined points which he wishes to get across. 'What this admission highlights', he says, 'is the fact that the art teaching situation is a highly artificial one. The images are illustrated not so much for their own sake but as examples of general points the teacher wishes to make, in this instance, a point about pictorial syntax and semantics' (ibid.).

Inasmuch as it was Walker's intention to prove a point by means of the flood-victim slide, he failed in the case of only one student, the others so it seems being more or less open to his ideas. But this statistically slight failure worried him to the extent that he had to return to the same slide and to the same issue in the second lecture where he brought to bear the fruits of a week's reflection. In this lecture he gained some ground with the doubting student, but the latter was still not convinced by the end of the lecture. This continuing failure to convince absolutely all of his students was, one suspects, the reason why he was moved to commit the experience to paper and to publish it in a journal. And if Walker is typical of lecturers in the history of art, then his experience recounted in that journal shows that, even in a class where feedback is 'welcomed', the real business of the lecturer is not to accommodate the individual and ideosyncratic responses of his students but to transmit, by means of verbal argument, the values and attitudes he holds himself.

4.42 The teaching of Art Criticism

Closely associated with the teaching of art history is the teaching of art criticism. Most of the literature on this comes from the States; it is not specifically aimed at the visual arts, but the methods it promotes are applicable (see, for example, Aschner, 1956; Beardsley, 1968; Smith, 1968 and 1973; and Feldman, 1973). Typical of this literature is the work of R.A. Smith who divides the process of art criticism into two basic sets of activities: 'exploratory aesthetic criticism', and 'argumentative aesthetic criticism'.

Exploratory criticism may be described as an aid to and a means of sustaining aesthetic experience. Aesthetic argument, on the other hand, may be called critical communication carried on in behalf of a given critique (Smith, 1973, 39).

According to Smith, exploratory criticism involves describing, analysing, characterising, and interpreting the work of art under consideration. In describing it the critic simply notes the more literal aspects of the object; in the analytical phase he attends carefully to the 'inter-relations of sensuous elements' noted in description; characterisation marks 'the peculiar nature of the work's aesthetic qualities'; and in the interpretive phase he makes an effort 'to construe overall meaning' (ibid., 40). Smith presents exploratory criticism as 'a set of techniques a learner can use to perceive an object as completely as possible' (ibid.). Implicitly in the process, however, there is also an appraisal of the value of the object, and in this respect the language of exploratory criticism may also be seen as aesthetic argument, leading to the final phase of the process, that of evaluation.

Ostensibly the teaching of art criticism would appear to equip the student with skills which will enable him to approach works of art more sensitively, and which will allow him to make up his own mind about the meaning and the value of particular works. On closer examination, however, this is found not to be the case; for Smith also says that the aim of teaching criticism is, essentially, 'to assert a measure of informal control over the quality of thought and feeling in a society' (ibid., 38); he says that the language of exploratory criticism is 'typically normative'; he speaks of the teacher selecting works of art for criticism, for their aesthetic, cognitive, and moral value; and he owns that some interpretations may be better than others;

There can be variability among logically compatible interpretations of the same work; the sticky issue arises in the case of logically incompatible interpretations ... One meaning must be wrong, for the work is not that indeterminate or formless. The possibility must be held open, however, that new experience may turn up a more relevant, better grounded interpretation (ibid., 43).

The reality seems to be that variability is allowable within limits which are established by the teacher whose role it is, like that of the art history teacher, to select appropriate material to demonstrate particular aesthetic, cognitive, and moral points, thereby exercising a degree of control over the ways in which art is thought about and understood. The argument that logically appropriate interpretations arise from the form of a work of art is more difficult to prove than Smith appears to recognise. So complex are the processes of perception that it is by no means agreed just how much 'form', as perceived, is determined by the material object, and how much it is the product of mental processes and schema which are, to a considerable extent, culturally and socially conditioned (see my discussion in 8.31, below). Thus, when Smith speaks of 'logically compatible' interpretations it is quite likely that he means, in a veiled way, those which arise from a similar social, conceptual, and ideological base. If this is so, then his claim that 'more relevant' and 'better grounded' interpretations on the part of the student may follow from the educational experiences set up by the teacher, is another way of saying that, as a result of such experiences, students may come to understand art and particular works of art in the same terms as the teacher who, by dint of his authority, mediates what is and what is not a valid or logical interpretation.

Reid (1974) says something about artistic interpretation which is relevant here. He makes the point that, although artistic meaning may not be circumscribed, the meaning of a particular work of art is not open to unlimited interpretations. He maintains that interpretation in art must be 'competent' or 'artistically viable'. Among the various definitions of 'competent' in Chambers's dictionary is 'belonging', and in the Penguin dictionary one finds 'with authority to act'. Applying these to the idea of a competent artistic interpretation, one comes up with the view that it is one made by a person who 'belongs' to, or is accepted by, the artistic community, and one who acts therefore with the 'authority' of that community. As such a person the teacher is competent to make artistically 'viable' interpretations of the works he selects for his

students' consideration and, inasmuch as he endeavours to pass these on to the class, it is his role to teach his students the lore of the artistic community.

This view of the teacher as a mediator of social values, attitudes and knowledge comes across clearly in the writing of Feldman (1973) who proposes a method of criticism similar to that of Smith. Feldman describes criticism as 'more or less informed, and more or less organised talk about art', and he casts the teacher in the role of 'model critic' (loc. cit., 50). In this role the teacher passes on to his students his own experience of art and its relation to life in general. More to the point, the teacher passes on the language he uses to 'communicate effectively' about art, as Feldman puts it.

Wilson (1970) also sees it as the teacher's role to verse his students in the appropriate language, but he identifies more than one language of art education. He holds that art, art history, and art criticism are distinct disciplines which articulate and communicate knowledge of particular kinds by means of different technical languages which are only partially known and understood by the uninitiated. By means of content analysis of the language used by art teachers, art historians, art critics, and non-art-trained individuals he has shown that the languages used by critics and historians are comparable in many respects; the language used by these categories differs significantly from that used by practical art teachers; and all three categories differ in their language use from the control group of people without art training. His conclusion is that if art teachers are to function successfully as teachers of art history and art criticism, then they must make an effort to grasp the necessary specialised languages which it is their role to pass on to their students.

The implications of teaching art criticism, or indeed art history, extend further than the use of specialised languages for communicating and framing particular concepts. As Crittenden (1970) shows, aesthetic argument and the persuasive use of language in teaching art has an effect on the way art is experienced. Thus, the teaching of art criticism, whereby an experienced teacher pits his values, attitudes, beliefs, and powers of persuasion against those of his students must be seen, ultimately as a means whereby society may influence and form the individual student's experience of art, bringing it into line with that of other members of the artistic community.

4.5 Post-script

The end of this chapter completes Part One of my thesis in which I have been taking a speculative look at some of the ways in which language and art relate, and in which I have tried to demonstrate the point that the relations between art and verbal language are not merely incidental but integral.

In the Introduction I reduced the complexity of these relations to a system of concentric spheres of operation, with the language and the work of the artist at the centre, and extending through the spheres of art criticism and art history to that of art education. It would be well to remember here, however, having looked at each sphere in turn, that the reduction of such complex relations to a system of spheres is only an expository device adopted for convenience and not because it necessarily reveals or reflects something about the field of study. The issues I have been discussing under their respective headings interweave and interact, and if this is not emphasised then the artificiality of the system may well distort what really happens. One must remind oneself that, while it may be possible to consider the language and work of the artist in some degree of isolation, in effect they are bound up completely with criticism, history, and education. Again, one must remember that the distinction between art criticism and art history is a tenuous one, and that one cannot really distinguish between the effects of criticism on the production and consumption of art, and those of art historical writings.

Just as it would be a distortion to distinguish too sharply between the spheres within the world of art, it would also be a distortion to isolate the artistic community from society at large of which it is part. The work of the artist is conceived, executed, interpreted, and consumed within a complex social context in which the worlds of commerce, politics, and so on, all feature. It would be impossible to explore every possibility in a work such as this, but their existence must at least be acknowledged. And it must also be said that, just as language mediates between the artist and his work, and between the spheres of the artist, the critic, the historian and the educationist, it is also the medium by which these spheres communicate with the 'outside' world. It is through language predominantly that society creates, sustains and controls

the world of art, and it is through language that the prevailing emotional, intellectual, ideological and political climate is assimilated and accommodated within the art world.

Having considered the relations between art, language and society in very broad terms, it is now time, in Part Two, to concentrate on a more specific and localised study of language in art education.

PART TWO

EMPIRICAL WORK

CHAPTER 5

TWO CASE STUDIES: CONTEXT AND METHOD

The time has come in this field for the false truism and the plangent platitude to give way to the elementary experiment and the hesitant hypothesis (Goodman, 1968, 265).

5.1 Introduction

As the title of this chapter suggests, it is my aim here to provide a theoretical context for the two case studies which follow, and to explain the method which I have adopted and adapted to suit the aims and objectives of these studies. In order to do this I shall begin with a brief survey of the literature on language and education which has influenced my thinking most, and which should help to clarify much of what I have to say in succeeding chapters. Then I shall explain the aims and objectives of the case studies before describing the methods of data collection and analysis used. I shall complete the chapter with a note on the source of my data; that is, the school in North London and the particular classes where I carried out the research, and this will introduce the first of the case studies which follows in Chapter 6.

5.2 Language and Education: A Brief Survey

Language has been an explicit concern in education, throughout the curriculum, since the early 1960's. In 1963 the Newsom report stressed the importance of language, and language development has been one of the main preoccupations of the Schools Council since its beginnings in 1964. Aspects which have attracted most attention include relations between language and thought, language and social structure, and language in the classroom.

5.21 Language and Thought

Educational interest in the relations between language and thought has centred on the dynamic view held by the Russian psychologists, particularly Vygotsky and Luria. According to this view, language shapes, makes possible, and even generates some kinds of thought (see, for example, Vygotsky, 1962; and Luria, 1959). The American educational psychologist, Bruner, is also sympathetic to this view, and he goes so far as to say that the use of language is essential to cognitive growth (see, for example, Bruner, 1964; 1966). Piaget, however, swims more or less against the tide with his 'image primacy hypothesis' (see Piaget, 1926; 1954); according to him, language follows thought and, while it may be important to cognitive growth, particularly in what he calls the 'concrete' and 'formal' stages of development, it is not crucial. Other influential views include those of Chomsky, and behaviourists such as Osgood. Chomsky's genetic approach posits primary, deep-structures in the intellect which are originally cognitive, and which are fundamentally well-suited to generating language (see, for example, Chomsky, 1957; 1966; 1976). Osgood has built 'internal mediating processes' into the traditional behaviourist stimulus-response model, and he sees language as such a process (see Osgood, 1953). Empirical work on the relations between thought and language has, however, produced little more positive than that, for example, verbal labelling facilitates such cognitive tasks as categorisation (see Shepard and Schaffer, 1956), and that language assists transfer of learned principles from the learning situation to a more general application (see Kuenne, 1946). Also, research tends to show that infant deafness handicaps abstract, propositional, cognitive tasks, although Furth claims that deaf children develop non-linguistic means of conceptualisation (see Furth, 1966).

5.22 Language and Social Structure

Sociological interest in language originates in the 'linguistic relativity hypothesis' of Sapir and Whorf. According to this, what we take to be the 'real' world is unconsciously built up from the language habits of our particular social group (see Sapir, 1966; and Whorf, 1956, for example). No two languages, according to Sapir, are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality; we see and hear and otherwise experience as we do very largely because the language habits

of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.

Vygotsky and Bruner accept the social implications of language use (see, in particular, Bruner, 1971, Chap 2). Vygotsky's view (Vygotsky, 1962) that speech is originally social has prevailed over Piaget's theory of 'ego-centric' speech (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, 117-122). It is generally accepted therefore that thought derives in infancy from socially received language usages by a process of internalisation. In this way language may be seen as instrumental in socialisation through self-regulation. Bruner (loc. cit.) proposes something very similar when he says that cognitive growth is an internalisation of cultural tools which are symbolic, and language is the most sophisticated of these.

The possibility that social considerations may effect thought and experience through the mediation of language has far-reaching implications for education. Two sharply opposed views have emerged over these, represented in the respective theories of Bernstein and Labov (see Labov, 1971 and Bernstein, 1971, Part 1). The former is associated with what is known as the 'deprivation' or 'deficit' model, while Labov contends that it is a fallacy. The deficit model suggests that different languages and dialects mediate different kinds and levels of thought and experience, and that particular forms are thus preferable for educational purposes. Put very simply, the Standard English spoken by Middle Class children may facilitate a higher level of abstract thought and understanding than forms spoken by Working Class children who are thus educationally 'deprived'. Labov accepts a strong correspondence between social class, language, and educational success, too, but he rejects the idea that some forms of language are educationally more suitable than others. His view is that if Working Class children are, in general, less successful in school it is because their language does not reflect that of their Middle Class teachers. Bernstein and Labov differ over the question of research method, too: Bernstein's early theories were developed without the benefit of extensive fieldwork, while Labov's ideas have emerged out of naturalistic research and participant observation. However, the issues are no longer as clear cut as they once were; Bernstein's thinking has changed considerably since his early and best known work. He no longer relates complexity of linguistic form directly with complexity of thought and experience, but he maintains that different language forms have different cognitive effects by 'focusing' experience in different

ways (see Bernstein, 1971, Part III). Meanwhile, Labov continues to explore the notion that educational performance relates more to the language user's identification with this or that set of values and attitudes than to the power of language forms to facilitate cognitive growth. The balanced view is provided by Lawton who maintains that every language or dialect is adequate for the particular needs of any culture or sub-culture; that one may think and say anything in any language, but it may be more difficult to convey certain ideas in some forms rather than others (see Lawton, 1977).

5.23 Language in the Classroom

Studies in classroom language range broadly between those concerned with methods of coding teacher-pupil exchanges to naturalistic commentaries on classroom dialogue. Between these - the quantitative on the one hand, and the qualitative on the other - lie interaction analyses, sociolinguistic approaches, and studies of language as a means of class control.

An example of coding would be Waimon's categorisation of teachers' statements according to function (see Waimon, 1969); these include 'gaining attention', 'disciplining', and 'making statements about goals'. It has been argued that this approach is limited in value because it moves away too soon from the classroom situation and into generalities (see Barnes, 1971). In this respect the more inclusive structural approach of interaction analysts such as Bellack is preferable (see Bellack, 1966). Drawing on Wittgenstein's notion of 'language games', Bellack identifies four, basic, pedagogical 'moves': structuring, soliciting, responding, and reacting. These moves, according to Bellack, occur in cycles making up sub-games which in turn compound to produce the complete language game of classroom teaching and learning. Sinclair and Coulthard too identify recurrent units of typical classroom language (see Sinclair and Coulthard, 1974), including what they refer to as 'IRF'. This is a sequence of teacher and pupil moves (initiation - response - feedback) which is repeated to build up more complex interactions.

Commentaries on classroom dialogue tend to raise more questions than they would claim to be able to answer, although their authors seldom come across as being completely impartial. Barnes, for example, cries

out for research into the effects of teachers' language, and draws attention to what he sees as 'blocks' to learning (see Barnes, 1969). Among these he cites 'language registers' and certain kinds of question. By 'register' he means the language of secondary education, and the specialised languages of individual subjects in the curriculum. If used insensitively, Barnes argues, these special forms of language may inhibit learning by mystifying the essential issues unnecessarily. Similarly certain sorts of question, favoured by teachers, may prove unproductive; for example, there is what Barnes calls the 'pseudo question' whereby the teacher asks for information when it is clear that he already has in mind the 'right' answer. Such questioning may discourage pupils from reasoning for themselves, Barnes suggests, and it might well be that 'open questions', by which the teacher genuinely invites original answers, have more educational value. Britton also comments on actual examples of classroom dialogue, and makes suggestions as to how it may be made more effective (see Britton, 1969; 1970). In particular he favours what he calls 'expressive speech' by which he means open discussion between pupils with a minimum of teacher intervention. Such discussion is beneficial to certain elements in the school, he says, inasmuch as it makes pupils aware of 'alternative possibilities' on given issues which they feel to be relevant to their own lives. By extension, he suggests the use of 'Rogerian debate' (named after its originator, Carl Rogers), in which pupils are encouraged to take up particular points of view often antithetical to their own. Britton also comments on written work in schools, and the ways in which it is affected by the audience for which it is intended; in this respect the teacher may at different times assume the role of different kinds of audience ranging from the confidant to the impersonal examiner. In the same context Rosen contrasts the formal and impersonal language of school text-books with what he describes as 'personal, creative language', dismissing much of what is written in text-books as 'empty verbalism' (see Rosen 1967; 1969).

Sociolinguistic interest in classroom language has centred on the use of language as a means of control, not only in terms of discipline, but also as an insidious control over the distribution of knowledge within society. Walker and Adelman (1972; 1975a; 1975b) have examined and reported on the differing functions of language in 'formal' or traditional classroom settings and 'informal', more fluid settings. In formal classes

they find that language is used mainly for the transmission of socially validated knowledge, while in informal settings it is used more as a tool for creating and sustaining complex social relationships. In general the sociolinguistic approach has found that the teacher's language fulfils certain functions whether or not the setting is formal or informal. The teacher dominates the situation by the amount of talking he does as compared with that of his pupils, and he uses language to maintain control, to underpin social relationships, to define implicitly what counts as valid educational knowledge, and to define, again implicitly, what counts as valid educational behaviour (e.g. what kinds of discourse are permissible in class). The implicit messages conveyed to pupils in the language use of the teacher, and in the control he exerts over language in the classroom, have been described by some researchers as the 'hidden' curriculum or agenda (see Jackson, 1968; Snyder, 1971). Bernstein also concentrates on this aspect of classroom language, identifying three message systems whereby educational knowledge is transmitted: firstly there is the curriculum which defines what passes for valid knowledge in a particular society; secondly there is pedagogy which defines what are taken to be valid ways of conveying that knowledge; and thirdly, there is evaluation which defines what are held to be valid 'realisations' of knowledge by the pupil. These systems, according to Bernstein, are mediated by social values and attitudes which are more or less implicit in the language of education and the classroom (see Bernstein, 1971, Chap 11). Barnes, too, is interested in the control aspect of the teacher's language, particularly the control exerted over the language of the pupil (see Barnes, 1975). According to Barnes, a teacher's linguistic style sets up classroom relationships which determine the speech roles open to pupils. This is important, he says, inasmuch as the use of language by the pupil determines, in turn, the kinds of learning which he is able to engage in. Barnes offers a spectrum model of teaching style ranging between transmission and interpretation (Barnes, 1973, 14-16). In reality, he says, no teacher would be placed at either extreme of this range, but a teacher who tends towards the transmission pole prefers to dole out information to a passive audience, thereby directing his pupils' attention ^{more} towards his signals of approval or disapproval than towards making sense of the subject-matter. Thus he restricts his pupils' ability to think and feel independently, whereas a teacher tending towards the other end of the scale sets up a

classroom situation which, according to Barnes, allows more 'exploratory' talk of a kind which develops the pupils' ability for independent thought and feeling. In such a classroom attention is centred on problems raised by the subject-matter rather than the language which is used more as a means of discovery.

A survey of work and ideas on language in the classroom would not be complete without some reference to 'language learning programmes'. Most programme designers agree on the necessity for three overlapping stages: 'reception', 'internal symbolisation', and 'expression'. An example of such a three-stage programme is that published by E.J. Arnold for the Schools Council under the title, Concept 7 - 9. The three units in this package are 'Listening with Understanding', 'Concept Building', and 'Communication'. The programme was originally designed for West Indian children, but it has been found to have a more general application. Its materials are aimed at effectiveness and communication competence within clearly defined tasks, and this overcomes a problem inherent in the language 'deprivation' theory, the *raison d'être* for language learning programmes; that is, the problem of adequately defining the notion of language proficiency. One activity in the package, which is of particular interest here, involves children working in pairs, with one describing a picture as faithfully as he can to the other who cannot see it. The second child must draw the picture from the verbal information, and the exercise is aimed at testing and developing abilities in the purposeful use of language.

5.24 Language Studies and Art Education

Although it is never directly admitted in the literature on language and education, there seems to be a tacit understanding that art education somehow falls outside the scope of research in this area. This understanding may be based on the misconception that, because art education is to do with things 'visual', this removes it effectively from matters 'verbal'. If this is so, then one wonders why mathematics, say, has not similarly been excluded by the researcher from studies in language and education, since it is to do with things 'numerical' rather than things 'verbal'. But maths. has not been excluded in this way (see, for example, Barnes, 1969), mainly because the inclusion or exclusion of subjects does not depend upon logical distinctions but upon ingrained attitudes and

habits of thought which are rarely questioned. Nonetheless, there are instances of studies which have looked into the question of language in art education, but these too seem to accept at the outset a fundamental difference between art education and education in other areas of the curriculum, particularly in respect of language. Consequently they ignore the possibility of a functional relation between language and the production side of art, and restrict themselves to those aspects of art education which are more obviously verbal; that is, the history of art and art criticism. For example, Smith (1968; 1973) and Feldman (1973) concern themselves with devising methods of criticism suitable for use in schools; Othanel-Smith (1961) studies language across the curriculum, but when it comes to art, he considers its value only in relation to the development of 'critical judgement' which, he says, is common to all subjects. In other words, his interest in art only extends to particular aspects which it happens to share with other subjects in the curriculum; he is not concerned with the role of language in art specifically. Wilson (1970) also restricts himself, in this case to a comparison between the language used by art teachers and that used by art historians, art critics, and non-art-trained individuals. In such studies it is the efficacy of methods of transposition from the 'visual' to the 'verbal', and vice-versa, which are in question and not the relations between the visual and the verbal in art, or the underlying social values and attitudes which mediate artistic production and consumption, and which are transmitted in the language of the teacher.

5.3 Background to the Present Project: the Pilot Study

In the Autumn of 1978 I carried out a pilot study (see Appendix) in which I set out to 'test the water', as I put it; to confront the technical problems; and to see if it would be feasible to mount a 'more systematic' investigation of language in the practical art classroom. My conclusions were that it would be possible to adequately record exchanges between the teacher and the class, and between the teacher and individual pupils, without running into too many technical problems or being too intrusive. I found that many of the ideas and methods discovered in the literature on language and education generally were equally applicable to art education, and I found that the art lessons I observed and recorded were such a rich source of conjecture on the issue of language in art education

that a deeper and more systematic investigation would doubtless be rewarded.

But the pilot study was a very rudimentary exercise intended only to complement the theoretical work I was doing at the time, to focus or to 'ground' the wide-ranging ideas I was conjuring with, and to inform my plans for empirical work. It was never intended to test or to confirm my theoretical presuppositions, or to provide a firm basis for the more ambitious investigation toward which I was working. Neither did it provide any solutions to the problem of how one might begin to examine 'more systematically' the use of language in art education.

5.4 Aims and Objectives of the Present Project

Useful and necessary though the pilot study was, the ground-work still remained to be done. It was still too soon to launch into breadth studies, with representative samples, designed to provide 'objective' results capable of being generalised, if indeed this field of study does lend itself to such an approach. What was needed, I decided, was an in-depth study of a small sample, with the emphasis on the qualitative rather than the quantitative, the impressionistic as opposed to the objective, to open up the field and perhaps to frame specific questions and generate hypotheses. What was needed, in fact, was a phenomenological examination of the language of particular, randomly selected art classes, in which everything is held to be problematic, and nothing is taken for granted.

The case studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7 aim at such an examination, the objective being to allow the findings to emerge directly out of the events and conditions encountered in the classes observed. More specifically, the aim is to take what passes between the teachers and their pupils in the two lessons (which, by chance, represent quite different examples of art teaching), to see if there are any real grounds for believing that language is instrumental, in a fundamental sense, in the production and consumption of art in the classroom and, if so, to pursue the issue.

5.5 Method

In the last ten years there has been a move, particularly in the States, away from the quantitative, behavioural approach to educational research and evaluation to a more qualitative one. Eisner, for example, and some of his research students at Stanford, claim to have been working at the task of creating a new way of looking at the phenomena that constitute educational life within classrooms (see Eisner, 1976). In the past, they say, educational research has treated educational practice as a 'nomothetic' activity (one controlled by laws) rather than an 'ideographic' one (guided by the unique characteristics of the peculiar situation). The Stanford researchers have reacted against this, taking the view that, 'teaching is an activity that requires artistry, schooling itself is a cultural artefact, and education is a process whose features may differ from individual to individual, context to context' (loc. cit., 140). According to this view the quantitative approach is in many ways inappropriate for educational research, not least because it leads to the over-simplification of the particular (quality) through a process of reduction aimed at the characterisation of complexity by a single set of scores. In other words, the scientific approach attempts to reduce quality to quantity, and this is inappropriate if the particular is seen to be of central importance in educational practice. Furthermore, the number symbol itself possesses no inherent quality that expresses the qualities of the particular it is intended to represent. Hence it is the case that certain areas of the curriculum may suffer more than others by the use of numerical test scores as the basis of research and evaluation. In particular, it is most inappropriate to try to reduce the practices of art education to quantities when artistic activity involves the use of symbolic forms which, unlike assigned scientific symbols, embody their own meanings in their particular qualities.

Eisner's 'new way' of looking at classroom life involves two central concepts which have their roots in the arts rather than the sciences: 'educational connoisseurship' and 'educational criticism'.

5.51 Educational Connoisseurship

According to Eisner, connoisseurs appreciate what they encounter, and this does not mean that they simply like what they see. Appreciation,

he says, means 'an awareness and an understanding of what one has experienced', and 'such an awareness provides the basis for judgement' (ibid.). Educational connoisseurship, then, is judgement informed by experience and by a grasp of educational theory.

5.52 Educational Criticism

If connoisseurship is the art of appreciation, criticism is the art of disclosure. What the critic aims at is not only to discern the character and qualities constituting the object or event - this is a necessary but insufficient condition for criticism - the critic also aims at providing a rendering in linguistic terms of what it is that he or she has encountered so that others not possessing this level of connoisseurship can also enter into the work. Dewey (1934) put it nicely when he said, 'The end of criticism is the re-education of the perception of the work of art'. Given this view of criticism ... the function of criticism is educational (Eisner, 1977, 347-8).

Eisner identifies three constituents in educational criticism: description, interpretation, and evaluation.

5.521 Description

- . The descriptive aspect ... is an effort to characterise or render the pervasive and purely descriptive aspects of the phenomena one attends to. For example, critical description might tell the reader about the number or type of questions raised in a class, the amount of time spent in discussion, or the kind of image or impression the teacher or the room gives to visitors. Descriptive educational criticism is a type of portrayal of the qualities that one encounters without getting into - very deeply, at least - what they signify (Eisner, 1976, 142).

5.522 Interpretation

The interpretive aspect of educational criticism represents an effort to understand the meaning and significance that various forms of action have for those in a social setting. For example, just what do the intrinsic rewards for reading mean to the third graders who keep charts of the number of books that they have read? What do the eager outstretched, waving arms and hands signify to both teacher and students when students compete for the opportunity to provide the teacher with the right answer? What kinds of messages are being given to students by the allocation of time and its location in the school day to the various subject matters that constitute the curriculum? To answer these questions requires a journey into interpretation, an ability to participate empathically in the life of another, to appreciate the meanings of such cultural symbols as lists of books

read, hand-waving, and time-allocation. The interpretive aspect of educational criticism requires the judicious and informed use of a variety of social sciences, and the practical wisdom born of experience in schools (Eisner, 1976, 145).

5.523 Evaluation

The ultimate consequence of educational criticism is evaluative in the sense that something must be made of what has been described and interpreted. The task of the critic is not simply one of being a neutral observer (an impossible position in any case), nor is it one of disinterested interpretation. The critic uses what he or she sees and interprets in order to arrive at some conclusions about the character of educational practice and to its improvement (Eisner, 1976, 146).

5.53 Validity of the Method

Eisner admits that the method raises problems, not least being the possibility that different educational connoisseurs may describe, interpret and evaluate the same phenomena differently. However, he puts forward certain useful criteria which may be applied to validate the results of the technique. The most important of these he calls 'structural corroboration' and 'referential adequacy'. Structural corroboration, he says, 'is a process that seeks to validate or support one's conclusions about a set of phenomena by demonstrating how a variety of facts or conditions within the phenomena support the conclusions drawn. It is a process of demonstrating that the story hangs together, that the pieces fit' (Eisner, 1976, 148). As Eisner himself recognises, one of the liabilities of this criterion is that 'nothing can be so persuasive and coherent as a swindler's story'; structural corroboration needs to be checked, therefore, against referential adequacy:

The test of criticism is empirical in the sense that one asks of criticism whether the referents it claims to describe, interpret, and evaluate can be found in the phenomena to which it attends ... The referential adequacy of educational criticism is determined by looking at the phenomena and finding what the critic has described (ibid.).

In this sense, according to Eisner, the test of criticism may be more empirical than the traditional, numerical approach to research and evaluation; the classroom events which are to become the subject of the criticism may be recorded on audio- or videotape, transcribed, and presented with the criticism for the scrutiny of other educational connoisseurs.

5.54 Generalisation of Results

One might well ask whether educational connoisseurship and criticism are likely to lead to useful generalisations about educational practice. Can the study of a handful of non-randomly selected classrooms yield conclusions that apply to classrooms other than the ones studied? The answer to these questions is complex. Insofar as the application of critical procedures discloses subtle but important phenomena that other classrooms and teachers share, then of course the gist of critical disclosure is applicable. But the only way to know that is to be able to learn from critical discourse what might be worth looking for in other educational situations. In other words, if it is true that the universal does indeed reside in the particulars which artistic activity constructs, the renderings of those constructions in critical language should open up aspects of classroom life that participate in such universals. To know that requires itself a sense of connoisseurship. Unlike the automatic application of a standard, what one learns from effective criticism is both a content within a particular classroom and a refined sensibility concerning classrooms that is useful for studying other educational situations.

There is another way in which effective connoisseurship and criticism might yield warranted generalisations and that is as cues useful for locating phenomena that might be subsequently pursued through conventional educational research. Creative scientific work in any field depends upon new realisations, new models, or new methods to guide enquiry. Insofar as effective criticism reveals aspects of educational phenomena that were previously unnoticed or underestimated, a fresh focus for conventional scientific study could be provided (Eisner, 1977, 356).

5.6 The Appropriateness of Eisner's Method for the Present Project

Eisner and his students have experimented with the method described above, and they are satisfied that, 'educational criticism may truly be regarded as a complementary tool to other methods in educational research' (see Alexander, 1977). It is clearly a very attractive method to one such as myself with a background in art and education, not only because the notions of connoisseurship and criticism are familiar and comfortable, but also because the broad aims and objectives of the method are similar to those of the present project as they are presented above.(5.4).

The study of language in the practical art class is 'a much neglected area; Eisner says that one important purpose of his method is to reveal aspects of educational phenomena that were previously unnoticed or underestimated. Starting more or less from scratch, one's first approaches must take

nothing for granted; they must be exploratory, qualitative, and open to possibilities. By asking questions which are too specific, or by seeking data which lend themselves to quantitative analysis, at this early stage, would be to risk ignoring possibilities which might, in the long run, turn out to be of great importance, and which, once recognised, might be pursued through conventional educational research methods.

In short, Eisner's method is suitable because it is qualitative; it assumes that the general resides in the particular, and that generalisation must rest, in this area of research at least, upon in-depth investigation of the particular situation. But it is also suitable because it is extremely versatile and allows for the incorporation of subsidiary methods appropriate to the particular objects of the researcher's interest. In the case of the present project it is possible to call upon the ideas of researchers who have already tackled the problem of language use in areas of the curriculum other than art, to act as a base upon which to build and to open one's eyes to the possibilities.

5.7 Application of the Method

The method revolves around the ideas of educational connoisseurship and educational criticism. In the present project I am claiming the status of educational 'connoisseur' on the strength of over ten years teaching at a secondary modern school, two grammar schools (one boys' and one girls' rolled into one as the result of educational reorganisation), a sixth-form college, and a tertiary college. But this does not mean that I consider myself particularly well-qualified to stand in judgement over the work of other teachers who may well be better experienced. Indeed, I do not see this project at all as an exercise in 'judgement', in that sense, even though there is an element of evaluation involved. I shall return to this point later (see 5.73 and 10.3, below), but I must say here that I claim connoisseurship, not by any supposed superiority in my own teaching experience, but on the strength of several years of addressing myself to a problem which other art teachers and researchers have neglected. On this particular issue, therefore, my experience is probably better than most.

The other basic element of the method, that of representation or written criticism, develops through three stages: description, interpretation, and evaluation.

5.71 Description

In practice the three stages overlap to some extent; it is impossible to describe any phenomenon without discrimination and selection, and these imply interpretation and evaluation. However, in the two case studies I attempt to describe the proceedings in the lessons observed in a way which is relatively unproblematic, at least in terms of commonsense. Events are recounted in the sequence in which they occur, following closely transcripts of audio-tape recordings and notes made continuously throughout the lessons. This plain description is meant to underpin everything which follows. It provides the context within which everything must be understood (this includes the physical context - the rooms); it serves to relate the events, utterances, exchanges, and so on, which are picked out and discussed separately, out of sequence, and in greater detail in the succeeding stages of the analysis; and it provides the reader with a basis on which to judge the writer's interpretations and evaluations.

5.72 Interpretation

It is in the interpretive stage mainly that the ideas of other writers are brought in to act as a springboard for discussion. As subsidiary approaches or methods it must be emphasised that the main function of these ideas is to fire my thinking and to help break down the material into manageable categories. They are not allowed to dictate the way the discussion goes, and they are not allowed to overwhelm the aims and objectives of the method by tying down the discussion to particular, fixed possibilities. It would be contradictory to choose a method for its freedom and scope, and then to restrict the discussion by the wholehearted adoption of this or that theoretical approach. For this reason it will be seen that while the notions of, say, 'coding' or 'structural analysis' (see 5.23, above) may be brought to bear, there is no question of coding the transcripts according to the functions of every word or phrase, and neither is there any question of analysing them completely into 'acts', 'moves', 'exchanges', and so on, to see what this proves.

The method is not intended to prove anything; it is intended to reveal and to explicate, and it relies more on the insight of the researcher, as participant and connoisseur, for its results than upon methodological instruments.

It will be seen that there is a broad similarity between the categories chosen to interpret the material from both lessons. However, within these categories there is some variation because, as far as possible, I have allowed the data to dictate the form of the discussion. Thus, while both interpretations concentrate on the 'situation', 'language registers', 'teacher evaluations', and 'structure', there are considerable differences between the sub-headings which appear under these categories.

There follows a brief explanation of the meaning and significance of the main categories chosen to interpret the data:

5.721 Situation

Communicative competence includes knowledge of the 'etiquette' of speech in particular situations. Without this knowledge, the participants risk being disvalued themselves, or having what they say ignored or misunderstood. Observers need some of this knowledge too if they are to follow what is going on, and especially if they are to interpret the fine shades of meaning carried by various linguistic choices. Their interpretation of everyday, personalised conversation depends largely on a knowledge of basic rules by which an ordered interchange of words is created and sustained - for example, the conventional ways of claiming, keeping and relinquishing 'the floor' - and an awareness of part of that back-cloth of shared meanings to which the speakers implicitly refer (Edwards, 1976, 157).

School classrooms offer typical 'situations' where there are relatively well-defined constraints on the distribution of talk, the communicative processes, and the level of formality. Aspects of the language used can be seen as 'both patterned and predictable on the basis of certain features of the local social system' (Blom and Gumperz, 1972, 409). Thus, the choice of 'situation' as a category for interpreting the data is intended to reveal those features of the 'local social system' (i.e. the social relations prevailing in the lessons observed) which help to determine the distribution of talk, the communicative purposes, and the level of formality. Prominent among these features is the 'setting' (i.e. the physical arrangement of the room and the clues this gives to the teacher's position

relative to the pupils, figuratively speaking), the 'participants' (i.e. their role-relationships), and the 'topic' around which the talk centres (i.e. the particular object or objects of the lesson, and the relative control of the participants over the choice and treatment of these).

5.722 Language Registers

The notion of language registers recognises the existence of the specialised use of language relative to different activities and types of 'situation'. As Edwards (1976, 150) points out, however, there are difficulties attached to this notion; there has not been sufficient formal characterisation of registers to enable us to use it precisely. But in the literature on language and education there is informal recognition of what are called the 'subject register' (the language of particular school subjects), and the more general 'classroom register'. For my purposes, and in the absence of clear operational definitions, I take a leaf out of Barnes' (1969) book, and identify examples of the use of registers 'impressionistically' under the headings of 'presented' and 'non-presented' specialist language (e.g. technical terms and conventions of the subject which are either explained by the teacher or left for the pupils to pick up), and the 'language of secondary education' (i.e. language typical of scholastic 'situations' and which is more or less common to all subjects).

5.723 Teacher Evaluations

This category is fairly straightforward and self-explanatory. The intention here is to examine evaluative statements, mainly by the teacher, and the ways in which evaluation is used in the lessons (i.e. its strategic value). It is a particularly important category in a study such as this where the broad aim is to discover what values and attitudes the teacher is attempting to communicate, or is unconsciously communicating, to his pupils as being especially 'artistic'. It is a category which deals with both the 'what' and the 'how' of cultural transmission.

5.724 Questions

Many writers, as the following passage (from Edwards, 1976, 170-1) shows, have recognised that it is not so much what is asked by means of questions

in the classroom, as how it is asked;

Mood has been called 'the grammar of communicative roles', a main means of 'realising' semantic options (Halliday, 1971). Of course, a question may be asked in other ways than through the interrogative mood, and what seems from its surface to be a question may realise quite different functions (e.g. a 'rhetorical' question, which indicates not a dialogue but a continued monologue, or a command when the 'question' draws attention to a rule which has been broken - 'Is that someone talking in the back?'). But however they are asked, questions are an essential method by which teachers claim and retain the initiative, and allocate the complementary respondent roles. The type of question asked also has far-reaching communicative consequences, as well as the possible cognitive implications suggested by other investigators (Gallagher and Aschner, 1963; Taba et al., 1964; Sanders, 1966). The proportion of 'factual' to 'reasoning' questions is seen by Barnes (1969) as indicating to pupils whether the content of the lesson is to be received ready-made, whether it can be challenged, and whether their own experience has anything relevant to contribute. This is how they are socialised into the appropriate learner-roles, into an appropriate stance towards the knowledge being transmitted. This is how the teacher defines the content of the interaction and controls the 'participant structures' (Philips, 1970; Barnes and Todd, 1975).

It need hardly be said, then, that an analysis of questioning in the interpretive stage of a study such as this can be immensely fruitful. Actually, this is one of the categories which varies considerably in its content between the two studies. The two lessons described, as it will be seen, are very different in several respects, particularly in the role relationships of the participants. Whereas the pupils passively accept what they are told to think, see, and do in Lesson A, in Lesson B they are much more active and in control of what they are doing. And whereas in Lesson A it is the teacher who asks most of the questions, for a variety of pedagogic purposes, and the pupils ask the odd question to confirm that they have 'got it right', in Lesson B the pupils are given more to asking questions, and for various reasons. Since the constitution of the categories derives, as much as possible, directly from the material presented in the respective lessons, this accounts for some of the variation between studies. There are other reasons, one being the fact the two teachers concerned use questions in slightly different ways.

5.725 Structure

The notion of 'structure' is tied very closely to that of the 'hidden curriculum'. The latter (as used by Jackson, 1968; and Snyder, 1971) refers to 'the tacit rules and attitudes concerning appropriate pupil behaviour which every pupil must learn if he is to be successful at school; values concerning what is appropriate educational knowledge, what are appropriate pupil responses to teachers' questions, and so on. Many such messages are transmitted to pupils, but they are rarely transmitted explicitly in the content of what teachers say' (Stubbs, 1976, 94). Rather, they are transmitted in and through the 'structure' and sequencing of teacher-pupil discourse, and the ways in which teaching and learning roles are defined. Typical conversational structures discovered in classrooms other than art classrooms show that the teacher assumes almost complete control over initiating topics, evaluating, accepting or rejecting the pupil's contribution, and over closing the exchange. In the IRF discourse structure revealed by Sinclair and Coulthard (1974), anything the pupil says is sandwiched between anything the teacher says, the implication being that it is the teacher who has control over who talks when, and that education consists of listening to an adult talking, and answering his or her questions.

By devoting a category to 'structure' in the interpretive stages of these case studies my intention is to tease out, in the evaluative stages, the tacit messages about appropriate art educational behaviour and thinking which might be transmitted through the control that these particular teachers exert over the linguistic environment.

5.73 Evaluation

It is not my intention in the evaluative stage to judge the performance of the teachers observed, nor to gauge the value of the learning experiences they provide for their pupils. Neither is it my immediate intention to improve art educational practices or to prescribe more effective uses of language in the art class. Admittedly such outcomes are suggested in the way Eisner describes the evaluative stage of his method, and I dare say that they might well follow as a by-product, at least, of any research which, like the present project, takes a 'critical' view of current practices. I also accept that it must be the long-term

aim of every one of us involved in art education to bring about improvements of one kind or another. But my immediate aims and objectives, as I have already said, are to understand something of the role of language in what is popularly called a 'visual' subject, and to reveal some of the ways in which it performs that role.

Now, I would argue that this is not inconsistent with what Eisner says about the evaluative stage of the method, even though it does not seek the same outcome. Accepting that he does expect the evaluations of the critic to lead to improvements in art educational practice, he also says that the critic uses what he sees and interprets in order to arrive at some conclusions about the character of educational practice (see 5.523, above). This, I would say, is just what I do in the final stages of the case studies, and I would defend them as being 'evaluative' in two senses which are perfectly consistent with what Eisner says: they set out to conclude something about an aspect of art educational practice (i.e. the use of language) and to say something about the value of language in the lessons observed; and they attempt to distinguish those aspects of language use in the art class which might be worthy of closer examination.

With the benefit of hindsight, in Chapter 10 I propose an alternative to the evaluative stage as it is construed here and by Eisner. This is derived from the literature on social action (e.g. Sartre, 1963; and Bosserman, 1968) and it effectively adds another dimension to the method besides those of connoisseurship and criticism. This is 'feedback', and its inclusion transforms the spirit of the method from one of reflective analysis on the part of the researcher to one of action-research, involving both the researcher and his subjects in the business of continuous evaluation and re-evaluation.

5.8 The Source of the Data

The source of the data was the Art Department of a fairly large comprehensive school in North East London. It has a young staff, half a dozen in all, one of whom is a qualified technician, and it has seven studios which include the Print Room, the Ceramics Area, the Graphics Room, the Sixth Form Studio, two general purpose rooms, and the Art

Office/Design Studio. Not all of these rooms are purpose-built, but the Department as a whole is well equipped and well organised.

I observed and recorded three complete lessons at the school in September and October, 1980: the very first lesson of the term for a first-year class, with a teacher whom I shall call Tony; a forth-year lesson with the Head of Department whom I will be calling Peter; and a lesson with a fifth-year group which, in the event, I did not use.

I also observed and recorded a full day's teaching in a tertiary college in South West London in early October, 1980. The class of sixteen-year-olds was in its first year of the newly validated DATEC General Art and Design course, and the recording extended through two, three hour sessions with the same lecturer.

None of the lessons I recorded was chosen for its particular 'suitability' for my purposes; I wanted simply to observe and record lessons, more or less at random, so that I would have typical or everyday examples of language in art education as it is practised. If anything did guide my choice then it was the lingering feeling ('lingering', that is, from an idea I played around with in the Pilot Study - see the Appendix) that perhaps classes going through a transition from one level of education to another, such as the first year in the secondary school or the first year in the tertiary college, and which are in the process of acquiring a new or modified art language, might provide more explicit material than those which had had time to settle-in. But this did not turn out to be a major consideration, and when I had made and transcribed the recordings it was clear that all of the lessons afforded something of interest, whether or not they involved a 'transition' class.

Having observed, recorded, and transcribed all four classes, I decided to use Tony's first-year lesson and Peter's fourth-year lesson in the secondary school. I chose these for my in-depth case-studies because, paradoxically, they are very similar in some respects and very different in others. It was not my purpose to do a comparative study, so it was not particularly important to avoid choosing two lessons from the same school, taught by close colleagues who, one would have thought, spoke very much the same art language. But it was important to have some variety in such a small 'sample' if only to sustain my own interest and

that of the reader and, more importantly, to provide a broader range of possibilities to explore. Tony's was the first lesson I recorded and I made up my mind fairly quickly that I wanted to use it for one of the studies. The fifth-form lesson was very different (it was a lesson in which the teacher handed out mock 'O' Level examination papers and explained to the pupils how they should go about preparing for the exam.) and so, as one might imagine, was the lesson recorded in the tertiary college. Peter's lesson was similar to Tony's inasmuch as it involved the teacher in the supervision of practical work over a relatively short yet intense period, but given this similarity, one could see immediately that the two lessons provided rather different examples of language use and respondent roles. This relationship between these two lessons - similar in format yet different in detail - made them a natural choice for pairing. There was no question, of course, of tackling all four recordings in the present work; the case studies alone would have filled the space allowed and there would have been no room for the theoretical chapters.

My methods of data collection were very simple and therefore relatively unobtrusive. The teachers concerned carried a portable audio-cassette tape-recorder, complete with neck-mic, which recorded everything which passed between the teacher and the class, and between the teacher and individual pupils throughout the lessons. I observed the proceedings as discretely as possible, from the entrance of the first pupil, making notes to explain and enhance the transcripts.

CHAPTER 6

LESSON A

6.1 Description

6.11 The Room

This lesson takes place in the Graphics Room which is approximately 32'x30', and which is made into an L-shape by the inclusion of a stock-room (8'x12') in one corner. The Graphics Room fills the complete width of the building and is well lit, having windows along the two external walls. Most of the windows are brightly painted with translucent floral and other designs, freely executed. The dominant colour on the walls is a deep mulberry, blotted out in places by hurriedly stapled information sheets, pictures torn out of magazines and glued on, a heavily decorated radiator, and one or two large paintings on boards. Apart from these paintings there is little in the way of school work on display in this room, although the walls are marked where work has been stuck on and removed. One gets the impression that the room has been emptied and tidied ready for the new school year, and that it won't remain like this for very long. The tables and worktops have been scrubbed, but they are still spattered with dried paint and ink. There is a large sink set into a bench-cum-draining board which runs along a whole wall beneath the windows. On this bench there are arranged rows of plastic palettes, each palette containing a range of powder colours. There are also brushes, water containers and other materials arranged neatly on the bench, and a large display rack containing still-life objects such as Coca-Cola and lager cans, wine bottles, and pieces of machinery. Beneath the bench, and elsewhere around the walls of the room, there are plan chests and cupboards to store work and materials such as card, paper, tracing paper and scraps. The tables and work benches are arranged tidily and in groups across the room. They betray no obvious pattern and seem to have been placed according to use. As I stand alone in the room waiting for the class to arrive, I can make out no obvious focus suggested by the arrangement of the furniture, no obvious place where the teacher might stand to engage and instruct the class.

6.12 The Lesson

The lesson should begin at 1.55 pm, but it is five or ten minutes late today because, being the first art lesson of the year for these first-formers, they must be greeted beforehand by Peter, the Head of Department, who introduces them to his staff and to the facilities in the Department before dividing them into groups and handing them over to their teachers. The lesson which I am to observe and record is with the group assigned to Tony, a young, bearded, softly-spoken teacher.

At 2.05 pm the door of the Graphics Room opens and in marches Tony with his group. They come in quietly, a group of about twenty boys and girls. They sort themselves out around the tables and, while they are settling into their seats, Tony sets up a slide projector and sticks a piece of white cartridge paper, A2 size, on the wall of the stock room, near the corner which projects into the room. There is little or no talking among the pupils as they wait for Tony to finish what he is doing. Most of them sit with rather glazed expressions, somewhat overwhelmed perhaps by the first three and a half days in their new school. Tony, as it will transpire, has decided to put off most of his talk about studio arrangements and procedures, and to involve his class straight away in some practical work. He is well prepared for what he intends to do and he works quickly and deliberately, enlisting the help of one or two pupils to arrange the equipment as he wants it. This done, Tony takes up his position, seated on the table nearest to the paper screen he has attached to the wall, and begins to speak. As he does so, those pupils who are facing the other way turn and shift in their seats in order to see him.

Today's lesson, Tony explains, will involve working with faces. In his experience, he claims, faces are typical subjects for junior school drawings, along with such things as houses, transport and animals. But not many people at that stage have drawn a face from somebody actually sitting in front of them. He demonstrates this by asking for a show of hands by those in the room who have worked in this way. Very few hands are raised.

Tony makes the point that we are all very familiar with the human face. We spend quite a lot of time, each day, looking at our own faces in the mirror, and we have personal friends whose faces are well-known to us.

This remark produces smiles and whispers among the pupils, but silence returns when Tony asks how one might go about describing the face of one's best friend. He suggests the kind of words one might use, and says that such words provide the sort of information that might be useful in making a drawing. Then he asks the class to suggest some words of their own to describe a face or an expression. One or two pupils respond with words such as 'fair' and 'shy' and Tony comments on their contributions; then, sensing the reluctance of most of the group to participate in strange surroundings, he changes his approach and informs them that they are now going to study the proportions of the face. He asks the boy sitting nearest to him to come and sit between the projector and the paper stuck to the wall. The intention is to use the projector to cast a shadow of the boy's profile on to the paper, as close to actual size as possible. This achieved, the teacher calls to the class to watch carefully as he draws around the shadow with a black felt-tip pen. As he draws he talks continuously, pointing out the difficulties of the method, the best kind of line to use, where to start, etc. The pupils themselves will be expected to repeat this procedure, he says, in the next lesson.

When the out-line is complete the model is allowed to return to his seat and Tony informs the group that he is going to 'ruin' this drawing by drawing over it. Then, with the aid of one or two of the more outspoken pupils, he locates the top of the head, the chin, the eyes, etc., and marks them with horizontal lines. As he does so he comments on the relationships between these intervals and in particular he points out that the eyes come about half-way between the top of the head and the chin; the tip of the nose comes about half-way between the eyes and the chin; and the lower lip comes about half-way between the tip of the nose and the chin.

Tony compares the relationships he has identified with those of what he feels to be the typical junior school drawing of a face. He imitates such a drawing next to the shadow profile. The sketch demonstrates certain naive conventions and proportions which differ widely from those in the shadow profile. Tony says that such a drawing may be adequate in the junior school where 'the main emphasis is on enjoying the work and getting involved in it', but in the secondary school pupils must 'try and get much more precise results and try and see more than (they) normally would do'.

He advises them to look at some of the work done by the sixth formers, who might spend anything up to three hours on one drawing, and he enquires how many people in the class have spent as long as one hour drawing. No one claims to have done this, but on further enquiry Tony discovers that a few have spent half an hour doing so. This, he feels, is quite a long time to spend on a drawing at this age. The teacher then launches into a lecture on how important it is to take art seriously and to try and get involved in the subject while the opportunity is there. He also draws attention to the need to use materials responsibly because money is scarce and everything is so expensive.

Then he gets back to the subject of faces and, in particular, to the individual parts of the face and head. He chooses one or two pupils and he draws their hair styles on some fresh scraps of paper which he has ready. As he draws he talks, revealing to the class the thinking which guides his hand as he translates what he sees into marks on the paper

Right, the way (his) hair comes ... if I draw his eyes ... in fact, if I start drawing not at the top of his head but down on the eye. There's a strand of hair, look, you can see, that comes down there. There's another one that goes across the eye. Now, although I'm not drawing every hair on his head, I'm drawing some of the main parts ... the way the hair curls, and so on, and the way it kind of wraps around the face.

Next he talks about eyes and eyebrows, and the variations to look out for. He illustrates his points with more drawings, and he shows the class how to capture different expressions in the eyes. He apologises at one point because his drawing 'looks a bit cartoony', and he scraps it and starts again. He also emphasises how important it is to examine a person's face very carefully, and to discover exactly what it is about it which gives it its character.

From the eyes Tony moves to the nose which, he says, is always a problem to draw. His advice is to 'underdraw' it, using light marks and concentrating on the tip.

The mouth is next. This, according to Tony, should not be seen as just one line, but three: there is a line in the middle, between the lips and one line above and below this to describe the shape of the lips.

Before he leaves the parts of the face, Tony returns to the eyes and, in particular, the eyelashes. He tells his pupils that, if they look very carefully into each other's eyes, they will see that the lashes do not simply radiate outwards, like the legs of an earwig, as he sees in many drawings (he demonstrates what he means on some scrap paper), but they 'wrap around' and 'change direction' (he demonstrates this, too). Eye-lashes are quite complicated, he says, and he certainly would not expect first-formers to see them clearly, or to be able to represent them. But, he goes on, it is the task of the Art Department to try to train them to see such things.

The class has been listening quietly and with varying degrees of concentration to what the teacher has been saying. One or two members have spoken in response to his questions, but on the whole the only sound of children's voices has been that coming from the Print Room next door where the second form is noisily engaged in practical work. Tony's group becomes more animated, however, when he asks them to look into each other's eyes for the reflection of the windows. They become self-conscious and uneasy, and this leads to whispers and giggles.

Tony says that he has spoken enough and that it is time for everyone to choose a partner to draw. He gives them some advice on how to sit, so that they can draw and model at the same time, and he asks them to start drawing the eyes and to work outwards, using the proportions discussed earlier in the shadow profile. Before he allows them to begin, however, he produces some drawings of faces and figures done by other pupils as examples of good drawings in respect of composition, effort, depth of observation, and intelligent use of time available.

It is 2.50 pm when the class springs into action. Pupils choose partners, change places, move chairs, examine each other's faces, and talk excitedly. Tony wanders around the room handing out paper (A3 size) and as he does so he calls over the chatter to repeat his instructions about starting with the eyes and working outwards. He also advises everyone to start near the centre of the paper, and he reminds them that there are about forty minutes of working time left. He says that they should slow down a bit, look harder, and try to see as much as they can.

Tony continues to talk as the class settles down to work quietly. He says that somebody said to him, that morning, that the bottles on the

still-life rack were quite easy to draw. He had disagreed, for the more you look into the them, the more you see. They reflect the room and the lighting, and this makes them very complicated to draw. Faces may at first seem quite simple, he goes on, but they are probably even more complicated than bottles when you really begin to look into them. He suggests that, if we look at faces as if they were some kind of alien landscape, with valleys and hills, we might really begin to see them clearly. We take familiar things, such as faces, too much for granted, he says, we get accustomed to them, and this blinds us to some extent.

Tony talks for a few moments more before he allows the class to carry on quietly with their work. He asks them again to pace their work so that they do not finish in the first ten minutes, and he urges those who feel that they cannot draw to make an effort. He says that he will come around and help them in about five or ten minutes and he begins to sort out the work which he has just used as examples of good drawing, ready to put it away. This takes him not much longer than a minute or two and, no sooner has he done it than he is again addressing the class. He says that there is no work on the walls of the studio because it has been cleared ready for new things. He draws attention to one of the few remaining paintings, a piece about three feet square, on board. It is a head, in profile, and the outline contains a spiral of words, which begins, 'My name is Ray, I have a dog called ...'. Tony explains that it was done by a first-former in a previous year and that it is unusually large because if everyone worked on that scale there would be no room to store everything. As it is, he says, the Art Department has to cope with an enormous amount of work.

As he talks Tony roams around the room. When he finishes he stands at the projector watching the class working as if he is reluctant to leave them alone. Then a thought strikes him and he is on the move again, telling the class that there should be about one eye's length between the eyes and, if the person they are drawing has eyes spaced more widely than this, then it is a sign of great beauty. He says this with some amusement.

When he has made his point, the teacher stops walking and addresses the group of pupils around the table at which he happens to be standing. He tells them not to worry if they are finding it difficult and that they will find it easier with practice. Drawing is like playing a musical instrument, he says; one needs to put in a lot of practice to get to grips with it.

Tony disappears into the store-room to put away the pile of drawings he has sorted out. There is a slight increase in the amount of talking in the room and most of it seems to be directly to do with the work in hand. When he comes out again, the teacher wanders from table to table, talking to pupils in ones and twos. He commends some drawings, tells one pupil he is working too slowly, and gently admonishes another for not concentrating hard enough. He talks with others about their favourite school subjects and hobbies. He discovers that the mother of one pupil studied at the Royal College of Art and that her grandfather started a local newspaper.

While Tony is talking with individual pupils, the attention of others in the room begins to wander from their work and the general noise in the room begins to rise. Tony calls for the attention of the whole group again to tell them something about the running of the Art Department. This means telling them about the other specialist rooms in which they will be working as the year progresses and about the different activities, such as printing and pottery, in which they will be involved. Also he tells them about the paints they will be using (powder paints), how to mix them and how to treat the equipment. He stresses the importance of cleaning everything and putting it away in the right place after use.

With everyone working quietly again Tony returns to helping individual pupils. One complains that he can't draw his friend's nose and Tony sits next to him to show him what to do. He tells him that it is wrong to draw a line all around the nose when it is seen from the front because the nose is formed by the play of light and shade over its curved surface and by the shadows it casts. He talks about shading and he draws a cylinder and a sun dial to illustrate his points. This leads him to talk about the different grades of pencil and the kinds of marks and tones they produce. He also mentions the texture of the paper and the effect this may have on shading. Then he returns to the nose and relates some of the things he has said to drawing the nose.

After speaking to another pupil about the varying shapes of faces and the difficulties of drawing freckles so that they don't look like Measles spots, Tony is drawn to a boy who says he is having difficulty with the hair. He finds some scrap paper, explaining that he doesn't like to work on his pupil's drawings, and he sits down to draw. As he draws he talks;

he talks about the particular head of hair he is drawing and the relations between the hair and the face; and he talks about the more general difficulties of drawing hair, how much detail to apply and how to use shading. He tells the boy that if he half closes his eyes he will make out differences in tone more easily.

Then Tony moves on to a small group of girls working together and asks them how they are getting on. He likes their drawings and he asks them what other subjects they are good at. Then he approaches another, mixed group whose work he also likes for its 'accuracy' and because it is interesting.

While Tony has been attending to individual pupils and small groups, others in the class have become restless and talkative. The teacher calls for everyone to listen and he says that there is some very good work going on. As it is approaching the end of the lesson, he says, it might be a good idea for everyone to look at one piece in particular, which he is holding in his hands, even though he feels that he shouldn't really single out the work of individuals. He holds up the drawing, saying that there are others just as good that he could have picked, and he tells the class that he likes it because it is 'accurate', 'well-timed' and 'attractive'.

When he has finished talking about the drawing Tony asks everyone to put his or her name on their work, and the name of the person they have been drawing. He uses the remaining moments of the lesson to prepare the class for next week's lesson. He shows them a piece of work done by one of last year's first-formers in which he has drawn a profile, using Tony's shadow-casting method and he has filled it in with contour lines. Tony says that this has not worked particularly well because it doesn't really follow the form of the head, but the work is interesting inasmuch as the person who did it has painted the spaces between the lines with rainbow colours. This is what the class will be doing next week and, he says, it would be helpful if they could bring in felt-tip pens for the purpose. The Art Department can supply only the basic materials, he explains, and if the pupils are really serious about their work, as indeed they should be, then they should be prepared to equip themselves more and more as they progress through the school. He concludes by warning everyone that the art room can be a very messy place and he asks them to wear overalls or aprons or their fathers' old shirts to protect their clothes.

There are two minutes left, during which Tony gets a volunteer to collect all the work, and the rest of the class to tidy up the room and to put the chairs on the tables. His instructions are called over the sound of excited voices and furniture being moved and they are interspersed with pieces of small-talk with nearby pupils about how impressed he's been by the work, and about the snacks available in the canteen. At 3.35 pm the bell for the end of the lesson rings and Tony slides open the door for the class to leave. As they do so he thanks them and says that he's looking forward to seeing them next week.

6.2 Interpretation

6.21 Situation

6.211 Setting

The organisation of the Graphics Room suggests an informal teacher-pupil relationship. There is no obvious focus in the arrangement of the furniture; no obvious teacher's 'place' from which the lesson might be conducted. The seating is such that the class breaks down into smaller work-centred, as opposed to teacher-centred, groups.

When they first enter the room and find a seat the pupils are uncertain where to look and how to behave. Tony soon establishes which part of the room he is going to operate from, however, and when he begins to set up his equipment pupils shift in their seats and move their chairs to face in that direction. That is, having grasped that the teacher is about to inform or instruct them, they change the setting to facilitate the anticipated transmission of information.

The transmission takes up the greater part of the double-lesson, from about 2.10 pm until 2.50 pm when the original setting is restored and the pupils get down to some practical work. During this second phase of the lesson Tony uses the spot in front of the projector as a base from which he makes sorties into the rest of the room. He returns to this 'spot' at the end of the lesson, too, to deliver his closing remarks.

6.212 Participants

There is hardly a moment in the lesson when someone is not talking, and that someone tends usually to be the teacher. He talks almost continuously throughout the first phase while most of the pupils listen attentively, and if not attentively, quietly. A handful of children speak out during this period, but only in response to Tony's questions. Some words are exchanged briefly between pupils, more to make contact than to communicate anything.

The linguistic situation becomes a little more complicated in the second phase of the lesson when the teacher is speaking with individuals and small groups. However, it is still his voice which dominates and it is still he who controls what is said, although the response from the pupils with whom he converses is somewhat less wooden than in the first phase. Other centres of conversation develop around the room when the teacher is occupied in one place. Much of this pupil-to-pupil talk is centred on the work set by the teacher. Some is not. It is very restrained and hardly noticeable until quite near the end of the lesson when the class is becoming restless in anticipation of home-time. This rise in the level of talk seems to be a sign to Tony to call the class to order and to resume central control until the bell goes.

There is a clear, almost classic relation between the language roles of the participants and the settings described above. The first phase of the lesson takes the traditional 'chalk-and-talk' form in which all attention is on the teacher who assumes complete control over what is said. The pupils remain passive and contribute only when invited to do so, and then only within limits prescribed by the teacher. The tone of the language at this time is factual and formal, although less formal than one might expect in this mode of teaching. The participants adopt accepted roles which, on the whole, over-ride personality. When this formality is dropped occasionally and the teacher makes personal remarks about his pupils faces, say, or about his own receding hair-line, there are moments in which pupils stop attending to him and smile or whisper to each other. But, for the most part, there prevails what has been described as a 'central communication system' (Adams and Biddle, 1970) under the complete control of the teacher.

In the second phase of the lesson, when the pupils are drawing each other, the central communication system breaks down to some extent, to be replaced by a more dissipated system in which individual pupils talk informally with the teacher and with each other. Under these conditions the teacher feels more able to wander off the main subject of the lesson and to discuss such things as the pupils' families and their favourite school subjects. However, he never really relinquishes control over the general linguistic atmosphere in the room. Between conversations with individual pupils he maintains contact with the whole class. When he feels that pupil talk is getting too much he returns to the spot he has established as his, and he resumes his formal tone. While not exactly asking for less talk he inhibits it by drawing the attention of the class back to lesson-related things such as examples of work by older pupils, or the running of the Art Department.

6.213 Topic

The overt subject of Tony's lesson is fairly simple and straightforward to relate. If one could eavesdrop on one of the pupils as he tells his parents, after school, what he did that afternoon, he might say something to the effect that he learned how to draw faces in the correct proportions, and how to draw the individual facial features and facial expressions. If pressed he might also recall that the teacher spoke of the need to compose pictures well, to look really hard at what one is drawing and not to be blinded by familiarity. If he were a really attentive pupil then he might add that Tony had said something about using time and materials responsibly and effectively.

6.22 Language Registers

Tony's language is less formal than one might expect in the 'transmission' style of teaching (Barnes, 1973) which he adopts during the greater part of his lesson. Indeed, his language is aimed, on the whole, at the age-group he is teaching and he seems careful to explain what he means in everyday terms which his pupils will understand. However, this language is evenly peppered with, and underpinned by, words and passages which stand out as being related more to the conventions of the subject and of

secondary education generally, than to a simple understanding of the topic of the lesson. For example, towards the end of the lesson, when Tony is explaining the differences between the various grades of pencil, he says:

If I just tickle the paper, look with this pencil, I mean, the paper is like that, isn't it? It's ruffled, it's up and down, basically. If you look at that magnified, you can see it's got holes in it, you see? I think it's called heat-press paper actually. So if I just tickle the surface of it like that, all the pencil does, it just catches the top bits here. So we get all these light bits in between, you know, as you can see, it makes a sort of texture. Can you see that?

Here Tony is using words such as 'tickle', 'ruffled' and 'up and down', which are common words and expressions and which adequately convey his meaning. But he goes beyond his immediate meaning to include the information that this particular paper is called 'heat-press' paper (a fact which could mean little in itself to the pupil without further explanation) and that the effect of tickling the surface of this paper with the pencil is to make a 'sort of texture'. While such information is superfluous to the particular point that Tony is making, it is not, however, redundant. For it fulfils purposes other than to explain the effect of a certain use of the pencil on that paper. In particular it provides the pupil with the kind of knowledge he might need as a fully-fledged member of the artistic community and the kind of vocabulary he will need to be recognised as such or, for that matter, to be recognised as the product of secondary education.

Specialist language such as this appears consistently throughout the transcript of Tony's lesson. Some of the more typical examples are discussed below.

6.221 Specialist Language Presented

Tony is sensitive to the possibility that his pupils may have difficulty over certain words and expressions and in most cases he explains or presents those which might be problematic. For example, early in the lesson the words 'profile' and 'proportions' crop up. Tony uses them once or twice without explanation, but he soon attempts to define them without any indication from the pupils themselves that they may be new to them:

Now, a profile is just like an outline drawing of a face seen from the side. I think you've probably seen profiles on coins, in fact. You know, sort of like pictures of the Queen or whatever.

If we have a drawing from the side for this week it can help us work out the proportions, you know, how far down the nose is, how far down the eyes are, and so on.

More examples of specialist words which Tony presents in the lesson are 'tone' and 'collage'. In the case of the former he works towards the word through its meaning. That is, in searching for an appropriate way of saying what he means, he arrives at the word 'tone', thereby defining and presenting it:

I think it would be possible to work further in to that, you know, with a bit more strength in, sort of, light and dark, in terms of tone.

As for 'collage', like 'profile' and 'proportions', Tony mentions it and adds an explanation in case anyone is unfamiliar with the word:

That's things stuck on; things actually stuck on to the page.

There are further examples of specialised terms which are presented but which do not belong in the first instance to the art specialist. One occurs when Tony shows the class an example of an older pupil's work in which 'contour' lines have been used to help define form. Having mentioned the term Tony explains carefully what contours are:

Now you may not know exactly what 'contour lines' mean. But, in fact, they're lines on maps which join places of equal height. And if you look at a contour map it makes these funny kind of shapes, circular kind of shapes, or long circles, or whatever So if you look at the tip of the nose, there for instance, this chap's managed to put some contour lines around the nose to show which is the highest point.

6.222 Specialist Language Not Presented

There are very few examples of technical words in the transcript which Tony does not explain. At one point, while informing the class of the kind of work that goes on in the Art Department he does mention 'lino-

-printing', 'relief-printing' and 'screen-printing' without explaining what they mean, probably because he feels that what he is saying is peripheral to the main topic of the lesson and that he will talk more fully about these processes at the appropriate time. Similarly, he does not explain what he means by a 'design problem' which he promises for next week's lesson, but one is given the impression in the way that he uses the term that he intends to return to it.

Such examples, as I have said, are few and far between in the transcript, but there are numerous instances of the specialised use of quite common terms which Tony seems to take for granted since he makes no attempt to present them as problematic. These are particularly interesting since they constitute a specialised language of art education which pupils are implicitly invited to adopt and which embody particular concepts in art educational thinking.

Perhaps 'specialised' is not quite the right word to describe these words and expressions. A better one might be 'characteristic' since the experienced observer might come to expect their regular use in art lessons. Those discovered in Tony's lesson may be identified broadly as characteristic utterances which a) refer to the teacher's own behaviour, b) reveal the teacher's expectations of the pupils' artistic performance, c) refer to the setting and d) refer to art work (i.e. artistic production).

a) Utterances which refer to the teacher's own behaviour

On several occasions Tony makes comments which reflect upon his own behaviour and these comments betray something of his view of art education. For example, at one point when he is telling the class what he wants done when he finishes talking, he slips in the statement, 'I don't want to talk for too long'. A little later, in the same address, he says, 'I think I've said enough'. Now, what is the point of revealing these thoughts to the pupils? What does the teacher wish to communicate? Is there some particular reason, on this particular occasion, why the teacher must talk as little as possible? Apparently there is nothing more pressing that he must do because, when he allows the class to get on with the practical work he does not rush to perform some other duty or task. It must be, therefore that he is eager for the pupils to put pencil to paper and, this being so, he must feel that, to some extent, he is wasting time talking. If this is the case and if, over a period of time, the pupils hear the teacher making

similar statements, then the message that the real business of the art lesson begins when the talking stops must eventually filter through.

Another example of a quite simple statement bearing an implicit and highly significant message occurs when Tony is helping a pupil who is having difficulty with his drawing. Tony demonstrates how to draw those parts of the face which are giving difficulty, but he says to the pupil, 'I won't do it on your drawing' and he uses a piece of scrap paper instead. The message here is quite plain to the experienced observer. Tony is reluctant to contribute directly to the pupil's own drawing because he feels that this is wrong. It is not in the rules of art education: a pupil's art work must be all his own, even though the teacher may show him how to go about it. Whatever the virtue of this belief, it too will filter into the pupil's conception of art if such statements are made regularly by the teacher.

A further example of this kind of 'loaded' statement occurs towards the end of the lesson when Tony decides to resume central control over the class and to reflect upon the work that has been done. He begins by holding up a drawing and, before he says anything about it, he says, rather apologetically, 'I shouldn't really select one, you know, from the group'. He doesn't say why he shouldn't, although it is most certainly because he feels that in art the element of competition should be played down. That is, he feels that art in education is to do with the quality of individual experiences rather than with performing in accordance with externally mediated values. This of course, is not made clear to the pupils who are left, again, to absorb the underlying concept over a period of time.

The last example in this category is extremely subtle. Whenever Tony speaks of what he intends to do in class in future lessons, he never claims to know exactly what will be happening. He always uses the word 'probably' to qualify any statement he makes in this respect, as in the following case: 'I should think, probably, later in the term, we'll be doing things including some lettering'. Now, it is quite likely that this early in the term Tony has not worked out exactly what the sequence of events will be. But my feeling is that this way of talking about what will happen is, again, a covert indication to the pupils of a way of thinking which they should adopt in relation to art. That is, they should see art, not as a set or a series of exercises to be completed, but as an

exploration of the possibilities conducted in a spirit of discovery. Thus Tony is prepared only to speak of possibilities rather than set plans, to give the impression that whatever they will be doing in the future will depend upon where their present work takes them.

- b) Utterances which reveal the teacher's expectations of his pupil's behaviour in art lessons.

Tony repeatedly tells his pupils that they must 'try and look a lot harder' at what they are drawing:

Try and see more than you normally would do. I think that's the most important thing.

You've got to really look and think, well, what is it about this face in front of me ... ?

Now, if you look really carefully ...

You've got to look that much harder.

The regularity with which Tony says such things is an indication of the importance he must attach to the concept they embody. Indeed, in one of the quotations above he says that to 'try and see more' is 'the most important thing'. The idea is that the artist sees more than other people and it is this which makes his drawing more successful than that of the non-artist. Further, the artist achieves this highly tuned vision by looking 'harder' than other people do and it is beholden upon the pupil, therefore, if he wishes to succeed in art, to put in the necessary effort. Hence the use of words such as 'achieve' and 'effort' which are also liberally sprinkled throughout the transcript.

There is another dimension to this way of thinking which is revealed in these words of Tony's:

You could look at the face and almost imagine that you've come out of a space-ship and you've never seen a human face before, and then you'd really look at it.

That is, in order to be able to see more, one must clear one's vision of interference from preconception. One must look afresh at the world, as if through the eyes of the proverbial visitor from another planet.

The thinking behind this kind of language is contradictory; it is impossible to see with what Gombrich (1960) calls the 'innocent eye' and I suspect what the teacher really means, when he implores the pupil to look harder, is that he must learn to look at things in the way that he, the teacher, as a representative of the artistic community, looks at them. This contradiction between what Tony says and what he implicitly means comes out very clearly in the following statement from the transcript:

It's there, it's in front of your eyes and, you know, all we've got to do in the Art Department is to try and train you to actually see it.

The impression given here is that the Art Department will try to open the pupil's eyes to things which are there to be seen, and that there is some absolute value in being able to see these things. But another way of interpreting it, and one which is born out by Tony's approach to the lesson as a whole, is that the teacher is saying 'you will see what I want you to see if you adopt my way of thinking'. This interpretation is substantiated by the fact that Tony devotes the greater part of his time to teaching the class how to look at the face, what position to assume, what features to attend to, and how to translate those features into two-dimensional symbols. He might well be opening their eyes to things they have not noticed before, but he is not simply releasing them from a more narrow way of seeing; he is substituting another, equally narrow way of seeing of his own, coupled with a way of representing.

All this is implicit in the deceptively simple instruction to 'look harder' which is, clearly, an example of specialised language use, but which is not presented as problematic to the pupils. It is doubtful, anyway, that at their age Tony's class would be able to grasp the difficulties inherent in the instruction, but they are not too young to pick up the language as such and to associate 'looking harder' with the kind of drawing the teacher recognises as successful. In this way the myth of 'looking harder' is perpetuated, the contradictions are buried deeper and a particular way of drawing is communicated.

Briefly, another example of a 'specialised' word which is not presented, but which is used once or twice in the lesson, is 'involved'. For example, Tony advises his pupils at one point to try and get involved in the subject. The implication here is that art is not a subject that one

engages from the outside, as it were, as a given body of knowledge, but one in which the pupil may contribute something of his own. Further, art is something which results from an active interest in things visual - exploring the visual world; experimenting with visual media - and the pupil's success, therefore, will be gauged by the degree to which his interest is evident. In short, 'involvement' is a central requirement and of positive value in the world of art.

c) Utterances which refer to the setting

The teacher makes one reference in particular to the setting which invites discussion. In the second phase of the lesson, while the pupils are working, he says to the class, 'Actually, you've probably noticed that there's no work on the walls at the moment' and he goes on to explain that this is because it was decided to clear the walls at the end of the previous term to make space for new work.

It might be considered interesting that Tony should assume that his new intake of pupils would notice the lack of work on the walls before he drew attention to it. But even more interesting is the way that, by voicing this assumption in this way, the teacher not only draws attention to a basic art educational convention, but he also obviates the need to present it as problematic. He simply talks as if it were self-evident that there should be work on the walls, thereby ensuring that his pupils will come to expect to see this in the future without questioning why it should be. Here is another example, then, of art educational values being transmitted implicitly in the language of the teacher, not in this case by repetition, but by the way in which the value is discussed.

There is another reference to the setting in the transcript which should be mentioned. Soon after Tony tells the class to begin work he draws attention to the bottles on the still-life rack near the sink and tells how a girl in the class he had taken that morning claimed that they were 'quite easy to draw'. He had agreed with her that, on the face of it, they might appear easy to draw but, when you begin to look inside the shape to the reflections in the glass, a bottle becomes a very difficult object to draw.

With regard to the setting, Tony is implying here that the objects in the still-life rack have not been assembled arbitrarily, but very deliberately, to present the pupils with particular artistic problems. The pupils have been primed by this point in the lesson to grasp this implication by Tony's repeated use of the word 'problem' in relation to drawing the parts of the face, and by the general impression he gives, by the use of that word, that art classes are essentially problem-solving sessions.

Thus, by the way Tony draws attention to and talks about the bottles, the setting influences the pupils' expectations of art inasmuch as they will thereafter see bottles, and any other selected objects in the art room other than equipment and materials, as appropriate subjects for artistic exploration, or even as the proper content of art.

d) Utterances which refer to artistic production

One or two of the examples which belong in this category have already cropped up in the other categories of characteristic utterances not presented as problematic. Tony's use of the word 'problem' is one of them. He seems particularly fond of this word and, as I have already said, its repeated use gives the impression that art work is, in essence, problem-solving.

Another example already mentioned is Tony's use of words such as 'perhaps' and 'maybe'. Earlier I commented on their use in relation to the development of the course, but Tony also uses them in relation to the development of individual pieces of work. For instance, when he is showing the class how to draw a nose, he uses both 'perhaps' and 'maybe' in the same sentence:

You can try and draw the tip of the nose here, but make it a lot lighter, perhaps; don't press so hard with the pencil, maybe. "

Used in this way such words function to reduce the impression that what the teacher is saying and doing is absolute and this is an important characteristic of the language of art education. It stems partly from practical considerations and partly from theory, one suspects. In the practical sense, the art teacher may wish to draw attention, in his demonstration drawing, to the fact that drawing is very much a matter of trial and error and that even he must feel his way towards a solution.

In this sense he tries to reflect in his use of words the exploratory nature of the process. In the other sense, however, his use of words may reflect an inner conflict between what he knows he is doing and the constraints of art educational theory. In effect, he is showing his pupils how to draw the face and the facial features. Yet art education above all other subjects is supposed, in theory, to facilitate personal discovery and personal expression. By qualifying much of what he says, therefore, with words such as 'perhaps' and 'maybe', the art teacher may feel that he is leaving some room for the pupil to contribute something, thereby effecting a compromise.

Examples of utterances in this category, which have not come up before, include the expression 'based on'. An instance of this occurs at the very beginning of the lesson when Tony tells the class to watch what he is doing carefully because in subsequent lessons they will 'probably' be doing something 'based on' it. This expression arises from and supports the notion that art is exploratory and developmental, and it may be compared with another expression which Tony does not use but which is also characteristic of the language of art education, which is 'to use something (an object, an idea, etc.) as a starting point'.

The exploration model of art education is extended into one of pseudo-scientific experimentation and description when Tony implores the class to 'try and get much more precise results' in their drawings. And this model is behind several other terms and expressions used during the lesson. In particular, when Tony is helping a pupil to draw the shape of his friend's face, he says, 'I reckon that's roughly the shape,' as if shape could be fixed and calculated (i.e. 'reckoned').

Another word which Tony uses and which, according to usage, may be seen as a specialised term, is 'works'. A good example of its specialised use occurs when Tony is showing the class how to draw the nose. He tells them that it is better to 'under-draw' it and he calls their attention to the way that fashion designers often draw only the nostrils to indicate noses on their models. 'That works as a nose', he says, and he adds, by way of explanation, 'that registers as a nose'.

This example might have been categorised as a specialised term which is presented as problematic by the teacher, since he does attempt to explain

its meaning, thereby drawing attention to the word and to its specialised use. However, his explanation is hardly adequate because he simply substitutes another word - 'registers' - which must be equally strange to this age-group of pupils, leaving them, in effect, to absorb the meaning of the original term through its repeated use.

On this particular occasion Tony uses the word to mean, simply, that the marks on the paper are sufficient to give the viewer the impression that he is seeing a nose. But the term is used more generally. It is an all-purpose term of approval which fits in with the view of art as a quasi-objective form of enquiry. Instead of saying, in so many words, that he feels that a drawing, or part of a drawing, is successful, the teacher says that the drawing is successful (i.e. it 'works'). This removes the evaluation from the realm of the subjective to that of the objective and puts it beyond question. (Robinson, 1981, puts it nicely when he says, 'All jargon and all cant, it seems, want to pre-empt all argument by assuming that we are all agreed'.)

We are dealing here with one of those terms which members of the artistic community use as a kind of short-hand or 'restricted code' (Bernstein, 1971, Ch.5). It is a term which is not defined, but 'picked up in the course of training or initiation into the community. It is used when it is difficult to explain one's feelings towards a work of art which one deems to be successful and, as such, it inhibits or forestalls critical examination of the concepts and conventions which inform a positive evaluation.

When Tony uses this term in his lesson he is not only making a positive evaluation, he is also initiating his pupils into his way of thinking which is ultimately that of the artistic community. He is not inviting them to discuss the reasoning behind his evaluation, however. This is left for them to absorb through example and through habit. In time they will learn when to use the term appropriately and to recognise a drawing or a work of art which 'works'.

6.223 The Language of Secondary Education

This may be considered under two broad headings, a) formality and b) control.

a) Formality

Apart from the examples already discussed, Tony's language is fairly simple and common and, as I have said before, aimed comfortably at the age-group he is teaching. However, he does at times use words and expressions which are particularly formal and unlikely to be used in the everyday language of his pupils. For example, 'visualise', 'minimises', 'encountered', 'produce', 'aggressive', 'registers', 'intrude', 'tend to', 'facial expressions', 'just a fraction' and 'quite an amazing bit of technology'.

There are also occasions in which Tony translates simple ways of saying something into more formal terms, not to bring about any significant change in the meaning but, presumably, to initiate his pupils into the conventions of the language of secondary education. For example, in distinguishing between the work of his Department and that of the English Department he says that his, 'is obviously more to do with pictures, visual information, things that you see rather than ... with words that describe'. Here, while 'pictures' and 'things that you see' are perfectly adequate for the purpose, perfectly understandable to his pupils, Tony provides the more formal term, 'visual information', for no other reason, it seems, than to teach them the jargon.

Another example of gratuitous formality occurs when Tony is helping a pupil to draw her friend's nose. He says, 'Now, in fact, if you can imagine, a nose is a projection from the face, ok? It sticks out like that'. His point is that the nose 'sticks out' and, put this way, it is within the understanding of the pupil. But the teacher provides the alternative, formal way of saying this to give the remark a spurious objectivity in keeping with the supposed serious and impersonal spirit of learning associated with schools and education generally.

b) Control

The language of secondary education is not only characterised by a certain formality, but also by forms which are geared as much to controlling groups of pupils as to teaching them anything. In Tony's lesson there are obvious examples of language used to control the class. It being his first lesson with these new pupils, one suspects that

Tony touches on matters of behaviour and procedure more frequently than he might with a class that had already been 'broken in', so to speak. His concern is mainly with the use of art room facilities, as in this example:

If you're, sort of, fairly considerate and actually rinse out your palette, hopefully you'll get a clean one when you come back. But people tend to be a bit lazy and try and sneak out without washing up their palettes!

At the end of the lesson, as one might expect in a practical subject, there is clearing up to be done before the class is dismissed:

Now, what do you do at the end of a lesson? The first thing is to make sure you've cleaned up all of your materials (that's what you'll be doing next week), and put the chairs up, ok? ... So who's going to collect in the drawings?

If there is any educational value in such language it is in teaching the pupils how to co-operate and how to treat facilities responsibly. When he is speaking in this way Tony does not pretend to be teaching his pupils anything about art as such. However, there are examples in which he appears, on the surface, to be talking about the constraints of art work when, in effect, he is still aiming to influence the pupils' behaviour for the sake of classroom control. For instance, as the class settles down to work in the second phase of the lesson, Tony says:

I think it's quite important to start learning how to pace yourself. So if you start now, for instance, we've got forty minutes actual working time. It's quite a long time, isn't it? So, you know, if you draw the eyes in five minutes, and then the nose and mouth in the next five minutes, you know, in half the time you'll have finished. So, you know, slow down a bit, look harder, try and see as much as you can in there.

A little later he says:

Anyway, try and learn how to pace yourselves. I don't want anyone finishing in ten minutes. Try and look a lot harder.

Here Tony gives the impression that his concern with timing is primarily to do with the quality of the work he expects of his pupils. He wants them to spend longer looking harder. But what he is really asking them to do is to make their drawings last for as long as the time available.

He doesn't want anyone finishing before the end of the lesson because, as the saying goes, the Devil finds work for idle hands.

If this is so then it is particularly interesting, for it provides an example of how the constraints of secondary education can impinge upon the pupils' concept of art. At the beginning of the lesson Tony quizzes the group on how long they have spent on just one drawing and he says that they must learn to spend longer over things. Now he is directing them to use the whole forty minutes remaining on this drawing. The implication must be for the pupils that a 'good' drawing is one which takes a relatively long time to do, even though timing is an issue which has more to do with schooling than with drawing.

Similar examples of advice aimed as much at classroom control as at a better understanding of art may be found in Tony's words on the need to 'practice', as one might practice scales on a musical instrument, and the need to resist 'distraction'. The comparison between art work and playing a musical instrument is a doubtful one. It reduces drawing and painting to sensori-motor skills which must be mastered before one is able to express oneself. But if a pupil is convinced that what he is doing is essential practice for what is to come he is more likely to put all his efforts into that rather than into idle chat. Also, what the teacher may see as 'distraction', inasmuch as the pupil is talking rather than putting pencil to paper, may really be serving a useful and educational purpose. It may well come into the category of what Barnes (1973) calls 'exploratory talk', through which pupils may help each other to understand better what they are doing. In both of these cases, that of 'practice' and that of 'distraction', the teacher's advice may be seen as an attempt to subdue and to dominate the class, but the implication for the pupils is that art is necessarily something that you do quietly, fervently, almost reverently, and privately.

6.224 Language used with Visual Presentations

In the first phase of the lesson much of Tony's language is related to his demonstration drawing of the face in profile. In the second phase he talks about the work of older pupils and about work done in the lesson, which he holds up for the class to see. He also helps pupils with their

drawing problems by demonstrating for them and by talking about what he is doing as he draws. The following passage is typical of the language he uses while drawing:

Right, the way Andy's hair comes ... If I draw his eyes ... In fact, if I start drawing, not at the top of his head, but down here where the hair comes down on the eye ... There's a strand of hair, look, you can see, that comes down there ... There's another one that goes across to the eye ... Now, although I'm not drawing every hair on his head, I'm drawing some of the main parts ... The way the hair curls, and so on ... And the way it kind of wraps around the face. It comes down to the side of the face there ... He's got his hand against his head there but, for instance, it goes out in that kind of shape ... then it goes up to the top of the head ... Now we should, if that's accurate, the top of the head ... We should be able to say that, you know, we could measure then ... If that's the top, that's the bridge of the nose. In other words, it's level with the eyes ... It's that distance again to his chin ... so we can already say, immediately, that that's the bottom of his chin, which looks about right, doesn't it?

Here Tony is reflecting in his language the ways in which he is looking at his model, the way his eye moves from point to point, seeking, selecting, relating, connecting. Simply to draw for the pupil would not be enough. Some explanation or explication is necessary if the pupil is to understand the drawing process. Such language as Tony is using here is, therefore, necessary to complete the demonstration, to make explicit the thinking behind the drawing and the requisite ways of looking.

This language has certain typical characteristics inasmuch as they occur each time Tony gives a demonstration. In itself his talk, at these times, makes little sense. It is spasmodic and distracted. Sentences are left incomplete. It is not fluent and the sense keeps changing. Listening to it on a tape-recording is almost like listening to only one side of a conversation and this, in effect, is what it is. For the drawing and the thinking behind it (revealed in Tony's language) proceed as a kind of dialogue in which each side acts upon and responds to the other. The language makes sense, therefore, only in relation to the developing drawing. In the teacher's demonstration the drawing completes the language just as much as the language completes and makes sense of the drawing.

When Tony holds up the work of pupils as an example to the class, his

language is again somewhat distracted, 'restricted' and tending to wander. This one might expect, for although the teacher may not be engaged in doing the drawing himself, his attention is divided between what he is seeing and what he is saying. What he is saying is a response to what both he and the class can see and his language does not, therefore, need to be too explicit. And what he is saying is what he is led to say by what he finds as his eye darts about the piece of work he is holding up.

6.23 Teacher's Evaluations

Tony's evaluative statements are concerned mainly with pupil performance and pupil behaviour; that is, with his pupils' work and the ways in which they work. The character and function of these statements vary according to the mode of teaching. In the first part, or phase, of the lesson they are more objective and impersonal in keeping with the 'transmission' style which Tony adopts in this phase. They are also more specific, particularly the negative evaluations. The same is true for evaluations which occur towards the end of the lesson when Tony resumes central control of the class to review what has been done. In between, however, when Tony confronts his pupils individually and his style is more conversational, his evaluations are more generalised, they are invariably positive and somewhat less objective.

6.231 Teacher evaluations in the first phase of the lesson

It is in this part of the lesson that Tony establishes the criteria by which he will judge the work and the behaviour of the pupils. It is here that he identifies those qualities of behaviour which are considered worthy or unworthy in the art room and where he indicates some of the qualities of art work which are acceptable or unacceptable.

As for behaviour, Tony expects his pupils to 'involve' themselves in their work; to show 'interest'; to take it 'seriously'; to put in the necessary 'effort'; to take 'care' over their work; and to show 'consideration' in their use of materials and equipment. A pupil who does these things will be considered a 'good' pupil, while one who does not appear to be 'involved', 'interested', 'serious', 'careful' and

'considerate' will be judged 'poor'.

As for performance, Tony says that he expects his pupils to 'look harder'; to draw more 'accurately'; to make their drawings 'fit well on the page', and not to produce 'cartoons'. He holds up a drawing by someone in the second year and says that it demonstrates 'good proportions', even though it is 'very pale and you can hardly see it'. He holds up another and describes it as 'a very, very nice, elegant drawing'. Thus, a piece of work will be judged 'good', if it is 'well-observed', 'accurate', 'well-placed' on the paper and 'elegant', and if it shows good proportions. It should not be 'pale', but if it is, this will not be held too much against it if the drawing exhibits all or some of the other 'good' qualities. Cartoons are not acceptable.

All of the above are examples of the values which Tony brings more or less deliberately to the attention of the class. They are constitutive of the overt topic of the lesson. There are examples, however, of values which exceed, to some extent, that topic and which Tony brings in, often unintentionally, in his extemporary efforts to substantiate his main points, or in his unguarded responses to the unexpected. These covert values are not less effective for being so. They are nearly all negative inasmuch as they are expressed as disapproval of, or distain for, certain undesired behaviours, ways of working, or types of work. Here is an example of the way Tony unintentionally betrays his dislike for a certain way of working:

Tony: Has anybody got anything that they particularly like to draw?

Pupil: I like to draw things out of books.

Tony: From books? To copy from books, in fact. Yeah? ... Any particular types of things?

Pupil: No.

Tony: Just anything that sort of appeals?

Tony does try to sound impartial here, probably not wishing to inhibit the pupil from indulging in what he, the teacher, might feel to be a marginally creative pursuit, but not one which he, himself, might promote. However, there are in this exchange several rather subtle ways in which

he betrays his feelings towards drawing 'things out of books', thereby conferring a negative value upon this way of working. To begin with, Tony translates the pupil's neutral phrase, 'to draw things out of books', into his own, somewhat more derogatory, 'to copy from books, in fact.' It is derogatory because this apparently small change in the sense suggests a lack of originality in the pupil who must resort to 'copying' his pictures from other pictures. After this Tony hesitates, his expression glazed, indicating distraction, if not disquiet. This has the effect of concentrating everyone's attention upon the translation he has just made and allows time for the implication to register. Then he shrugs off the material which this pupil might choose to copy as 'just anything', thereby diminishing the status of that material and implying that such a pupil is not very discriminating. The result of all this is to impress upon the class that there is something not very nice about working from pictures in books and so this way of working gets a minus rating.

Perhaps less subtly 'the junior school' also emerges in Tony's language with a minus rating, both for the behaviour he claims it encourages and the art work it produces.

- Now, I mean, the normal first year drawing, to me, of a face, would be something like this (he parodies a child's drawing of a face) ... Now, we all realise that that's not an amazing drawing, but I'm sure that you'll have seen lots and lots of drawings like that, you know, at your last school.

The clear implication here is that, from now on, 'junior school' drawing is synonymous with 'bad' drawing, the reason being, as Tony goes on to say, that art is not taken as seriously in the junior school as it is in the secondary school:

Now, you know, I think that when you're in junior schools ... the main emphasis is on enjoying the work ... But when you come to this school, I think that you've got to try and do, gradually you know, it will take time, is to slow down, just a bit, try and get much more precise results.

It should not be thought, however, that Tony has anything against the junior school as such, even though he is in danger of giving this impression to his pupils by repeatedly criticising its attitudes and values. For it is also apparent from what he says that these remarks

emanate from a broader philosophy of art education in which the junior school plays its part and has its moment. This philosophy postulates a progressional or developmental model in which each successive stage is necessarily 'superior' to preceding stages in various respects. For example, each successive stage is more demanding and, since 'effort' is one of the foremost, positive values, each successive stage is of greater value. Thus, following his criticisms of the junior school, Tony is also heard to say that he does not expect his pupils to produce 'masterpieces' in the first year, but he does expect them to put in a certain amount of 'effort'. If they carry on being 'interested' for another five years, he continues, they should emulate the work of the current 'very good sixth-form group', whose 'standard of drawing is really very, very high'.

In effect, Tony is not merely communicating values by talking this way, but a system of values. It is a system in which there is a fixed and generally recognisable standard of excellence which is achieved through years of hard work. Within this system the work of the pupil is evaluated, at any stage in his progress through the school, by the degree to which it approaches that standard. It follows that in the sixth-form his work should come closest to achieving it and so the 'very good sixth-form group' is held up as an example to everyone else in the school. It also follows that, in the first place, the 'junior school' should represent work and attitudes which came furthest from achieving that standard and then the 'first year' of the secondary school should take on a similar negative value as pupils move on to the second year and beyond (hence Tony's ironical reference to a 'normal first year drawing').

Tony is very fond of communicating what he wants of his pupils by showing them what he doesn't want. For example, he draws a 'normal first year drawing' (i.e. one with exaggerated 'faults') to show the class how not to draw and he holds up the 'junior school' as a model of how not to go about things. One interesting, negative evaluation which arises in this way involves the word 'adventurous'. Tony shows the class how not to draw eyelashes:

Now the usual way I've seen eyelashes drawn is actually like this ... (he draws) ... Something like this ... And those people who are really adventurous even do this ... It looks like an earwig of some kind, doesn't it? But just look again and see if they do, in fact, splay out in that direction.

To be 'adventurous' might well be considered a good thing, especially in an educational context. But Tony uses the word here somewhat ironically, intending to belittle the efforts of the untutored, or those who, for want of a closer look ('but just look again'), misrepresent what they see. The implication is that it is not a good thing to waste one's efforts, no matter how well-intentioned, barking up the wrong tree.

Another rather interesting and consequentially negative evaluation of this kind occurs not only in the first phase, but regularly throughout the lesson. Whenever Tony refers to the way 'a lot of people' do something, he means that this is the wrong way to go about it. 'A lot of people', then, in Tony's language, is an alternative to the 'junior school', when it comes to identifying the wrong sort of behaviour and the wrong sort of performance. Also, its use suggests that the right way of going about things is not all that common. For if 'a lot of people' get it wrong, then only special people, or an 'in-group', get it right.

Implicit in Tony's use of the term 'a lot of people' is an exhortation to his pupils to reject the common herd and to join that group, the in-group, which behaves and performs correctly. It is implicit, too, in some of the other negative evaluations mentioned above. As I have suggested, Tony's method, or strategy, is to identify various out-groups, whether it be those left behind in the junior school, or those who draw eyelashes to look like earwigs, or, indeed, 'a lot of people', and to speak of them in disparaging terms. Not only this, but he often 'loads' the evidence against them (e.g. by parodying junior-school drawing). In this way, and without necessarily specifying what it is that members of his in-group really know or do, he encourages his pupils to eschew certain identifiable values, beliefs, behaviours, and methods, in favour of the less tangible and less easily expressed values, etc., of his in-group (i.e. the artistically successful), whatever they may turn out to be. Thus behaving and performing well in the art class may become, among other things, a matter of allegiance.

6.232 Teacher evaluations in the second phase of the lesson

Most of Tony's evaluations here appear to be directed towards performance rather than behaviour. He does, at one point, warn one or two pupils

against being 'distracted', but this is an odd occurrence. Practically all of his evaluations during this period are positive, and words such as 'attractive', 'interesting', 'excellent', 'good', 'right', 'nice', 'alright' and 'ok' crop up regularly. Consider the following passage, taken from near the end of the lesson, in which Tony evaluates the work of a group of four girls working together around a table:

How are we doing ladies? Oh yes, you're taking your time, but it's nice and accurate ... (He moves around the table, considering each drawing.) ... That's very nice, yes ... Good, very good indeed ... Phew, that's a nice one ... My goodness, that is good ... Very nice drawing actually, isn't it? ... Yes, very, very nice that; very attractive drawing.

This is a fairly typical example and it shows that most of the time Tony's evaluations of his pupil's performances amount to little more than broad commendations rather than explicit, critical analyses of what they have done. In this example only one of the girls is given any idea why the teacher thinks her work is good (i.e. because it is 'nice and accurate'). The rest, presumably, are left to assume that, in one way or another, their drawings must meet the teacher's requirements as laid down in his opening address.

Now it may well be that Tony does not wish to intimidate his pupils in their very first lesson with him, by being too critical or demanding, and that these broad commendations are not, therefore, typical of his regular style of teaching. If this were so then it might be better to see them as acts of encouragement rather than truly critical statements - an attempt on Tony's part to send these pupils away at the end of the lesson with a favourable impression and a positive attitude toward both himself and his subject. This interpretation gains strength if his evaluations are seen in the light of something he says during his opening remarks to the class:

Now, you know, there are going to be lots of people in the group here who are going to say to me 'I can't draw' If you can't draw, that's excellent, because it means that I can actually try and teach you something, And, you know, I think that you'll get something out of this subject if you're prepared to put in the effort, you know, and sort of try and get involved in the subject.

Here Tony is saying that, with a little effort, everyone can participate

successfully in art and it would appear that his subsequent, invariably enthusiastic evaluations are intended to confirm and promote this view. If this is the case, then these evaluations may be directed not so much towards pupil performance as behaviour and Tony is not commenting so much on the artistic quality of the work as on the effort the pupils are putting into it.

But there are occasions which seem to contradict this possibility, when Tony is more specific or explicit in his commendations. For example, in the passage quoted above, in which he praises the work of the four girls, Tony tells the first girl that her drawing is 'nice and accurate'. There are examples, also, in which he tells pupils that their work is good because it is 'precise'. Here he would seem to be, quite simply, indicating to the pupils that they are achieving the requirements laid down by the teacher at the beginning of the lesson. He asked them to look harder and to be more 'accurate' and 'precise', and this is what they are succeeding in doing.

However, on closer examination, these apparently more specific evaluations of performance also turn out to be little more than broad commendations of behaviour. For Tony makes these evaluations often after the most cursory examination of the work and it must be clear to everyone that, unless he has some mystical insight he cannot really know whether the drawings are 'accurate' or 'precise' as such. Not only this, but it would be unreasonable of him to expect accuracy and precision given that, although he stresses the necessity for these qualities, Tony does not really give his pupils a method for achieving them. He does implore them to 'look harder' (whatever that means) and he does provide schema for drawing the features in an idealised relationship, but he doesn't actually provide a method for drawing particular faces, in oblique planes, with any degree of accuracy or precision.

This is not meant as a criticism. Such techniques would probably be too advanced for most of these pupils anyway. But it does rather show that Tony's use of such words as 'accurate' and 'precise' is aimed not so much at the results of the pupils' efforts as at the efforts themselves. Such words are not meant to be taken literally, they are meant as general signs of approval of the ways in which the pupils are working.

Another interesting point arises out of an apparent conflict between the

teacher's stated values, expressed in the earlier part of the lesson, and those which he applies in the second part. In his opening address Tony makes it quite clear that he expects his pupils to 'slow down' and to take longer over their work in order to put more into it. One is given to assume, therefore, that 'slower' is 'better'. Returning to Tony's encounter with the four 'young ladies', however, we find that in a less guarded moment he seems to contradict this. He says to the first girl, 'you're taking your time, but it's nice and accurate'. He does not say, 'you're taking your time, and it's nice and accurate', thereby confirming the efficacy of taking one's time. On the contrary, he implies the work is good even though it is not progressing very quickly.

This example might well be dismissed as a slip of the tongue if it were not for the fact that it is not the only occasion in the second part of the lesson when Tony appears to criticise pupils for working slowly. Another good example comes shortly before that quoted above. Tony approaches a small group of pupils working around a table and, as he walks around the table he says:

Lovely, yeah, excellent ... These two are very good. Yeah, I saw that one from the other side. I like it ... (walks on) ...
A little bit slower over this side ...

In order to resolve this apparent contradiction we must remember that Tony's instructions regarding time and 'pacing' are aimed just as much at class control as at an improvement in the standard of drawing. Tony wants his pupils to use all of the time available to work on their drawings. He does not want them to finish too early. But he also expects them to complete their drawings in the time available. For him, the relation between time and quality is mediated by institutional constraints. His early remarks on timing, and his subsequent comments on the time pupils are taking over their work may be seen, therefore, as the beginning of a process of fine-tuning in which Tony attempts to regulate the working speed of his pupils to fit in with the time-keeping of the school. Thus, 'slower' does mean 'better', but not if it also means running over the time allowed.

Inasmuch as Tony's concern with timing may be put down to class control, his criticism of certain pupils for being slow may be seen as yet more examples of the evaluation of behaviour rather than performance (i.e.

evaluation of the way in which the pupil is arriving at his product, rather than of the product itself). It would seem then that most of his evaluations in the second part of the lesson are aimed at the regulation of behaviour. However, there are just a few examples, in this part of the lesson, of evaluations which refer directly to performance and which begin to reveal the teacher's artistic expectations. They tend to be negative evaluations and they function to narrow down the possibilities open to the pupil rather than to specify what the ^{teacher} actually wants. A good example occurs towards the end of the lesson when Tony is helping a pupil to draw his friend's nose. Tony criticises him for using a 'big, harsh' outline and he shows him how to suggest the nose with a minimum of marks on the paper. Then he criticises his own demonstration drawing for being 'a bit clinical'. Through such negative evaluations as 'big', 'harsh' and 'clinical', Tony attempts to set limits on his pupil's performance. They indicate extremes between which hovers the positive quality for which the pupil must strive.

Putting such infrequent examples aside, it is possible to distinguish Tony's evaluations in the second part of the lesson from those in the first part by their relative functions. In the first part Tony presents his criteria for judging pupil performance and behaviour in an impersonal, formal setting. Here his evaluations function as information. They are projective, referring to the work the pupils will be doing and the ways in which they will be doing it. Everything is to be gained by being as explicit as possible in this part of the procedure. In the second phase, however, the setting is more personal and the teacher's evaluations are directed at work done. In this phase it is the teacher's aim to maintain a hearty atmosphere and friendly personal relations with his pupils. It would not do, therefore, for his criticisms to be too searching. Their function in this part of the lesson is more to do with group dynamics than with art criticism.

6.24 Teacher's Questions

There are very few pages in the transcript of this lesson in which Tony does not ask some kind of question. The first few pages are particularly thick with his questions. To give some idea, this is how Tony begins his lesson after the preliminaries:

How many people, for instance, here, have drawn a face at some time during their time in the previous school? (Some hands go up, but most of the pupils seem uncertain what is being asked of them.) How many people have never drawn a face from somebody actually sitting in front of you? (A few hands are raised.) And of those people who've got their hands up now, how many people have not drawn a face ever, of any kind? (No hands.) Good, ok. Well, it's interesting to me that one of the first things that people tend to draw ... things like faces and houses, transport perhaps; maybe even horses ... Can anybody think of anything else to add to that list? You know, things you may have drawn apart from, perhaps, these ones? I'd be very interested to know, actually.

A little later he quizzes the class on how long they have spent on a single drawing:

Now, how many people have spent, say, for instance, more than an hour on drawing a face? Ever? (No response.) Nobody? How many people think they may have spent, say, half an hour on drawing a face? (A few hands.) That's quite good. I mean, that's quite a long time, a half an hour, you know. I mean, in the sixth-form people would probably spend three hours, you know, quite a long amount of time, on a drawing.

Ostensibly these questions come over as an enquiry made by the teacher out of 'interest'. But it is not difficult to see through them to other purposes which the teacher may have in asking them, or to functions which are not altogether grasped by the teacher himself. In this respect, it is clear that, in the first of the two passages quoted above, the teacher's attention is not wholly caught up in his enquiry. If it were, then he might not have wandered off the subject of drawing faces to listing the kinds of things young people like to draw. This lapsing from one subject to another suggests, not only that the teacher's 'interest' might not be all that great, but also that he may have something else in mind. Perhaps he is using this form of discourse to activate his pupils at the beginning of the lesson, in which case it does not really matter what he is actually asking them. Or perhaps he is simply stalling for time while he decides how to proceed. In the second passage, his underlying purpose is more obvious. Here he is not so much concerned with how long pupils have spent on their drawings in the past as with impressing upon them the value of spending more time in future. That is, he is not so much asking for information as communicating a value.

One would be hard pushed to find examples of questions in the lesson

where the teacher is simply asking for information which he does not already possess and in which the teacher is not covertly seeking to transmit knowledge and values to the pupils. The only real examples of such questions are those in which Tony asks a pupil for his or her name and it might be argued that even this kind of question may have something to do with classroom relations and with defining roles. It remains, therefore, to identify the kinds of questions that Tony asks, to indicate the 'mood' (Halliday, 1971) in which they are asked and to suggest their underlying purposes.

6.241 Rhetorical Questions

These questions are rhetorical in the sense that they do not call for answers. They are 'closed' questions (Barnes, 1969) inasmuch as the teacher already has the answer, but unlike those discussed in the next sub-section, they do not invite the participation of those questioned. In asking these questions Tony leaves no time for a response from the class.

For example, when he returns to the problem of drawing faces, after wandering off the subject on to that of 'favourite drawings', Tony says:

So, faces then, if we come back to faces ... How long do you think you spend every day looking in a mirror? Think about it ... get up in the morning, have a wash, brush your teeth ... Do you look in the mirror? ... Do you look in the mirror when you comb your hair, or brush your hair? You do tend to, I'm sure. It's amazing. If you just try and visualise, just try and think how many minutes you probably spend combing you hair. If you're going out in the evening, if you're going to a party ... I'm sure you spend quite a lot of time, in fact, looking into the mirror ... But, you know, we do spend a lot of time looking into the mirror.

While he is going on in this way, it is clear to everyone that, although he asks several questions, Tony does not require an answer. He is already convinced that his pupils 'spend a lot of time looking into the mirror'. His questions are not asked in the interrogative mood. Their function is to give substance to the point which he is intent upon making.

More good examples of this sort of question occur after Tony has shown the class how to draw around the shadow of a head;

There, we've got one profile. And, in fact, can you imagine how quick it would be to get a set of profiles of the whole group? I mean, it would take no time would it, really? You know, we could whizz through them in about twenty minutes.

What do you do from this point? You know, how do you fill them in to make them more interesting? Obviously there is a range of things you can do. Well, let's have a look at the proportions of the face.

Here again Tony is not really asking his pupils to make suggestions. If anything, he is preparing them, by asking the question, for the answer or the point he wants to make. It is a way of emphasizing the point.

6.242 'Closed' or 'Pseudo' Questions

Consider the following exchange. Tony is marking out the proportions of the face on his shadow profile:


Tony: That's the top of the head there (draws a horizontal line). This is underneath the chin (draws another horizontal). Now, where do the eyes come? Have a look. Just turn your head sideways so that you can see your friend from the side. We've got an answer over there. How far down are the eyes, then? Where do they come?

Pupil: About half way down the head.

Tony: That's excellent. That's a really good answer because, in fact, most people that I've encountered that have come from Junior schools seem to think ... well, they probably don't think this, but when they actually draw a face they make the eyes much too high up. But that's exactly right (he nods to the girl who gave the right answer).

When Tony says, 'that's a really good answer', what he means is, 'that's the answer I am looking for'. This is a typical example of what Barnes (1969) calls 'pseudo' questioning, what Labov (1969) calls 'test' questioning and what Postman and Weingartner (1971) call 'convergent' questioning; that is, questioning in which the teacher plays a kind of 'guess what I'm thinking' game with his pupils. In this instance, however, it is clear from what Tony says that he does not expect anyone in the class to come up with the 'right' answer because, in his experience, children

fresh from junior school are not usually familiar with the formal rules of proportion. If this is so, then here is another example of a question asked, not in order to make the pupils think and reason, but as a prelude to the transmission of a piece of information.

A similar thing occurs almost immediately after this exchange. Tony draws an eye, like this: , on the profile, half-way between the top of the head and the base of the chin. Then there follows this exchange:

Tony: What do you think's wrong with that eye? Just have a look at that one. What's wrong with the one I've just drawn in?

Pupil: It's touching his nose.

Tony: It is, in fact, yeah. It's touching his nose and it (should) be a bit set back, that's right, and, in fact, what else about it? We've got a side-view of the face, but what's happening with the eye?

Pupil: It's too big?

Tony: Well, I think it is a bit too big as well, actually. But there's something else about it. The one I've just drawn there is a front view, isn't it? Look at somebody from the side. Their eye's not like that, is it?

In this case Tony fails to get the answer he is after, although he does get two quite reasonable ones instead. While acknowledging that these are acceptable he does, nonetheless, make it clear that they are not 'right'; neither of them is the answer for which he is seeking. In the end he has to give that answer himself, the class having failed to guess what is on his mind. By this time, however, they are well and truly primed to absorb the concept he intends to transmit.

A third example again follows almost immediately. Tony returns to the business of marking in the proportions of the face. Having established that the eyes fall half-way between the top of the head and the base of the chin, he continues:

Tony: Now, the bottom of the nose, how far does that come down in this face, roughly?

Pupil: About a quarter of the length.

Tony: Yeah, in fact, a quarter of the whole distance, but roughly about half-way down here (he means between the eyes and the base of the chin). You see, if I put the line about there, it comes, in fact, just under the nose, doesn't it?

The pupil is quite right in what she says and Tony does acknowledge this. But he still manages to give the impression that the answer is not quite what he is looking for and therefore not quite as good. He is not seeking the fruits of reason or, in this case, observation, so much as the congruence of his pupils' views with his own. This also seems to be his aim in those questions which fall into the following category.

6.243 Confirming Questions to do with Observation

This is by far the largest and most interesting category of questions to be found in Tony's lesson. Here is a selection of typical questions to give some idea of what is meant by confirming questions to do with observation:

If you look in the pupil of the eye while you're inside this room, you'll probably see the windows reflected. Just look and see if you can see the windows reflected in the person's eye ... Can anybody actually see the windows reflected? Good.

I mean, the paper is like that, isn't it? It's ruffled; it's up and down, basically. If you look at that magnified you can see it's got holes in it, you see? ... So if I just tickle the surface of it like that, all the pencil does, it just catches the top bits here. So we get all these light bits in between ... you know, as you can see, makes a sort of texture. Can you see that?

It's like a ... tennis ball. If I said, 'that's a tennis ball, shade it' ... It's dark on this part, isn't it? It's dark on the underside like that and it goes through to light.

In these examples Tony is drawing attention to certain things (the reflection of the windows in the pupil of the eye; the texture of the paper; the pattern of light and shade on a spherical object), and his questions are meant to confirm, in his own mind, that his pupils can see what he sees. There are other examples in this category in which the

object of the observation is not quite as simple. In these cases Tony is asking his pupils not just if they can see something which is there, but if they can see something in a particular way. For instance.

1. (Referring to eye-lashes drawn in a naive way)
It looks like an earwig of some kind, doesn't it?
2. (Referring again to eyelashes)
It's a bit like a rake or comb, isn't it?
3. Fairly narrow face, isn't it, in fact?
4. Lovely drawing. Really fits on the page nicely, doesn't it? ...
Don't you think so? (Silence) Some people are not so sure.

In the first two examples Tony is really saying, 'both you and I can see that this is not very good'. By adding 'doesn't it?' or 'isn't it?' to his derogatory comparisons between the drawings of eyelashes and an earwig, or a rake, or a comb, he is inviting the agreement of the pupils, and ensuring that they will see the drawings in the same way he does, even if they do not already do so. These are not questions which ask the pupil how he views things; they are questions which tell him what view to take.

The same is true of the third example. Here the teacher is not asking the pupil if he finds the face 'narrow'; he is telling him that 'in fact' it is narrow and this is how he should see it. He does very much the same thing elsewhere when he says, 'That's what the nose does, doesn't it?'.

The fourth example is a little unusual inasmuch as Tony seems to require an answer to confirm that everyone's perception is in accord. In the other examples the questions are more or less rhetorical. He almost takes it for granted that the pupils are seeing things as he does. Either that, or he doesn't really mind if they do not. In this particular case, however, he does seem to need a positive response and, one assumes, this must be an indication of the importance he places on this issue. He is concerned that his pupils should learn to recognise what he means by a good composition.

By this sort of question, then, Tony attempts to bring his pupils' perceptions into line with his own. If the strategy works then it is because Tony makes his observations with the authority of an assumed objectivity. He does not say, 'I see this in such and such a way, how do you see it?'. He says, 'This is so and so, can you see it?'. Thus the pupil is more or less obliged to look at the object in the way presented by the teacher.

6.244 Confirming Questions to do with Actions

These, like those in the previous category, are mainly rhetorical questions, or interrogative forms appended to statements, to confirm in the teacher's own mind that everyone understands what is going on. Since they do not invite responses from the pupils one must assume that the teacher believes that no response is a positive response and that if anyone did not understand he would say so. The following examples speak for themselves:

You've got to draw like this, ok? I'm drawing you now, for instance, ok? Now, I'm looking straight towards you and all I'm doing now is just turning the eyes down and just looking down like that. In fact, my head did tilt just a fraction.
Like that, ok?

Don't take your pen off, or your pencil. Just keep going right the way round the head 'til you get to the other side, right?

6.245 Control Questions

There are some questions, though not very many in view of the passivity of the pupils, which Tony asks in order to exert and maintain control over the behaviour of the class. One good example occurs at the end of the lesson, moments before the bell rings, when Tony asks, 'Now, what do you do at the end of a lesson?' He does not wait for a reply before continuing, 'The first thing is to make sure you've cleared up all your materials'. This, like some of the other questions I have discussed, is another case where the teacher uses the interrogative form, not to elicit information, but as a sign to the class that he is about to make an important statement. In this particular case the statement is about the way in which the pupils should behave at the end of an art lesson and to

this extent the preceding question forms part of a control strategy.

6.246 Socialising Questions

'Socialising' here is meant in two senses. Firstly it describes questions which Tony asks in order to be 'sociable' with his pupils, particularly, in the second part of the lesson when his style is less formal and more personal. Secondly, it refers to the kind of questioning which does little more than communicate the values of the social group into which Tony is initiating his pupils. These two senses are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are more often than not indistinguishable and this is why they are included here under the same heading. Consider the following example:

Tony: What's your favourite subject?

Pupil: Me?

Tony: Yeah

Pupil: I haven't got one.

Tony: (with obvious surprise) You haven't got a favourite subject?

Pupil: (giggles)

Tony: Have you got any hobbies?

Pupil: No.

Tony: What are you interested in?

Pupil: Nothing.

Tony: Nothing? (very surprised) My goodness ... I'm sure that's not true! I'm sure you can't think of what to say.

This exchange has very little to do with the overt topic of Tony's lesson and it may be seen simply as an attempt on the part of the teacher to

get to know his pupils and to be 'sociable'. Yet there is another dimension implicit in what passes between the teacher and his pupil. There is a sense in which Tony is letting his pupil know that, in his lessons (and in the secondary school generally), pupils are expected to be positive, to take an interest in things, to show initiative. In this sense too Tony is revealing those areas in which pupils are expected to take an interest: the 'subjects' offered by the school and 'hobbies'. This interpretation is substantiated by the fact that, just prior to this exchange, Tony has cause to criticise this pupil for allowing himself to be 'distracted' and he warns him against becoming one of those who 'coast' through school and 'achieve' nothing at the end of it. Following this, Tony's questioning becomes something more than an expression of interest in the boy's preferences. It is a way of showing a supposedly indolent pupil that he could be heading the wrong way. If this is so then Tony's last words, 'I'm sure that's not true,' may be seen as a chance, given to the pupil, to redeem himself by heeding the warning and taking more interest in things.

If this is an example of questioning whereby Tony identifies a pupil as unworthy of membership of the artistic community, or even the scholastic community, there are other examples by which he confirms that the pupils questioned are what might be called, 'in-persons'. For instance:

Tony: What other subjects do you, you know, are you good at?

Pupil: I like music and (pauses to think)

Tony: You are musical are you? What do you play?

Pupil: I play piano, organ and recorder.

Tony: My goodness!

Notice, Tony's questioning here begins with the assumption that this pupil is good at art because he asks her what other subjects she is good at. He is obviously delighted when his expectations are fulfilled and he discovers that she does take a positive interest in the arts.'

The example which follows speaks for itself:

Tony: These are good (He means the drawings) ... Very nice ...

Pupil: Thank you. My mother went to art college.

Tony: (Impressed) Did she?

Pupil: Yes.

Tony: My goodness ... I don't suppose, you don't remember which one? You must try to find out.

Pupil: The Royal Art College in London.

Tony: (Very impressed) The Royal College she went to? My goodness.

Pupil: She's a kind of examination teacher from time to time.

Tony: Really? That's very good ... (Thinks) You haven't got any famous artists in the family? Famous ancestors or anything?

Pupil: I don't think so, but my great-grandfather started the Brentwood Gazette.

Tony: Really? That's where I come from, Brentwood.

This pupil is clearly very 'in'.

6.247 Open Questions

There are very few examples of what Barnes (1969) calls 'open' questions in the transcript; that is, questions which do not call for answers predetermined by the teacher. Probably the best example of such questioning occurs towards the beginning of the lesson when Tony is preparing the class to think about faces and how to draw them.

Tony: I'm going to go round, in fact, to see if people can think up words to describe a face, right? It can be any, it can be a complete range. Just make up a word which might describe a face, like, for instance, well, obviously, 'happy'. I'm not going to say many, otherwise it will take them all

away. But put your hand up if you can think of a kind of a word which might describe a face, or an expression, or something like that.

Pupil: Fair complexion?

Tony: 'Fair complexion'. That describes a face, doesn't it? Somebody could even mention the opposite, which would be 'dark complexion', then. Any more? Let's see if we can get a real range and whizz through them quickly.

Pupil: (The same pupil) Sly eyes?

Tony: 'Sly eyes'. Yeah. We've got one person doing all the work here. Another one over there, yeah? No? Just stretching? Anybody else think of a way of describing a face? Think of somebody you may have seen on television. ... Nobody?

Pupil: (A different one) Dull?

Tony: 'Dull', a 'dull' face. I certainly think that's, you know, that's a good one ... Well, we've had a few words there, you know, and I think that could obviously be added to, and I think people have probably got words in mind. ... Now, in a moment I'm going to ask somebody to come up here, and I want to trace off their profile so that you can actually look at the face on paper ... just to see if we can study the actual proportions of the face, ok?

In this exchange Tony invites the class to suggest words to describe faces. He does not have any examples of his own in mind (except 'happy'), to which he tries to lead his pupils; the invitation is completely 'open'. The class is not very responsive, however, and Tony does not pursue the issue for very long. Instead he abandons this approach and proceeds with his demonstration drawing.

But there is more to it than this. Tony does not really make anything of the suggestions made by the two pupils who do contribute. The whole exercise seems to be inconsequential and this might be one reason why the rest of the class is reluctant to participate. It is as if the enquiry is just an interlude in the real business of the lesson: an interlude during which the pupils may come up with something of their own before they return to absorbing what the teacher has to tell them.

6.248 The Teacher's Attitude to Questions

There are several occasions during the lesson when Tony betrays certain

attitudes towards questioning and the role of the question in an educational context. For example, in the following passage:

You've got to really look, and think, well, what is it about this face in front of me that makes it just him? Makes it just, you know, exactly my mate? This bloke I've known for years: what is it about it?

Here Tony is presenting 'the question' as the essential method of art. That is, he is subscribing to the view that art is an enquiry into things visual; a way of attending to the visible world. He does the same thing in the following:

Imagine that you've come out of a space-ship and you've never seen a human face before, and then you'd really look at it. You'd think, well, what's that thing there? And this thing that somebody told me is a nose? You know, it sort of opens and closes: what is it?

The implication is that, in art, the pupil must look at things, particularly those things which are most familiar, with a critical eye. He must suspend his usual ways of seeing and comprehending and adopt a questioning attitude. He must continually ask himself 'what am I really seeing?'.

In art lessons, then, the pupil must be prepared, according to Tony, to ask himself questions. In the following passage Tony implies that he, the pupil, is also expected to ask questions of the teacher:

I've brought up a couple of drawings, a few drawings here, from one or two other groups, we'll have questions in a minute, so that you can see drawings which I think fit well on the page.

Tony says this towards the end of the first part (i.e. the 'transmission' phase) of the lesson, just before he allows the class to begin drawing. Notice that he interrupts the sense of his discourse to slip in the statement about questions. In effect he is apologising for extending his monologue and he is assuring his pupils that it will not be long before they have the opportunity to come back at him with questions.

Implicit in this brief statement, are certain assumptions which, in turn, betray a certain attitude towards the role of the question in teaching. The assumptions are that the pupils are expecting or needing to ask

questions and that, in the proper course of events, pupil questions follow teacher monologues. If the pupils are not anticipating asking questions (as one might expect with pupils as yet unused to secondary school teaching strategies) the the statement serves to let them know that the teacher expects them to do so and that there is an appropriate time for them to do so.

The attitude revealed by these assumptions is that pupil questions provide the teacher with feed-back on what he has taught them. The teacher expects to make his points, uninterrupted, while the pupils try to understand them. Then the teacher invites questions from the pupils to establish whether or not they have understood them. If there are no questions the teacher may feel that it is alright to proceed with more points or with practical excercises based on the original points. If there are questions, then the teacher will know which points he needs to repeat and to clarify. This is a strategy which is typical of the transmission style of teaching where the objective is simply to pass on a body of knowledge to the pupils.

By this strategy the teacher exerts a measure of control over pupil questions: he has control over what is discussed and he has control over when questions may be asked. Tony manages to take this element of control to the limit when, on occasions in the lesson, he reports exchanges between himself and pupils in other classes. By so doing he speaks for himself and for the pupil, cutting out any real contribution from the pupils to whom he is actually speaking. Here is an example to close this section on teacher questions:

Somebody this morning was saying, 'Are these bottles over here for drawing?' And I said, 'Yes'. And she said, 'They're quite easy to draw, aren't they?' And I said, 'Well, they are in a way, but,' I said, 'once you start looking at the reflections in them, you know, if I said draw this bottle, and the first thing I want you to draw in it is the reflections from the strip-lighting, some people would say well, where are they in there; you know? But there they are, you can see them'.

6.25 Pupils' Questions

In spite of Tony's apparent conviction that pupil questions are an essential part of the lesson, there are no straightforward examples of

questions asked of the teacher by the pupils. (The opportunity to ask questions promised by the teacher in the passage discussed in 6.248 did not arise.) Indeed, the pupils' verbal contribution to the lesson seems to be restricted mainly to short, often one- or two- word answers to the teacher's questions. Examples of such answers have come up already; for instance, in the passage in which Tony fishes for words to describe faces. It is interesting to note, however, that, by the tone of their voices, the pupils make their suggestions in the form of questions:

Fair complexion?

Shy eyes?

Dull?

They are, in effect, asking the teacher if their answers are right.

There are occasions in the lesson when pupils ask the teacher for assistance, but these are very few and they may hardly be categorised as pupil questions:

I can't see to draw him.

I can't do his nose.

I'm stuck doing his hair.

6.26 Structure

Structural analysis of classroom language centres on the concepts of 'initiative' and 'response'. Statements to the teacher, such as, 'I can't do his nose!'; and 'I'm stuck doing his hair' may be seen as examples of the pupil initiating an exchange with the teacher and eliciting a response:

Pupil: I can't do his nose.

Tony: Eh?

Pupil: I can't do his nose.

Tony: You want a bit of assistance with his nose? Alright, let's see what we can do.

Such pupil-initiated exchanges are few and far between in Tony's lesson and even those which do occur, on closer examination turn out to be invited by the teacher. That quoted above, for example, follows a general question which Tony puts to the class: 'Now, anybody need any assistance?' This imbalance between teacher and pupil-initiated exchanges is characteristic of lessons in which the teacher adopts a traditional 'transmission' style of teaching (Edwards, 1976, 180).

Also characteristic of such lessons are certain typical structures identified by Bellack (1966) and Sinclair (1972 and 1974). Bellack, following Wittgenstein's theory of 'language games' identifies four 'basic verbal actions' which occur in regular cycles. These he refers to as 'structuring moves', 'soliciting moves', 'responding moves' and 'reacting moves'. The exchanges built up from these pedagogical moves are initiated by the teacher. A common example is a teacher stating a problem ('structuring'), asking a question ('soliciting'), eliciting a reply ('responding') and commenting on it ('reacting').

Sinclair identifies a similar, recurring, structural unit in transmission style lessons. This he calls IRF (teacher initiates: pupil responds: teacher gives feedback).

Examples of these characteristic sequences occur quite frequently in Tony's lesson. Some may be recognised in passages already quoted. Here are one or two more.

Tony makes a 'structuring move' by saying, 'I think in order to be relatively good at drawing you've got to really practice at it. I think it must be like playing a musical instrument'. Then he makes a 'soliciting' move by asking, 'Is anyone here musical?' The 'responding move' is made by a few pupils who raise their hands. Then Tony completes the sequence with, 'Good. Excellent. Well, I think these people will know that you really need to put quite a lot of practice in, really ...' This is his 'reacting move'.

A typical example of the IRF sequence occurs when Tony takes the 'initiative' and asks a pupil, 'Is your Dad musical?' The pupil 'responds' by saying, 'No, his (i.e. her Dad's) mother was musical. I think she played the treble recorder or something ... And my mother's taught me not to use a rubber.' Tony's feedback on this 'response' is, 'So in other words, you've got to look that much harder and get it exactly right first time. Good'.

Such teacher-initiated and teacher-controlled sequences are as common in the second part of Tony's lesson, when he appears to adopt a more informal style, as they are in the first part, when his style is more impersonal. This reflects the fact that Tony is in complete command of what is said throughout the lesson, whether or not he assumes central control of the class and whether or not he is openly imparting knowledge.

Structural analysis concentrates on what is done by means of language rather than on what is said. On this understanding it is possible to view the structure of Tony's lesson in a much wider perspective than Bellack's or Sinclair's and to discover an interesting, recurring function which underlies much of what is actually said in the second part, or phase. Thus function is more obvious in the 'description' than it is in the transcript mainly, perhaps, because the 'description' is a broad account of what happens and the detail in the transcript tends to obscure the broader issues.

In terms of 'initiative' and 'response' it might be said that the underlying function in question is initiated by the pupils and that the teacher's use of language is a response to that initiative. What happens is that Tony responds to the level of pupil-to-pupil talk by drawing attention to something which is intended to refocus the minds of the pupils on the work in hand. It happens first when the class begins to draw. There is a certain amount of 'noise' as everyone settles down to work and Tony effectively speeds up the settling-down process by calling over the noise to repeat his advice on how to start the drawing. He doesn't actually ask the class to be quiet and to get on quietly with their work but, by his use of language, he achieves that end. What he actually says is of secondary importance. It is the sound of his voice which fulfils the function.

A similar thing occurs a little while later. Tony leaves the class for a few moments to return some drawings to the store-room. While he is out

of sight there is an increase in the amount of talking among the pupils. The level continues to rise when Tony returns and while he is talking with individual pupils it reaches what might be described as his 'discomfort threshold'. He responds by calling for the attention of the whole class, ostensibly to tell them about the running of the Art Department. As he talks, of course, the pupils fall silent and the work goes on. This achieved, Tony feels free to return to his conversation with individual pupils.

A third example of this indirect use of language to maintain class control occurs near the end of the lesson when, again, the general noise level rises while Tony is talking to individuals. As the lesson draws to a close the class grows restless and talkative and Tony deals with this by drawing attention to one drawing which he thinks is good. This has the desired effect of refocusing the minds of the pupils on the subject of the lesson. When Tony stops talking about the drawing it is time to begin tidying up. This activity, like the settling-down period earlier in the lesson, threatens to get 'out of hand' and Tony maintains control, again, by calling over the chatter. Some of the things he says are instructions directly related to the task. But much of what he says is simply picked out of the air to keep up his flow (he talks about 'the locker situation' and the 'school snacks') and its content is lost on the pupils, anyway, as they go about their business.

The function described above is seen to be a recurring one and it acts somewhat like a brake applied at particular moments during the lesson to subdue the pupils and maintain control. As a recurring element in the control mechanism of the lesson it must be seen as part of the structural fabric of the lesson - as an underlying function of language which operates irrespective of what is actually said.

6.3 Evaluation

The preceding analysis and interpretation of Tony's use and control of language say more about the values and attitudes of the teacher than about the ideas actually picked up by the pupils. But it is likely that, if a teacher usually talks as much as Tony does in this lesson, and if he is consistent, he will, in time, convey his values and beliefs to his

pupils. This is not to say, of course, that the pupils will adopt them. Much depends upon the strength of the values and attitudes they bring with them from home and from their previous schools, and much depends, also, on the esteem in which they hold the teacher and the scholastic community. But this does not diminish the fact that the teacher is in a very strong position to influence the pupils' values and attitudes and that he is the representative of the art educational community, bearing the values and attitudes, however ambivalent, and the conventions of that community.

The values and attitudes of the teacher as representative of both the art educational community and the scholastic community are not conveyed directly through the topics of individual lessons, or the practices and techniques arising from those topics. Of course, the teacher's choice of topic is affected by his values and attitudes for these must underly everything that he does and says. But the values and attitudes themselves, often ambiguous, ambivalent, contradictory (and for this reason often very difficult to talk about directly), are conveyed more by what the teacher does with language and by the specialised meanings he attributes to his words, than by the more general or overt meaning of what he says. These two aspects - what is done with language and the specialised meanings (conventions) embodied in the teacher's language - may be distinguished and explored in Tony's lesson under the headings of the 'hidden curriculum' and the 'secondary content'.

6.31 The Hidden Curriculum

The 'hidden curriculum' (Jackson, 1968; Snyder, 1971) refers to the tacit values and attitudes concerning appropriate pupil behaviour, appropriate educational knowledge, appropriate pupil responses to the teacher's questions and so on, which are transmitted mainly by the form and structure of classroom language which is, ultimately, under the control of the teacher. One rather typical example of values and attitudes being transmitted in this way in Tony's lesson concerns the role of language.

We have noted that Tony is apologetic to his pupils for spending so much time talking in the first phase of the lesson. We have also noted that he suppresses pupil-to-pupil talk whenever it threatens to develop. From this we surmise that, in his view, there is 'talking' and 'doing' in an art

class and that the real work begins when the talking stops. This interpretation is strengthened by certain things Tony said after the lesson. When questioned he said that he probably talked more than he would normally because it was the first lesson with a new group. He said this, again, rather apologetically, as if excusing himself for talking so much. He added that in subsequent lessons he would teach 'on a more one-to-one basis', as if talking to individuals as they work, as opposed to addressing the whole class, is somehow not really talking. As for pupil-to-pupil talk, he said that 'group criticism could be profitable', but 'as a general thing, it's a practical subject to them and they don't like this sort of theoretical side'. That is, he believes that the pupils do not expect to have to talk in art lesson^s; they expect to be 'doing' things and he would agree with them.

From this it would appear that Tony is unaware of the all-pervasive nature of language in his lessons and that he, like teachers in other, more obviously 'verbal' subjects, talks almost continuously, if only to 'keep in touch' (Stubbs, 1976) with his pupils. One would suggest, therefore, that he is the victim of a certain degree of mystification so that language, in his view, is associated only with the 'theoretical side' and he is able to ignore its other functions. This being so, it is not at all surprising that, through his words and through his actions he should convey to his pupils the idea that talk is an intrusion in his lessons and that art is essentially something which goes on outside the realm of words.

But it is not quite as simple as this. The 'hidden' message in this case is far more subtle and ambiguous. Irrespective of the value Tony consciously places on language and of his conscious attitude towards it, what actually happens in his lessons betrays a completely opposite attitude, more deeply held. In the lesson observed the preliminary talk took up over half of the time available and there is no reason to believe that, unless Tony is given to skimping on his introductions to new topics, this is not a regular occurrence. When the class does, eventually, get down to some drawing, Tony continues to talk intermittently. When he is not addressing the class as a whole he is talking with small groups or individuals. When he does some drawing himself, to help pupils in difficulty, he provides a commentary to make sense of what he is doing and, by way of preparation for drawing, he even asks for words to describe faces, thereby acknowledging the value of the 'verbal' in 'visual' work.

There is a contradiction here, then, between Tony's values and attitudes openly expressed and those transmitted through practice. In other words, Tony does not practice what he preaches. The pupils must come to terms with this and they must come to realise that there are different kinds of talk: that which is encouraged and that which is discouraged by the teacher. There is talk of the kind in which the teacher himself indulges, which must be seen as useful or acceptable and there is conversation of the kind which the pupils themselves might strike up, which is a hindrance to artistic activity. The pupils must learn to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable talk and respond appropriately, if they wish to be successful in this subject. That is, they must work quietly unless approached by the teacher and then they must adopt the conventions of his language. But over and above this ability to distinguish and to respond appropriately, they must also profess the 'knowledge' that talk of any kind is an intrusion in artistic matters. In order to 'swallow' this, the pupils must also become party to the mystification which allows Tony to see his own, continuous chatter, as a kind of 'non-talk' in relation to the real work of the lesson. This is not to imply a deliberate strategy on the part of the pupils. It is simply that, in order to succeed, they must absorb the rules of the game, no matter how contradictory, and respond appropriately.

Another aspect of the 'hidden curriculum' discovered in Tony's lesson is conveyed through his chosen style of teaching. I have mentioned several times that in the first phase of the lesson Tony adopts the traditional 'transmission' style of teaching, but I have not yet explained what this means. The idea comes from Barnes (1973; 1976) who contrasts this style of teaching with what he calls 'interpretation' teaching. The 'interpretation' teacher, he says, sees language as a means by which the pupil can take an active part in his own learning. Such a teacher sees 'discussion and writing as ways of helping pupils to think more effectively and (he) will credit them with the ability to make sense of experience for themselves by talking and writing about it. For him, knowledge is something which each person has to make for himself. As a teacher he tends to be very aware of his pupils' attitudes to the work that he gives them. He is careful to be a good audience to his pupils: he writes comments on his pupils' work, often he reads it aloud or displays it, and uses it as a springboard into the next piece of work for the class' (Barnes, 1973). In short, 'interpretation' teaching is pupil-centred as opposed to subject or discipline centred.

By contrast 'transmission' teaching is subject-centred. The 'transmission' teacher, according to Barnes, 'sees language as a kind of speaking tube: he sends knowledge down the tube and the pupil receives it or fails to do so. When he asks questions of his pupils, or tells them to write, it will be primarily in order to test whether they have in fact received the knowledge he transmitted' (Barnes, 1973, 15). He sees the purpose of talking and writing primarily as the acquisition or recording of information. When such a teacher sets work, he thinks mainly of the product and of whether the task he sets is appropriate and clear to his pupils. He sees marking primarily in terms of assessment and either hands back the work to pupils with no follow up, or he uses it as a basis for the correction of errors.

Barnes says that he does 'not want to make too much of these two stereotypes which perhaps approach caricatures. Nevertheless, it is becoming clear in the course of some on-going research ... that large groups of secondary teachers fall near to one (model) or the other' (ibid.). In the lesson observed Tony certainly appears very close to Barnes's model of a 'transmission teacher'. The aim of the lesson seems to be to transmit information about the appropriate ways to represent the face and about appropriate art-room behaviour. Tony sets his pupils to work making drawings, the purpose of which is to reflect a grasp of this information (i.e. he has certain expectations of the product). He is at great pains to explain what he wants and, as the work proceeds, he stalks the room evaluating and regulating it according to the criteria he has laid down. If the work meets his criteria he follows it up with little more than a vague, positive evaluation. Thus it would seem that, even in the second phase of the lesson, when the pupils are involved in their drawings and when Tony's approach appears more casual and informal, his style is still consistent with that of the typical 'transmission' teacher.

According to Barnes (1976), the 'transmission' and 'interpretation' styles have different implications. The 'transmission' teacher believes that knowledge exists in the form of public disciplines which include content and criteria of performance. He values the learner's performance insofar as it conforms to the criteria of the discipline. He sees it as his task to evaluate and correct the learner's performance according to criteria of which he is the guardian, and he sees the learner as an uninformed acolyte for whom access to knowledge will be difficult since he must qualify himself through tests of appropriate performance.

Insofar as he conforms to Barnes's model of the 'transmission' teacher Tony conveys, through his style of teaching and his use of language, rather than in what he actually says, that art is a public discipline with an associated body of knowledge and criteria of performance. It is the task of his pupils to absorb that knowledge and to meet those criteria, while it is the task of the teacher to regulate and evaluate their performances accordingly. The pupils are as yet uninformed and the teacher holds the key to artistic knowledge.

On occasions Tony reinforces this impression, that art is a self-contained discipline with its own tacit rules, in the things he says. For instance, at one point he claims that it is the task of the Art Department, 'to try and train' pupils to see in the right way. On another occasion, when he asks for words to describe faces, he has to say that, while these words may provide 'the kind of information which ... could be useful in terms of drawing', words really belong on the English Department. The Art Department, he says, 'is obviously more to do with pictures'. In the same vein, Tony recognises a boundary between the work of the Art Department and that of the Drama Department. On this occasion he is talking about the way make-up and spectacles can change facial expressions and by bringing in the Drama Department in the way he does, he implies that this area of the discussion belongs there, rather than in the art room. By speaking in this way Tony begins to compartmentalise knowledge, thought and action for his pupils. He distinguishes that which 'properly' belongs to art from that which 'properly' belongs within the realms of other subjects and disciplines. To use Bernstein's (1971, p.151) notion of 'classification', Tony makes quite a strong classification of that knowledge, thought, experience and behaviour which may be seen as 'artistic', thereby establishing art as a more or less self-contained world.

6.32 The Secondary Content

Having established this, one must now ask what knowledge does Tony convey as being 'artistic' and how does he convey it? Some is conveyed overtly in the teacher's choice of topic for the lesson and in the planned constituents of that topic. In this way Tony conveys the idea that knowing how to draw faces in the 'correct' proportions is 'artistic' knowledge; knowing how to draw eyes, eye-lashes, hair, the nose, the mouth, in the way Tony prescribes is 'artistic' knowledge; knowing how to arrange pictures

on the page is 'artistic' knowledge; knowing that one must look really hard at things is 'artistic knowledge'; and knowing how to use those materials and that equipment discovered in the art room, responsibly and economically, is 'artistic knowledge'.

Such knowledge, conveyed in the topic of the lesson, may be described as the 'primary content' of the lesson. There is, however, another kind of knowledge which is not formally presented in this way, but which may be read between the lines, so to speak. It is to be found in the teacher's specialist use of language (the registers); in the unguarded and distracted language that he uses when he is doing a demonstration drawing; in his responses to the unexpected answers he gets to his questions; and in his informal 'socialising' with the pupils. Such knowledge is not 'artistic knowledge' in the same sense as 'knowing' the 'correct' proportions of the face; it is contextual knowledge, knowledge about art, or more correctly, about art in the context of the school. This knowledge may be described as the 'secondary content' of the lesson. It fulfils a complementary role to that of the 'hidden curriculum'; if the pupil learns how to relate to the teacher by means of the 'hidden curriculum', he learns how to relate to the subject by means of the 'secondary content'.

Now, what might one glean from the 'secondary content' of Tony's lesson? Drawing from what has been discussed under the heading of 'interpretation' (5.2), one might glean some or all of the following:

A pupil's work must be authentic, it must be all his own, and it must not bear the mark of someone else's hand. Copying from pictures is to be frowned upon. Art is a form of enquiry, it is an exploration and, as such, is unpredictable. Art is something one does privately and fervently, almost reverently. It is not competitive; it is done for personal satisfaction. Good work takes a long time, but not too long. There are standards towards which one must strive and which one may attain in time with experience. One should not be too 'adventurous'; one should proceed according to the rules/knowledge which the teacher will provide in due course. The artist must see with an 'innocent' eye. Artistic enquiry opens one's eyes. The product of artistic enquiry may be judged against the world that is there to be seen once the scales have been removed from one's eyes. Certain objects are more appropriate for artistic enquiry than others. Artistic enquiry is a problem-solving process. The products of this enquiry should be exhibited on the walls.

It is difficult to believe that so many concepts should be transmitted, more or less unintentionally, in the course of just one lesson and it is not until one analyses what is said, in some detail, that such a list, almost a creed, comes to light. This is not to say, of course, that the pupils will necessarily grasp all of these concepts after just one lesson. It is more likely, in fact, that the average pupil will leave the lesson with the impression given in 6.213, that is, with the ideas conveyed by the overt topic. But it is reasonable to assume, I think, that the 'secondary content', like the 'hidden curriculum', will transcend particular lessons and particular topics, and that Tony will rehearse the concepts listed in the paragraph above over and over again until they eventually sink in.

6.33 Conclusion

It is quite clear that, in this lesson at least, language and verbally framed concepts dominate over any experience or knowledge the pupils might derive from the act of drawing. This must be true if only because of the time given over to talk compared with that allowed for drawing. But it is also true because of the ways in which the practical work is organised, regulated and evaluated within a closely-knit network of words. The whole event is created, characterised and sustained by means of words. By means of words Tony prescribes and evaluates the area of activity which he has chosen as his topic. He tells the pupils how to see faces and he tells them how to represent them. He comments upon the work which is done in order to show the class what is good and what is bad practice. He bombards the class with a host of ideas about art and how the pupils should view the subject. He tells the class how they should behave in art lessons and he controls behaviour by means of words. In particular he controls the verbal environment, thereby conveying more ideas about art as an activity and art as a school subject. Indeed, by his control over what is said, who says it and how it is said, Tony embarks on a process of 'socialisation' in which he, as an accepted representative of the art educational establishment, attempts to make his pupils think and act as he does.

CHAPTER 7

LESSON B

7.1 Description

7.11 The Room

This lesson is in what is called the Bottom Studio. The room was originally intended to be a light/sound workshop but, due to lack of money, it was never equipped as such and is now used as a general art and design studio. On one wall it has a door into the Art Office which was to have been the control room for the light/sound workshop. There is a large window in the wall between these two rooms, but the view through it is obscured by piles of work and equipment on planchests and tables pushed against the wall on the studio side and by clip-boards hanging over Peter's desk on the Office side. The Bottom Studio has only one external wall and this is adjacent to that shared with the Art Office. There are windows all along this wall, over a bench with one large sink. This bench, like that in the Graphics Room holds, among other things, all the painting materials and equipment. But it is not as neatly laid out as it was in the other room. The wall opposite the Art Office has a door, with a light-trap, giving access to the Dark Room. The rest of the wall is more or less hidden behind work-laden tables, a projection screen, and a Dexian tower. The fourth wall of the room has a door leading to the corridor. This wall, too, is practically hidden behind tables, planchests, shelving and work stuck on to it and along the top there is a narrow strip of windows which have been blacked out. The main colours of the room are deep blue, red and black. The room is approximately twenty-four feet square and it is filled with furniture leaving very little room for movement when all of the seats are occupied. There is a blackboard on the wall next to the Art Office windows. The room is cosy and intimate and it speaks of activity and industry.

7.12 The Lesson

The class-change bell rings at 2.45 pm and it takes about five minutes for Peter's fourth-form group to arrive and to settle down sufficiently for him to begin. These pupils (about twenty-six of them) are much more lively and talkative than the first-formers discussed in the previous chapter. They are, clearly, much more at home and Peter has to shout, at first, to make himself heard. He stands at the blackboard and, when he has the attention of the class, he sustains their interest, talking quietly and fluently.

Peter says that he has 'another visual problem' for those who are not already involved in any 'personal work'. The idea is to take the word 'strata' as a 'visual starting point', he says, and he suggests that the class may have heard of strata in a geography lesson. He asks if anybody would like to give him a definition of the term and hardly waiting for a response, he gently cajoles a girl to suggest something and she, confused by the reference to geography lessons, says that it's something to do with clouds. Peter tells her that it isn't and he quickly accepts the idea called out by another pupil that it means 'layers'. 'That's the word I was hoping you'd say', he says, 'a layering effect', and he goes on to explain that he has picked this particular starting point 'because it is open to very, very, free interpretation' while still remaining 'a fairly enclosed idea'.

The purpose of the exercise, Peter says, is to 'see how far we can develop this particular word in visual terms'. The word 'strata', he claims, may be applied to anything which is layered, although it is usually associated with layers of earth. As earth moves and compacts it gets a bit like a sponge sandwich with cream in the middle. If you press one of these the cream squeezes out around the sides because the sponge is harder than the cream. Peter says that this is a useful idea, but he doesn't want the pupils thinking in terms of foodstuffs because this, he believes, will limit them. Instead he wants them to take a cross-section through an imaginary piece of earth sliced by a gigantic knife to expose a series of 'interesting' layers which have been 'compressed', 'contracted', 'squeezed', 'pressed' and 'crushed' into 'different sorts of shapes'. As he is saying this he illustrates what he means on the blackboard. It will help the drawing, he goes on to say, if the pupils can imagine the

different 'pressures' and 'forces' acting downwards and sideways to create the various shapes. It will help, even though the forces themselves can't be shown in a 'visual image'. It is up to the pupils, he says, to see how 'interesting' they can make the shapes, and he points out some 'interesting' things going on in his own drawing on the black-board. For example, two areas have been 'nipped together' and are 'a bit like caverns and caves'. Having said this, Peter quickly checks himself and adds that he doesn't want anyone 'to get too literal' in his drawings. That is, he doesn't want little people crawling around. This would 'spoil the visual effect' and make the drawing 'too cartoony'. What he does want, he explains, is for people to 'use the pencil' to 'invent' visual textures and formations of lines and patterns which would begin to suggest interesting textural differences in the different layers of the earth. This means, he continues, that each must use the full range of tone that a 2B pencil will allow. Also, people may recall and make use of a previous exercise they have done on texture. The aim is to be as 'inventive as possible', and to produce a 'variety' of textures and patterns.

This drawing is not the only objective of the exercise, Peter explains. 'There is a lot of mileage' in the idea. It could develop into lino or silk-screen printing, or even into a clay relief. Thus, the drawing is only a starting point, but it can still go into pupils' folders as a finished thing in itself.

Peter's talk has taken five minutes. He concludes by reminding everyone that the 'strata' exercise is the 'next (thing) in the pipeline' for those who have finished what they have been working on and may not have anything they immediately wish to do. He asks if there are any questions. There aren't any, so he organises the giving out of paper and the sorting out of folders which are stored on the Dexian tower. The class, having sat quietly through Peter's talk, now erupts into noisy activity. Some pupils crowd around the teacher as he hands out folders, others begin to equip themselves and to set up their work on the tables. Everyone is talking. A few huddle together continuing the conversation they had been having before the lesson began and hoping the teacher won't notice them too soon.

Peter talks continuously as he sorts through and distributes the folders of work. He answers questions such as that from one pupil who wants to know if he might do the strata exercise in paint. He tells him that he

may but there isn't really enough time to paint in a single lesson such as this. He also comments on the work in progress in the folders as he hands them over;

Right, Julie, this one was nice. Where is she? Terry? I'm sorry you left that on the window sill; I'd like you to carry on with that, not today though ... Aaron?

And he slips in one or two jokes:

Julie Wood, if she could!

A boy calls Peter away from the pile of folders, which he leaves for the owners to sort through themselves. The boy is using a diffuser with stencils to create a picture of stars and planets against a black background. He doesn't want a hard edge around the planet he is working on and he needs some advice from Peter. The teacher tells him to hold the stencil above the surface of the paper and to spray through it.

Peter looks up and someone asks him again if he can do the strata idea in paint. Peter tells him that he can and then someone else asks for a set-square and he is told by the teacher to look on his desk in the Art Office.

A girl called Stacey waves to Peter as he passes and shows him a book of drawings that she has brought from home. He says that he knows the chap who wrote it and that he himself had bought one of the author's posters for his niece who had found it frightening. Peter says, he really likes the drawings in the book; he finds them 'very inventive' and 'amazing', with 'lots of detail'.

A boy interrupts and asks for some paper. Then another comes to Peter with a magazine to ask if a particular black and white photograph of a figure against the sea would make a good painting. The teacher is doubtful at first; although it works as a photograph, he says, it might present problems in a painting because of the difficult viewpoint. He asks the boy what it is that he wishes to capture in the painting. It appears that he likes the strong contrasts of tone and the effects of the spray flying from the water as it hits the rocks. Peter begins to see possibilities and he suggests that the boy might use a similar spray method to that being used by the boy with the star and planet painting. He advises him

to retain the same format as the photograph and to use carefully controlled washes of colour.

This conversation ends when someone asks Peter for a pencil sharpener. Peter goes into the office to find one and when he returns he is met by a girl who asks if it is alright for her to choose a title of her own to work on. Peter says that it is fine with him for her to work from her own starting point; his titles are only for those who can't devise their own.

Peter moves on and, as he passes the boy who is working on the stars and planets, the boy complains that the method he was advised to use is not going to work; the edges are still going to be too hard. Peter looks at the work and he says that it seems to be turning out as the boy had said he wanted it, with the marks spreading out from a central, intense area. The boy does not seem sure what he wants and he says that he is just going to see how it turns out. Peter replies, 'Good. Have a go', and he moves on.

He approaches a pupil who turned up late and who doesn't seem to be doing much. He asks him if he understands what he is supposed to be doing. The boy says that he doesn't and Peter explains again all about strata and the need to create 'interesting' shapes which look as if they have been formed by 'pressures' working in all directions on materials of different 'consistency'. The aim, he repeats, is visual 'variety'. He asks the boy if he understands now. He says he does and Peter is dragged away to find some antiseptic cream for a boy who grazed his knuckles during lunch break.

When he returns Peter is attracted to a pupil who complains that he can't do the strata exercise. Peter laughs and calls him a 'chump'. Then he takes his pencil and demonstrates again the idea of slicing the landscape to reveal the different layers of 'granite, rocks or whatever'. As he draws he talks:

So that would create a shape. It's got to be an invented shape because it's not geographically accurate. It doesn't exist anywhere. It's just visually interesting, because of the shape relationship ... But you'll need quite a lot of textural variety you see. Another one could come in here, so you create two layers there. Then maybe another one if you want a fluid, more fluid appearance. You could have a piece like that. Maybe another one

appearing over here. Maybe even one, like, of, sort of, smaller groups of it, which represent different consistencies - hard, soft, gritty, runny. And then you've got to use your pencil to invent a way of shading these things and drawing into them to create the visual effect.

The boy seems a bit confused and asks, 'What? Do you fill it in?' And Peter says, 'Yes, using dot techniques, short lines, short bursts of lines, ruled lines, freehand drawn lines.' Then he asks him if he understands yet. The boy says yes, but not very convincingly. Peter decides to leave it at that and moves on.

He comments briefly on another pupil's effort, saying that it is 'too busy'. Then he approaches a boy who doesn't really want to be disturbed and decides to leave him to get on with it. He tells another pupil that his work is good and he comes round again to the boy working on the stars and planets, who is talking now with a friend. The friend asks Peter if he thinks the boy should use other methods besides the diffuser. Peter says that it is his decision really and that he must allow the work to progress step by step. It may well be, he says, that the introduction of other methods may be useful, but one has to let these things happen of their own accord.

A boy approaches Peter and asks if he has any pictures of old buildings or structures. Peter says that he hasn't, but the boy could take an existing building and imagine what effect years and years of disuse would have on it. He gives some examples, such as broken windows and holes in the roof.

Then Peter comes again to Stacey and her friend who are working together from a set of photographs mounted on a sheet of card. The photos were taken in a graveyard. 'Right', he says cheerily, 'how are you doing with the grave-stone? Is it a personal epitaph? Is this where you are going to be?' Stacey replies that she is stuck and Peter says that he feels she is getting slightly out of tune with the idea! She agrees, and he goes on to make some suggestions as to how the picture she is putting together from the photos may be improved. He talks about grading the tones between the objects in the foreground and the trees in the background to create a focus and he talks about making the trees in the background 'more diffuse' or less detailed. He suggests that Stacey should

introduce another tree or some grave-stones on one side to help balance the composition and he also suggests that she considers the ground-texture to prevent things from looking as if they are floating. He also points out that she is trying to put in more detail than she can actually see in the photographs. In photos, he says, areas tend to run into one another and outlines are not complete.

Stacey complains that she can't draw trees and Peter says that this will come with practice. She disagrees and says that she thinks that Peter should tell her how to do it. Peter is taken aback, somewhat, and he says that she should be taking more responsibility for her own work. He may provide an idea for a composition but he only creates the problems. It is up to the pupils to find their own solutions. There is nothing to say that the answers he might provide to artistic problems are the only ones possible and, anyway, 'the fact that it's getting difficult is better for (her), because the more (she) struggles with these problems, the more (she) will learn.' Stacey returns to the problem of introducing another tree into her picture; she doesn't really want to do this. Peter says that he appreciates that she is reluctant but, he asks, what is she going to do instead? At this point he is called away to answer the 'phone in the Art Office.

When he emerges again into the studio, Peter's attention is taken by a boy who is looking through a book called Creative Drawing, which has been left on one of the tables near the door to the Office. Peter calls the boy a 'crafty devil' and asks if he is looking for ideas. Before he can answer, Peter draws his attention to 'a good strata theme' in the book. It is created by 'linear construction', he says and he points out that the tighter the lines are grouped together, the more black the tone becomes. Peter leaves the boy to carry on looking through the book and turns again to the girls working from the graveyard photographs.

Stacey shows him her work and asks if she is doing what Peter had suggested. Peter is still unhappy about the tonal contrasts in the drawing and comes up with the idea of moving a bush and making it very dark in tone so that a crucifix, which is the real focus of the picture, stands out in front of it. Stacey seems quite enthusiastic about this. Peter makes one or two more small suggestions and then, promising to 'have a ponder' he moves on.

Someone calls to him from across the room and Peter makes his way over. This is the boy who is working from the photograph of the sea and he wants Peter to confirm that he has used too much water in applying his washes. Peter agrees that he has and he suggests that the boy should look upon this attempt as an 'experiment'.

Moving on again, Peter provides one pupil with a small paint-brush and he agrees with another that it might be nice to contrast coloured areas against pencil-drawn areas. He leaves this pupil with the advice to let his work grow. 'Let it grow on its own. It'll evolve.'

He joins a small group of girls working together and he asks them if they happened to see a programme about Zandra Rhodes, the fashion designer, on the television the previous evening. One or two had and they agree with Peter that it was 'amazing'. Peter recalls Ms. Rhodes brush drawings and her fabric prints and says that the facilities for silk-screening are available in the Art Department. He goes off to find a screen which has been prepared by a pupil in another class. On his way he stops to have another brief word with Stacey about using her rubber to clean up some white shapes. Then he disappears into the office to return, a moment later, with a silk-screen, about two feet by eighteen inches. The design on the screen is a large, stylised eye. Peter carries it over to the girls he had been talking with and he explains how a print is made from such a screen. He also goes into the possibilities of over-printing in different colours and of moving the screen between pulls to create complex patterns. One of the girls suggests that one might make an 'eye-tree' in this way and Peter says that he will pass on this suggestion to the girl who designed the screen. He says, too, that he likes it when ideas start coming from the pupils themselves. The exercises that he sets, he feels, 'tend to hold everybody marking time on the same spot'.

Before he leaves this group Peter tells one of the girls that he thinks her work is 'going very nicely'.

It's got ... a feeling of space, don't you think? Like ins and outs and rounds, and round the back of, and things like that. I feel it ought to be developed almost as a piece of stage scenery.

It's a nice piece of work for the girl's folder, he says, and he also

likes the fact that it is completely different in its approach from Catherine's, her friends's, work.

It is 3.26 pm. Since Peter finished his talk to the whole class at the beginning of the lesson, the room has been a hive of activity. Most of this has been directed towards producing pictures and designs, although one or two pupil's have escaped Peter's efforts to see that everyone is fruitfully occupied. Nearly everyone has been talking nineteen to the dozen but Peter's voice has been audible throughout. He has put a lot of energy into this lesson, wending his way between the busy, tightly-packed pupils, speaking continuously with those who have followed him around and those whom he has himself approached. It is now time to begin clearing up and when Peter announces this, asking everyone to wash and put away palettes, brushes, etc., the noise and the activity becomes, if it is possible, even greater.

Amidst the apparent chaos, Peter shouts to make himself heard. He is promising that in a single period such as this, in the near future, he will use the school's video equipment to show the class a tape about the work of Graham Sutherland. A girl attracts Peter's attention and tells him about a friend of her father's who is the art director for the covers of paper-back books of a well-known publisher. She has some of the original pictures from which covers have been made, she says. Peter says he would like to see them some time and the girl tries to remember which ones she has. Peter continues to talk to her, trying mainly to talk her into joining his extra sessions in drawing which he takes after school on one day a week. But he breaks off now and then to regulate the clearing up which is going on around them.

Peter drags himself away and begins to sort through some work near the blackboard. He shows a drawing to a nearby pupil and asks if he showed it to the class last lesson. The boy says that he did, so Peter selects a painting from the pile saying that, when everyone is ready, he would like their 'opinion' of it. It's actually a piece of failed 'A' level work, he says, as he tapes it to the blackboard, and they are to discuss the possible reasons for its failure. Then he goes back to directing the clearing away and the putting away of folders until everyone settles down and someone asks, 'Did that painting fail?' Peter replies that it did, 'It went down the tunnel, as they say!'.

Peter now has the attention of the class. Before he begins, he asks Stacey to go into the corridor to bring back one or two of the less interested pupils who have left, without permission, while the room was being tidied. She returns with two boys who start to explain why they were outside of the room, but the laughter of the rest of the class drowns their excuses. Peter is keen to get on with criticising the painting, so he lets the incident pass and when everyone is quiet again he begins.

He says that the painting, a still-life of a bottle, a skull, some carrots and other vegetables against a chess-board background, received a very low grade. One never knows exactly why works receive low grades, he says, but one can make suggestions by comparing them with those that get higher grades. Then he asks if anyone would like to make some criticisms of the painting. Someone says that there aren't any shadows and Peter agrees, adding that the person who painted it doesn't seem to have taken any notice of 'the play of light and shade' on the objects. Someone else says that one of the black squares doesn't seem to fit. Peter takes the point, but he doesn't make anything of it. Another suggests that the shading on the label of the bottle doesn't take into account what is behind the bottle. Peter agrees with this, but again he doesn't expand upon it. He repeats the three points made so far and describes them as 'quite valid observations' since they do relate to things going on in the painting but, he asks, are these things 'omissions' by the painter, or are they perhaps 'intentional'? Nobody takes this up and Peter appeals to Stacey for her views. She says that she doesn't think the painting is 'realistic'. 'In what part?' asks Peter. There is a babble of replies and Peter picks out Marcus to answer, who thinks that the bottle could be quite realistic if it was a bit darker. Peter agrees that there is 'quite a lot of careful work there'. Someone else calls out that the carrots and onions look 'flat'. Again Peter agrees and he adds that this painting would probably pass an 'O'level examination, but at 'A'level the examiners are looking for 'a much more sophisticated product'. John says that the bottle doesn't really reflect anything. Peter accepts this, but he says that he thinks that the person who did the picture was quite 'a sensitive draughtsman'. He has managed to get a 'feeling of volume' in the skull, but he seems to have 'lost interest' in the carrots. Marcus wants to know if one is allowed to use rulers in examinations. Peter says that you can if you wish, providing you don't overdo it and he produces a drawing,

again of a still-life group, with bottles and an umbrella, but formed mainly by vertical lines of varying thickness and shape. This piece, he says, did pass the exam., but with a low grade. Why, he asks, did it get greater credit than the other one? Carl suggests that it is because it has reflections. Peter agrees. Someone else believes that it is more realistic. Peter is surprised at this but several others support the idea. Peter wants to know if this is a general opinion and someone says that it isn't realistic, but he can't think of a good word to describe it. Peter steps in and agrees that one could hardly call it 'photographic' if that is what is meant by 'realism'. There are a lot of 'invented shapes' in it, he says, a bit like the strata exercise some of the class have been doing today. It is based on observation, but the girl who did it has 'really taken a lot of liberties with the shapes'. And these have become very 'personalised'.

While he has been saying this Peter has been talking over several contributions from the class. By the time he finishes what he wanted to say, there is silence. He asks one of the pupils what they had been trying to say, but the boy shakes his head. So Peter starts up again, saying that maybe the second piece of work is more 'consistent' than the first in which the background and the objects don't really relate to each other.

Here the bell rings for the end of the lesson and Peter decides not to pursue the point he had begun to make. He asks the class to put up their chairs as they leave and everyone disappears into the corridor.

7.2 Interpretation

7.21 Situation

7.211 Setting

Unlike the Graphics Room the Bottom Studio has a blackboard which distinguishes that corner of the room as the teacher's territory. However, any suggestion of a formal teacher-class relation is contradicted by the arbitrary arrangement of the work-tables which seems to recognise no particular focus beyond the work going on around the tables themselves. As the lesson progresses, however, it is apparent that the blackboard is used from time to time and that the teacher does occasionally use that

corner of the room as his platform. For most of the time, though, the class operates as a collection of action-bases between which the teacher moves holding everything together and keeping the work going.

Peter's choice of teaching methods is very similar to Tony's and he arranges them in much the same way, too. He begins at the blackboard, with a more or less captive audience, where he develops the main theme of the lesson with appropriate visual back-up. Then he releases the class, after speaking for only a fraction of the time spent by Tony on this phase, allowing it to break down into informal groupings. He maintains control by moving himself, vigorously, from one locality to the next arguing points, making suggestions, demonstrating techniques and, like Tony, gossiping about things, such as the Zandra Rhodes television programme and the paper-back book design editor, which have no immediate bearing upon the work in hand. The main difference between this part of Peter's lesson and the equivalent part of Tony's is that, because the theme with which Peter introduces his lesson is optional, he must hop from one theme to another, and back again, as he moves between localities.

Towards the end of the lesson, again like Tony, Peter resumes central control over the whole class, focus-ing everyone's attention, in this case, upon some 'neutral' work which is of equal relevance to everyone irrespective of what he or she has been doing. The only real difference in method here is that Peter chooses to tidy the room before he settles the class down to discuss the work, while Tony prefers to talk first and to clear up last thing.

7.212 Participants

Like Tony, Peter talks almost continuously throughout the lesson, whether it be in front of the whole class, or in conversation with individual pupils. But in this lesson, unlike Tony's, there is almost continuous talk from the pupils, too. While Peter is addressing the whole class at the beginning and at the end there are one or two whispered conversations going on at the back of the room. When Peter asks questions there is very little reluctance among the pupils to answer. When they break up into small groups they chatter noisily among themselves. Most of this talk is to do with the work or with related matters. Some has nothing to do with art at all. Peter's role seems to be more that of a helper than a controller during this part of the lesson, as he rushes around, pursued by

one pupil after another, supplying advice, assistance and equipment.

7.213 Topic

The topic or focus of this lesson is much more difficult to pin down than that of Lesson A. If we were able to eavesdrop on several of Peter's pupils as they recounted what they had learned or what they had done in the lesson, we would undoubtedly hear several rather different stories. They might all agree on the dominant or common theme of the lesson, that is, the exercise on 'strata', but beyond this it would depend on what each had been working on for the greater part of the time.

The 'strata' idea may be summed up in its aims and objectives. The aim of the exercise is to invent a design based on the notion of strata or 'layering', which is to show variety and contrast of pattern and texture. The object is to produce a pencil drawing as an end in itself (i.e. as a piece of work to go into the pupil's portfolio), but which can also be used as the basis for a lino or silk-screen print, or a piece of ceramics.

Subsidiary themes are several and varied, both in subject and in technique. They include the painting of planets by means of a spray diffuser, the drawing of a figure against a seascape by means of tracing from a magazine, the drawing of tombstones in a graveyard from a collection of original photographs and the painting, rather than the drawing, of a design based on the 'strata' idea. These are all validated by the teacher and being plainly visible to all, they contribute, at least to some extent, to the general content of the lesson.

One of two more general themes emerge in the group criticism at the end of the lesson. Peter introduces the notion of 'consistency' in a painting, by which he means the unity of its parts, whether it be a 'realistic' or an abstract work. He also touches on the power of the artist to select what he puts into a painting and the possibility that something may be omitted or distorted deliberately to achieve certain artistic ends.

There are other themes discernable, however, which are restricted to just one pupil or to a small group. Unlike Tony's lesson where everyone in the class could hear what was said to individual pupils. Peter's is very

active, noisy and diffuse, so it is unlikely that words addressed to particular pupils reach a wider audience. Thus, certain themes must be accepted as localised, although they may be repeated in more than one locality during the lesson. Among these is Peter's contention that the pupil should accept more and more responsibility for all aspects of his work as he proceeds through the school. The teacher provides the problems, he claims, but the pupil must choose the particular vehicle and develop the particular techniques. Another such theme is Peter's view that a work of art must 'evolve' in its own way.

7.22 Language Registers

Apart from the odd occasion when Peter, quite unconsciously, translates something a pupil says into his own, more specialised terms (e.g. when a pupil talks of 'using' a particular medium, Peter substitutes 'controlling'), his language is, on the surface at least, informal, spontaneous, and aimed squarely at the particular pupils he is teaching. However, the 'feel' of his language is deceptive inasmuch as its comparative simplicity, lack of formality and directness, disguise the fact that much of what he says is generated by certain school- and subject-related conventions and habits of thought which are by no means as uncomplicated as they appear.

7.221 Specialist Language Presented

This is a very different kind of lesson from Lesson A inasmuch as the teacher does not spend a lot of time transmitting information and ideas upon which he expects his pupils to act. On the contrary, for the greater part of the lesson pupils approach the teacher with their problems and questions, or the teacher enters into the work of individuals and small groups. In Lesson A the teacher and the pupils are new to each other. The pupils are made to feel that they are being introduced to a body of knowledge and techniques by the teacher who, understanding their lack of experience, is reasonably careful to explain what he feels to be new or difficult terms and concepts. In Lesson B, however, the pupils and the teacher are familiar to each other. They have had time to build up a rapport which means that, apart from the odd term or concept which the teacher might introduce to spark off a new piece of

work, there is no longer much need for him to 'present' words. In Bernstein's terms (see Bernstein, 1971, 80-82), the teacher in Lesson A, addressing a group from the 'outside' as it were, adopts a more formal, 'elaborated code' for the sake of greater clarity (what Barnes, 1976, might call 'final draft'), whereas the participants in Lesson B, the teacher included, adopt more of a 'restricted code' (Bernstein, loc.cit.) which reflects their familiarity with each other and with their common pursuit.

Left to himself, the only occasions on which Peter feels the need to present terms in his lesson are in the beginning, when he introduces the word 'strata', and at the end when there is some confusion over the meaning of 'realistic' as it is applied to pictures.

Peter: I mean, look at the umbrella here, which is a beautiful, beautiful thing. You could hardly call that 'photographic' if you are talking about 'realism' being 'like a photograph'. (1)

It is important to note that both of these instances occur at those times in the lesson when Peter is addressing the class as a whole, for it is at such times that he comes closest to adopting a 'transmission' style of teaching with its associated 'elaborated code', or 'final draft' sort of language. The implication is that his style of speech, and the view he takes of his pupils' understanding and knowledge, is related to the degree to which he includes himself in the group or spaces himself from it.

There is one quite important occasion, however, when Peter is talking informally to two girls about their work, when he is moved to adopt an 'elaborated' style. One of the girls breaks the tacit rules of pupil-teacher conduct and questions Peter's method of teaching which she finds negative and unhelpful. Peter takes what she says to heart and replies

-
- (1) He does use the word 'realistic' without presenting it earlier in the lesson. He criticises a pupil's drawing for not being 'that realistic'. He also says of it that she is putting in a lot of information from (her) own mind' and that she is not 'saying much' about the branches of a tree in the drawing. The pupil is left to gather what he means by realistic from this.

at length to her criticism in an attempt to present his approach in a more positive light. His reply represents what might be described as the presentation of specialist ideas.

The exchange arises out of Peter's suggestion (one of several) that the girl might include another tree in her picture,

Pupil: That's one thing I can't draw is trees.

Peter: Well, it's practise, I think, with trees. It's like anything else.

Pupil: I don't know, because I think you should tell me.

Peter: You think I should tell you?

Pupil: Yes

Peter: Well you should be taking more responsibility for these decisions now, because if I could tell ... I could give you a compositional idea, but I feel that I should hold it back until the last minute, if you can't find a solution to it yourself. Because there's no reason to believe that mine will be the only one, you know? I don't hold the answer to everything in here. It's just I think you've got some interesting problems to solve, artistically, there ... We don't want to jump in and say, 'Oh, do it that way', because you've got through to that, and that represents a lot of artistic learning ... It really does, you know, and the fact that it's getting difficult is better for you because the more you struggle with these problems, the more you'll learn, I think.

Pupil: The thing is, if I put another tree in there ... I don't really want to.

Here Peter is putting forward a similar point of view to that of Tony when he says that he (the teacher) shouldn't draw on his pupils' drawings. That is, the pupil's work must be completely authentic and there is some artistic and educational value in working things out for oneself. Such a view, it would seem, leaves the teacher with very little to do. If he is not there to show the pupil what to do, or how to do it, then what is he there for? Could not the pupil do just as well if the teacher were not there? Peter's answer for this is that he is there to make suggestions, should the pupil fail, after every effort has been made to find original ways of doing things. Even then, however, his solutions, according to Peter, are not definitive. As he sees it, it is more his job to provide the right sort of problems (i.e. 'artistic')

problems) than to provide solutions.

Like Tony, Peter holds art to be a problem-solving activity. Participating in art, his pupils are led to confront problems of 'composition', 'representation', and so on, and it is up to them to find solutions. Finding a solution represents 'artistic learning', and the harder the problem the better the learning experience when a solution is found.

One would assume that by the time they have reached the fourth year Peter's pupils will have been exposed to this way of thinking often enough to have absorbed and accepted it. It is rather interesting to note, therefore, the girl's response to Peter's statement. She ignores completely what he has said and returns immediately to her main interest - that of whether or not to include another tree in her picture. She is clearly not concerned about art educational theory; she has heard it all before and it cuts no ice with her (at least, that is the impression she gives). Either she has contrary ideas on what art is about, derived perhaps from stronger influences than Peter, or she is incapable, as yet, of grasping Peter's rather abstract ideas. Her interests are much more concrete and her problem much more tangible and pressing.

There is, of course, another possibility, which is that the girl's views on art and art-teaching are informed more convincingly by the covert messages Peter conveys through channels other than direct explanation. I am thinking here of the 'hidden curriculum' in particular. But this must be discussed in due course.

7.222 Specialist Language Not Presented

For the greater part of the lesson Peter is completely absorbed into the group and, during this time, he talks to the pupils, often using quite difficult concepts without any attempt to explain what he means. He takes it for granted that, as fellow members of the group, everyone understands the language he is using. This goes for technical terms such as 'textural', 'relief', 'format', 'linear construction', 'lino-printing' and 'silk-screen printing', as well as for language which embodies conventions of art educational thinking.

One such convention, which has already been mentioned, is the idea that

art in education is a matter of problem-solving. Peter takes it for granted, in the way that he speaks, that there is such a thing as a 'visual problem'. Such problems, one gathers, are appropriate subjects for artistic enquiry since, according to Peter, one 'solves' them 'artistically'.

'Visual problems', in Peter's language, are synonymous with 'visual starting points'. Peter is very fond of the idea of the 'starting point': it crops up regularly in his language. Art work must be based on a 'visual problem' posed by the teacher or dreamed up by the pupil himself. When the pupil provides his own 'starting point', or when he is under way with work 'based on' an idea of the teacher, he is said to be involved in 'personal work'.

Peter's 'strata' idea is meant, presumably, to be an example of a 'visual problem'. 'We'll use this as a starting point', he says, 'and see how far we can develop this particular word'. If this is so, then it is of considerable interest that this particular 'visual starting point' is not in fact 'visual' but 'verbal'. It is not as if Peter were showing the class something to fire their imaginations or to encourage a sense of wonder. He is presenting them with a verbal concept, supplemented by more words, such as 'compressed', 'contracted', 'compounded', 'pressed', 'crushed', 'forces', 'pressures', 'hard', 'squeezed', 'cream-cakes', and 'caverns and caves', and by a rudimentary model drawing on the blackboard. From all these words, and the idea of a rectangle with wavy lines across it, the pupils have to conjure up something which is 'interesting' and, above all, 'visual'.

Another interesting observation is that the idea of 'strata' is hardly a 'problem', as such, visual or otherwise. If it does present a problem to the class then it is how to make a picture of 'strata' which complies with the teacher's expectations. Ostensibly Peter presents the idea as 'open to very, very free interpretation'. He does add, however, that, even so, it is 'still fairly enclosed'. Then he proceeds to 'enclose' the idea by telling the class what he does not want them to do. He does not want them to draw 'edible substances' (in spite of the fact that he uses the cream sponge to convey the idea of compression and layering) because he thinks that that 'is going to limit us'. Neither does he want the drawings to be 'too literal' (in spite of the fact that he

himself talks of caverns, stalagmites and stalagmites). To have 'little people in there crawling around', he says, would 'spoil the visual effect'. He further 'encloses' the idea by making suggestions as to what he does want to see. These include 'interesting textural differences', and 'some sort of faceted appearance of almost like crystalline structures'.

If this is anything to go by, all this talk of 'visual problems' cannot be taken at its face value. It must be seen, rather, as a way of speaking, which Peter has adopted as a member of the art educational community, and which, in all good faith, he is attempting to pass on to his pupils. As such it belongs to a mythology, other aspects of which may be detected in Peter's language.

In particular there is the notion that works of art somehow create themselves; they have a life of their own. This being so, the pupil must see himself as a more or less passive agent through which the artistic process operates to produce its objects. 'Let it grow', Peter advises one pupil, 'Let it grow on its own. It'll evolve'. When asked by another pupil if his friend, who is painting planets with a spray diffuser, should use something besides the diffuser to apply the paint, Peter answers:

Well, that's his decision really. He's got to sort of take it step by step and watch it happen. I mean it's, it might be that the introduction of a more, of a sort of, I don't know, a painted structure, or something in there might be nice later, but I think he's got to let it happen on its own. It's coming gradually. Things are appearing.

Apparently, not only must the teacher not interfere too much with the work of his pupils after he has posed the appropriate 'problems', but the pupils themselves must not take too active a part. The impression is that art is a mystical process, or an unconscious, natural process which proceeds at its own pace. In art one must follow where one is led. But this is not the whole story as it is told in Peter's language. There is a materialist aspect too:

Peter: I think we've got to solve that problem of that distance across there. Is there a clue here as to that? You see, we've got space across there, we've got these, sort of, different levels, you know, created by the trees. You've

got a more enclosed space there with these trees coming in at the top. That's another alternative. Here, because the photograph's a bit bleached out, we've lost a lot of that detail and it's very difficult to draw, anyway. There's the bush, we could bring that in behind, if you wanted, here ...

Pupil: What, very dark?

Peter: Very dark, and that would make the cross stand out.

Pupil: Yeah, and have a little ...

Peter: Yes, so that's one other solution, isn't it? But you have to have small textural differences in that to suggest that it was a piece of foliage. Maybe just along the edge. I'll have a ponder, ok? Stacey? Have a ponder.

Here Peter is breaking his rule of 'non-intervention' and he is also encouraging a pupil to actively take decisions as to how she should proceed with her picture. This happens quite frequently during the lesson. Here is another example:

You've got enough there to leave a fairly big expanse of, er, a simple area there, and bring it in again, maybe creeping up this way. I think you also ought to say where the top of your landscape is, you know, bring a definite edge to it, like a mountain-scape or whatever, ok?

I describe the view of art contained in these extracts as 'materialist' because they show Peter responding to the material constraints of the pictures as he finds them; that is, to the particular configuration of pictorial elements as it is given to him in the present state of the work. Occasionally, with a view to more desirable possibilities open to the pupil, he makes his suggestions as to how to proceed. Otherwise, as in the following example, he simply draws the attention of the pupil to the possibilities inherent in what he has done so far:

Think about it; think about it. Don't just whack into it. Think about the shape of that line. Is it going up? Is it going down? Does it pinch that together?

The 'materialist' view still appears to attribute the active role to the work of art rather than to the agent. When Peter asks the pupil to 'think about it', and to decide whether the line is going up or going down, he gives the impression that it is the line which is active

(i.e. it is the line which is doing something) and it is up to the pupil to recognise what the line is doing so that he can respond appropriately. But this does at least concede that the pupil does have some responsibility for the way the work develops, and that, far from letting it happen on its own, it is beholden upon him to take decisions.

Thus there appears to be a contradiction between the 'mystical' and the 'materialist' views embodied in Peter's language. It is difficult to reconcile conflicting instructions such as 'let it happen on its own' and 'think about it; think about it', and to see them as parts of the same mythology. It is difficult that is, until one remembers the context within which the conflict occurs, and that the mythology of art education is mediated by scholastic necessities, particularly those of class control. We are dealing here with the interface between the register of the subject, and that of the secondary school, and this is an area where one might expect to find ambiguity.

It is particularly important to recognise that in a lesson such as Peter's the setting is fluid. There are moments when the teacher confronts the class as a whole when, in order to maintain control, he assumes a more formal, transmission style in which he is more prone to speak in the abstract about art and the work in hand. There are other occasions, though, when the teacher becomes totally involved in particular pieces of work and, on these occasions, he addresses himself to the concrete problems of the pupils concerned. There are also moments, however, when he is not in central control of the class, yet he is distracted from individual pieces of work by the need to maintain class control. At such times he attempts to be everywhere at once, like a circus entertainer keeping plates spinning on the tops of poles, attending to pupils whose interest in their work is wavering.

It is while 'plate-spinning' and while addressing the class as a whole that Peter conveys the 'mystical' view of art, because at such times he is either having to talk in a general, theoretical way about work which is yet to be done, or which has been completed, or he is avoiding becoming bogged down in the particular in order to maintain mobility. A good example of this, already mentioned, is where the boy asks if his friend should use something besides the spray diffuser. Peter doesn't really have time to get involved at this point, so he evades the

question by saying that it is the friend's own decision and that he must let things happen of their own accord. When Peter does feel free to get involved, however, his approach is very different. His advice is more practical and down to earth, that is, more materialist.

So the conflict between the different myths embodied in Peter's language may be accounted for, to some extent, by the different organisational exigencies which arise in the course of the lesson. The myths are never really presented: Peter does not actually say that art is 'mystical' or that there is a dialectic between the work of art, as a material given, and the artist, as 'interpreter'. He takes these things for granted and he implies them in the language he uses. Because he does not present them, the contradictions are obscured so that neither he nor his pupils appear to see them. To the teacher, who has to juggle with a variety of priorities in the course of one lesson, all the things he says are true relative to the ever changing nature of the context in which he says them. To the pupil, who is not party to what is going on 'behind the scenes' in the mind of the teacher, and who may not be aware of shifts in context, everything the teacher says is true irrespective of the contradictions. The authority of the teacher blinds the pupil to the contradictions and there is the possibility that the different myths may become welded in his mind to create an inconsistent and mystified mythology.

Clearly this scenario does not hold true, however, for the girl who wants Peter to show her how to draw trees. She copes with the conflict somewhat differently. She recognises that, at times, Peter seems quite open to instructing pupils, irrespective of what he says in his more 'mystical' moments, and this is what she wants of him. As for what he does and says for the rest of the time, she simply ignores it.

Before leaving the subject of registers, it is interesting to note two instances in the lesson when pupils draw attention to ways of speaking. One of these is simply a case where Peter is asked what he means by 'a bit more diffuse'. This is clearly not a phrase any of the pupils is likely to use of his own accord. 'Diffuse' is a formal and somewhat unusual word, particularly for those from working-class homes, and, as such, it belongs to the register of secondary education. By asking the teacher what he means by 'diffuse' the pupil demonstrates this, and

he also demonstrates that, if pushed, the teacher can come up with a perfectly suitable, yet more common alternative: 'less detailed'.

The second instance demonstrates that the register of secondary education extends beyond the use of uncommon words; it also includes manners of speech and, quite simply, 'manners'. This is seen towards the end of the lesson when Peter himself breaks the tacit rules of teacher-pupil talk. He is called to task by the pupil concerned who is clearly well-versed in what is proper:

Peter: Ian, could you take the rest of the folders off that table and put them on the bottom shelf for me.

Pupil: Please.

Peter: Thank you: please. Yes, nice to be picked up on manners, isn't it, by fourth years!

7.23 Evaluations

There is hardly a page in the transcript of Lesson B which does not include at least one evaluative statement by the teacher, and most contain several. Positive evaluations outnumber negative ones by about five to one. There are very few instances in which an evaluation is made of pupil behaviour (i.e. the quality of the pupil's work in respect of effort, concentration, attitude and so on). Probably the most significant has already come up in the previous sub-section where Peter is quoted as saying that one particular girl 'should be taking more responsibility' for decisions affecting her work. This, clearly, is a negative evaluation of the girl's present attitude and it is quite uncharacteristic since Peter seems to resist making negative criticisms, particularly if they are aimed directly at the pupil. He seems much more inclined to evaluate the drawings and paintings as things in themselves rather than the ways in which the pupils are working on them. He prefers to treat them, not as products of pupil performance, but as independent objects. In this way both he and the pupils seem to be 'on the same side', as it were, and they are able to talk about a drawing or painting as if it were a third party which is evolving, to some extent, on its own. This, of course, is consistent with the views attributed to Peter in the last subsection.

7.231 Positive Evaluations

Here are some of the words and phrases which emerge in Peter's language as being positively charged:

Interesting, visually interesting, different, inventive, variety, lots of detail, important, valid, careful, consistent, sophisticated, sensitive.

Some of these are more informative than others; informative, that is, to the pupils who should be able to understand what the teacher means when he admires a drawing because it has 'lots of detail', but who might not be quite so sure what makes a drawing 'interesting', let alone 'visually interesting'. Very often, however, Peter gives clues as to what he means by the ways in which he uses these words. For example, 'interest' and 'visual interest' are often linked with the idea of 'variety', as in 'interesting textural differences', and 'visually, we want some variety in it'.

Words such as 'interesting', 'inventive', and 'variety' tend to crop up more as prescriptive evaluations. They point to qualities which Peter seeks in work yet to be done. 'Valid', 'consistent', 'sophisticated' and 'sensitive' are used more as reflections upon work which has been done. These are more specific and, in their own ways, they imply a relation between what has been done and something else by which the work may be judged. For example, for a work to be 'valid' it must comply with a code of practice and for a work to be 'consistent' it must embody a rule or a principle. The idea of 'sophistication' suggests that the work has progressed beyond a certain, externally determined level of competence, and for a work to be 'sensitive' it must display a sensitivity to something; that is, it must recognise certain, less obvious qualities in the objects it represents, or it must itself embody certain qualities, such as delicacy of touch, which the teacher deems appropriate. In other words, these evaluations suggest that there are certain criteria by which works of art may be judged.

Peter does not make these criteria explicit however; he simply takes them for granted. It is all part of his manner whereby he gives the impression that he and the pupils are 'in tune' or 'on the same side'. He talks as if they are like-minded and as if they share the same

feelings about things and under these circumstances it would seem unnecessary to spell out criteria. So he makes his evaluations as though what he is saying is obvious to everyone.

As a teaching strategy this has clear implications. In the first place, much of what Peter says may pass over the heads of the pupils, leaving them none the wiser. And secondly, the authority with which he makes his remarks might well have the effect of beguiling pupils into adopting his criteria without really understanding them or questioning them. In this case Peter might be described as 'teaching by infection' and the pupils may be compared to sheep following the shepherd into the art educational fold.

This is not to suggest that it is Peter's conscious aim to impose his values on his pupils, but one particular incident tends to show that when a pupil openly adopts an attitude which is not that of the teacher, it becomes a matter of concern for him. This is the incident in which the girl seems to criticise Peter for not teaching her how to draw trees. One gathers, by the way Peter invites this girl to voice an opinion in group discussion, and by the way he calls on her to do odd jobs for him (such as running after boys who have skipped off early) that he finds her generally dependable. In particular he must respect her views and this would suggest that he feels that she shares his values. It comes as something of a shock to him, then, when she expresses an opinion that runs counter to those values. Peter is taken aback with the result that he momentarily drops his easy-going facade and hits back at the girl, albeit quite mildly, by criticising her own approach to her work and by preaching a short sermon in defence of his methods. After this he is repeatedly drawn to the girl as if she remains a nagging problem.

Moving on, now, to other examples of positive evaluations not listed at the beginning of this sub-section: these include general signs of approval, such as 'amazing' and 'fantastic', which Peter makes, not as often in respect of what is going on actually inside the classroom, as of extra-curricula events, such as programmes on the television, which he discusses with his pupils while 'socialising'. For example:

Peter: I don't suppose you saw a programme on the tele last night?
A fashion designer, did you? Called Zandra Rhodes?

Pupil: Yes.

Peter: Amazing wasn't it?

Pupil: Yes, it was really good.

Peter: Fantastic. I wish I'd got that video'd. Fantastic.

Here again the teacher is infecting a pupil with his values without really explaining why the programme in question was so 'amazing' and 'fantastic'. In the brief discussion of the designer which follows the above extract, Peter does little more than indicate those things which particularly impressed him about her. He does not say why he was so impressed:

Peter: Did you see her drawings? It was nice the way she'd, sort of ... the little brush drawings. And she did the silk-screen printing as well; the fabric.

No attempts at analysis here; it is little more than an exercise in which the teacher confirms that the pupil shares his values and that they belong to the same community.

There are more positive evaluations, such as 'nice', 'good' and 'alright', which seem to trip as easily off Peter's tongue as they do off Tony's. But whereas Tony tends to use these words only to approve of what has been done, Peter also uses them as instruments to influence work in progress. Take the use of 'nice' in the following extract:

Pupil: Is this alright?

Peter: Yes, that's nice. What about rubbing out some of those lines in the middle now? You know, the thin pencil lines. See what the white shapes look like, because I think that the white shapes are quite nice as shapes now that you've surrounded them with areas of very ... lots of drawing. It's a very nice image.

Here Peter opens with 'that's nice' as a general sign of approval. But he goes on to suggest alterations, which implies that, although the work is 'nice', it could be better. Then he assures the pupil that he foresees an improvement if his suggestion is carried out: the white shapes, without the thin pencil lines across them, will be 'nice'. Finally, he confirms his original judgement, to reward the pupil for what she has

achieved so far, and to encourage her to make the change he has suggested.

7.232 Negative Evaluations

There are very few obviously negative evaluations in this lesson, which suggests that, implicitly, Peter, like Tony, believes that reward rather than disapproval is a more effective inducement to work and to succeed. From the few he does make, however, it transpires that he does not like drawings and paintings which are 'too busy', and he doesn't want an interpretation of the 'strata' exercise to be 'too literal' (i.e. representational). He fears that a drawing traced from a particular photograph might turn out to be 'very ambiguous', which he sees as a point against using photographs. It should be made clear, though, that, unlike Tony, Peter seems to have no qualms about 'copying' from pictures. Like Tony, however, he uses the word 'cartoony' as a negative criticism.

He also invests the word 'strange' with negative connotations, as in the following example:

At the moment it's a strange sort of image because this looks as though it's resting on nothing. There's no indication at the moment of a ground texture ... So, we've really got to think about what to put that on.

In this case, clearly, 'strange' equals 'unacceptable' and something must be done to the work so that it is no longer 'strange'.

Finally, there is the word 'afterthought' as it is used in the following extract:

It seems to me that in this (picture) the back-ground and these objects don't really relate together. It looks like an after-thought, that, doesn't it?

What Peter means here is that the parts of the picture have been assembled piecemeal with little evidence of a unifying structure. The positive correlate of this negative evaluation would be 'consistent', a word which has already been identified in Peter's language as positively charged.

7.233 Ambiguous Evaluations

There are one or two instances in the lesson where Peter is clearly passing judgement upon something a pupil is doing, or upon a piece of work, but it is difficult to decide whether he means to comment or to criticise. For example, at one point he emerges from the Art Office to find a pupil looking through an art book, and he says, 'Looking for ideas? You crafty devil'. Is he suggesting, here, that the pupil is breaking the rules by looking for ideas in the work of other artists? Or is he commending the pupil for showing initiative? He is definitely implying impropriety, with the hint that one's ideas should be original. Nonetheless, he is also responsible for leaving books lying around for anyone to look through and, having called the pupil a 'crafty devil', Peter himself delves into the book and draws attention to the fact that 'there's a good strata theme in here'.

7.234 Pupil Evaluations

There is a significant decrease in teacher evaluations towards the end of the lesson when everything has been cleared away and Peter produces some 'A'level work for the class to examine, (although several of his more informative evaluations occur at this time). At this time he invites the pupils to make their comments on two paintings which he puts before them. He does not seem over-concerned to make his own criticisms, rather to make points in response to what the pupils have to say, and to reflect back their words in his own more specialised language. For example, one pupil says of the first painting they look at that 'there aren't any shadows', and Peter replies:

That's true, there aren't any shadows in there. So he doesn't seem to have taken any notice of the play of light on the objects. Yes?

In this example Peter accepts the concrete observation that there are no shadows, and he situates it in a broader, more abstract context, that of the 'play of light'. The implication here is that in the language of art criticism one speaks of the particular in relation to broad principles.

All of the pupils who comment on the two pictures Peter holds up take

as their criterion for judgement the relation of the images to 'reality'. One, as we have seen, criticises the first picture (which didn't pass the 'A'level examination) because the objects depicted do not cast shadows as they would in reality. Another points out an inconsistency in the shading relative to what would happen in reality. Another thinks that the bottle in the picture 'looks real'. When Peter produces the second picture (which did pass the 'A'level examination) pupils suggest that it is more successful because 'it is more realistic' than the first one and 'because it's got reflections'.

It is at this point that Peter intervenes to suggest that the second picture can hardly be called 'realistic' if, by that, people mean 'photographic'. It might be 'based on observation', he says, but the girl who painted it has 'really taken a lot of liberties with the shapes' which, as a result, have 'become very, very, personalised'. The end of lesson bell halts the discussion here.

7.24 Questions

As with Lesson A the transcript contains many examples of questions, but whereas in Tony's lesson practically all of them are put by the teacher, in Lesson B a substantial proportion (about two fifths of the total) are pupil questions.

7.241 Pupil Questions

These fall roughly into four categories. Firstly there are those questions by which pupils ask for information. For example, at one point Peter tries to talk a girl into joining his Wednesday evening art classes. She asks what goes on there and he tells her that they concentrate mainly on life-drawing. Another example of such a question is put by one pupil who, somewhat incredulously, asks Peter if the first of the two pictures he holds up for criticism at the end of the lesson really failed at 'A'level. one more example occurs during the same discussion when a boy wants to know if one is allowed to use rulers in examinations.

The second category of pupil questions includes those whereby pupils ask the teacher for some object, piece of equipment, or whatever. Examples

of this sort of question occur mainly towards the beginning of the lesson when everyone is settling down to work and they need paper, pencils, etc. But pupils do approach the teacher during the lesson asking for such things as pictures of old buildings to work from, and the odd item of equipment, such as a pair of compasses, as the need arises.

The third category includes those questions in which pupils seek practical advice from the teacher as, for example, near the beginning of the lesson when the boy working on the picture of planets asks Peter how he might use the spray diffuser to create the shapes he needs without the sharp edges left by the stencil. Another example occurs soon after when a pupil asks whether it would be better to paint in the background of his picture and leave a space for an object in the foreground, or to apply a wash over the whole surface and paint the object over it. This sort of question does not occur very often and, indeed, neither do those in the other two categories already discussed.

By far the greatest number of pupil questions fall into the fourth category and this, as it will be seen, has certain implications. This category includes all those questions whereby pupils confirm that they are 'doing the right thing', or what they want to do is acceptable to the teacher. For example, two or three pupils, at different times, ask Peter if it would be alright for them to paint or fill-in the 'strata' drawing; another asks if she can work on her own idea rather than that suggested by the teacher; another asks if he is to use the whole of the sheet of paper he has been given; another wants to know if he has mixed his paints with too much water; and others simply ask 'is this alright?' as Peter looks at their pictures.

A special case of this sort of question occurs when Peter is making suggestions as to how a pupil might proceed with his picture and the pupil asks the odd question to confirm that he has understood what Peter is saying. For example, while talking to one of the girls working from the graveyard photographs, Peter says;

Peter: Here, because the photograph's a bit bleached out, we've lost a lot of that detail. There's the bush, we could bring that in behind, if you wanted, here.

Pupil: What, very dark?

Peter: Very dark, and that would make the cross stand out.

In a case such as this, where Peter is voicing his thoughts, his language is not explicit. One must guess very often what he means, by following what he says while closely observing the work in question and the gestures he makes. The girl guesses that he is suggesting moving the dark bush behind the cross so that the whole shape of the cross will stand out against it, and she confirms this by asking her question.

The kinds of question asked by the pupils, and the frequency with which they occur, says something about relations between the pupils and the teacher and about the way pupils view the work they are doing in his lessons. Although Peter rarely, if ever, rejects a suggestion put forward by a pupil, and although he says, quite openly, that he wants pupils to be more independent, they still feel the need to confirm that what they want to do, or what they are doing, is the 'right' thing. The implications of this are several.

Firstly, although Peter does not demand to be kept informed about his pupil's decisions from moment to moment, and although he professes not to impose his own ideas upon them, the conditioning of the pupils in the ways of secondary school demands that they show due deference to the teacher as the person 'in charge' of the class, the room and all that it contains. This is something which is, to a great extent, beyond Peter's control.

Secondly, the facile nature of some of the questions suggests that the pupil's responsible are not thinking very much before asking them (e.g. 'do I use the whole piece of paper?'). This again may be put down to conditioning inasmuch as these pupils have come to expect to be told what to do rather than to work things out for themselves. Again it might be argued that Peter has little control over what goes on in other classrooms and that he is fighting the effects of 'transmission' teaching. However, in one respect he must accept some of the responsibility. He is such an active teacher, moving rapidly around the room, settling momentarily to make his assessments and his suggestions before moving on, it is likely that some pupils, at least, have cottoned on to the fact that all they have to do is sit tight and, before long, teacher will arrive and do their thinking for them.

And thirdly, despite what Peter says to them, the pupils really do seem to feel that they are doing the work for him, in the first instance, rather than for themselves. They also demonstrate a belief that there is a right way of doing things and that the teacher is the arbiter of what is right. The implication is that Peter is communicating these views himself, certainly not in what he says, but in ways which are, clearly, much more effective. In other words, there is a contradiction between what he says and what he conveys by, say, his readiness to make value judgements (which we saw in the previous sub-section). In this case he is saying that he is not the judge, the pupils must really become their own judges, yet he repeatedly makes judgements. Another way in which he may convey the view that, in spite, of what he says, there is a right way of doing things in art, is through his use of the registers of art education and secondary education. The very existence of such registers implies a proper way to behave and a proper way to think. There is a deep-seated, highly mystified contradiction in the use of a special way of thinking and doing. Perhaps the pupils are impressed, deep down, more by the 'specialness' than by the overt meaning in what Peter says.

7.242 Teacher Questions

Not only do questions put by the teacher out-number pupil questions by about five to two, in this lesson, but they also fulfill a broader range of functions. These functions, by and large, are comparable with those discussed in Lesson A.

7.243 Questions Calling for Information

There are a few questions in which Peter simply asks for information. These are very basic and require little more of the recipient than that he or she should remind the teacher where the work is stored, or whether the class has already discussed the pictures he intends to talk about.

There are one or two instances, however, in which Peter asks a question to discover what is going on in the mind of a pupil. For example, he approaches a boy who arrived late, after the teacher had started to explain the 'strata' idea to the rest of the class and Peter asks him if he understands what he is supposed to be doing. Another time he asks a

girl if her drawing has turned out as she intended. In both these cases the question is instrumental in helping the teacher to decide what to do or what to say next. This is fairly obvious in the first case; the boy says that he does not understand and so Peter has to explain again what he wants. The second case is a little more complicated. Here Peter is confronted by a piece of work which is more or less completed. He is faced with the choice of commenting upon it as it has turned out, or of suggesting ways in which the girl might continue working on it. He asks his question, therefore, to discover how she feels about it before deciding what to say. He does not appear to mind either way and, in the event, he settles for commenting upon the drawing as a finished piece. He singles out its 'most unusual feeling' and compares it with stage designs.

7.244 Rhetorical Questions

There is only one real instance of a rhetorical question in the whole lesson, if one means by this a question which does not invite an answer. Actually, this instance incorporates several rhetorical questions strung together. It occurs at the beginning of the lesson, at the end of Peter's talk about 'strata':

The people who still have some work to do can get on with that.
This is the next one in the pipe-line if you start to run dry.
Are there any questions? No? Stunned? Anybody want any paper?
Who's going to start this straight away? Those people don't need
to get out their folders immediately.

Peter gives no opportunity for anyone to reply to those questions, the implication being that answers are not required. No-one attempts to answer, anyway. Everyone recognises Peter's move as a sign that it is time to spring into action and this is what they do. There is a general feeling that it is time to stop talking and to get on with the work.

7.245 Control Questions

Control questions are those asked, not so much to elicit information, as to exert control over the pupils and to maintain discipline. There is only one clear example of such a question and this occurs as Peter is settling the class down, after clearing away all the work and equipment,

to talk about the two 'A'level paintings:

Peter: Right, we're gonna have a look at this little picture here. Are you ready Bonny?

Pupil: Yes.

Peter: This piece of work (and so on).

Here Peter is asking Bonny if she is ready, partly so that he knows he can proceed, but mainly in order to tell the girl to pay attention because he is ready to proceed. Not only is he telling the girl, but also anyone else in the class who is not already attending to him.

7.246 Confirming Questions

These are among the more common types of question discovered in this lesson. There are about a dozen examples. Most of these take the form of interrogatives tacked on to the ends of statements or instructions to confirm that they have been understood. For example:

We're going to use this word as a starting point - strata - ok?

It's not that realistic any more, is it?

To use the categorisation adopted in the interpretation of Lesson A, the first of these two examples is a question asked to confirm that the pupils have understood a course of action which has been put to them, and the second is asked to confirm that the pupil concerned sees or observes in the same way as the teacher. Other examples of 'action' questions include:

That's one other solution, isn't it?

You can always use this for your experiment, see?

And other examples of 'observation' questions include:

It looks like an afterthought, that, doesn't it?

A bit like Zandra Rhodes, you know?

There is the odd example which falls somewhere between 'action' and

'observation'. for example:

Because visually we want some variety in it, do you know what I mean?

In this one Peter is confirming that everyone understands what action they are to take, but he is also confirming that they can visualise the result of that action in the way he does.

There is another odd example which does not fit in with any of the above. This is where Peter says:

You could, if you wanted to, try some sort of faceted appearance of almost like crystalline structures in some areas. A bit like the piece of work you've already done with the criss-crossing of lines ... Have I made a link there between (this and) the previous piece of work? (The class replies with a soft murmur of agreement.)

Here he is trying to confirm that everyone recognises a certain continuity between the 'strata' exercise and the preceeding exercise. That is, he is asking everyone to 'see' the 'action' they are being asked to take in the same way as the teacher sees it.

7.247 Open and Closed Questions

The most common and probably the most important type of question in Lesson B falls into the category of 'open' and 'closed' questions. In my interpretation of Lesson A I considered these separately but, for reasons that will become apparent, it is more convenient to group them together when discussing Peter's lesson.

There is a classic example of a 'closed' question at the beginning of the lesson:

Peter: Anybody like to give me any definitions of the word 'strata' in your terms. Come on Sarah, you've been dying to say something.

Pupil: It's a cloud.

Peter: No, that's a different ... no it's not. It doesn't apply to that, no.

Another Pupil: It's layers.

Peter: It's layers. Alright, that's the word I was hoping you'd say. A layering effect.

Peter knows what he wants to hear when he asks the question, even though he invites 'any' definitions 'in (the pupil's) terms'. After one failed attempt to guess what the teacher has in mind, the 'right' answer comes up and Peter jumps at it, saying, 'that's the word I was hoping you'd say'.

This is the only clear example of a 'closed' question in the whole lesson and, as such, it is not particularly remarkable. It is not typical of Peter's use of language, and therefore it implies little of any consequence. It is simply a case of the teacher introducing his pupils to a new word and ensuring that they understand what it means.

Much more typical of Peter's teaching are those particular questions, or groups of questions, which appear, on the surface, to be quite 'open' but, on closer examination, prove to be 'leading' pupils to certain conclusions about their work or about the issues under discussion. To this extent, then, they are really 'closed' questions. Here is a good example. Peter is discussing a photograph which a pupil has chosen to work from:

Peter: What particular qualities of that photograph are you trying to get in the painting?

Pupil: Well, the actual darkness of that ...

Peter: Yes.

Pupil: Against the light ...

Peter: Yes.

Pupil: And that shadow, there ...

Peter: And do you ... ?

Pupil: And all the spray ...

Peter: Do you see it ... well, you could get the spray effect a bit like he's doing, couldn't you? And are you going to use the same format, (and) keep it within a square?

Pupil: I'll probably do that ...

When Peter asks the boy what particular qualities of the photograph he is trying to capture in his painting, the question seems completely 'open' although, from the expression on his face, it is clear that he is turning over the possibilities in his own mind. The boy begins to reply, but Peter's thoughts are racing ahead and he doesn't allow him to work things out in his own time. He hurries the boy along, saying, 'yes, yes', obviously eager to come in now with something he has thought of, until he butts in with another question ('and do you ...?') by which he intends to make his suggestion. He doesn't have time to finish it, however, before the boy, still addressing himself to the first question, interrupts with 'and all the spray' (it is a photograph of the sea breaking on rocks). It takes a moment for the word 'spray' to sink in, during which Peter begins his question again ('Do you see it ...?'). But before he can complete it, the association between the word 'spray' and the spray diffuser in use elsewhere in the room strikes him. He abandons his question/suggestion to say that the 'spray effect' may be achieved with the diffuser and, having made a positive contribution in this way, he does not seem concerned to return to it. He does go on, however, to suggest that the boy retains the square format of the photograph in his painting and he puts this suggestion in question form. The boy certainly is in no doubt that, although he is being asked a question, he is really being told that the teacher thinks the square would be the best format. Although he has clearly not given any thought as yet, to the problem of format, the boy dutifully concedes that he will probably do as Peter suggests.

There is a good example of an 'open' question towards the end of the lesson when Peter invites the class to criticise the two 'A' level paintings. He holds up the first painting and asks, 'Has anyone got any opinions why you think it should have (failed the examination)?'. Here he is asking pupils to reason things out for themselves, and his use of the word 'any' (unlike when he asks for 'any' definitions of the word 'strata') is quite correct because it is clear, from the way he responds to the replies he gets, that he is prepared to accept 'any' suggestions. Replies include the criticisms that 'there aren't any shadows', that 'one of the black squares doesn't fit in the bottom', and that the person responsible 'should have shaded in the label at the bottom because there's white squares behind it'. Peter accepts them all and, apart from rephrasing, or clarifying the points made by the pupils, his only

response is to describe them as 'quite valid observations', because 'the things (the pupils) have noticed are happening there'.

This initial phase of the group criticism may be seen as an 'opening-up' exercise in which Peter establishes those issues which strike the pupils as being important. As he listens, however, he begins to see a point he would like to make in response, and he starts to 'close-up' the discussion. He does so by chipping in more questions, not 'open' questions now, but questions intended to lead the pupils to certain conclusions:

I wonder if that, - do you think he was in, - do you think what he's done is in - the things that have been mentioned - no shadows, you can't see the square underneath the bottle - do you think that's intentional? Or do you think it's an omission on his part?

Peter is struggling here to make his question sound 'open' by saying, 'do you think' that so-and-so is the case. Also he provides a choice of two options - 'intention' and 'omission' - which seems to throw the onus back upon the pupils to decide. Nonetheless, he gives the impression that he has something on his mind and that the options he is providing are intended to reveal it: the pupils work out, or guess, which is the 'right' answer so that he may proceed to his point.

This little game doesn't really get going, however; Peter's question is met with blank stares, so he invites one of the girls to say what she thinks. She says that the picture is not 'realistic' and this diverts the discussion away from the point Peter wanted to make. But he immediately takes up a new position in relation to the girl's assertion and he asks:

In what parts? I mean, what about the bottle? Is that realistic? I mean, would you call that realistic or not?

In the framing of this question there is again an attempt to sound impartial, but the implication is still very strong that Peter feels the picture is realistic in parts, and that the bottle is one of them. Thus he gets the reply, 'It looks real ... the bottle', and, once this has been voiced by a pupil, it allows him to reveal that this is indeed his view.

When Peter comes to the second painting, the one which was successful at 'A' level, he reverts to the 'open' question to start the ball rolling:

If you look at that one, what ... can I have your reaction to that?
Why do you think that that one got greater credit than the other?
Any ideas?

The second reply he gets is that, 'It is more realistic', and this dictates the course of what remains of the discussion. Undoubtedly Peter is quite open to suggestions when he asks for 'reactions', but once a statement such as this is made, he takes up a position and begins to lead the pupils towards that position:

1st Pupil: It is more realistic, more ...

Peter: Do you think so?

Several pupils together: Yes.

Peter: More realistic than the other? Is that a general opinion?

2nd Pupil: No.

Peter: Who says 'no'?

3rd Pupil: It's not as, um, what's the word?

Peter: (Talking over contributions from several pupils) I mean, look at the umbrella here (in the picture), which is a beautiful, beautiful thing, you could hardly call that 'photographic', if you are talking about realism being 'like a photograph'.

Peter clearly does not go along with the view that the picture is at all 'realistic', and he quizzes the class until he gets the reply he is after. Once he has got it, that is, once he has got a pupil to say it for him, he feels free to develop the point, and he even talks over the contributions of some pupils who might have done it for him, in their own ways, had he given them the opportunity.

7.248 Socialising Questions

Like Tony, Peter chats with his pupils about things which, although related to art and art education, are not of direct relevance to the work in hand. For example, in this lesson he chats about the

Zandra Rhodes programme 'on the tele' the night before; he talks to one girl about a book of drawings she has brought in to show him; and he talks to another about a friend of her father who is a picture editor for the covers of paperback books.

During these chats questions seem to fulfill two main functions other than those already discussed. Firstly, Peter asks the pupil concerned questions if it is not he who initiates the conversations, and if he cannot think of anything particular to say. In the case of the girl who talks about the picture editor, Peter clearly has very little to contribute and he keeps up his end of the conversation by feeding her questions. And secondly, Peter uses the interrogative (as opposed to 'asks questions') to establish an identity between himself and the pupil concerned. This might be described as a kind of 'confirming' question which is intended to confirm that teacher and pupil feel the same about things. A good example of this has already come up under a different heading (6.231):

Peter: Did you see - I don't suppose you saw a programme on the tele last night - a fashion designer? Did you? Called Zandra Rhodes?

Pupil: Yes

Peter: Amazing, wasn't it?

Pupil: Yes, it was really good.

7.249 The Question As Method

Yet again Peter's approach resembles that of Tony inasmuch as he, too, urges his pupils to adopt the question as an essential part of their work. Here are two examples in which he is impressing upon pupils the importance of stopping and looking at ones work from time to time, and considering the possibilities:

Think about it, think about it. Don't just whack into it. Think about the shape of that line. Is it going up? Is it going down? Does it pinch that together?

Are you going to use a grass effect? And then, how are you going to draw it? Or are you going to bring another tree into there? These are questions you've got to ask of your picture as you go through it.

7.25 Structure

The structure of Peter's lesson divides conveniently into three phases. The first extends from the moment the pupils arrive until Peter finishes talking about 'strata'. The second begins when Peter 'releases' the pupils to set about their practical work, and it ends when he resumes central control of the class for the tidying up process. This marks the beginning of the final phase which includes the short group criticism of the two 'A' level paintings.

Each phase is marked by a change in the relationship between the teacher and his pupils and a consequent change in teaching style. These changes relate to differences in the aims and objectives of the teacher. In the first phase it is the task of the teacher to admit a collection of rather boisterous young people who arrive from various parts of the building, thinking and chattering about anything but art as they come through the door, and to settle them down and redirect their minds and energies to his subject. In order to do this he pulls them together as a class and he assumes central control, focusing everyone's attention on a common 'problem' (i.e. the 'strata' exercise). He slips almost inevitably into a 'transmission' style of teaching to do this because it is a case of a teacher imposing an idea on a class 'from the outside' so to speak. This approach achieves its objective inasmuch as the pupils become passive and co-operative in accordance with the tacit rules of transmission teaching. The teacher is now able to release his grip a little and to remove the weight of the 'strata' exercise from the shoulders of certain pupils who have other work to finish, or who wish to provide their own 'starting points'. When everyone is clear about the work they are about to do, Peter is able to relinquish central control for a less formal, more mobile teaching style.

In the second phase it is Peter's objective that everyone in the room should be involved in his or her own work, and it is his aim to facilitate this by moving from individual to individual, responding, advising, equipping and generally helping. In the role of 'helper' he adopts a style of teaching which approaches the 'interpretation' end of the spectrum (see 5.31). This does not mean, of course, that he ceases altogether to 'transmit' concepts, values and attitudes to pupils. We have seen that covertly, in his use of registers, evaluations and

questions he is continually doing this. But it does mean that overtly he shifts much more of the responsibility for working things out and for taking decisions on to the pupils and that what he conveys covertly in his use of language acts as a constraint on these processes rather than as an imposition. That is, although pupils might derive certain values and attitudes from the teacher's use of language, they are not under any obligation to adopt them.

In this phase of the lesson the pupils are encouraged to take a more active part and it is interesting to note that, in exchanges with the teacher, it is more often than not the pupil who takes the initiative. If it is not the pupil who approaches the teacher with a question or a request, then it is a case of the teacher approaching the pupil with a fairly open or general question which invites him or her to direct the ensuing exchange. The following example reveals a pattern of language acts which is fairly common in this phase. It involves the boy who is working on the planet picture with the spray diffuser. He is unhappy with the result he is getting, having followed Peter's earlier advice to raise the stencil a little above the surface of the paper to make outlines less sharp. He is working by the door to the Art Office and, as Peter emerges from the office, their eyes meet:

Pupil: This isn't going to work.

Peter: Why not?

Pupil: It's still going to come out too rigid.

Peter: But you want it to spread like that, do you? From a central intense bit there, spreading out?

Pupil: No, it might be - I'm just going to see what it looks like just spraying. I'm just going to see how it comes out.

Peter: Well, yeah, good. Have a go.

The pattern here is as follows: the pupil initiates the exchange by making a broad statement with an implied call for action on the part of the teacher (soliciting move); the teacher responds with an equally broad question inviting the pupil to expand on what he has said (responding move); this the pupil does (structuring move) and the teacher makes a tentative response (responding move); the pupil reacts to what the

teacher has to say (reacting move), and implicit in his reaction is an evaluation of the teacher's help. In this case the implication is that the teacher is not being very much help and so the boy is going to try and work things out for himself. The exchange ends with a brief comment (reacting move) from the teacher who, it seems, must always have the last word to maintain his authority (particularly, one would have thought, when his help has been rejected in this way). Schematically this sequence appears something like this:

Pupil solicits
 Teacher responds
 Pupil structures
 Teacher responds
 Pupil reacts
 Teacher reacts

Simplified in this way the sequence shows that, although the teacher might get the last word, the pupil exerts considerable control over what passes between them and this deviates somewhat from Sinclair's classic IRF sequence, so typical of 'transmission' teaching. Whereas in Sinclair's exchange it is the teacher who dominates and controls, in the sequence identified above it is the pupil who initiates things and who reacts to the teacher's response.

The clearing away process at the end of the second phase of the lesson forms a kind of intermediate stage between two distinct modes of teaching. During the process Peter continues to talk to individual pupils. As there are no pictures now to talk about, his conversation comes more into the category of 'socialising'. But this is interspersed with orders shouted over the general hubbub, and with statements intended to hasten the next phase of the lesson. Gradually the class comes together and Peter withdraws from his conversation with individual pupils to resume central control of the class.

Attention is now focus-ed again on a common problem (i.e. why did the painting in question fail the 'A'level examination?) But, unlike Peter's talk about 'strata' in the first phase of the lesson, the aim is not, initially, for the teacher to make prepared points, but for the pupils to direct the discussion with points of their own. This phase is

characterised, therefore, by Peter's adoption of the 'interpretation' style of teaching and a more conversational use of language.

7.3 Evaluation

Peter's lesson is different from Tony's in many respects, and the problem of evaluation is somewhat less straight-forward. Whereas Lesson A is fairly consistent in terms of setting, participants, topic and teaching style, Lesson B is more varied and complex. As a result it is much more difficult to pin down the overall role and value of language in Lesson B than it is in Tony's lesson. Indeed, one wonders if there is anything to be gained, in the first instance, by attempting to reach a general conclusion, when it would seem much more appropriate to trace the changing role and value of language as the lesson progresses. As we have seen (7.25), the structure of the lesson divides neatly into three phases and each of these represents a more or less distinct set of pedagogic elements (i.e. teaching style, teaching methods, topic, use of language). It would seem reasonable, therefore, to evaluate the part played by language, in the consequences of its particular uses, phase by phase, and then to see if any general points emerge.

7.31 Phase I

Peter's lesson begins, as does Tony's, with a verbal introduction by the teacher. In this phase, then, the lesson is dominated by language: it is the means whereby the teacher takes control of the situation and establishes a particular relationship with the pupils; it is also the means whereby the main topic is presented, and whereby the pupils are induced to create something 'visual'. In this respect it is particularly important to remark that what Peter calls a 'visual starting point' is in effect a 'verbal starting point', and that the inspiration for the eventual design is induced almost exclusively by means of words, the only visual aid being a sketchy chalk drawing on the blackboard.

The following extracts convey something of the flavour of Peter's introductory talk:

Usually, as earth has moved in the world ... and compounded and pressed down, it gets a bit like one of those cream cakes, with

icing in between the sponge. And if you imagine, if you press it like that (he gestures with his hands), you know, the icing, the sponge, the ice-cream stuff would actually dribble out and be pressed out because it was compressed.

I'd like you to try and take an imaginary cross-section through a piece of earth ... If you took that as your landscape (he demonstrates on the blackboard), sort of the top of your landscape, and then imagine getting a gigantic sort of knife and cutting off a great chunk of this so that it fell away like that, you know? And exposed in the process a whole interesting series of different layers compressed and contracted in some ways, and squeezed and pressed and crushed into different sorts of shapes. Because you have to imagine the different pressures on this, you know? Terrific pressures of heat, and so on. It doesn't matter that you won't be able to show that, but I think it will help the drawing if you can identify (the) forces, downward pressures, sideways pressures, on this landscape.

And then it's up to you ... to try and make this as inventive as possible with the pencil and with the shapes and the patterns that you're going to invent in here: fluid, liquid shapes, appearances: hard, granity, bitty sort of textures contrasted together. And to give as much variety to your invention as possible.

The key word which crops up several times in these extracts is 'imagine'. Peter is not asking his pupils to work from direct observation; he is not setting up an exercise by which they are supposed to learn something about looking and seeing (as Tony does with his first-year class). He is asking his pupils to respond imaginatively to something which is not essentially 'visual', but which is induced by means of his rich verbal description: 'dribbled', 'compressed', 'contracted', 'squeezed', 'crushed', 'fluid', 'liquid', 'granity' and 'bitty', all these adjectives and more he produces in what amounts to just a few moments of speech. In this sense, then, Peter is not setting up a 'learning' exercise so much as an 'expressive' one, and one which amounts to an exercise in transposition from one symbolic mode of experience (i.e. the verbal) to another (i.e. the visual).

But Peter's language goes further than simply inducing visual ideas and stirring up visual memories; it also prescribes and proscribes the ways in which these ideas may be realised. Take this extract in which Peter is demonstrating what he wants on the blackboard:

These are a bit like caverns and caves, I suppose; I suppose this is where you get your stalagmites and stalagmites in real life ...

But I don't want you to get too literal; I don't want little people in there crawling around. I think it's going to spoil the visual effect; it's going to become too cartoony. What I want you to do is to use the pencil and invent in here visual textures and formations of lines and patterns which would begin to suggest interesting textural differences in the different layers of the earth ... You could, if you wanted to, try some sort of faceted appearance, of almost like crystalline structures in some areas; a bit like the piece of work you've already done with the criss-crossing of lines.

From this one gathers that the teacher has a fairly clear idea of what he wants to see in each pupil's work. He does not want a representational picture, still less a cartoon with little caves and people. What he wants is an abstract design along the same lines as one produced in a previous exercise.

The first phase of the lesson bears many of the hallmarks of 'transmission' teaching, with all that that implies: asymmetrical control of the proceedings; active teacher/passive pupils; closed questions; strong subject 'classification' (see Bernstein, 1971, Chap 11); the use of language as a 'speaking tube' down which the teacher conveys ideas and confirms that they have been received and understood. There is little doubt that Peter makes all the running in this part of the lesson, and that he uses language almost, at times, to beat his pupils into passivity. He talks at them and over them, and he contrives a really classic example of the pseudo-question when he asks for 'any' definitions of the word 'strata', and then admits that he was looking for the word 'layering'. As for subject classification, Peter makes one or two remarks, in what is a comparatively short time, which tend to distinguish the approach he is proposing from other, non-artistic approaches. One of these crops up in the above extract where the teacher identifies the shapes he has drawn on the blackboard as 'caverns and caves', saying that 'in real life' one might discover stalagmites and stalagmites in them. He goes on to say that he doesn't want his pupils to concern themselves with this sort of thing, implying that his lesson is not about 'real life'. The inference is that, in art, one must adopt a different frame of mind from that normally adopted in respect of reality; that is, art is unreal.

There is another example of this kind of classification which, strictly speaking, does not occur in the first phase but in a brief reprise of

Phase I which takes place early in the second phase when Peter has to repeat his piece on 'strata' for a pupil who does not understand. In this example Peter distinguishes the artistic approach, which he requires, from that of the geographer:

It's got to be an invented shape because it's not geographically accurate. It doesn't exist anywhere. It's just visually interesting because of the shape relationship.

By adopting a style of teaching which approaches the transmission end of the spectrum; by setting himself up as the source of appropriate problems to be tackled in art lessons; by framing these problems in verbal terms; by indicating ways which are more appropriate and ways which are less appropriate for tackling these problems; by making statements which help to distinguish the artistic approach from, say, real-life, or geography, and so on, it is clear that in Phase I Peter uses language to fulfil a wide range of functions and to convey certain impressions of art and art education. In particular he uses it to control relations between teacher and taught; he uses it to induce and to characterise artistic experience in his pupils; he uses it to induce the right 'artistic' attitude; and he uses it to lay down the rules by which success may be judged. There can be little doubt therefore that language features prominently in this part of the lesson.

7.32 Phase II

In the second phase of the lesson Peter relinquishes the subject-centred 'transmission' style of teaching for a work-centred approach; that is, an approach which concentrates or focuses the attention of the class on the work in hand. On the surface Peter does not appear to have particular ideas or methods which he wishes the pupils to adopt, relying more on the pupils themselves to initiate exchanges and to make demands upon him. Indeed, on more than one occasion he says something to the effect that each pupil should be pursuing his own ideas and taking more responsibility for his own work. In both word and deed, therefore, Peter conveys the impression, in this part of the lesson, that it is not his role to prescribe what is valid artistic behaviour, but to facilitate the different approaches adopted individually and independently by the pupils.

In effect, however, this change of emphasis from the demands of the teacher and the subject to the demands of the individual pupil's work merely shifts the attention away from the ever present influence of the teacher upon the proceedings exerted mainly through his language. Peter does not seem to stop talking for a moment, and in this phase of the lesson he uses words, broadly speaking, for three main purposes: he uses them to act upon the conditions under which the work is done (i.e. to maintain control over the class as a whole, both directly and indirectly); he uses them to act upon the work itself (i.e. by instructing, explaining, making suggestions, evaluating, and so on); and he uses them to act upon the pupils individually (i.e. by arguing, socialising, and generally infecting pupils with his values and attitudes). Thus, while the attention of the class is focused on the 'visual' work in hand, the words of the teacher continue to influence the context within which that work proceeds.

This phase of the lesson is the longest one and one assumes that had the lesson extended over two periods instead of one, the extra time would have been devoted to this phase rather than to the others. This phase must be seen, therefore, as the one which is intended by the teacher, and interpreted by the pupils, as the essence of the lesson - what the art lesson is really all about. The more obviously 'verbal' phases are squeezed into a few minutes at the beginning and at the end of the lesson, the implication being that talk is less important in art than practical application. This message, in the 'hidden curriculum' of Peter's teaching, that there is more value in doing art than in talking about it, is contradicted, however, by the fact, already noted, that words pervade Phase II of the lesson and influence what is done and how it is done. This contradiction between the reality of art education (as a verbally mediated sphere) and the attitudes towards art which are conveyed implicitly by the 'hidden curriculum', lies at the heart of the mystification surrounding the distinction between the visual and the verbal in experience, and art and the other subjects in the curriculum (I will return to this point in Chapter 8).

7.33 Phase III

In this phase Peter assumes a typical 'interpretation' style of teaching as it is characterised by Barnes (1973, 15). He allows the pupils to

think aloud about the pictures he produces for criticism, and instead of making his own points about them he reacts, at least at first, to things said by the pupils. In this way he appears to credit the pupils with the ability to make valid observations and to make sense of the situation with which they are presented. That is, Peter implies, by the way he organises the discussion, that the pupils have it in themselves to work out why the one painting failed the examination and why the other fared better (as if the matter were grounded in natural laws).

There is little doubt that in this phase too language plays an important part, but here, unlike the 'transmission' phase or the 'work' phase, the emphasis falls more upon the language of the pupils, and the role of language in helping pupils to think and to communicate about art. This is not to say however that the teacher does not take the opportunity to make points in response to what the pupils say, and he does so more and more as the discussion proceeds. Also he selects from what the pupils say those points which he feels are worth developing, and he tries to influence the language the pupils use in making their points.

Thus, while the pupils are free to say what they like in the first instance, their contribution is valued, albeit tacitly, against the teacher's scale of priorities, and it is translated into more appropriate 'art language'. The implication here, like that of the transmission style of teaching, is that there is a body of knowledge, or at least a proper way of thinking, which the pupil must adopt if he is to be successful. But unlike the typical transmission teacher, Peter does not make this clear; instead he makes a game out of the exercise in which the pupils must seek out what is proper, like diviners looking for water. In short, while the general style of this part of the lesson may be described as 'interpretation', there is a covert element of 'transmission' in the teacher's response to his pupils' contributions.

7.34 Conclusion

Although Peter is explicit in his view that art is a 'personal' and 'individual' affair, and that pupils in the fourth year should therefore be starting to initiate their own projects and to develop their own ideas rather than continuing to depend on the teacher for ideas and methods, this is not necessarily the message which is being received by

his pupils. This is shown most dramatically when, in Phase II, the girl (Stacey) challenges Peter, much to his surprise, and insists that he should be teaching her how to draw trees. But it is also apparent in the general way in which pupils make demands on the teacher while supposedly solving their own problems in their own personal work; they treat Peter unhesitatingly as the source of artistic knowledge and the arbiter of artistic values in spite of what he says about personal responsibility. This is not particularly surprising of course since the whole of their school experience leads them to see their teachers as mediators of value and propriety, and if, as Peter implies, they are only now, in the fourth year, being expected to assume responsibility for their own art work, then they must be allowed some time to adapt. However, it must also be taken into account that what Peter is actually saying, about the personal and individual nature of art, is contradicted to some extent by his style of teaching and, in particular, by his use of language. This is most obvious in Phase I of the lesson when he adopts the 'transmission' style of teaching with its one-way system of communication, its closed questions, and the general impression that the teacher knows what he wants and that he is trying to get the class to see things his way in order to be able to complete his exercise successfully. The contradiction is least obvious in Phase II when everyone in the room is talking nineteen to the dozen; but even here it is Peter's voice which dominates as he moves around the room, talking with pupils, helping them, instructing them, arguing with them, and generally reminding them that it is he who is in control; whatever they do, they are answerable to him and they must provide an adequate verbal account of what they are doing in order to satisfy him that they are succeeding. In Phase III, even though he adopts a style of teaching which approaches the 'interpretation' end of the scale, there is still an element, as we have seen, of 'teacher knows best' in the way that Peter selects from what the pupils say those points which he sees as being of greater consequence, and in the way he restates these points in more acceptable art language. Thus, throughout the lesson, even though Peter varies his method of exposition and mode of discourse, there is an implicit assumption that it is the teacher who is in control and that it is he who ultimately makes or validates artistic decisions whether they relate to the general direction of the work of the group, or to particular problems arising out of the work of individual pupils.

This tacit acceptance of the authority of the teacher contradicts Peter's exhortations to the pupils to take more responsibility upon themselves in their work and to make their own decisions. Such contradictions may contribute to much of the mystification surrounding art in education (and art in general, for that matter). If words such as 'personal' and 'individual' are persistently and openly associated with artistic production, when it is covertly or tacitly accepted that the teacher, as the representative in the school of the artistic community at large, is the ultimate arbiter of value, then such words are little more than empty accompaniments of the activity. They would be more meaningful, perhaps, if they were qualified in some way to make it clear that individuality in artistic production is not limitless, depending upon some natural propensity, but that it is conditioned by prevailing material and ideological constraints imposed in the art class by the teacher. But in the 'restricted' language of the art class such terms are rarely if ever qualified, and they are certainly not explained in Peter's lesson.

If it were simply the case that certain terms, and the concepts they embody, adhere to artistic production in schools as empty verbalism, then it would be of little consequence. But, as Hayes points out (see 3.4 above), art language such as this has a material effect upon artistic production and consumption. There is no telling what effect language may have if it is contradictory and mystifying, but one thing is clear and that is that terms such as 'personal' and 'individual' applied carelessly or habitually to art in education blind the educationist and the administrator to the fact that success in art, like success in any other discipline, involves grasping and applying the prevailing concepts and conventions of the discipline. It is not simply a matter of responding in one's own, individual way to one's own personal whims. If it were, then the notion of examining art with any degree of objectivity becomes a nonsense, as does the notion of 'art' as a distinguishable curriculum subject.

In the context of Peter's lesson the terms 'personal' and 'individual' are key words which explain to some extent this teacher's particular approach and the relations he maintains with his pupils (they explain, for example, the difference between Peter's approach and that of Tony who is less concerned with 'expression' in Lesson A than with the effect-

ive application of received concepts). They are not words peculiar to this teacher's approach, however, and Peter is not the only teacher to use words in contradictory or mystifying ways. Indeed, art education is riddled with contradictions of this sort, and it is tempting to suggest that the relations between particular teachers and their classes represent more or less successful attempts to resolve them. It may be the case that in this relationship Peter has fallen victim to mystification moreso than his pupils. If Stacey's attitude is representative, then the pupils are in no doubt that their performances are judged not according to their own personal standards but according to externally mediated values to which the teacher is party, whether or not he is consciously aware of it. However, it is more likely that words such as 'personal' and 'individual' work within the restricted linguistic code which the teacher and his pupils have developed over several years of playing the art education game together. If this is so, then they may suggest to all concerned that to take greater responsibility for one's work is to take over from the teacher, in the fourth year, the values and conventions he has been 'transmitting' over the years, and to work independently within these verbally framed constraints.

PART THREE

THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE

IN ART EDUCATION

CHAPTER 8

A CRITIQUE OF ART EDUCATIONAL THEORY

I believe that what is wrong with our education system is precisely our habit of establishing separate territories and inviable frontiers: and the system I propose in the following pages has for its only object the integration of all biologically useful faculties in a single organic activity (Read, 1943, 10-11).

8.1 Introduction

Educational interest in language has increased enormously over the past twenty years or so, extending beyond the traditional areas of grammar, literature, and the learning of foreign languages, to the various ways in which language affects experience and learning throughout the curriculum. Thanks largely to the efforts of the Schools Council, inspired by the Newsom Report (1963), schools and classrooms have come to be seen as 'pervasive language environments' (Stubbs, 1976, 12), and research has proliferated from a variety of disciplinary standpoints, enquiring into the functions of language in education generally. Thus, when we speak today of 'language in education' we may be referring to anything from language learning to the role of language in cognitive development (see, for example, Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, 84-91; and Bruner, 1974, Chap 2), or to the ways in which language mediates social reality (see, for example, Berger and Luckman, 1966, 49-61), social differentiation (see, for example, Bernstein, 1971; and Labov, 1969), or relations in the classroom (see, for example, Barnes, 1969; Stubbs, 1976; and Edwards, 1976).

Given this expansion in the scope of language studies, and a general acceptance of the principle that language is an all-pervasive mediator of experience and learning in the school, it is significant, I feel, that little or nothing has been done to explore the functions of language in art education. On the few occasions when attention has been turned in this direction it has been restricted mainly to those aspects of art

education which are most obviously verbal; that is, art history and art criticism (see, for example, B.O.Smith, 1961; Wilson, 1970; and R.A.Smith, 1973). The practical side has been almost completely ignored. Not only have language theorists failed to extend their studies to include language in art education, but art educationists have managed somehow to insulate themselves against the implications of the various theories of language for their subject, unless one takes into account the widespread yet dubious trend among art educationists towards treating art itself as a language. Indeed, there would appear to be a tacit agreement among all concerned that art education falls mainly outside the scope of language studies, or that language is relatively unimportant in that area of the curriculum.

But why should this be? Is there any real reason to suppose that language studies are not relevant to art education? We have seen in Part One of the present work that language plays an important part in the production and consumption of art in general, and we have seen in Part Two that art, like any other school subject, involves a teacher, a group of pupils, and a classroom or studio in which the teacher organises, instructs, explains, controls, and evaluates predominantly by means of words. Also we may assume that pupils in the art class discuss their work and ask questions, read books and magazines, come to understand and make sense of what they are doing, chiefly through the use of language both spoken and printed. If all this is true, it follows that language must have an important effect upon the artistic experience, understanding and behaviour of the class, and there should be every reason, therefore, to study its role. The fact remains, however, that the role of language in art education has been conspicuously ignored at a time when interest has been shown most keenly in the functions of language in education generally, and I suspect that this is due to some extent to the language which is used in education, with its implicit assumptions, values and attitudes, to differentiate between areas in the curriculum.

Curriculum theorists fall roughly into two groups: there are those who argue that school subjects should be distinguished on the basis of different forms of knowledge or disciplines (Hirst, 1974b, for example); and there are those who say that subjects should be identified with different realms of experience (for example, Phenix, 1964). Most actual curricula fall somewhere between these two approaches, but they invariably reflect something which is common to both; that is, they tend

to set art apart from the other subjects as something unique; something which is essentially 'visual' as opposed to 'verbal' or 'rational'. Art educationists accept this distinction even though it is to a great extent responsible for the unfavourable comparison of art with the other, 'academic' subjects, of which art teachers accuse the educational establishment (see Ross, 1975, 45). Indeed, art educationists seem to have embraced the distinction actively as a means of identifying their territory and, far from questioning it, they have devoted their efforts to elaborating the notion of a distinctly visual/emotional realm of experience, or form of knowledge, and to promoting art education as the proper means by which visual and emotional faculties, capacities, and sensibilities may be exercised and developed.

My own view is that the divisive language of curriculum planning, and the related jargon of art education have succeeded in creating a climate in which it is very difficult even to connect verbal language with art in education. It may well be that distinctions between the visual and the verbal, the emotional and the rational, art and language, are logistically expedient when it comes to the practical problems of time-tabling, but they help to create an image of art and art education which is simplistic and positively misleading. At one extreme they give rise to the colourful yet unfounded view that art is an appropriate subject for the illiterate and undisciplined, while at the other extreme they promote the equally unfounded view that art is in some way 'divine' or spiritual, and that it cannot be taught because it operates on a different plane from that of words. Both of these conclusions completely ignore the facts: art, as it is actually practised and consumed within the artistic community, relies heavily on the language used by artists themselves, critics and historians, and in order to be able to participate in art at anything above a naive or therapeutic level one must take the trouble to learn the language used to talk and write about it. Art is not, therefore, a pursuit for the illiterate or undisciplined (although one must accept there may be exceptions), and it is not beyond the realm of words.

The fact is, as Hayes says (see 4.1 below), that the practice and the appreciation of art in the schools are themselves conditioned by the language used to talk and write about art in education, and in this chapter I wish to pursue this point and to examine in greater detail the

most prominent rationales of art education and the language used to frame them. My aim is to show that much art educational thinking, mediated as it is by a hotch-potch of received, 'commonsense' dicta, is fundamentally untenable inasmuch as it assumes that art represents a uniquely 'visual' or 'affective' realm of experience and behaviour. Such thinking is therefore inadequate as a basis for studying art in education being itself part of the problem. That is, we should recognise fully the active role played by commonsense theory and the language which generates it in the production and consumption of art in education, and we should treat it, therefore, not as a basis for study but as an object of study.

8.2 Rationales for Art Education

Barratt (1976) identifies and characterises six main art educational strategies currently employed in the schools, which are supported by distinct rationales or commonsense theories ('commonsense' inasmuch as they are commonly held by teachers and administrators, and they are received rather than researched). These Barratt calls:

- The Conceptual or Art Based Rationale
- The Design Education Rationale
- The Visual Education Rationale
- The Fine Art Rationale
- The Art and Craft Rationale
- The Graphicacy Rationale

It is unlikely, according to Barratt, that any of these would be found operating in its purest form, most Art Departments having a more complex rationale containing aspects of some, most, or all of them. It is also the case, as Barratt admits, that there are certain fundamental ways of thinking about art which underlie most of the rationales. Much of what is discovered under the heading of 'visual education', for example, may also be placed under other headings, in particular that of 'graphicacy' (which is defined as being the visual equivalent to literacy and numeracy).

With the possible exception of design education with its divergent approach, all the rationales have in common the attitude that art education is to some extent remedial in that its aim is to counteract or counter-balance other forces at work within the curriculum, and to ensure a

'complete' education. The basic argument is that there are human sensibilities, faculties and capacities which are not exercised or developed by a curriculum which concentrates on literacy, numeracy and reason, and the neglect of these is detrimental not only to the individual but also to society. The rationales differ in respect of the particular sensibilities, etc. they purport to educate: the art based rationale, for example, sees the development and realisation of the pupil's 'personal reality' as paramount, and it concentrates on 'the self' and the uniqueness of the pupil's ideas, impulses and feelings. The visual education and graphicacy rationales, by contrast, concentrate less on individuality and more on the mastery of concepts and skills which presuppose a realm of experience and knowledge which is purely visual and which generates its own language (that of space, form, structure, colour, symbols and so on).

Given that there are certain fundamental attitudes towards art and art education which underlie most of the rationales identified by Barratt, it is possible to reduce art educational theory to three main schools of thought which I shall refer to as: the 'sensory' school, the 'affective' school, and the 'cognitive' school.

8.21 The Sensory School

This school includes all of those thinkers and writers who portray art in the school as an education of the senses. Prominent among these is Rowland (1964; 1968; 1971) whose text-books adorn the shelves of most school libraries or art rooms, and who must therefore be seen as influential, certainly at grass-roots level. Rowland develops his philosophy in a small book called Educating the Senses (1968) which opens with a telling quote from Read:

The foundations of a civilisation rest not in the mind but in the senses, and unless we can use the senses, educate the senses, we shall never have the biological conditions for human survival let alone human progress (in Rowland, 1968, 4).

In a chapter devoted to 'Art and Language', Rowland elaborates on this distinction between the mind and the senses, claiming the support of Arnheim, among others. His argument is that our experience, and our culture generally, are dominated by literature and values associated

with it. Consequently, education concentrates on the development of verbal skills to the detriment of the visual and the sensuous. This, says Rowland, is to put the cart before the horse, for the senses provide the pure raw material, the 'physical reality without which (verbal) ideas would have no value' (loc.cit., 19). Verbal experience, he claims, is 'indirect experience' and a distortion of the purely sensuous. And it is this distortion which he holds to be behind the disturbing and insensitive treatment of our environment, and the lack of harmony and organic unity in modern design. It is Rowland's intention, therefore, to redress the balance and to promote the education of the senses and, in particular, 'visual' education.

8.22 The Affective School

This school of art educational theory is exemplified in the work of Witkin (1974) and Ross (1975; 1978). Whereas Rowland's approach centres on a distinction between the visual and the verbal in education, Witkin and Ross recognise a split between the expressive arts and the sciences as more significant. They accept that science is the domain of logic and reason, and that scientific experience is 'impressive' in the sense that it is moulded by events in the external world. By contrast, they reason, the arts must function to maintain the balance by providing an 'expressive' element in education. Art education is, they say, a context in which the pupil may be free to explore the realm of 'feeling', unhampered by the demands of logic and reason. Further, Witkin claims that feeling is itself guided by a kind of primal intelligence which may be different from the accepted kind, but which is every bit as worthy of development.

8.23 The Cognitive School

The Cognitive School of art educational thought owes much in the short term to the work of educational psychologists such as Vygotsky and Bruner. This school sees all experience, knowledge, thought and communication as symbolic, and in this scheme visual art becomes one of a number of conceptual modes. The more recent work of Eisner exemplifies this approach. He argues (Eisner, 1978) that different symbolic modes are closely related to, and take their flavour from, the sensory means by

which we contact and construe reality. Each symbol system, according to Eisner, whether it be art, science, music, literature, poetry or whatever, functions as a means for both the conceptualisation of ideas about aspects of reality, and as a means for conveying what one knows to others. Each symbol system has unique capabilities, and sets parameters upon what can be conceived and expressed. Thus it is not the case that certain cultural forms, such as the arts, are affective while others, science or mathematics, say, are cognitive. Each of the major cultural forms are symbol systems that we use in order to know: they are all cognitive, and they are all valuable. This being so, according to Eisner, schools should be concerned to develop the pupil's capacity to think and to communicate his thoughts in and through the full range of symbolic modes and forms.

The three schools have certain features in common: they all believe that art is presently undervalued by an educational establishment which favours the development of verbal, intellectual and academic skills rather than visual, emotional and practical skills and sensibilities. They all adopt a similar strategy to try to put right this imbalance in educational values, which is to accept the popular or commonsense distinctions between the verbal and the visual, art and science, feeling and reason, and to extol the virtues of the visual and the affective in education. This means 'elevating' them to the level of those subjects traditionally held to be intellectual or academic, by conferring upon the visual and the affective the status of cognitive processes, or by demonstrating the fundamental necessity for visual or emotional experience in intellectual operations. Following Arnheim (1969), the Sensory School sees visual experience as a kind of pre-verbal kind of thinking and knowing; and the Affective School juggles with the notion of a kind of 'felt knowledge'.

While it is enough for the Sensory and Affective Schools to differentiate the territory of the art educationist within the curriculum, the Cognitive School, having established art as a separate symbolic mode of experiencing and communicating, considers the relations between the various symbol systems. Eisner, for example, recognises 'a rich and productive' interaction between modes of conceptualisation... and the form one chooses to use to publicly render what one has conceptualised' (Eisner, 1978). He

demonstrates this by quoting a particularly 'visual' passage from a piece of literature by Annie Dillard (1974). In order to be able to write in this way, according to Eisner, Dillard had to be able to see: 'she had to be able to visualise, to form concepts of the reality to which she previously had attended... Her eyes, which are a part of the mind, provided the content that made her writing possible' (loc. cit.). What Dillard has given us, says Eisner, is literature which helps us to see, and the possibility of this kind of interaction between symbol systems exists not only for the visual and verbal modes but for all the conceptual modes and forms of communication: the concepts we form in mathematics, for example, may facilitate forms of cognition which can be expressed in music.

8.3 Contradictions Implicit in the Three Main Schools of Art Educational Thought

While there is much, I believe, to commend the approach of the Cognitive School in its willingness to see thought and communication in the various modes as an integrated system, there are, nonetheless, fundamental misconceptions in the thinking of all three schools.

8.31 Educating the Senses

Embodied in the language of the Sensory School is a theory of perception which has changed little since Descartes. It supposes that human knowledge and experience are stratified or layered and that perception, or the exercise of the senses, contributes at a fundamental level. It is said to provide a species of data which is distinct from the inferences, constructions and interpretations which are expressed in the relatively high-level judgements of everyday life. Subscribing to this view, Rowland (1968, 17-21), for example, is able to conceive of 'a sensuous experience' which is 'intrinsically visual', and of 'visual concepts' and values which 'can't be expressed in any other way', which he associates with the primary stage in the process. Mind, according to this model, intervenes at succeeding levels when 'sensory comprehension', to use Rowland's terms, is swallowed up in the world of 'indirect experience' mediated predominantly by words.

The current scientific view of visual perception, however, is quite different from this (see, for example, Vernon, 1962; Gombrich, 1962; Gregory, 1966 and 1970; and Gregory and Gombrich, 1973). Even the most conservative review of the literature on the subject (Child, 1973, 64-78, for example) recognises that visual experience, even at its most basic, is not given in this way: it is actively constituted or 'intentional'. That is, perception is a process whereby we actively select from the mass of incoming information that which is useful or meaningful. What we make of it depends upon the context within which it is received and upon the expectancies we bring to bear upon it. Another way of putting it is that the screening of incoming signals is regulated by pre-established frames of reference, mental sets, or cognitive maps which involve more than just the specifically 'visual' centres of the brain. Scientists are not at all sure yet how far these frames or maps may be inherent and to what extent they are acquired in the process of socialisation. But it is probably true to say that those with which we are born, or which develop soon after, are fairly rudimentary, and it is not until we acquire language, and the knowledge which it brings, that we begin to recognise the world as it is seen and shared within our culture. Once this stage is reached, language becomes an inextricable element in visual perception, predisposing us to certain choices of interpretation which give meaning and form to our perceptions. It is inconceivable that, having acquired language, our choices of interpretation may be made independently of knowledge and experience gained through its use. This is not to say that we may not choose to adopt different ways of seeing, or that we may not choose to look at objects as if in a 'pure' or 'direct' way; only that one's choice to 'see' in this way, and what one sees as a result, are almost inevitably induced by ideas received through the use of language.

There is, of course, another side to this particular coin: there is, indeed, a powerful visual element in what is usually thought of as the verbal realm of experience and communication. Read (1965), Arnheim (1969), and Gregory (1970) all make this point. They observe that language is replete with visual references and that it works only on the basis of a shared perceptual experience. Their interpretation is that, in the course of time, language grew on the back of purely visual experience and understanding, and that its meanings contain or refer back to that understanding. If this is so then it would appear to confirm the views of the Sensory School; but it does not necessarily

follow that, because language draws on visual understanding, in the life of the individual visual knowledge necessarily precedes verbal knowledge, or that the one may be distinguished from the other in experience. It is much more complicated than this and we may begin to understand something of the relations between the visual and the verbal in experience if we put what Read et al have to say together with the current scientific view of perception.

If we do this then we may come up with the idea that once language appears on the scene, whether it be in the history of mankind, or in the life of an individual, visual experience can no longer remain 'pure' or immediate. It is unrealistic to hang on to the belief that a kind of direct perceptual faculty underlies linguistic and intellectual development, and that we may gain access to it by an act of will. Much more consistent with the evidence is the view that the verbal and the visual, insofar as it is at all possible to distinguish between them in experience, are indissolubly linked in a mutually effective, developmental or dialectical relation: that language inevitably modifies perception, and perception in turn modifies language. Once the ball has started rolling, and experience has been gained, there is no going back, in the normal course of events, to earlier less informed states.

The implications of current scientific thinking on perception for the theories of the Sensory School are devastating. There is no such thing as Rowland's 'direct sensuous experience' untainted by verbal concepts, except in early infancy. What we see is necessarily informed by learned or received concepts which means that, when one speaks of art education as a means whereby vision may be affected in some way, one is really saying that art education acts upon the conceptual frameworks which mediate perception. These frameworks are necessarily susceptible to the effects of language, and when adherents to the 'sensory' theory of art education speak of developing the pupil's powers of perception, what they mean in effect is that they wish to persuade him to adopt certain ways of conceiving and understanding the visual world. This of course is their own preferred way of seeing things which is induced by the mystified language they use to talk and write about art and art education, and in communicating it to their pupils with all the authority of the teacher they ensure the persistence of the unfounded and contradictory theory on which it is based.

8.32 Educating the Emotions

Whereas the Sensory School discriminates between art and the other subjects in the curriculum in terms of a supposed dichotomy between the visual and the verbal in experience, the Affective School recognises a split between the 'expressive' arts and the rational, 'impressive' sciences. The arts, it is said, provide a vehicle for the expression of feeling and for the exploration of the emotions, while the sciences are concerned with objective enquiry into the laws of the natural world.

I would argue against this premise in much the same way as I argued against the presuppositions of the Sensory School. There can be no sharp division of this kind between the emotional and the rational in experience, thinking, knowledge and communication. The emotional is present in the rational, and the emotional is tempered by the rational. It cannot be denied that the formal products and the methods of art and science may be very different (although they may also appear strikingly similar at times). But the human factors, the internal processes, the emotional and intellectual content, may differ hardly at all. The scientist relies on intuition and imagination just as much as the artist, and the artist may be just as methodical and self-disciplined as the scientist. The artist may be just as objective in the way he pursues his interests as the scientist, and the scientist may derive just as much emotional fulfilment from what he does as may the artist from his work.

Any real evidence on this issue, such as that afforded by studies in creativity (e.g. Wallas, 1926; Ghiselin, 1952) and personality (e.g. Roe, 1952; Barron, 1955; Mackinnon, 1962; Getzels and Jackson, 1963; Cattell and Butcher, 1968) confirms that the creative process in artists and scientists is very similar; that artists are not necessarily more emotional or subjective than scientists; and that scientists are not necessarily more rational beings than artists. The scientist, like the artist, expresses his feelings, explores his dreams, through the work that he does, and the artist, like the scientist, uses his intellect. As Gombrich says, 'many scientists have testified to the role which creative dreams have played in their work, dreams that were hammered into rational theories by hard and inspired work; many artists, on the other hand, use the power of intellect with a lucidity and concentration that rivals that of the scientific pioneer. The cult of art as pure emotional

abreaction, expression or automatism... is a debased form of the Romantic belief in inspiration' (Gombrich, 1963, 149-150). The difference between art and science, then, as Goodman puts it, 'is not that between feeling and fact, intuition and inference, delight and deliberation, concreteness and abstraction, passion and action, mediacy and immediacy, or truth and beauty, but rather a difference in domination of certain specific characteristics of symbols' (Goodman, 1968, 264). Put another way, the difference lies not so much in the personalities of the respective exponents, or in the creative processes underlying their work, or yet in what they get out of their work; it lies in the contrasting methods and products of art and science which are culturally and historically determined. What is considered to be 'artistic' or 'scientific' in one culture, or at one moment in history, may not be regarded as such elsewhere or at another time. Art and science proceed according to rules, some tacit, some explicit, which are established by the respective authorities. These rules are not absolute, but subject to constant change. Nonetheless, they determine what is a valid artistic product, and what is a valid contribution to science at any given moment. The establishing of such rules is a complex business, too complicated to go into here, but we have seen in Parts One and Two, below, some of the ways in which the rules of art may be generalised through the language of the artist, the critic, the historian, and the educationist.

Like the Sensory School, the Affective School may be seen as a product of a certain kind of art language predicated, as Gombrich says, on the culturally- and historically-specific tenets of Romanticism. As such it may also be seen as a product of the commonsense language of a subgroup within the artistic and art educational community, and thus untenable as an objective or general view of what art is and how it should be taught. Put simply, it cannot be said unequivocally, as the Affective School would have us believe, that art educates the emotions and science does not. Indeed, it might well be the case that art may be used in schools quite adequately to develop the pupil's capacity for rational thought if he does not get on particularly well with the sciences, and that science may be a sufficient vehicle for exercising the imagination for pupils who do not get on with art.

Before I move on to discuss the Cognitive School, I should just add to what I have said about the Sensory and Affective Schools that I am quite aware of the physiological basis on which the visual and the verbal, the emotional and the rational may be distinguished, and that this in no way detracts from my argument. Language and reason, it has been established, belong to the left side of the brain, while spacial and emotional capacities and sensibilities belong to the right (see Blakeslee, 1980). It so happens, however, that this is not an exclusive arrangement and, according to Watson (1979, 171), 'a man with only half a brain can, given time, develop all the normal faculties of logic, speech and imagery on one side alone'. Even in physiological terms, then, 'the simple verbal-nonverbal division of the two halves of the brain is really an oversimplification' (Blakeslee, 1980, 86). But even were this not the case, the physiological evidence would be beside the point. Even if the different faculties and capacities were exclusive to this or that part of the brain, it would be much too much to infer that experience, thought, knowledge, and the power to communicate may be neatly separated into their visual, verbal, emotional and rational components. Experience, thought, and so on cannot be confined to particular physiological locations; they operate at a higher and more complex level. They are functions of the mind and, as such, they incorporate the visual, the verbal, the emotional and the rational in a fully integrated, holistic system.

8.33 Educating the Intellect

The Cognitive School owes much to Cassirer, through the work of educational psychologists such as Bruner, and in particular to the philosophy that all experience, thought, knowledge and communication is 'symbolic'. Before I criticise this particular school, therefore, I should attempt to clarify what this means.

Langer (1953, x) lists some half a dozen uses of the term 'symbol' besides her own, but Reid's (1961) description probably comes closest to what is meant by the Cognitive School and Eisner in particular. Reid says (in his Introduction) that in order to apprehend with more understanding the complexity of our intuitive field of awareness we must focus selectively on its parts to build up a synthetic view of the whole. This selective

focusing requires articulation by means of mediating systems or 'symbol systems' of different kinds, including visual images, words, the arts myth, ritual, religion and the sciences. These symbolic modes of articulation simultaneously and paradoxically act as bridges and barriers between experience and the real world: they are bridges inasmuch as they are the necessary instruments of human knowledge, and they are barriers inasmuch as they are never identical with that which we seek to know.

Experience, according to this model, can never be 'impressive' in, say, Witkins's sense: experience is actively constituted by means of various, overlapping symbol systems. Moreover, it is a self-contained world in which meaning is generated through the interaction of symbol systems (as opposed to the interaction of the symbolic with the 'real' world to which it refers). As Reid says, 'if, for instance, the mathematical constructions concerning light or sound are related at certain points to experimental observation, this is a relation of mathematical symbols, not directly to an independent world, but to another set of symbols, those of sense perception' (loc. cit.). This point is echoed by Hirst:

When ... a statement, whose function it is to pick out something in perception, has meaning, its meaning is translatable into the symbolism implicit in sense perception and thus is testable in perception. But this is not to say that the symbolic expression is tested against the world which is understood independently of any symbolic structure. It is to test one symbolic expression by an awareness which is itself implicitly symbolic (Hirst, 1974, 76).

In these terms concepts are not higher order abstractions from raw, sensory data, as the Sensory School would have us believe, but implicit indications of the appropriate use of a symbol system. To perceive something in a particular way is to exercise a visual concept in just the same way as one grasps a verbal concept through a particular use of words.

Returning to the Cognitive School, and the ways in which theorists such as Eisner relate the doctrine of symbols to art education, we find that there appears to be some confusion over the relation between perception, conceptualisation and symbols. Consider the following extracts from Eisner's article 'The Impoverished Mind' (1978):

accepting that both involve symbols, and that each is modified by the other. It would also recognise that probably the most important source of knowledge is not sense-perception as such but the society into which one is born, and this knowledge is acquired through the use of language. Of course linguistic communications are received via the senses, but this 'pre-processed' information is somewhat different from the 'raw' sensory data which the Sensory School, and I suspect Eisner, see as being the primary source of knowledge. Words may be received by sight, hearing, or touch; they are not exclusive to, or dependent upon particular modes of perception; they are not 'perceptual' in that sense.

Eisner's contradictory interpretation results, I suspect, from an attempt to reconcile what is a socially or culturally based theory of knowledge (i.e. the theory of symbols with its emphasis on cultural forms such as 'art', 'myth', 'religion', 'the sciences'), with a theory of education based on the notion that learning comes about through observation and discovery. The two are not easily reconciled; as Hirst says, learning does not come about by direct, unmediated observation, but by the acquisition of the appropriate language:

It is ... in general necessary to the growth of understanding to learn to use the appropriate language in which that understanding is expressed and communicated ... (Teaching) methods that assume that in general concepts can be formed - and it is the world of public concepts that I have in mind - without developing the use of the relevant language are doomed before they start (ibid., 79).

There is no reason to think of course that a person cannot have certain concepts without the use of a common language but, again according to Hirst, 'those that are expressed in our common language are ... only acquirable by learning the use of that language. I fail to see how we could in general come to have precisely these concepts prior to acquiring the appropriate language' (ibid., 77).

Applying his thinking to art education Hirst conceives of art as a 'common language' embodying public concepts (see Hirst, 1973). This is a somewhat contentious view (see 4.2 above) which need not concern us here; it matters little to my present point whether or not art is itself a language. It is enough to say that one must participate in art, as a producer or a consumer, in order to acquire artistic knowledge, and that participation in art necessitates the acquisition of the public

language used to talk and write about art.

To sum up my criticism of the Cognitive School as it is represented by Eisner: its approach is basically contradictory; it adopts the theory of symbols without fully accepting its implications. Symbol systems are socially and culturally received, and they mediate experience, thought, knowledge and communication at the most fundamental level. If art is such a system, as Eisner suggests, then the knowledge it affords stems from the culture rather than directly from a supposed independent, visual world. Yet when Eisner applies the theory to art education, he comes up with a stratified and linear model similar to that of the Sensory School with directly sensed visual experience as the primary source of artistic knowledge.

8.4 Conclusion

The three schools of art educational thought criticised above are not independent; they are all discovered in some degree in the thinking of most art educators, particularly in the secondary sector. Between them they have created an intellectual climate in which it is very difficult even to conceive of the study of language in art education. The Sensory School is openly antagonistic towards language which, it claims, distorts purely sensuous experience. The Affective School opposes art to reason which is closely associated with things verbal. And the Cognitive School, like the Sensory School, differentiates between the visual and the verbal at a fundamental level, as distinct modes of experience.

The thinking behind the three approaches is, in varying degrees, muddled and misconceived, but this is not in itself to be criticised. The value of art theory in education resides not so much in its logic or philosophical integrity as in its power to inspire teachers and pupils, to initiate good work and experience, and to generate interest and ideas. However, the adoption of this or that theoretical approach, with its associated language, not only helps to release talents and energies, it may also close doors. Words carry with them a dense cargo of values, attitudes and assumptions which tend to focus thinking in

certain directions while inhibiting it in others. Even if there was no value judgement intended, labels such as 'visual' and 'expressive', which the schools between them attach to art, artificially isolate it from things 'non-visual' and rational. Thus the art language of the three schools works implicitly and explicitly to mystify the issues and to obscure the very real contribution that words and rationality can and do make to art. In particular it obscures the fact that, whatever else it may be, art is a relation between the maker and the made, the viewer and the viewed, which is mediated by public concepts acquired predominantly by means of words in the process of education.

CHAPTER 9

THE LINGUISTIC CONTEXT OF ART EDUCATION

Since the concepts people live by are derived only from perceptions and from language, and since the perceptions are received and interpreted only in the light of earlier concepts, man comes pretty close to living in a house that language built (Smith, 1952, quoted in Postman and Weingartner, 1971, 121).

Specialised professionals, particularly, now maintain webs of intimate contact with other professionals, wherever they may be. They share a particular body of values; their roles are defined by the organised structures of their groups; they undoubtedly have a sense of belonging to the groups; and, by the nature of the alliances, all share in a community of interests (Webber, 1964, quoted in Worsley, 1970, 300).

9.1 Introduction

Participation in art, whether it be as a practising artist or as a consumer, presupposes the acquisition of concepts of art and artistic concepts. Such concepts are acquired in the process of art education mainly from the language of the teacher who is the representative in the school of the art educational community. It will be clear from the way in which I have been using the term 'community' in this context that I mean a specialist or professional community of interest as opposed to a spatially located community. Interest communities, according to Webber (1964, 108-11) exhibit all the characteristics that we attribute to spatially located communities except, of course, physical propinquity. Their members share a particular set of values and beliefs; their roles are defined by the informal structures of their group; they have a sense of identity and, by the nature of their alliance, they share particular interests.

Communities in general comprise people with common interests who communicate with each other. It is no linguistic accident, as Webber (loc. cit.) points out, that 'community' and 'communication' share the Latin root 'communis': 'in common'. This point is particularly important in relation to communities of interest because it is almost exclusively through formal channels of communication that they maintain their integrity. This being so, we may ask ourselves how communication is effected within the art educational community; how do the changing values, attitudes and beliefs of the community impose themselves upon teachers who may seldom come together to discuss common aims and objectives, and some of whom may spend most of their working lives in comparative isolation. To some extent we can take it for granted that art teachers are affected, like everyone else, by information and ideas broadcast by the mass media. We may also take it for granted that they are subject to ways of thinking and constraints which are imposed upon teachers generally. But what of the specialised thinking of their own professional community; how is this communicated and generalised? How, for example, do theories such as those discussed in the last chapter become generalised throughout the art educational community? How do particular art languages, with their implicit values, attitudes and preferences, get adopted by the individual members of the community?

In this chapter I propose to identify something of the range of linguistic instruments whereby the art educational community sustains its internal communications and by which the community as a whole maintains its influence over the production and consumption of art in education. I shall present the range in descending order of effectiveness, as I see it. The order is open to question since it is not the result of an objective survey, but it is correct according to my own experience as a practising art teacher. However, whether it is correct or not is really not important because I am presenting these items mainly as a list of topics any of which might become the focus of future studies of language in art education.

9.2 School, College, and Teacher Training

Probably the strongest influence on the language of the teacher, and hence on the way he thinks and teaches, is the language he himself picked up in the course of his own education. This is modified subsequently, as ideas change within the community, by means of the instruments listed below. It tends to be a hotch-potch of received dicta which do not gel into a coherent and consistent philosophy. Ross (1975) found that when he questioned art teachers about their function in relation to their pupils, or about the function of the arts in education, there was no general agreement. Indeed, he says, most of the teachers questioned, 'were either struck totally dumb or rapidly collapsed into incoherence' (loc. cit., 17). From this one might assume, as does Ross, that art teachers lack an adequate theoretical grasp of what they are doing; that is, they lack a theory of art education. Taking this to be the case, Ross outlines a theory to fill the apparent vacuum, a theory based on the assumption that art in education is the means by which pupils may express feeling. However, as we have seen in Chapter 8, there is no lack of such theories in the art educational community. If anything there are too many conflicting and rather dubious theories, and this may explain just as well as Ross's conclusion the inability of art teachers to articulate their aims and objectives. What-ever they say must be qualified and modified in order not to contradict any of the conflicting attitudes tacitly assumed to be appropriate to an art teacher.

The really telling thing that Ross says is that, although the art teachers he questioned found it difficult to explain their aims and objectives, they did not lack a sense of where they were going, or of what they were doing; rather, he says, 'their own best work seemed to derive more from intuition than deliberation' (ibid.). This suggests that the language of art education which is spoken by these teachers, quite fluently in class one assumes, is not a self-conscious or logical language. If it is used in a self-conscious way, as in an interview, it becomes impossible because it is a practical language, geared less towards making sense, as such, and more towards achieving particular results in the work of the pupils. The efficacy of such a language is thus valued according to the results it achieves, and the typical art language which is received by the art teacher in the course of his training is that

which has proved to get valid results in the eyes of the art educational community. The meaning of this language may be understood, therefore, not so much as something created by the words and the way in which they are used, as a relation between the words and the 'visual' results required.

If this is the case, then it is insufficient for researchers to question teachers, or to refer to particular overt theories of art education to discover what counts as valid art educational knowledge, for this may be achieved only by encountering the language of art education in context and relating what is said by the teacher to the visual and verbal responses of the pupils, noting what is upheld as a valid response and what is rejected as unsuitable. What is valid and what is not, of course, will change in time, and some of the means by which the teacher is kept in touch are listed below.

9.3 Examination Syllabuses, Examination Papers, and Examiners' Reports

One of the most prominent linguistic constraints on the thoughts and actions of the art teacher, particularly in the secondary sector, is the examination syllabus to which he works. Closely connected with this are public examination papers and examiners' reports and, where there is an element of Art History, examiners' recommended reading.

The linguistic influence here is exerted along three main channels. Firstly there are the explicit aims and objectives which every public examination syllabus professes and which provide linguistic cues and clues as to how the subject should be approached. In the secondary sector one finds that the language used to express the aims and objectives of the various G.C.E. 'O' and 'A' Level examining boards is very similar. On the positive side there is a general emphasis on 'originality' and the 'individuality' of the pupil; 'sensitivity', 'expression' and 'communication'; a 'wide range of media and materials'; the 'development of skills', 'problem-solving'; the 'realisation' of ideas through a series of 'preliminary studies'; and an 'awareness' of the work and the role of practising artists in society. On the negative side it seems to be agreed that 'copying' from the photographs or the work of others is

undesirable, and too much assistance from the teacher is frowned upon too, particularly in work produced for examination. In broad terms there is surprisingly little difference between the language used to state the aims and objectives of the G.C.E. syllabuses and those of the C.E.E. and C.S.E. syllabuses; the main differences occur in the second channel by which the syllabus exerts an influence on the teacher's approach. This is the form and the spirit of the examination to which the syllabus leads as communicated in the options and instructions which are found mainly on the examination papers themselves. One finds that differences in the form of examinations occur not so much between the different levels of examination as between boards. Whereas course-work is required by the C.E.E. and C.S.E. boards, not all of the G.C.E. boards feel it necessary to examine it (see Carline, 1968/1975, 283-4). Also, G.C.E. boards differ on the number of papers candidates should sit for their examinations, and, significantly, whether or not the History of Art and Craft should be compulsory. Most agree however that examination work should be treated not as something special but as a 'natural extension' of the pupil's coursework, and most structure their examinations on the premise that, for their main paper, candidates will work towards a finished product through a series of preparatory stages.

It is only when one delves back into the past to compare examination papers of thirty, forty and fifty years ago with contemporary papers that one can see just how much the instructions convey a concept and a way of producing art. For example, the London Board is typical of the contemporary approach to examining G.C.E. candidates inasmuch as it allows them to prepare for the examinations in advance, it requires the candidates themselves to choose objects and to arrange the still-life groups from which they will be working, and it encourages candidates to take as much of the initiative as possible in controlling their own examination conditions. Looking back to the University of London General School Examination procedure in the 1950's, however, one finds that papers were not distributed until the beginning of the examination, with no time to prepare; invigilators were required to arrange still-life groups following a sketch provided by the examiner, and the examination as a whole was much more strictly controlled and prescribed. Further back in the twenties, thirties and early forties a section on 'memory drawing' was included to test a skill which is scarcely considered necessary today. In the past, then, the emphasis in art

examinations seems to have been on the demonstration of skill by the candidates, whereas today it is on the demonstration of an attitude. This points to a change in the concept of art and art education over the past fifty years or so from a product-centred activity to a process-centred one, a change which has come about for the most part over the heads of ordinary art teachers, but which has communicated itself to teachers to a great extent through the form and the language of the public examination.

The third channel by which linguistic constraints are imposed upon the teacher through the examination system is that of the examiner's report. Some boards, such as the A.E.B., publish such reports as replies to comments made by teachers on the question papers set by the Board. These are concerned mainly with practical matters such as whether or not the Board should supply paper with a printed box for information in one corner, rather than labels for sticking to the back of paper supplied by the schools (see, for example, the A.E.B. Board's 'Comments and Replies', 1978, 5). Most examiners, however, take the opportunity in their reports to tell teachers in which respects candidates and centres have been meeting the expectations of the Board, and in which respects they have not. In respect of the London Board, the examiners make general comments followed by detailed criticisms of the candidates' performance in the various options offered. In their 1978 report their general remarks included the following:

Looking through the previous reports of 1969, 72 and 75, the examiners are aware of how much has already been said about the philosophy and attitude determining the growth of this syllabus and the criteria used in examinations. The same central issues have been repeatedly emphasised and re-presented, and they are just as relevant now. We would urge schools to refer again to all three reports...

Unfortunately there are still some schools who fail to grasp the nature of the syllabus or the examination and refuse to take advantage of the opportunities they offer...

For example, the compulsory use of colour, and the arrangement of still-life objects by each individual candidate, are regulations specifically designed to help the candidate. It is reprehensible that these should be denied simply as a matter of convenience or negligence on the part of the centre (loc. cit., 18, 19).

There is clearly no pretence here that the Board is not the mediator of

artistic practices in the schools; it lays down the 'philosophy' and the 'attitude' of the artistic performance it expects from the schools, and it admonishes teachers who do not comply with its instructions. These passages typify the tone of the general comments of the London Board's examiners, detected again in the 1978 report in their criticism of teachers for not attending closely enough to the Board's assessment criteria which it lists in its syllabus. There are numerous passages also in this report which I could quote from the comments on particular examination options to show how the Board seeks to control not only the conception and execution of the work submitted for examination but also, by inference, course work, since courses are conceived more often than not as a preparation for the examination. I shall restrict myself to two only.

Among their comments on the response of candidates to the papers on drawing and painting from observation, the examiners have this to say:

In the plant drawing and painting option some of the best candidates showed a constructive and analytical approach which resulted in controlled work of great intensity. This is a difficult, and it might be said, limited area in which to work and the supporting studies should show some real purpose in adding to the depth of study, through genuine research and enquiry. The botanical drawing may be beautiful, but like technical drawing really serves another purpose (loc. cit., 19,20).

From this the teacher learns that the words 'constructive', 'analytical', 'controlled' and 'intensity' are positively charged and refer to 'good' practices, while botanical and technical drawing are inappropriate in the context of 'art' because they show no 'real purpose' or 'genuine research and enquiry'. In just a short passage such as this there is a whole philosophy of art and a language which the teacher must adopt if he is to be a successful examination coach.

The second passage may be found in the section on 'painting from a theme', the option in which one might expect the candidate to have the maximum control over the image-making process:

The improvement in the theme work submitted this year was possibly due to the nature of the subjects set. Candidates placed less reliance on ready made 'pop' images as a starting point for their pictorial ideas and were more inclined to observe at first hand... In contrast to previous years there were fewer good non-figurative

works submitted. Where attempts were made in this direction the results usually showed some lack of understanding of this type of work (ibid.).

From the juxtaposition of the first two sentences in this passage the teacher learns that the use of 'pop' images as a starting point is inadvisable. From what comes after he may also learn that it is risky for candidates to attempt pictures which are non-figurative. Again, if he is concerned for the career prospects of his pupils, the teacher will respond to these clues by teaching them to produce more traditional, figurative compositions.

9.4 Prepared Teaching Materials

By prepared teaching materials I mean anything from books, film-strip notes and published projects, to exhibition and museum catalogues, television and radio programmes, and even the catalogues of commercial suppliers. In short, any publication in which verbal material on art or art education is packaged for the direct consumption of the teacher or which is convenient for use by the teacher.

9.41 Books

Some books appear with monotonous regularity in art departments and libraries in schools and colleges. Among these are books which do not profess to put forward a philosophy of art as such; they are conceived more on the lines of text-books from which teachers may take practical ideas. They may be concerned with particular techniques or processes such as print-making (e.g. Rothenstein, 1966; Heller, 1972), with particular problems such as that of colour (e.g. Itten, 1970; Albers, 1963), or, more commonly, with the general idea of 'basic design' (e.g. Anderson, 1961; Bevlin, 1963; Rowland, 1964; de Saumarez, 1964; and Itten, 1975). Although such books are not explicitly or primarily philosophical they nonetheless subscribe to a particular aesthetic and thus it is that particular ideas are communicated to the teacher as to what is appropriate in art education. Presented as they are in a

matter-of-fact and apparently unproblematic way, such books provide the teacher with a quasi-objective platform on which to base his teaching, and an appropriate language in which to frame it. The kind of language I mean is exemplified in the following passage from de Saumarez (1964):

The simplest unit, a spot, not only indicates location but is felt to have within itself potential energies of expansion and contraction which activate the surrounding area. When two spots occur there is a statement of measurement and implied direction and the 'inner' energies create a specific tension between them which directly affects the intervening space (loc. cit., 20).

Here the language suggests that the writer is reporting natural scientific facts rather than a particular culturally- and historically-specific way of thinking about art and design. It is the spot, according to the writer, which 'activates the surrounding area' and the inanimate elements of design which provide the 'inner energy'. The fact is, however, that the characteristics attributed to the spot, etc., in this kind of presentation belong not to these elements but to the viewer. It is the viewer who provides the 'energy' and it is his expectations which 'activate' the design. The abstract elements behave in the ways de Saumarez suggests only to the extent that the viewer plays the game, and he will do this only if he subscribes to the philosophy - the aesthetic - which motivates de Saumarez to write in the way he does.

9.42 Film-strip Notes

Film-strips are used by art teachers not only for the teaching of Art History but also, very often, as background for practical work. For example, in my Pilot Study (see Appendix) it transpired that the teachers concerned had introduced the work on 'colour' which they were doing with the first form by showing a film-strip on colour theory. Probably the best known publisher of film-strips on art is the ubiquitous Visual Publications. Not only do they exert an influence on art teachers through the choice of visual material they include in their strips, but they also supply comprehensive notes which indicate how that material should be interpreted.

9.43 Projects

Bodies such as the Schools Council embark on educational research which often results in the publication of teaching materials. One Schools Council project which is currently under way focuses on 'Art and the Built Environment'. According to a recent progress report (Adams, 1981), the project, based at the Design Unit of the Royal College of Art, 'is concerned with developing environmental perception based on visual/tactile modes of study, with eliciting a subjective, affective response, and with developing discriminatory and critical skills as a basis for environmental appraisal'. Whatever the intention, this is the kind of language which the project organisers aim to impose upon art teachers whom they see as responsible for 'areas of understanding not necessarily covered by subject disciplines such as geography, history, social studies and science, which normally deal with environmental study', and to this end they seek 'to explain the theoretical basis for this, together with an explanation of study methods and work undertaken by trial schools'. Needless to say, it is not only the language used in such reports which is passed on to the art teacher, but also a view of his role and the work that he and his pupils should be doing if they are to be considered visually 'literate'.

9.44 Museum and Gallery Catalogues

Museums and galleries exert some influence over their patrons' understanding of art inasmuch as they choose what items to collect, which of these to exhibit, and how they should be presented. They also provide printed material to inform the visitor of the ways in which their collections have been organised, both physically and conceptually. Like any other visitor the teacher is subject to the overt and the tacit messages embodied in the selection and the organisation of works of art in such places, but it is particularly in the case of special exhibitions that these institutions may act through the teacher upon his pupils. Take, for example, the exhibition 'The Splendours of the Gonzaga' at the Victoria and Albert Museum in the Autumn of 1981. Apart from the choice of subject, the choice of material, and the organisation of that material, the Museum also put on special Study Days to reinforce its view, and it produced an illustrated catalogue which has been described as, 'the

finest to be produced for such an exhibition; a must for anyone interested in the Italian Renaissance' (Fox, 1981). How could a conscientious teacher, in a position to take a party of pupils to such an exhibition, fail to do so? And how could such a teacher compete with the sheer weight of research and facilities open to the Museum staff? This may well be an untypical example of a special exhibition, but even in the case of more modest shows the hard-pressed teacher is offered an irresistible, ready-made and smartly packaged teaching aid which must inevitably help to shape the pupils' view of 'art'.

9.45 Radio and Television

A similar point may be made in respect of radio and television programmes about art. Some of these may be specially prepared for schools and colleges (the Open University has a series of such programmes to accompany its Foundation and Arts courses). Most schools and colleges have audio- and videotape recording facilities these days, making it possible for the teacher to include recordings as complete, well-presented packages on this or that aspect of art in his courses. It may well be argued here, and in the case of exhibitions, that teachers do not necessarily adopt the language used and the line taken by museum staff and producers in the media. This is true, but it does not alter the fact that the initiative rests with such 'establishment' figures who mediate to a great extent the public view of art. Thus, even if a particular teacher does swim against the tide, the direction in which he swims is still dictated by the published views of the 'establishment', and it is still the case that the teacher is a means by which pupils are made aware of these views.

9.46 Commercial Catalogues

The last possibility in this category which I can think of is not immediately obvious as a prepared teaching aid; it is the catalogue of equipment and materials sent to schools by commercial concerns to try to interest art teachers in ordering their products. Of recent years these catalogues have been produced and presented less as lists of items, the purpose and value of which the teacher is assumed to understand

already, but as 'handbooks' which not only describe the products available, but also suggest how they may be put to use in class. Take, for example, the suggestion for 'lost clay' modelling in the Berol 1979 catalogue. It begins: 'The inherent strength and flexibility of dried Marvin Medium are the keys to this ... method. Model clay to the required shape. Mix Marvin with water ... ', and so on. The technique described depends directly upon the qualities of the product which the company is trying to sell, and the implication is that, if he wishes to benefit from this useful suggestion, the teacher must order the product. It is in this way that catalogues such as that of Berol may be construed as verbal instruments which effect the production and consumption of art in schools, and which maintain communications throughout the art educational community.

9.5 The Press

'Serious' newspapers such as The Times, The Sunday Times, The Observer, and The Guardian regularly report and comment on the visual arts, and practically every other newspaper from time to time includes items on art, particularly on its more sensational aspects such as the purchase of Carl Andre's 'bricks' and Ian Hamilton Finlay's Starlit Waters by the Tate, or the Prostitution exhibition at the I.C.A. in the mid 1970's. Such items capture the interest of the public and the art teacher inevitably finds himself having to defend controversial artists and their work to maintain the integrity of the artistic community, or joining the general public in its condemnation of these apparently 'aberrant' practices. Either way he must take up a position in respect of the values and attitudes of the Press, which may well affect his teaching. The more 'routine' approach to art taken by such papers as The Guardian may also have an effect on the teacher inasmuch as it keeps him in touch with the art scene as it is represented by the galleries and the world of book publishing.

Probably the most effective way in which the popular Press impinges upon the work of the art teacher is through the colour supplements which find in the visual arts a most suitable source of material. Piles of colour supplements are an almost indispensable feature of every artroom, supplying not only a store of graphic material for use in practical

projects, but also packages of copy presented in quantities easily digested in one sitting and easily transformed into teaching material.

The Press also provides specialist magazines on art which, again, may influence the teacher if he finds time to read them. In a comparatively recent survey of art magazines (Cork, 1976) there are 115 such magazines listed, 12 of which are British. These range from the more conservative ones such as The Artist, Art and Artists, and the Arts Review, through Art Monthly, Artifact, Artscribe, and Studio International, to the more radical Art Language, Control, Extremes, and One. Most school and college libraries take one or more of these as a regular order, and it is not difficult to get hold of international art magazines, particularly those from the U.S.A. such as Artforum.

Besides these the art teacher is also likely to come into contact with publications and journals aimed at his profession. These might include anything from the odd article or the 'Extra' devoted to art education in The Times Educational Supplement, to Athene, the official journal of the 'Society for Education through Art'. The National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education circulates a journal among its members and sometimes this contains material related to art education. There are also somewhat 'heavier' academic journals which may find their way into college libraries, such as the Cambridge Journal of Education which, again, may sometimes include relevant material, and there are journals of a similar 'weight' from the States, such as Studies in Art Education and The Journal of Aesthetic Education which may be obtained quite readily if the teacher seeks to read them, and which devote themselves to art educational matters.

9.6 Research Reports and Philosophical Publications

This category includes written and printed material of a lengthier and more involved nature requiring a sustained effort on the part of the teacher to get anything from it. It might include, for example, the Schools Council's curriculum study on Arts and the Adolescent (Ross, 1975) and the books associated with it (i.e. Witkin, 1974; Ross, 1978).

9.7 Conferences and In-Service Training Courses

Courses and conferences are predominantly verbal occasions when ideas are discussed and disseminated mainly through speech. Very often, however, printed material is published following such occasions, so that the verbally framed thought and knowledge generated may be spread more effectively beyond those actually present. The 'Cockpit Arts Workshop' in London holds regular conferences on art educational issues, as does the 'Curriculum Centre for the History of Art and Design' at Middlesex Polytechnic. A particularly topical two-day conference - the 'National Conference for Art and Design through Education (November, 1981)' - was held recently at Imperial College, London, to consider the effects of Government policy on art education. The point of the conference was to meet the threat to art education posed by cuts in public spending, and it began by considering rationales which might cut some ice in a climate of apparent political indifference to art which is not immediately associated with industry in the public imagination, or with economic necessity. For example, James Pilditch, Chairman of 'Allied International Designers', delivered a paper on 'The Economic Case for Design' in which he said that good design is necessary if British products are to be competitive, and much emphasis was put in the conference on the importance of links between industry and art education represented to a great extent by part-time teachers involved in both fields. The conference closed with plans for future operations involving more and more teachers to carry 'the word', so to speak, to a broader section of the art educational community. That 'word', if it is effective, will influence the conception and practice of art in the schools and colleges, and it speaks, not for the first time in the last century and a half, of making art more accessible to industry and more useful in society.

9.8 Government Policies and Reports

Following from what has been said in the previous sub-section, it is clear that Government policies have a general effect upon the production and consumption of art and upon art education. But the Government also issues reports of direct relevance to art and art education, and these it publishes through Her Majesty's Stationery Office. It is doubtful

whether very many art teachers actually read complete reports as they are issued, but it is likely that most of the salient points reach large numbers of teachers, filtered through the popular press and specialist journals. Ashwin (1975) has extracted the relevant material from the most important reports and policy statements published by various Governments between 1768 and 1975, and he has collected them in a book which makes them more accessible to the teacher. The effects of most of these have already been felt in the profession, however, although those of the Gann Report (1974) are still very much in evidence in the Further and Higher sectors of art education with the introduction in 1980 of D.A.T.E.C. courses aimed at rationalising vocational training in art and design and making it more responsive to the needs of industry.

The effects of Government policies and reports are probably among the most fundamental upon the production and consumption of art in education. However, I have placed them at the end of the list because the lack of political consciousness among art teachers in general puts the reading of such material low on their list of priorities. The effects thus filter through to the teacher in his classroom indirectly in other forms which I have placed higher on the list.

9.9 Post-script

Each of the linguistic instruments, or sets of instruments, presented above contributes to the generalisation and the characterisation of thinking within the art educational community, and collectively they may be seen as the communication system which permeates and mediates the otherwise disparate collection of people and practices which constitutes the community and its work. I present them here as elements in the linguistic context of art education and as subjects for further study. To what extent, for example, do examination syllabuses actually influence what goes on in the art class? How much do art teachers make use of prepared teaching materials? How much influence is exerted on the thinking of the art teacher by the media? And how much of an effect do any of these have on the values, attitudes and beliefs acquired by the teacher in the process of his own training? Such questions need to be approached using a variety of research methods. Questionnaires alone

would be inadequate because we are dealing here not with overt theories so much as tacit codes of practice which operate in subtle and often unconscious ways. Teachers themselves may not be in the best position to tell the extent to which they are influenced by books, journals, etc., although they can tell us how often they read them, and which books and journals they read. Ultimately, however, we may discover how much, and in what ways, the linguistic context of art education affects the teaching of art only through prolonged and extensive observation of teachers in action, of the language they use, and of the conditions under which such language is modified and developed.

CHAPTER 10

THE VALUE OF STUDYING LANGUAGE IN ART EDUCATION

Research is a living relation between men ... Indeed, the sociologist and his 'object' form a couple, each one of which is to be interpreted by the other; the relationship between them must be interpreted as a moment of history (Sartre, 1963, 72).

10.1 Introduction

I began this work with the proposition that language plays an important part in art and art education. In Part One I showed that it does indeed fulfil a range of functions in the art world in general. In Part Two I revealed some of the ways in which art teachers may use language explicitly and implicitly to pass on concepts, values and attitudes to their pupils, which must have an effect on the way art is produced and consumed not only in the schools but thereafter as a result of schooling. So far in Part Three I have attempted to remove some of the obstacles obscuring the need for more intensive study of language in art education, and I have indicated something of the extent to which language bears upon what goes on in the classroom. In conclusion it remains only to distil from the mixture of social-phenomenology, linguistics, and art educational theory which has motivated and informed my research, a brief restatement and clarification of the theoretical premises for studying language in art education, and to give some idea as to how the empirical work which I have begun may be extended and developed.

10.2 A Theoretical Basis for Studying Language in Art Education

For the sake of clarity I shall present the following as a series of brief axiomatic statements gathered into short, related sequences.

10.21 The Symbolic Nature of Experience

Behaviour is a function of experience.

Individual experience is not given, it is actively or 'intentionally' constituted.

Experience is created by means of symbols; knowledge, thought, perception, and even feeling are effected through the continuous use of diverse symbols.

Language (i.e. the use of verbal symbols) is thus more than a means whereby thought and feeling are communicated; it is the medium in and through which thought and feeling are made possible.

Similarly, visual perception is not a simple registering of sights from the 'real' world, it is the active constitution of a visible world in and through visual symbols.

While the capacity for symbolic thought and feeling must be innate, particular symbols are culturally received; they are absorbed and re-created through the processes of education in the broadest sense.

Insofar as particular symbols are learned from the culture and the social group into which one is born, they represent a means whereby the culture and the group may influence individual experience and behaviour; in learning to use and adapt the symbols one inherits, one becomes a member of this or that community.

Symbols carry within them a dense cargo of attitudes, values, beliefs, interpretations, assumptions, ways of feeling, conceiving and perceiving; in other words, symbols embody ideologies.

Experience is holistic and integrated; it is misleading, therefore, to make too sharp a distinction between visual and verbal symbolic modes of experience. The visual and the verbal are mutually constitutive and mutually effective: vision is conditioned by verbally mediated concepts which are themselves grounded in the visual. Insofar as it is possible, then, to distinguish between them for theoretical purposes, they must be seen to be dialectically entwined.

10.22 The Symbolic Nature of Art

Relating the above to art, one may infer that artistic behaviour or production is a function of artistic experience. Artistic experience is not 'naturally' given, it is actively created in and through symbols received initially from the culture and from one's social group. These symbols embody certain attitudes, values, beliefs, interpretations, assumptions, ways of feeling, conceiving and perceiving. Thus, artistic production and consumption necessarily embody an ideology or ideologies received, in the first place, from the culture or sub-culture into which one is born and, later, from the culture or sub-culture to which one chooses or is taught to belong. Such an ideology may be conveniently described as a 'visual ideology' in art which is popularly known as 'visual' art. But this label should not obscure the fact that the symbolic fabric in and through which such art is produced and consumed is an indissoluble and interdependent mix of the visual and the verbal.

A distinction should be made between 'art' and the 'aesthetic'. The 'aesthetic' refers to those supposedly physiological or psychological or spiritual processes which are persistently attributed to 'art' but which, in effect, are not properties of 'art' but of human beings. 'Art' is not a necessary condition for 'aesthetic' experience any more than 'art' is necessarily 'aesthetic'. The 'aesthetic' may be pursued beyond the particular historical- and cultural-specific parameters of art.

If artistic experience and behaviour depend upon a grasp of, and the use of, particular symbols, it is not possible even to conceive of art without bringing into operation a whole set of assumptions, values, attitudes, ways of seeing, feeling, etc. This means that in trying to influence his pupils' knowledge and experience of art, the teacher is in effect attempting to impose his own visual ideologies, and those of the artistic community to which he belongs, upon them. This is not to imply any sinister motive on the part of the teacher or the education system. The art teacher is necessarily a mediator or arbiter of visual ideologies, and this underlies all other aspects of his work.

It may be argued that some art teachers do not set themselves up as 'transmitters' of artistic knowledge and skills, but as disinterested

'catalysts' who facilitate their pupils' artistic discoveries. But such an approach to art teaching is itself based upon particular notions of art and education which, in turn, are underscored by a particular ideology which is passed on subliminally to the pupils through the teaching method.

10.23 The Study of Language in Art Education

If visual ideologies are an indissoluble mix of the visual and the verbal, then it is essential to study the role of language in art education. The main purposes of such a study would be to discover the ideological basis of art education as it is practised in the schools, and to explicate the ways in which visual ideologies are communicated. That is to say, its purposes would be to discover what counts as valid art educational knowledge in the schools and colleges, and to reveal the linguistic strategies by which this knowledge is conveyed.

Discovering what counts as valid art educational knowledge is more complicated than simply asking teachers or looking at art and art educational theories. There are many factors governing validity, many of which are institutional and expedient, and it is no more possible to discover what passes for valid art educational knowledge through what is openly said and written than it is to reveal moral codes by referring to the overt laws of the land.

10.3 Purpose and Method

Stubbs says that 'there is no reason why educationists should be interested in classroom language for its own sake', and he adds that, if it is to have any value, the study of language in education must be sensitive to educationally relevant issues (Stubbs, 1976, 93). I would endorse this, and I accept that work on language in art education must progress beyond essentially descriptive and reflective exercises, such as that presented in Part Two, to make some positive contribution to the art educational scene. In this final section of my thesis I shall

address myself to this issue and suggest a way in which the empirical work I have begun may be extended and developed to good effect..

In its original form Eisner's method, which I have adopted and adapted, is conceived as something more than a vehicle for the views of this or that 'connoisseur'. It is intended as a method for revealing and generalising good qualities and practices in art education, thereby enhancing or improving the educational artistry of the profession (see Eisner, 1976). Eisner does not go into the criteria by which the researcher/critic recognises what is good in the situations he observes, other than to say that the 'leading ideas and values about what counts grow from tradition and habit as well as from implicit and explicit theories about the nature of artistic virtue' (1977, 349). It is assumed, therefore, that by dint of his position as a connoisseur the researcher will simply know when something he observes is good. In this Eisner's thinking is consistent with social phenomenology. In effect he is saying that art is not a universal given, or a natural force, but a social fact created, sustained and developed through the praxis of the artistic community. This means that there are no absolute values or criteria for judging the efficacy of art educational practices, and the values and criteria which are applied are generated by the ever-changing needs and aims of the art educational community relative to the material and ideological climate. Who better, therefore, to judge the value of particular art educational practices than an experienced member of the community who is in touch with the general feeling of his group? It is his position as a representative of the community which validates the researcher's criticisms and not access to supposedly 'objective' criteria.

But this is to assume that the art educational community is a single, unified body with a more or less general code of practice. It is not, of course; it is a complex and disparate group or sub-culture within society which may well adhere to certain very broad and fundamental beliefs and values (e.g. the belief that 'art' is a worthwhile pursuit) but, due to the varying conditions under which its members train, live and work, also represents a diversity of approaches, emphases, preferences, criteria, and so on. Given this complexity and diversity it is unlikely that any particular member, no matter how much of a 'connoisseur', will be able to represent the whole gamut. On the contrary, it is more

likely that his evaluations will be partial and partisan, governed by the priorities and interests of his own particular sub-group within the community.

This is where Eisner's thinking departs from that of the social phenomenologist. Whereas Eisner sees some practical value in the criticisms of the connoisseur, the phenomenologist would see these criticisms as problematic since they are themselves part of the art educational scene to which they refer. No matter how consistent or adequate the researcher's evaluation's might be in relation to his descriptions and interpretations, they are nonetheless relative and open to contradiction by other 'connoisseurs' with differing ideologies. For example, from my description and interpretation of Tony's teaching style in Chapter 6, it is apparent that he is what Barnes (1973, 14-17) would call a 'transmission' teacher. One gets the impression that Barnes, as an educational connoisseur himself, disapproves somewhat of this kind of teaching and that, were he to turn his attention to art education which, according to its own folklore is concerned with self-expression and individuality, he might feel the 'transmission' style of teaching to be completely inappropriate. However, if one takes the view that art education, even in its most free and unstructured form, inevitably or necessarily communicates the artistic values, attitudes and beliefs of the teacher to his pupils, then one might value the 'transmission' style of teaching more highly as an honest attempt on the part of the teacher to control what his pupils learn about art, and through art.

I suspect that the possibility of contradictory evaluations by different connoisseurs of the same phenomena would not worry Eisner any more than it would worry him that art critics in general assume differing theoretical and ideological positions and come to different conclusions about the art and the artists of which they write. But I must admit that I found it difficult in the empirical work reported in Part Two to reconcile the supposed need for evaluation, as a distinct stage in the method, with the social-phenomenological position which I adopted at the outset. This is why I was obliged to adapt the method in the way I did, playing down the evaluative function. It would have been inconsistent to say, as a social-phenomenologist, that all schools of art educational thought, with their associated criteria for judgement, must be treated as problematic, and then to adopt this or that theoretical position in order to evaluate the performances of the teachers I observed.

This is not to suggest, however, that criticism does not have the practical value attributed to it by Eisner; only that some work needs to be done on the method in order to resolve the apparent conflict between this practical or projective element and the more reflective phenomenological approach. This may be achieved, I believe, by delving a little deeper into social- or existential-phenomenology, and in particular into the view that sociology and the social sciences in general should be approached not in the spirit of natural science but as 'dialectical' science (see, for example, Sartre, 1963; Bosserman, 1968; and Esterson, 1970).

The main difference between natural scientific enquiry and dialectical science revolves around the role of the researcher. In its original form Eisner's method casts the observer/critic as one who observes, records, analyses and pronounces from an informed yet nonetheless external position relative to the situation he is criticising. This is consistent with the natural scientific model in which the researcher is assumed to be an objective observer of rule-governed events in an independent 'natural' world. Dialectical science, however, assumes that the researcher, as a person observing and responding to the behaviour of other persons, is necessarily and inextricably bound up in the situation he is studying. As Sartre puts it, research in the social sciences is necessarily 'a living relation between men ... Indeed, the (researcher) and his "object" form a couple, each one of which is to be interpreted by the other; the relationship between them must be itself interpreted as a moment of history' (Satre, 1963, 72). The researcher inevitably brings with him certain preconceptions, prejudices, ideological and theoretical preferences, and so on, which predispose him to interpret, or in Sartre's terms to 'totalise', what he sees in particular ways. For example, in my own case, I approached the empirical study reported in Part Two predisposed to respond to certain characteristics of the language used in the lessons, and to respond to these in ways prepared by my review of the relevant literature. Dialectical science accepts this as inevitable in sociological enquiry, and it incorporates it as a positive element in its method. Indeed, it accepts it as a central methodological necessity, and it positively encourages the researcher to see himself very much as an active constituent of the situation under observation. Craib puts it this way:

A totalising sociology must aim at the freedom of both the sociologist and those he studies. It entails that the sociologist enters into a relationship of reciprocity with those he studies. If the reciprocity is positive, then it must entail what in conventional terms is called a 'commitment' to those studied; he must make their ends his ends in the process of pursuing his own ends and let himself be used as a means to their ends (Craib, 1976, 224).

Whereas the culmination of Eisner's method could be the 'definitive' pronouncement of the critic, the dialectical approach sees this as only the first step in a continuing process. Dialectical science holds that the researcher, as a kind of third party, will inevitably interpret a situation in a way different from that of the original participants, at least to some extent; but this does not mean, necessarily, that the researcher's view is any more objective. The value of the dialectical approach does not lie, therefore, in what is revealed unilaterally by the researcher, but in the creative dialogue which might ensue due to the presence of the researcher. The latter helps the participants to see themselves and their actions in a new light, and the reactions of the participants to his views helps the researcher to grasp what is going on at a deeper, more comprehensive level.

Different though it may be in spirit from Eisner's method, the dialectical approach is, nonetheless, compatible with it. The method may be modified and extended to include an element of dialogue between the critic and those he observes. This would in effect replace the third phase of the method, that of 'evaluation', bearing in mind that an element of evaluation would remain in the very acts of describing and interpreting which cannot be regarded as purely objective. Instead of the researcher's formal evaluation, then, the teacher or teachers whose lessons had been described and interpreted would be invited formally to respond by reviewing the 'performance' of the critic/researcher and by providing an insider's perspective on the situation. This might be effected in various ways: having been presented with the researcher's report teachers might prepare their own written responses, or they might be encouraged to express their feelings in tape-recorded interviews, or whatever. Either way, the process would culminate in a synthesis or a resolution of the conflicting interpretations of the observer and the observed in a document produced by the researcher. The value of this document would lie in its being a broader and if anything more objective 'evaluation' of the educational phenomena under scrutiny than that of

the researcher alone, and food for thought for those involved and other interested parties.

The modified method would thus have three dimensions instead of two. These would be 'connoisseurship', 'criticism', and 'collaboration', and it would proceed in a dialectical movement involving a series of stages or phases. The first phase would involve the intervention of the researcher as observer and recorder, and it would result in the written description and interpretation of the practices encountered. The second phase would involve those observed and it would result in the expression of their views recorded in an appropriate form. The third and final phase would involve the researcher alone in collating and resolving the material gathered, and in producing an enhanced and predominantly evaluative perspective on the events and behaviours observed. The process has no natural conclusion since the researcher's syntheses might be returned to the teachers, and their responses returned to the researcher ad infinitum. However, it is difficult to see what might be gained by extending it indefinitely since it is in the initial impact of the clash of views that most of the beneficial and useful effects will emerge. Such effects might include modifications in the behaviour of the participants resulting from their altered or expanded views of what they are doing. They might also include a deeper understanding on the part of the researcher than might be achieved by simply applying his own preconceptions to what he is observing, and one would expect him to share this by publishing the results, and build upon it in further work.

In its modified form the method is still broad and naturalistic as Eisner would wish, and generally applicable to the study of educational practices across the curriculum. It is necessary, however, that the connoisseur/critic/researcher should make some effort to understand and to explicate his theoretical and ideological presuppositions at the outset rather than to assume naively that he is observing objectively what is going on. He need not differ in status from the teachers he is observing, but he should bring some kind of specialist knowledge to bear, over and above the commonsense knowledge he shares with those he is studying. This need not exclude the possibility that colleagues might sit in as connoisseurs on each other's lessons, and enter into a critical dialogue to develop their thinking on a departmental, or even an interdepartmental basis.

But within a department or faculty it would be useful if prospective 'critics' could be encouraged to pursue individual and specialised courses of study, the fruits of which might be shared with colleagues through the application of new concepts to familiar situations. Inter-departmental exercises of this nature might be particularly useful inasmuch as concepts and values common to one area of the curriculum would come into sharp and effective contact with those of other areas, thereby expanding the experiences of all concerned.

While such exercises need not be restricted to the study of language use, it strikes me that this is a most appropriate starting point since language does pervade the whole of school life and it represents the most common factor throughout the curriculum. The purpose of such work, to echo Barnes (1969, 75), 'would be frankly pedagogical', and quite other than that of conventional theoretical linguistics. 'Teachers would gain from a more sophisticated insight into the implications of their own use of language, and into the part that language can at best play in their pupils' learning' (ibid.). This, of course, has been well understood for some time in most areas of the curriculum other than art, and it is high time that art teachers began to understand the implications of language use in their own area instead of hanging on blindly to the unfounded view that visual art is beyond the realm of words.

APPENDIXFEASIBILITY STUDYAUTUMN 19781. Presuppositions

When I set up the feasibility study in the summer of 1978, my thinking was still very rudimentary. I was convinced that the role of language in art education had been underestimated, and that this was due to mystification brought about by a dubious, yet generally accepted distinction between the 'verbal' and the 'visual'. I was under way with my review of the literature in which I was trying to show theoretically that this distinction is misleading if accepted without qualification. But I had very few ideas on how to commence empirical study of the role of language in the art class. I needed a model, therefore, and I came up with Barnes's (1969) study of 'Language in the Secondary Classroom: a study of language interaction in twelve lessons in the first term of secondary education'.

Barnes describes his study as 'a preliminary investigation of the interaction between the linguistic expectations (drawn from home and primary school experience) brought by pupils to their secondary schools, and the linguistic demands set up (implicitly or explicitly) by the teachers in the classrooms'. And his purpose in setting up the project was to explore the notion that 'extraneous barriers (are) introduced into children's learning (a) by linguistic forms whose function (is) social rather than intrinsic to the material and processes being learnt, and (b) by unfamiliar socio-linguistic demands and constraints arising in the control systems of the secondary classroom'. These demands, barriers and restraints, Barnes divides generally under two headings: the 'register of secondary education', or the linguistic conventions of the secondary school; and individual 'subject registers', or the technical and academic conventions of each discipline.

The twelve lessons observed, recorded and analysed by Barnes and his students did not include an art lesson (which helped to confirm me in

my view that art is tacitly omitted from such studies because it is thought to be 'visual' and hence beyond the scope of things verbal). But it seemed to me, as I planned my approach, that the register of secondary education invades the art class as much as any other class in the school, and art definitely has its own subject register. There was no real reason, therefore, why I should not adopt something of Barnes's approach, at least until my own ideas began to gather momentum.

I had some reservations, however; I was not sure that I agreed with Barnes that the registers necessarily represent barriers to learning, or that the material and processes being learned may be distinguished quite so sharply from social considerations. I inclined more to the view that forms of knowledge originate in, and are sustained by, particular language uses which are, to a great extent, socially mediated. That is, to be a scientist, or an historian, or a geographer, or yet an artist, is to be initiated successfully into the particular language conventions of those disciplines. My aim, then, was different from Barnes's. He was concerned to show up the contradictions between subject content and the linguistic demands of the teacher in order to cast doubt on the efficacy of teacher language in helping pupils to grasp this or that subject. If I wished to show up contradictions, it was with a view to discovering 'art' as it is created in and through the language of the art class. The contradictions I sought would be between pupil expectations and the linguistic demands of the teacher.

But apart from these reservations, I felt that Barnes's basic idea that children embarking on a secondary school course must come to grips with particular subject-related language uses was a useful one, and I could see that these subject registers are best observed in the classes of first-formers in their first term where they fall most sharply into relief against the contradictory linguistic expectations of the newcomers.

On the strength of this, then, I resolved to carry out a pilot study, based on Barnes's model in which I would record and analyse some lessons in first-term art classes at a convenient and accommodating secondary school.

2. Purposes of the Study

My original intention in setting up the pilot study was to complement the theoretical approach I had taken in my review of the literature and to ensure that my developing thoughts remained grounded in classroom practice. I also felt that just being able to observe classes would invite possibilities which might not have presented themselves through a theoretical approach alone.

As the study began, however, I found that I should also need to consider the technical difficulties that a full-blown study of classroom language might present and to give some thought to the relative values of different research instruments for art-room studies.

As time went on I came to use the study mainly as a focus for my thinking about further, more systematic exploration of the relations between the verbal and the visual in art education.

3. Method

The method was that of participant observation, supplemented by audiotape recording. I also recorded an interview with the teachers involved. I approached the body of information thus collected with various treatments borrowed from the literature on language in education. At first I intended to do this systematically. But as time went on I found it more productive to take a more spontaneous approach.

4. The School and the Teachers Observed

The school was a six-form entry, mixed comprehensive catering for 900 pupils aged 11-16. It was opened in September 1977 following a local authority educational reorganisation, when it replaced two other comprehensive schools in the Borough.

I observed the classes of two art teachers. The one, whom I shall refer to as Tom, I knew well because I had worked with him for several years before the reorganisation. The other was his new Head of Department.

She will be referred to as Helen. . Tom was in his fifth year of teaching. He was art college trained with a post-graduate teaching certificate. Helen was teacher-trained with eight or nine years teaching experience (including time off for in-service training).

Tom and Helen worked in adjacent classrooms in a new, purpose-built art block. Their rooms were light and spacious and throughout my study the layout of furniture in both rooms remained the same. In Helen's room individual work tables were arranged on three sides of a rectangle with the teacher's desk and the blackboard on the fourth side. Her classes, therefore, focused on the teacher whether she was sitting at her desk or whether she was wandering around the outside of the rectangle attending to individual pupils. In Tom's room, however, pupils sat in groups around tables pushed together to make larger working surfaces.

It is interesting to note that the formal teacher/pupil relation implied by Helen's seating plan, and the informal relation implied by Tom's plan, contradicted to a noticeable extent the respective, effective relations between the teachers and their classes. Whereas Helen's classes were organised ostensibly as complete units concentrated or focused on the teacher and Tom's were broken down into work-centred groups arbitrarily arranged in relation to the teacher's desk and the blackboard, Helen tended to address the whole class less than Tom. She seemed to prefer to talk to her pupils individually and, apart from the beginning and end of her lessons when she needed to supervise the distribution of work and materials and the clearing away, she spent most of her time wandering around the rectangle speaking softly to each pupil in turn. Tom also spent time wandering between the grouped tables and talking to his pupils individually or in two's and three's. But he tended to address his classes openly much more than Helen, from wherever he happened to be when a thought struck him. He also tended to lecture to his classes and to use the blackboard more than Helen.

Helen very rarely needed to raise her voice. Mostly she spoke gently, yet with authority, and even a touch of admonishment. Her classes were quiet and well-disciplined and, on the whole, her pupils concentrated on the work set. Tom was also very much in control of his classes but in a more relaxed way. In his room pupils talked freely amongst themselves and there was much more general noise. The talk was not always

directly related to the work in hand. Occasionally Tom had to call the class to order, either to ask for less chatter or to discuss a new idea. Both teachers commanded respect, but in different ways: Helen gently, but with the power of her institutional authority and Tom through the force of his personality and occasional use of good humoured sarcasm.

5. Findings

I visited the school on four occasions during the Autumn term, 1978. On the 13 September I spent most of the morning considering the technical difficulties involved in recording art-room talk. I returned on the 20 September to record a complete lesson with Tom and on the 4 October I recorded an interview with both teachers, ostensibly to use as background for my analyses of the lessons observed. Finally I taped a complete lesson with Helen on the 5 October.

5.1 First Visit

This was spent mainly on practical and technical matters. I experimented with my tape-recorders and made trial recordings to discover which would be the best ways to use them in the particular circumstances. I talked with Tom and Helen and we projected three modes of language use in the art class which we would need to find ways of recording. These were: a) lecturing or instructing, b) discussion involving the whole class, and c) talk between the teacher and individual pupils. We established that recording in the lecturing mode would simply require a microphone and recorder set up at the front of the class where the teachers believed they usually stood when they addressed the class. We also established that recording talk between the teacher and individual pupils could be achieved satisfactorily if the teacher carried a cassette recorder on a shoulder strap, with a neck mic. The main problem, we agreed, would be recording discussion involving the whole class. There was no doubt that the equipment I had was inadequate for this purpose.

This restriction led me to question the purpose of recording in detail the pupils' verbal responses to the teacher. If it was simply to examine how concepts are transmitted and formed in classroom discussion,

this has already been done by Barnes (1969) and others in subjects other than art and there is no reason to believe that their findings do not apply equally to discussion in art lessons. If it was a matter of studying the concepts which the teacher, as a cultural and social instrument, was trying to pass on, implicitly or explicitly, to his pupils, this could be done by analysing the teacher's language alone. And if it was a matter of studying how verbally mediated concepts affect the visual production of the pupils, this would require an analysis of the qualities in the pupils' work relative mainly to the teacher's words. The only purpose I could see in recording the pupil's language, at this time, in classroom discussion, would be to examine their explicit powers of understanding and appreciation (what Smith, 1961, calls their 'critical judgement'), and this could be done much more specifically and successfully by other means (e.g. see Wilson, 1970). I decided, under the circumstances, that I should concentrate my recording resources on the teacher and to make written notes of exchanges which seemed important at the time and which I was unable to get on tape.

Speaking with hindsight, it is possible to say that the problem of recording whole-class discussion turned out to be a minor one. For neither teacher tended to use this method very much. Most of the time they either instructed the whole class in what was to be done, or they talked with individuals or small groups of pupils about their particular pieces of work. This leads me to wonder how typical this is of practical art teaching and, if open discussion is not common, what effect does this have on the acquisition of art concepts by the pupils? It strikes me that implicit in the almost exclusive use of general instruction and individual attention is a concept of art as a personal response to a universal or given set of restraints. If this is the case (and much of what was to follow seemed to bear me out on this), then the key to art as a cultural and social invention must lie in the supposed universals and restraints in and around which the art teacher organises his or her material.

Before moving on to the second visit, I should just mention some questions which struck me while I was observing the classes of Tom and Helen on that first occasion.

a) If the art teacher prefers to treat pupils individually, what effect

does class size have on language use in art lessons?

- b) What effect does the particular task have on language use in art lessons? For example, what differences are there in the language used to teach a craft like pottery and, say, pictorial composition which is much less tangible?
- c) What effect does the age-group of the pupils have on language use in art?
- d) What effect do organisation and control by means of language have on the transmission and acquisition of art concepts?

5.2 Second Visit

The following week, on 20 September, 1978, I made my first complete recording of a lesson, with Tom. The class was made up of twenty eleven-year-olds and the general subject of the lesson was 'colour'. It was the third lesson of the new term for this class and the third in a short course of lessons on colour. The first, I was told, had taken the form of a slide-lecture in the school's lecture theatre, when Tom and Helen had pooled their classes and Tom had lectured to them all. I asked the teachers about this lecture when I interviewed them on 4 October. I wanted to know what sort of things Tom had said. I was told that he had used an educational film-strip of about thirty frames, which covered the physical and optical aspects of light and colour. Tom had embroidered upon the notes supplied with the strip to make it more palatable to the pupils and some of the slides had encouraged viewer participation (e.g. the complex Ostwald and Munsell colour analysis models), but they believed that the exercise had been a good introduction to the problems of colour.

In the second lesson of the term the classes began preparing colour 'work-books'. These were made up of pages of cartridge paper stapled together and each page was to be devoted to an exercise related to colour theory.

In the third lesson, the one I was recording, the class had to continue working on the covers of their work-books, filling in their names, their

group code, the title of the project, etc., and they also had to continue working on a colour-wheel or circle which most of them had drawn in the previous lesson. Throughout the lesson Tom wore a neck mic. and carried a portable recorder. I supplemented this recording with one made on a larger machine with a centrally placed mic.

After the visit I transcribed the tapes, expanding the transcript with contextual information remembered or noted at the time. Then I began to reflect upon the ways in which Tom had used language in the lesson.

At about this time I was completing a section in my review of the literature on various approaches to language in education. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to try out some of these ideas on the transcript of Tom's lesson, as one might try on new clothes for size.

5.21 Coding

I began with the notion of 'coding' and I discovered on looking again at the notes I had taken for my review of the literature that B. Othanel Smith, a leading exponent of this approach, had himself attempted to apply the idea to art education. Smith (in Eisner and Ecker, 1966) asks 'what are some of the actions that a teacher uses language to perform?' And he finds that there are at least three sorts: 'logical actions, directive actions and admonitory actions'. Directive and admonitory actions are fairly simple categories, but that of logical actions is complex. Smith says that analysis of classroom behaviour has identified twelve types of logical action: defining, describing, designating, stating, reporting, substituting, valuating, opining, classifying, comparing and contrasting, conditional inferring and explaining.

Smith's findings are the result of observation and analysis of teaching in various school subjects, excluding art. But he claims that there is no reason to suppose that the categories and types of language use observed generally in teaching are not characteristic of art teaching too.

This proposition offered me my first possibility. I could code Tom's language under the categories of 'logical actions' (and its various types), 'directive actions', and 'admonitory actions', to see whether

all of these were represented as Smith suspects.

If I discovered that they were not, I could observe Tom's classes over a period of time to see if they cropped up, or I could observe the classes of more art teachers to see if, on average, they were typical or characteristic linguistic actions of art teachers.

If I discovered that they were, I could start thinking about the proportions of each sort of linguistic action during each lesson or over a period of time and compare the results with similar analyses of the teacher's language in other subjects. This would give me a quantitative comparison between linguistic actions in the art class and those in other subjects, which might show that there is very little difference between the subject areas, or that on average art teachers use more of a particular type of linguistic device than, say, teachers of physics do.

But what could I safely conclude from a study of the relative frequencies of types of linguistic action? What kind of connections could I reasonably make between such data and visual ideologies affecting the production and appreciation of art in the classroom?

Smith, as I have said, simply assumes that there is a similarity between the language acts of the art teacher and those of teachers of other subjects. What conclusions does he draw from this?

He is able to make a connection only between language use and appreciation. And in order even to do this, he has to severely restrict his definition of 'appreciation'. This he sees as equivalent to critical judgement (through which we 'recognise the worth of something') and not to be confused with 'enjoyment'. Thus distinguished, he says, 'appreciation has logical dimensions, whereas enjoyment is a psychological matter and has no logical aspects at all'.

Smith's conclusion is that if art teaching involves basically the same linguistic actions as other subjects, it is because 'teaching students how to handle questions of appreciation is not essentially different from teaching them how to deal with questions of valuation in any field of learning'. All that he is really able to say, then, is that language fulfils the same functions in art teaching as in the teaching of any

other subject, to the extent that art teaching is similar to the teaching of any other subject.

This, of course, is to say very little. It certainly says nothing of the particular or peculiar ways in which language mediates art education and it expressly avoids some of the more difficult and most interesting aspects. Smith simply adopts the popular view that these aspects have little or nothing to do with language.

Surely it cannot be all that controversial to suggest that the language of the art teacher must have an effect upon the pupil's enjoyment and practical participation in art. If this were not generally accepted albeit tacitly, then what are art teachers employed to do? Indeed, it would be ridiculous to maintain that the art teacher does not effect his teaching, as does any other teacher, mainly through the use of words. He uses language to define particular activities (e.g. drawing, painting, etc.), to describe and explain processes and techniques (e.g. collage, printing, etc.), to designate elements and features (e.g. line, tone, texture, structure, etc.), to compare and contrast the work of one pupil with that of another or with that of professional artists and designers and to achieve many other ends. All of these actions prescribe activities, processes, products, concepts, qualities and values which the teacher holds to be 'artistic'. His words, then, initiate activities in the classroom which the pupils identify with 'art', and so these words must affect the pupil's 'psychological' disposition towards art and they must have an effect upon what the pupil actually does, and expects to see, under the label of 'art'.

Having established this, however, the questions remain: what kinds of effect can the teacher's words have on the artistic experience of his pupils and on the work produced and how are they achieved? Is the process indeed reducible to the relative frequencies of certain types of linguistic action? Is it possible to make connections between quantitative data such as this and the qualitative effects of language use on artistic production?

Reviewing the transcript of Tom's lesson, the answer to this last question has to be that, to some extent, there must be a connection between the frequency of certain language actions and qualities in the work produced.

For example, Tom's relatively frequent use of evaluative forms such as 'nice and big' or 'nice and careful' must, over a period of time, influence the pupil's general approach. For the frequency with which the teacher uses this or that evaluation indicates something of the importance he attaches to the values expressed.

At this point in my thinking, having reached the conclusion that coding could possibly be useful in discovering how art concepts are transmitted through the language of the teacher, I decided to suspend the idea for the time being in order to explore other possibilities.

5.22 Structural Analysis

Next I looked at the idea of structural analysis, following the examples of Bellack et al (1966), and Sinclair and Coulthard (1974). My first thoughts on this possibility were that if I could establish that Tom's teaching did indeed exhibit the characteristic pedagogical language games identified by Bellack, or the IRF pattern identified by Sinclair and Coulthard, this would only point to a similarity between art teaching and the teaching of other subjects. It would probably point to similarities occasioned again by the common scholastic environment and not necessarily by any peculiar relation between the verbal and the visual in art. I felt that it would be better, therefore, to look at the transcript of Tom's lesson with an open mind, initially, and to see if any structural patterns presented themselves.

And indeed they did. Or, rather, one very clear pattern emerged involving three or four stages which repeat themselves in sequence. The sequence begins when Tom demands the attention of the whole class. At such times he may call out any one of the following: 'Right', 'Now', 'Ok' , or 'Alright'. In themselves these words have no logical place in Tom's opening sentences. Take the sentence, 'Now, you've got as far as putting your name on'. Here, Tom's 'now' is not grammatically necessary, but Tom and his pupils understand it to mean 'Be quiet and listen to me'. It is, therefore, a contextual rather than a logical necessity. Indeed, very often the whole of the opening sentence may be taken to mean simply, 'I want to be heard now', or 'I'm ready to go on to the next activity', no matter what its literal meaning might be. In the example

above it was not really necessary to inform the pupils that they had put their names on their books. They must have known what they had done. But it was necessary to formally close that part of the programme before moving on to the next part. This stage in the sequence may best be described, therefore, as an establishing move since the teacher uses it to establish contact with the class as a whole, and it signals or establishes the teacher's readiness to proceed.

The next stage, after Tom has gained the attention of the class, is to deliver his instructions. If he feels that these are quite complicated, or that he may not be expressing himself well, or that the class is not paying attention, he may pick on one of the pupils as a kind of representative, to make sure that he or she understands. Take this example early in the lesson when Tom is explaining how he wants the words to be filled-in between the lines drawn on the covers of the work-books: 'So before you start, make sure that you can get all the word on that line. I don't want ...' At this point he breaks off to say 'Xy? Yes?' By which he means, 'Xy, are you sure you understand, because you don't appear to be listening very carefully?' This concentration on one member of the class (more often than not Xy) serves not only to regain that member's attention, but also to sharpen that of the remainder of the class who realise that any one of them might be singled out next if they aren't attentive. The second stage in the sequence may be described, then, as an instructing move with subsidiary moves. The latter may be seen as confirming moves since they simultaneously confirm that the class is keeping up with the instructions, and that the teacher is in control of the proceedings.

In the third stage Tom allows his pupils to get on with their work while he wanders around the room ensuring that his instructions are being followed. He talks to individual pupils as he goes, commenting on their work, approving their efforts or putting them right. For example: 'That's good. I like that writing, Sophie. Very nice. That's O.K. Kevin. That's nice, Alice. Make sure it goes right to the top Charlene, yes? Just about, eh, Paul? Just about, yes? The letters have got just a little bit thinner towards the end there'. As such language acts are made in order to ensure that the pupils follow instructions (even when the instruction might be to invent something), they may be described as regulatory moves.

If Tom finds that, on the whole, everyone has understood what he wants done, he continues to supervise the work on an individual basis until he feels everyone is ready to proceed to the next instruction. Then the sequence begins again with an establishing move. For example; 'Right, have you all done that? Now, what I want you to do is ... '.


But if, on his travels, Tom is asked a question, the answer to which he feels to be of general interest, he calls for the attention of the whole class and makes a statement which may be seen as supplementary to his earlier instruction. For example, at one point in the lesson a pupil asks Tom, 'Are we supposed to colour these as well?' (referring to the words and numbers on the cover of his workbook). Tom begins to answer the question, 'Yes, you can colour ...'. But he pauses at this point and raises his voice for everyone to hear, '... obviously colour your name as well, please. And colour the word "colour". It doesn't have to be just one colour, it can be lots of different colours. It could be dotted; it could be striped. I think we might be even having a competition to see who's done the best in the two groups - the best cover and the neatest book, right at the end of term. So make sure you take your time on this.'

Here is a typical case where verbal feedback from a pupil indicates to Tom where his instructions might have been unclear, so he feels the need to reiterate his intentions to the whole class. It is also a case where he supplements his original instruction with another idea to emphasize the importance of the instruction (i.e. the idea of a competition).

Something which doesn't come out in the transcript, but which is apparent to an observer, is that this feedback element need not come only from the pupils' questions, but also from their practical responses to Tom's instructions; that is, from their work. This accounts, in the passage quoted above, for Tom's wandering from the point about having to colour-in the words, to that of neatness. Since he has the attention of the class to make the first point, he takes the opportunity to make the second which is on his mind as a result of viewing the work in progress.

These supplementary moves need to be preceded by an establishing move to gain the attention of the class. And they are followed by a continuance of the regulatory moves which they interrupt. But the sequence differs from the establishing, instructing, regulating sequence as I have already described it. The supplementary moves do not fulfil the same function as the ordinary instructing moves. They do not mark a progression to a new phase in the teacher's programme. Rather, they refer back to an instruction already given.

A structural analysis of Tom's teaching thus produces a recurring pattern of moves which may be presented schematically as follows:



Having identified this, I had to ask myself, again, what possibilities would this kind of analysis open up to me? I could, I speculated, observe the lessons of a larger sample of art teachers to discover whether this pattern is typical or characteristic of art teaching, or whether it is more or less peculiar to Tom. If I discovered that it was peculiar to Tom, then I would be unable to generalise from it. But if I discovered that it is typical, then I could try to establish links between what is produced in the name of art and the method of teaching which, as can be seen from the schema, is predominantly verbal (the only moments in the proceedings when visual elements come in to effect are during the instruction phase when visual aids might be used, and under 'feedback' in the regulatory phase).

This was as far as I got with my analysis of Tom's lesson before I returned to the school, as I had arranged, to interview the teachers

together on, among other things, their aims and objectives in conducting a short course on colour theory with first-formers.

5.3 Third Visit

The interview took place on the 4 october 1978. I prepared some questions beforehand, although I didn't intend to allow these to limit the discussion. They were as follows:

- a) What sort of things did you say in the introductory lecture on colour in the first lesson of the term?
- b) What are the aims and objectives of this short course on colour?
- c) How does this short course contribute to the pupil's performance in, and understanding of, art?
- d) What do you understand by 'art' and 'art education'?
- e) How do you evaluate pupil's work, and how do you gauge their progress in a short course such as this, and in general?
- f) What sort of balance do you aim for between class control, individual freedom, and the transmission of artistic concepts?
- g) Do you always talk so much in your lessons, or did you feel obliged to do so for my benefit?

Ostensibly these questions were intended to elicit background information for a better understanding of the lessons observed. But I also wanted to use the interview to test some general impressions I had formed while observing Tom's lesson and the general running of the department.

In Tom's lesson I had tried to assume the position of a naive observer wanting to discover what was going on. Such an observer would have known in advance (as do pupils new to secondary education) that this lesson was an 'art' lesson. He might expect, therefore, that everything

in the lesson, insofar as it came within the control of the teacher was intended to convey something about art, or to produce some kind of artistic experience, or to develop an artistic skill.

Looked at in this way, Tom's language might give the impression that there is artistic value in work which is neat and well-organised. There is artistic value in taking one's time and being careful. There is a proper way of doing things in art; there is no room for mistakes; freedom is allowed only within certain, prescribed limits. Also there is artistic value in working large. In general, art involves conforming to certain rules or conventions, but beyond these there is room for individual expression. To this extent one may differentiate between the work of different artists, and the suggestion of competition implies that individual contributions may vary in artistic value. Finally, one is behaving artistically if one is always seen to be working, and working quietly, in isolation.

A not so naive observer would recognise that many of these impressions are not intended as messages about art. They are related to general classroom control (the register of secondary education) and are therefore common to many if not all secondary school subjects. But a searching study of language in the art class must at least entertain the idea that style of teaching rubs off on the subject content of a lesson, and a pupil might decide perhaps that he likes or dislikes 'art' on the basis of his experience in the classes of a particular teacher with particular control priorities. In other words, methods of class control chosen by the teacher might, in themselves, define 'art' for a pupil, and thereafter condition his ability to participate in art.

Some writers (Jackson, 1968; Snyder, 1971) have used the term 'hidden curriculum' to mean the tacit values and attitudes concerning appropriate pupil behaviour which every pupil must learn if he is to be successful at school. These values concern what is appropriate educational knowledge, what are appropriate pupil responses to teachers' questions, and so on. They are rarely transmitted explicitly in the content of what teachers say. Many tacit messages are transmitted by the form and structure of teacher-pupil dialogue.

In setting up the interview with the two teachers under observation I

intended to elicit a clear account of the explicit content of their lessons to compare with my 'pupil's eye-view'. This would be a useful exercise, I felt, since it would throw into relief, in particular, the secondary register and the subject register of art teaching.

5.31 What sort of things did you say in the introductory lecture on colour in the first lesson of the term?

I have already given the answer to this question at the beginning of 5.2. Briefly again, Tom and Helen pooled their first-year classes and showed them a commercial film-strip on 'colour'. The strip dealt with the physical, psychological, and optical characteristics of colour, and the lecture also covered colour-mixing with dyes and pigments.

While Tom and Helen were recounting what they had talked about in the lecture, we all took it for granted (myself included) that colour theory, dealt with in this scientific way, is essential to art education. It is just one of those things that art teachers seem to assume. Yet writers such as Itten (1970) who have made a special study of colour theory in relation to art, and those such as de Saumarez (1964) who have contributed much to the development of Foundation studies in art and design, point out that colour theory of itself does not lead to the aesthetic use of colour. This requires, in Itten's terms, 'inspiration', or, in general terms, a sensitivity bred through practical involvement, enjoyment, and other, less tangible conditions. Colour perception, it is generally agreed, is subjective, and our responses to colour cannot be reduced to a set of rules. If it were the case that colour could be mastered by grasping a set of rules, if there were a right and a wrong way to use colour, then art history would not accept such a wide range of approaches to the use of colour. No rules of taste could take in the Neo-classical approach, say, and that of the Fauves. Why then do we assume that a quasi-objective look at 'the' characteristics of colour should be necessary in an art syllabus?

Of course it is helpful for pupils to know something about colour mixing for practical purposes, but do they really need to know about the physics of light, about optics and the physiology of seeing in their first term in the secondary school?

Tom and Helen admitted that they were obliged to go into areas of colour theory, such as the Munsell and Ostwald models, which they recognised to be over the heads of the youngsters. In using a commercial film-strip they were obliged to show everything that the makers included, although they were free to concentrate on those frames which were most useful and to glide over the more difficult ones. But what conditioned their choice to present such a lecture in the first place? Why did they feel it necessary to bundle together classes of first-year pupils, to fill a lecture theatre, and to bombard pupils in their very first art lesson with a body of knowledge of dubious artistic value?

It might be suggested that in order to show slides they had to use the lecture theatre because the facilities for projection were not available in the art-block. And they had to show slides because this was the most convenient way of illustrating a lecture before a large group. Not only this, but while they had the use of the lecture theatre it was more convenient to show the whole film-strip than to go trudging back and fore during the term to look at one or two slides as and when appropriate.

But this still does not answer the question of why it was necessary to take this rather pedantic approach. Albers (1963), another colour specialist, recommends a course of experiments in which the pupil is not told about colour, rather he discovers what he can do with it through practical involvement. Might this not have been a better approach to take with eleven-year-olds who are at an age when concrete experience is more useful than abstract or pre-packaged concepts?

The answer to this undoubtedly would be 'yes' if it was the teacher's only purpose to inform their pupils about colour by means of the lecture. It is my view, however, that this was not the only objective. I feel that the lecture was also a pedagogical device to establish a particular kind of teacher-pupil relationship at the very beginning of their secondary school careers, and an attempt to establish in the pupil's minds the view that 'art' as a school subject was not intended to be recreational. This feeling is given substance, to some extent, by things said in the remainder of the interview.

5.32 What are the aims and objectives of this short course on colour?

The teacher's reply to this question was that, ostensibly, each pupil should complete the course with a 'work-book' in which he or she had carried out certain exercises to do with colour, arising from the content of the slide lecture. The books were to open with an exercise to do with primary colours and the mixing of secondaries and tertiary colours (i.e. a colour-circle). This was to be followed by some work on 'advancing' and 'receding' colours. Next was to come a cut-paper exercise in which colours taken from magazines (specifically reds, yellows, greens and blues) were to be arranged in tonal strips, and this was to lead on to a more complicated procedure in which the pupils tried to match the tones of the colours in the prepared strips to the tones of a black and white photograph. The result of this would be, in Tom's words, 'a very, sort of, abstract picture, but using information picked up along the way in the booklet'.

Tom and Helen saw in this a development from 'a very rigid beginning' (Tom), to being something between 'a little bit more individual' (Tom) and 'a much more, sort of, free approach' (Tom again). They felt that apart from coming to know something about colour, this development from a strictly controlled to a less strictly controlled way of working had other advantages for the pupils. And here Helen said something that supports the view I put forward in 5.31. Tom began to say, in response to my query about the rather strict control I had observed in his lesson, that this was very deliberate, and Helen took over:

Well, the pattern of ... the way they work in the very first terms is important to the way they work ultimately throughout the school. So if you can get them into this routine of treating things properly and, obviously we are trying to teach them the best way to use the facilities available, then of course you've got them.

In other words, while the overt aim of the course was to transmit certain concepts to do with colour to the pupils, its underlying aim was to control the pupils' social behaviour and to get them to use the art-block facilities 'properly'. By 'properly' Helen meant the economic use of paint, the cleaning of brushes, the return of materials to their appointed places at the end of the lesson, etc. The course on colour was also, therefore, an initiatory course on how to co-operate with others and how to work within a limited budget.

The interesting thing is that the teachers chose the subject of colour to get across these important, yet not essentially 'artistic' lessons. My view is that colour was chosen as the overt subject of this introductory course because, along with art history, it is one of the few areas associated with art education that may be presented as a body of knowledge with a 'factual' basis. It may be put across, therefore, by what Barnes (1973) calls the 'transmission' style of teaching (i.e. the traditional, formal, chalk-and-talk method). Here the teacher takes an active, dominating role while the pupils are expected to remain passive and submissive. And this was the kind of relationship that Tom and Helen wished to establish with their new intake of first-formers, with a view to loosening-up later on.

This is not to suggest, of course, that Tom and Helen were not altogether sincere in the way they set up their introductory course. If this were the case then they wouldn't have spoken so openly about the different levels on which the course was intended to work. Another level which Helen pointed out was that the disciplined approach of the course helped the less confident, more self-conscious and self-effacing pupils to settle in to their new environment before being expected to express themselves more freely. This surely could not be described as insincerity.

But the point must be made that a lot of what goes on under the label of art education as demonstrated in this one example, is really to do with things which are not essentially or necessarily 'artistic', things such as class control and social organisation generally. This being the case, the form and structure of art lessons, the hidden curriculum organised predominantly by means of words, may well contradict the notions and experiences of art which the teachers wish to communicate. And this is well demonstrated in the approach taken by Tom and Helen. For they were clearly aware of a contradiction between their own feelings about art and their method of teaching art with its subsidiary considerations. Take Tom's use of the terms 'more individual' and 'free approach', quoted earlier. He is at pains here to show that although the course began very 'rigidly' (i.e. not at all as 'art' should be approached) it would loosen up and relate more to the free will of the individual pupil (i.e. it would become more as 'art' should be).

What I have identified here is a contradiction between the register of secondary education and the subject register of art. In the first term it seems that the register of secondary education dominates the subject register of art. It would be interesting to discover whether control considerations do indeed give way to more artistic considerations higher up the school and, if they do, how is it reflected in the language of the art class?

5.33 How does this short course contribute to the pupil's general performance in, and understanding of, art?

Both Tom and Helen put forward the view that the course was not intended as a 'contribution to a major ... feeling for art in inverted commas'. Indeed, they were not at all sure that it was their role to teach their pupils about art, as such. They aimed, they said, at, 'understanding' rather than 'artefacts'. They felt a responsibility to develop what they called 'visual awareness', and they believed that their introductory course would begin to do this by starting to, 'sharpen (the pupils') awareness of colours around them', and by making them more 'critical' in their use of colour.

The teachers were themselves critical of some local primary schools for not concentrating enough on 'visual education'. They 'don't actually believe art is anything important on the curriculum'. To some extent, then, Tom and Helen saw their work as remedial. 'We're ... trying to emphasise that (the art room) is a place where they (the pupils) can understand and learn about something other (i.e. other than the normal, academic subjects) in a more respectable way'.

It is interesting to note here that at one moment the teachers reject what they call 'art in inverted commas', while at another moment they equate what they feel themselves to be doing (i.e. 'visual education') with 'art' on the curriculum. This distinction between art as an educational element, and the world of art outside the school is often made by art teachers. Usually they say that the world of art is too far removed from the everyday experience of the pupils to be of any immediate value to them. Also they feel that 'art in inverted commas' concentrates too much on the final product, the 'artefact', whereas

art education is concerned more with the processes - both technical and psychological - involved in artistic development.

But there is also an element of 'if-you-can't-beat-them-join-them' about this rejection of 'art in inverted commas'. Art teachers are sensitive to the fact that art is often treated as a soft option on the curriculum; as a recreational subject rather than as a serious or (in Helen's terms) 'respectable' academic subject. This attitude, they feel, is at least to some extent attributable to the rather jokey, popular reputation that modern 'art in inverted commas' has acquired. As a result, and in order to retain their own 'respectability', art teachers tend to reject any association with the world of art and ally themselves instead with the academics. This they do by absorbing into their own subject current educational trends in preference to current artistic trends. The 1960's and early 1970's saw a move in education generally from a product-centred approach to a process-centred one. This period also fostered the notions of 'discovery' and 'creativity' in educational theory. While there has been a move of late away from the so-called 'modern' teaching methods associated with the notions of 'process', 'discovery' and 'creativity', most teachers are still impelled to use the language of supposedly 'pupil-centred' education. But what really lies behind this language?

In the case of Tom and Helen what really lies behind their use of terms such as 'freedom', 'individual approach', 'understanding', 'visual awareness', 'critical approach to colour'? What is there to be aware of? What is there to understand about colour? And how free is the pupil in their classes to take an individual approach to colour?

Madge and Weinberger (1973) made an extensive study of art education in a Midlands art college where students were supposedly encouraged to develop their own approaches in an atmosphere of freedom and encouragement. The researchers paid some attention to the ways in which the staff used language to evaluate students' work and discovered that, while no staff member would actually advise students on which style or manner to adopt, their language contained covert clues to what they expected to see. And students learned over a period of time to pick up these clues and to work accordingly if their work was to receive favourable evaluations. In other words, staff at this college were playing a kind of game in which they were really saying, 'we know what

we want to see, but we're not going to tell you because, according to current education trends, you must find out things for yourself'. I suspect that Tom and Helen (and all art teachers to some extent) play this game. They had a clear idea of what they wanted their pupils to do in their course on colour, and even the more 'free' and 'individual' exercises towards the end of the course were in effect contrived. In the lesson I observed before the interview, Tom encouraged his class to 'freely' decorate the covers of their work-books which meant, in effect, that they could choose the colours and to some extent the patterns to fill-in the letters and spaces between. Clearly a very restricted kind of 'freedom'. In the interview itself Tom deplored the use of felt-tip pens; another restriction of the pupil's freedom of choice. These teachers knew exactly what they wanted to see in the work of their pupils and the form and structure of their lessons, and the covert clues in their language generally pointed to the desired product. Yet they still used words such as 'individual' and 'free'.

I'm not trying to paint a picture of Tom and Helen as narrow-minded disciplinarians. If anything I am using them to exemplify what we all do as art teachers. Our practices and our attitudes contradict to some extent the language we use to talk about what we believe we are doing.

When Tom and Helen talked about 'understanding' they did not really mean an understanding of some independent phenomenon - colour - with which each pupil must grapple. After all, what, from an artistic point of view, can there be to understand about colour and which can be communicated by the teacher? If it is the physics or the physiology of colour, what has this to do with art? Very little according to the experts. And if it is something to do with aesthetic response, what is there to understand? There are no objective rules for using the spacial qualities of colour, or simultaneous contrast, or complementaries, etc. in an artistically pleasing or correct way. If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then each pupil is already an authority on his own subjective response to colour and he needs no teaching. What the teachers really meant, I suspect, when they spoke of 'understanding', was an understanding of what they, as teachers, held to be valid educational knowledge and activity. And in this way they sought to pass on to the pupils what they had already been given by the culture through their own education and experience.

Again, when the teachers talked about 'visual awareness', were they really implying that their sighted pupils couldn't see? Of course not. What they really meant was that they expected the pupils to become aware of what they, as teachers, wanted them to see. That is, they wanted the pupils to attend to, and to value, the same qualities in the visual world as they did. In passing on their tastes in this way the teachers were defining valid artistic experience for the pupils and initiating them, again, into the conventions of their culture.

The use of words like 'freedom' and 'individuality' by art teachers only serves to compound the mystification we inherited originally from 19th century romanticism. Pupils in secondary school art classes would be 'free' to express something 'individual' in art only if, as romantics believe, art were a natural phenomenon which originates somewhere within us. But as Tom and Helen demonstrated in their methods and attitudes, they didn't really believe that this was the case. They in fact demonstrated the belief that pupils must be given the means to participate in art. That is, they must be initiated into artistic ways of thinking; they must be initiated into the artistic community which mediates matters of taste and behaviour.

It might be suggested, then, in this respect, that Tom and Helen, despite their denial, really were concerned with inculcating a feeling for 'art in inverted commas'. For they were providing their pupils with the language and the concepts they would need to make contact with the world of art, should they wish to participate.

5.34 What do you understand by 'art' and 'art education'?

The answers to this question simply gave substance to some of the things said in reply to the previous question. The teachers began by rejecting the view they felt was held by the rest of the staff at the school, that the art department existed to service other departments by providing such things as notices and by decorating the walls of the school. But having said this they admitted that it was very difficult to make a positive statement about art education. They felt that it offered a particular kind of experience not provided by any other subject, and that this experience was valuable. But they weren't convinced that it was a necessary experience, or even a useful one:

Often I (ask myself): 'Why am I doing this? What useful purpose is this serving? If I never teach another child to mix colours, will it ever matter?' When you're discussing it in isolation it seems so trivial (Helen).

They felt that probably the most useful aspect of art education was its contribution to the field of design and general problem-solving. Indeed, they felt that art education had more in common with education in general than with the 'ivory tower' world of art;

I tend to think that I can't separate art from maths, and I can't separate art from physics, and that's how it should be (Tom).

As for their notions of 'art', both saw it as divorced from the kind of thing they did in their lessons: 'The world of the successful artist has got nothing to do with what goes on inside schools'. But they felt this was true of the relation between school science and the world of the professional scientist, too. Tom saw some value in not being able to define art, inasmuch as it thus remains a receding 'pot of gold at the end of the rainbow', to be pursued throughout one's life (a kind of Holy Grail). But at one point he did equate 'art in inverted commas' with 'what's happening in the galleries in Cork Street'.

If a point does emerge from the answers to this question it is that art teachers have to 'come down' from the 'ivory tower' of their own art training, to the mundane level of the secondary school where they must reconcile their inclination to identify with the likes of Michelangelo or Picasso, with the low esteem they usually suffer in the school community. Moreso, probably, than in any other school subject (except R.E.) the art teacher identifies with his subject and demands that his pupils accept what he offers almost as an act of faith. He is convinced by his own involvement and experience that he is offering something fulfilling and intrinsically enjoyable (an experience offered by no other subject), and he is blinded by that involvement and experience to the fact that participation in art is not natural or spontaneous, but learned and almost partisan.

It is this mystification which is at the root of language which contradicts the art teacher's actual practices and attitudes. In order to pass on the values of the artistic subculture to which he belongs, the

art teacher must structure his lessons in appropriate ways (e.g. the 'transmission' style of teaching). But when he reflects on what he is doing he uses language which betrays a fond belief in a magical, natural, spontaneous, Grail-like entity which he calls 'art in inverted commas'.

Alternatively, he sourly rejects high-flown 'art in inverted commas', which doesn't seem to have much relevance in the context of the secondary school (and is generally misunderstood there anyway), in favour of a more 'down to earth' functional approach such as that of 'design' or 'visual problem-solving'.

5.35 How do you evaluate pupils' work, and how do you gauge their progress in a short course such as this, and in general?

The purpose in asking this question was to see what clues the teachers might give in their conversation to the values and qualities they seek, consciously or unconsciously, in the work and behaviour of their pupils. My assumption was that initially they would couch their answers in the language of art education (the subject register) with its legacy of child-centred sentiments, but, if pushed, they would begin to betray the evaluative principles implicit in their teaching styles.

And this is what indeed happened. Helen kicked off by saying that what they looked for was 'understanding' in their pupils. It didn't matter if their work was 'blotchy, or the paint's run, or it's very wet, as long as they've understood what they were doing'. She went on to say that their classes were made up of children with a wide range of ability. This being so, it was more appropriate to rate each pupil according to his own progress rather than against the work of his peers in a competitive way.

I didn't bring it up in the discussion, but I recalled that Tom had used the promise of picking the best work-book at the end of term as an incentive to careful work in the lesson I had recorded. Again I'm not implying any insincerity in the above reply to my question. I'm sure that when it came to writing reports or grading for administrative purposes both Tom and Helen did indeed evaluate each pupil 'according to his own progress'. But what did they actually mean by 'progress',

and what signs did they accept as being indications of 'understanding' in a pupil's work? What is more, did they really give the impression to their pupils that the principles of 'understanding' and 'individual progress' were paramount?

At the time of the interview I had not recorded a complete lesson of Helen's, so I had to refer to the one I had done of Tom's. Following up Helen's claim that 'blotchy' work was acceptable if the understanding was there, I pointed out that in Tom's lesson he repeatedly used phrases like 'nice and neat' which imply that neat is good (i.e. correct).

Helen responded by saying that she had to admit that she, too, advised pupils to paint carefully 'inside the line'. At this point the interview was interrupted and when we resumed Helen wandered off this particular point. But what she went on to say was, in fact, relevant. She began to make a point about the wide range of ability in their classes: 'With some of them we've got the most beautiful colour circles with maximum control and no problem'. These she saw as the 'brighter' end of the ability range, and it is clear that here she was equating 'beauty' (i.e. what is required) with 'maximum control' (which is therefore also required). From this it may be inferred that, in spite of Helen's overt position over the issue of neatness (i.e. that neatness comes second to understanding), she took neatness to be one possible indication of understanding.

I should point out here, though, that when Helen first made the remark that she looked for understanding in her pupils, she did say that while some of them produced the colour-circle as required, they did so in a 'mechanical way', without understanding, and this became apparent only through talking with them. That is, for Helen, the production of a neat colour-circle was clearly not, in itself, a complete indication of understanding.

It is interesting to note, here, the value that Helen placed on talk as a means of feedback. In the case of the colour-circle exercise, the understanding she sought to instill was of the same abstract kind as that sought in any science or geography or history lesson. But what about the understanding she would be seeking later on in the course when pupils would be working, as I had been informed, in a more 'individual'

and 'free' way? Would such understanding be so easily conveyed and confirmed by means of words? And if not, what qualities would Helen be looking for in her pupils' work to indicate an understanding of 'art'?

By taking up the question of neatness with Helen, and by using Tom's lesson to make my point, I forfeited the possibility of hearing Tom's spontaneous views on the subject. It was clear when he did speak about it that he realised it would be contradictory to deny a desire for neatness and he chose, instead, to hotly defend the need for neatness in his pupil's work. He felt that they were themselves amazed at what they could achieve with a little bit of extra care, and both he and Helen agreed that it was unprofessional to allow 'unsatisfactory' work to go unchecked. They likened such careless teaching to English teaching where spelling mistakes are not corrected. By this, I feel, they were betraying an acceptance that art, like spelling, is conventional and rule-bound.

I tried to tie the teachers down to some specific 'positive' evaluations by asking what qualities they looked for in a good' pupil in art. In the main the reply concerned an actual 'low ability-type' boy who made good, over a period of three months, in a C.S.E. art class. From the discussion I was able to extract the following list of words which seem to be positive evaluations:

perceptive
keen
interested
co-ordination
sensitive
quiet
mature

It seems that, for these teachers, a pupil who exhibits most of these qualities will be assessed as a 'good' pupil, even though he might not possess the 'mechanical skills to bring him a lot of success'. I suspect that teachers in most subjects in the secondary school would count pupils with these qualities as 'good', too. They are qualities which are good from the point of view of general class control, they

reflect well on the teacher, and they are qualities necessary for successful learning.

However, if it is one's rule to evaluate a pupil's progress in art ('progress' was a word used a lot by Tom and Helen), I can't see how one can avoid assessing what the pupil produces any more than a maths teacher can ignore his pupil's abilities to calculate correctly. Yet Helen would certainly not have claimed any interest in her pupils' products (scornfully referred to as 'artefacts') if I had not pressed the question of neatness. And Tom went along with her when she held that understanding was more important than finish. In Tom's lesson, however, his language was scattered with evaluative clues as to how the product should be completed, and this, seen against his overt philosophy, suggests most strongly that what he was actually teaching under the label of 'art' was transmitted, for the most part, unconsciously.

5.36 What sort of balance do you aim for between class control, individual freedom, and the transmission of artistic concepts?

I put this question to Tom first because Helen was called away for a few minutes. He was troubled by the word 'control' with its '1984' associations, and he kept opposing it to 'individual freedom' as if they were mutually exclusive. Then he hit on a compromise which was a happy one for me because it confirmed the impression I had formed from watching him working. He said that to some extent lessons needed to be organised according to what in particular is being taught, and that within the limits of this organisation pupils were free to improvise. I have already noted that such an approach in itself conveys a message about art to the class. It embodies the concept that art is a prescribed area of activity within which one is at liberty to experiment.

As for the balance between control and concept transmission, Tom was very unsure. So unsure that I rather led him to certain conclusions which I had myself been forming. But he did share my feelings and he volunteered the view that the transmission of art concepts in art education is 'almost an insidious sort of thing that (pupils) pick up'.

Helen tackled the question when she returned. She felt that there has

to be a balance between control and the transmission of ideas, but of the two, control is possibly more important: 'If there is no class control, there is no transmission of concepts whatsoever because nobody listens to you.' Beyond this she felt that pupils gained a lot from being taught 'a formula', which they could then apply in their own ways and it was up to the teacher then to know when to intervene and when to allow the pupils to carry on in their own ways.

Apart from supplying me with two more positive evaluations: 'original' and 'interesting', the replies to this question simply confirmed much of my earlier speculation. The teachers were more concerned with the problems of control than with teaching 'art' as such, and this stemmed to some extent from the lack of a working concept of art, and to a great extent from the constraints and priorities of secondary education.

Neither teacher really understood what I meant by 'concepts of art'. They took it to mean methods or 'formulas' imposed on the pupils. I was interested, however, with the notions which give rise to these methods and formulas. But it seems that not even the teachers themselves were aware of these.

5.37 Do you always talk so much in your lessons, or did you feel obliged to do so for my benefit?

This question was aimed at Tom since it was his lesson that I had just transcribed. I made it clear that I did not mean to imply that he did talk a lot in his lesson, or that he talked too much. I just wanted to know if I could take it that the amount of teacher talk on the tape was about average. His answer was an unqualified 'yes, I always talk that much'.

I told Helen that from what I had seen of her teaching she seemed to talk less than Tom. She, of course, wouldn't have known whether this was true or not, but she said she always thought she talked a lot. And she felt that she was 'one of the people who pushes the transmission of concepts rather than the other thing'. By this I think she meant that she felt she interfered too much in the work of her pupils instead of letting them get on with things in their own ways. She also volun-

teered some information on the ways she structured her lessons by means of words:

I always talk at the beginning of the lesson, and I always get them in their seats. And I always call the register, and I always talk to them. Either I recap., or I give the work out personally and just say, 'That's quite nice', or 'This is coming on well', or 'Can I help you with that?', so that they've got something to start off with.

I followed this up by asking both teachers how they felt about the pupils talking among themselves in the lessons. Both agreed that this depended on how 'noisy' they became. 'I hate them to be noisy. I like them to be quiet.' (Helen). Tom didn't mind if they talked to each other as long as they weren't 'wasting time'. Apart from impeding their progress, idle chatter reflected the low esteem in which they held the subject, he thought. Tom was very sensitive about the status of art in schools.

On listening to the recording of the interview, I wondered why I hadn't brought up Britton's (1969) views, and Barnes's (1973) views, on 'exploratory speech'. For it would have been appropriate to enquire where the line fell, in the minds of the two teachers, between idle chatter and genuine, though apparently aimless, exploratory speech.

Instead I asked if the pupils were ever invited to talk about their work in open discussions. Helen said that they did have discussions 'on a group basis', and she gave as an example the way that her class examined all the colour-circles at the end of their lesson and picked out the ones they thought were good. She said that they always tended to choose their favourite pieces of work and that their choices were always based on, 'preconceived ideas about who is good'. Usually if someone had won a prize it meant that they were good.

I was interested by Helen's use of the word 'preconceived' here. Experience told me that this word is a negative evaluation in art education circles, and this led me to assume that Helen disapproved of the criteria her new pupils brought with them from home and primary school.

So I took the opportunity to explore the question of evaluation again from a new angle and I asked Helen what the pupils usually looked for

in a 'good' piece of work. She said that usually they look for accurate representational drawings and paintings: 'If a child can actually represent something accurately, like a horse or a dog or a person, then they are it; they are number one.'

In view of what she had said earlier about 'preconceived ideas, I suspected that Helen disapproved of accurate representation as the main criterion of value in the pupil's work; now she spoke in such a neutral tone of voice that I was unsure. But as the discussion developed she began to betray more obviously her own feelings. For example, when I asked how much pupils bring with them from the primary school, in the way of ideas about art, she said that in many primary schools in the area art is just an element in project work, and this she didn't really accept as 'creative art'. For it usually meant copying from pictures and other such 'dreadful things'. But most new-comers to the secondary school, she felt, at least thought of art as 'painting', and some extended their expectations to include pottery and model-making. Thus, she thought, 'they have a general notion of what art's about, you know, using materials in a visually or expressive way'.

Here I felt I was beginning to uncover those elusive 'concepts' of art that I had failed to discover in previous questions. I pushed on with a question about the home-background of the pupils, and its effect on their performance in art, and I got the reply that 'our most talented children ... come from a family where there's an artist or an art teacher in the family'. I wanted to know how their 'talent' (Helen also used the word 'gift') presented itself and I was told that they 'seem to grasp ideas much more quickly, ... (they) seem able to settle down and get on, and seem to have a kind of ability to concentrate'. Also they are able to talk more easily about art (Madge and Weinberger, op. cit., found that students at the college they investigated were also considered good if they could talk well about their work), they are 'single-minded', and they 'wouldn't dream of wasting time because it's valuable'. And what is more, it seems that these pupils are also good in most other subjects in the curriculum.

It is significant that all of these qualities belong to the pupil's behaviour rather than to the work produced. It is significant because it confirms the point I made earlier about control considerations taking

precedence over artistic considerations (i.e. the register of secondary education takes precedence over the register of art education). It is significant that these qualities are valued in other subjects besides art, and it is significant because it points very clearly to the fact that 'good' or 'talented' pupils are those who obey the tacit rules of the subject area and of secondary education as an institution. These valued students did not need to play the game of 'spot the clues'. They had learned the rules at home and they could already speak the language.

At this point the interview had to come to an end. But I felt that it had already provided enough material for fruitful conjecture, and that it would complement my observations in the classroom.

5.4 Fourth Visit

This visit took place the day after the interview, on 5th October 1978. On this occasion I observed and recorded Helen's lesson with her first-year class. They were, of course, working on the same colour exercises as Tom's class which I had already recorded.

Helen began the lesson by calling the class to order, to explain to those who had completed their colour-circles what she wanted them to do next. Some were lagging behind for one reason or another. Helen explained that she didn't mind them working slowly as long as they worked 'accurately'.

She asked everyone to bring his or her colour-circle up to her table at the front of the class, so that they could briefly revise what they had done before moving on. She effected this revision predominantly by means of what Barnes (1969) calls 'pseudo-questioning', that is, questioning which required of the pupils answers which the teacher already had in mind. Take this exchange, for example:

Helen: Who can tell me what we've been doing? You told me at the end of last lesson, but I've got to ask you again.

Pupil: Mixing colours.

Helen: Yes, and what have you been trying to do?

Pupil: Trying to find different colours. Mixing primary colours and secondary colours.

Helen: Yes, good. And are any of these colour-wheels that we can see on the front table ... exactly the same?

Pupil: No.

Helen: No. Are there any colours that are exactly the same in them?

Pupil: Yes.

Helen: Yes. Which colours are the same?

Pupil: The yellow, red and blue.

Helen: Yes. Why is that then? Why are the colours the same? Mark? Why are the blue, yellow and red the same? Can anyone tell me? One of those boys at the back. Yes?

Pupil: Because they aren't mixed.

Helen: Good. Yes. Because we got them straight out of the palette and they weren't mixed. And all the other colours, then, are quite different. You've mixed up quite different colours: first of all your secondary colours, and then tertiary colours.

By means of such questioning Helen was able to satisfy herself that her pupils understood the technical terms - primary, secondary and tertiary colours - and that they understood that primaries cannot be mixed from any other colours. She was also implicitly conveying to her pupils that this understanding is valid educational knowledge about art, since this was an art lesson and these were the issues that the teacher clearly thought to be important. So important, in fact, that not only were these terms introduced in a special slide lecture, but they were the subject of a practical exercise and they were re-emphasized at the end of last lesson as well as at the beginning of this one.

When Helen was satisfied that she had made her points, she took the opportunity to ask how the class had coped with the paints provided. One or two interesting issues emerge from the exchanges which followed. Here for example, Helen turned to Angus who claimed to be having problems:

Helen: How many people found them hard to use? How many people have had a bit of a problem? Yes? Angus? Have you?

Angus: Yes.

Helen: Why?

Angus: I couldn't get the right colours.

Helen: Let's have a look. Well, it looks very controlled to me.
(To the class) It doesn't look as though he's having a problem.

Clearly Angus felt there was a problem, so how could Helen say to the class that he wasn't having problems? What she was saying, implicitly, was that while Angus might have been lacking confidence in his abilities to please the teacher, he needn't have worried because his work exhibited the quality of control which she was looking for. The words 'very controlled' here served as a positive evaluation, a clue for her pupils to what she expected of them. More generally, she was implying that art is controlled. This was an art lesson and control was what the teacher expected in that lesson. If I was right in saying that Helen's revision at the beginning of the lesson was an exercise in defining valid art educational knowledge, this little exchange with Angus was an exercise in defining valid artistic behaviour, or a valid pupil response in art.

Another point emerges from the following:

Helen: Who else had a problem? Who mixed (the paints) up too wet amongst this group? Yes? You mixed them up too wet? So you're going to learn by what you've done?

Pupil: Yes. It's gone over the edge.

Helen: It's gone over the edge? Yes, because part of this exercise is to see whether you can get them to fit into the shapes and not to go over the edges, and not to get it too wet either.

Here Helen is saying again that control is important in art, and that this piece of work is an exercise in control. More specifically, she is saying that control means not mixing the paints too wet and not allowing them to spread over the outlines of the shapes drawn on the paper. If this had not been achieved, then the pupils should 'learn' from their mistakes.

The day before, however, in the interview, she had said that it didn't matter if the paint was too wet, or if the finish was blotchy as long as

the pupils understood what they were doing. Here is an obvious contradiction between the stated aim of the teacher and her attitude as it appeared to the pupils. It is a contradiction between the subject register of art used in isolation, and the dominant register of secondary education activated by context.

At times during the lesson it was clear that Helen was conscious of the things we had discussed the day before. For example, before she allowed the class to return to their places after their brief revision, she once or twice betrayed a certain self-consciousness in her language. She told the group, at one point, that she wanted those who had completed their colour-circles satisfactorily to decorate the covers of their work-books with some kind of free design ... just using colours that you like. And she supplemented this instruction with another which was that these designs should be worked out in rough to begin with. Then she seemed to recall our conversation the previous day on freedom and control, and this caused her to qualify and explain her instructions as if for my benefit:

So it's not going to be entirely free painting. When I say 'free painting', it's when you start with the paint and then ... you build up a picture like that. And you'll get a chance to do that later on on the term, because we're going to go on to do imaginative painting.

It seems to me that this digression, brief though it was, is very revealing. It reveals something of Helen's idea of 'freedom' in art. She implies here that 'free' painting is not planned; it is spontaneous and, to some extent, uncontrolled since it relies on painterly effects which are often unpredictable. The digression also reveals that Helen vaguely equates this kind of work with 'imaginative' painting, and it implies that she feels that her pupils will be pleased to hear that they will 'have the chance' to do this kind of thing.

I feel that here Helen was trying to convince an observer (me) that although her class was presently working on a very tightly prescribed course, they would be allowed a certain freedom in the future. And she was doing this either to fulfil what she felt to be the expectations of the observer, or to convince herself that more 'imaginative' work was on the way. For she was admitting implicitly that although the current work was necessary for reasons of control and information, the real art

was to come later.

If I am right in assuming this, Helen's brief digression also reveals something at last of her underlying concept of art. It suggests that for her art was something enjoyable (that's why the pupils would be glad to hear that it was on its way), and that art is free and imaginative (and not rulebound as this introductory course might suggest).

But if this was indeed Helen's idea of art, then it is all the things that Tom and Helen were trying to convince themselves, their pupils, and their colleagues in other subjects, that art is not. For if art is enjoyable, free and imaginative, then it is comparable with other such activities which most people choose to pursue in their spare time. That is, art is just like any hobby and not a really serious or 'respectable' subject like maths or science.

It was Helen who said in the interview that although she believed that art offers an unique experience, she sometimes questioned the purpose of teaching it: 'In isolation it seems so trivial'. Does all this not confirm that deep down she was experiencing confusion and discomfort over the contradiction between her own understanding of art (as expressed in and through the subject register) and secondary school art, with its emphasis on rules and control, which falls somewhat short of the promise of art?

After the revision, when most of the class returned to their seats, one or two hung around Helen to clarify what they were supposed to be doing. Her instruction had been to 'think of a kind of design to use with (the) paints, perhaps using a pencil and, either using shapes that fit together or shapes that come apart, shapes that join together that you could use colours - get the colour values in'. She was thinking of an abstract pattern (she was later to say 'some of these mathematical designs do look very nice on the front of these books. You know, just using shapes rather than making them into pictures') to use as a vehicle for colour. But some of the pupils were as yet unable to grasp the idea of an abstract design, and Helen had not supplied a model with her instruction. More to the point, they had not recognised the clue in Helen's repeated use of the word 'shapes'. In commonsense terms everything has a shape and if one is asked to think of a shape, therefore,

it might well be the shape of a flower, or a dog, or a tree. But in the specialised register of art education the word 'shape' is a technical term, like 'line', 'tone', 'texture', 'form', etc. And this technical language developed alongside, and in response to, abstraction in art. As a result, when a teacher asks the class to use 'just shapes' she more often than not means 'abstract shapes' which don't derive from any recognisable object. This was a lesson that many of Helen's pupils had yet to learn, and in many respects this particular exercise may be seen as an initiation into the specialised use of words in art.

One of the pupils hanging around Helen asked, 'Can you do flowers or perhaps a country scene, or something?' This was the first indication to Helen that what she had believed to be a simple and straight-forward instruction could be misunderstood, and she was rather taken on the hop. She replied, rather reluctantly that one could.

It is interesting to note the ways in which Helen reacted to the various proposals made by the pupils as she wandered around the room after this, and how she attempted to transform some of them into something a little closer to what she wanted, or how she satisfied herself that everyone was doing the 'right' thing.

The most obvious way was with a pupil who was having trouble because his design wasn't turning out like his friend's. Here Helen admonished the pupil for copying his friend (clue: art must be 'original'), saying, 'Why don't you see if you can just draw some nice shapes that fit together, alright?' Then she proceeded to demonstrate what she expected on some rough paper.

The following exchange was more subtle:

Helen: Now what are you doing? What kind of design is this?

Pupil: I'm doing the alphabet.

Helen: (Hesitantly) Oh yes. (Helen was not very impressed by this idea, but she didn't admit it. Instead she thought very hard while the pupils continued to explain.)

Pupil: I'm going to do all the colours, every letter in a different colour so they show up.

Helen: (Distracted) Yes. What, um, starting with A, which colour?

Pupil: I don't know. Very light. Then going very dark.

Helen: (With light beginning to dawn) I see. Right. So you're going to start with, say, yellow there ...

Pupil: Yes.

Helen: ... and then you're going through ...

Pupil: Orange, and dark orange, then red.

Helen: Right, jolly nice.

Here Helen was not prepared to criticise the pupil's choice of a 'design' until she had worked out the possibilities for using that choice as a vehicle for colour theory. That is, for making colour do something systematically. As soon as the pupil hinted at tonal grading Helen was able to approve the choice and to satisfy herself that the pupil was on the right track.

The next encounter, however, was not quite as satisfying:

Helen: And what about you?

Pupil: My initials.

Helen: (Stalling for time) You're going to do your initials?

Pupil: I have done them before, but I did them in felt-tips.

Helen: (Lost for words) Yes. (But trying to think of something to say) It's going to be harder to paint them, right?

Pupil: ... 'cause I'll be doing ...

Helen: (Catching sight of the pupil's rough sketching, misreading it, and seeing an opportunity for systematic colour mixing) You're going to overlap them?

Pupil: (On a different track) Like leaves all round.

Helen: (Not so sure now that she understands the pupil's intentions) You're going to put your initials as part of a bigger design?

Pupil: Yes, I'm just going to put my initials and I'm going to have leaves twining round them.

Helen: (Disappointed, but at a loss for the time being to retrieve the situation) Hmm. (Moves on).

This exchange speaks for itself. Helen did not wish to criticise her

pupil's choice since this was a 'free' exercise in design. But the pupil's choice was so far removed from Helen's expectations that, for the moment, she was at a loss for ways of treating that choice to make it comply more with her expectations.

As the lesson progressed, and Helen continued her rounds of the class, it became clear that her method was to try to influence her pupil's approaches rather than to specify a particular 'correct' approach. To generalise, she would open with the question: 'What have you chosen to do? (or variations of this). The pupil would reply and, as a holding measure, Helen would say, 'Hmm', or 'Oh yes', or something similar while she computed the possibilities of marrying the suggestion with her prepared ideas on colour (e.g. the mixing of secondaries and tertiaries, tonal grading, etc.). While she thought through the possibilities, she would allow the pupil to expand upon his or her ideas in the hope that something said might suggest an association (e.g. overlapping shapes, even if they are letters of the alphabet, present the possibility of colour mixing). If she was successful, she would restate the pupil's original idea, incorporating her own modifications, and leaving the pupil under the impression that he had thought up the complete idea. If she failed to come up with anything, she would move on with a non-committal 'Hmm', hoping that something might come to her while she viewed the work of other pupils.

This method is a variation of the 'I'm not going to tell you what I want, you must find out for yourself' game that I mentioned earlier. But in this instance the class is being treated as an organic whole rather than as a group of individuals. This shows itself in two ways.

Firstly, some members of the class may discover what is wanted, and their work is declared 'jolly good' (or whatever) by the teacher. Then, according to their varying wills to survive in the subject, other pupils will adopt a similar approach without going quite so far as to copy directly.

Secondly, as the teacher wanders around the room pondering on the problems of those whose work cannot easily be fitted into the mould, something in the work or the conversation of those who have 'got it', or something in the general conversation, might give her the idea she needs. She

then passes this idea on to those who need it.

Either way the teacher doesn't have to begin by specifying exactly what she wants. (No, I won't draw you anything. It's got to be entirely your own, right?) Instead she helps the class as a whole to discover what she wants in subtle and skillful ways, thus maintaining the illusion of freedom of action.

Helen's lesson continued with alternating periods of silence, while the pupil's got on with their work, and periods of gentle conversation as the teacher wandered from desk to desk. When it was eventually time to clear up, there were groans indicating that the pupils were sorry to stop what they were doing.

Helen took a lot of trouble over clearing up. She appointed one of the girls to oversee the washing-up at the sinks, to make sure that brushes and palettes were clean before they were put away. And she jollied along the pupils as they cleaned their desks and disposed of any rubbish.

When the ritual was over, Helen called the class to gather round her and, if the end of lesson hooter had not cut her off, she would have reviewed once more the work in progress.

6. Conclusion

The above account of four visits to a secondary school art department is intended to be little more than a diary of events laced with my ideas and reactions. It is not a systematic investigation, but a testing of the water, so to speak. As such it is difficult to draw any real conclusions from it. But it is possible to say that the study fulfilled its stated aims inasmuch as (a) I established that it is possible to record art-room talk adequately without disrupting things too much with complicated hardware, if the object of one's interest is the verbal exchange between the teacher and the class, or between the teacher and individual pupils, (b) I found that many of the ideas and methods in the literature on language in education generally are applicable to art education, even though it is popularly thought to be a 'visual' education and there is no reason to suppose that more of these ideas and methods are not applicable

also; and (c) I found the language of the art class to be a rich source of conjecture and I have no doubt, therefore, that it will sustain and reward closer investigation.

After my first visit to the school I asked several questions, some of which I now feel able to answer provisionally. One of these was, what effect do organisation and control by means of language have on the transmission and acquisition of art concepts? Following my experience at the school it seems possible that, in the early years at least of secondary education, organisation and control take precedence over the transmission of art concepts. Put another way, the register of secondary education dominates over the subject register of art. One result of this is that teachers find themselves in a contradictory position where they must ask their pupils to work and behave in ways which might not comply with their own notions of artistic activity and behaviour.

Another question was, what effect does the age-group of the pupils have on language use in art? The answer to this relates to the first question insofar as one might expect from what Tom and Helen said that as pupils progress up the school, the subject register gradually takes over from the register of secondary education. However, from my own experience of secondary teaching, I suspect that the language of control is evident throughout.

A third question was about the effect of class-size on language in the art class. If the language of control predominates in the lower forms of the school, it must be due, partly, to the fact that classes are at their largest in these forms (also, of course, it is the time when newcomers must be 'broken-in', as it were). It follows, therefore, that higher up the school where classes are smaller due to systems of options and specialisation, there would be more possibility of the subject register taking over, even though, as I have suggested above, the language of control is necessary to some extent throughout the school.

To conclude, I would like to draw from my observations the point that in art education (I'm not qualified to speak for other subjects) there seems to be another complication besides the contradiction between the register of secondary education and the subject register. There is another contradiction to take into account and this is between the

concepts of art and its educational value embodied in the professional language of the teacher (i.e. the subject register), and deeper-seated, personally-held concepts of art which the teacher betrays in his off-guard conversation and when he is under stress while teaching. Unlike most teachers in other subjects, the art teacher is often a practitioner of his subject outside school. In effect, the art teacher is often two professionals rolled into one, and the two do not see eye to eye. The art teacher falls somewhere between the school-teacher and the artist.

The former is concerned with control and the latter with 'freedom' and 'expression'. It is this compulsion to wear two caps which lies at the root of the extra contradiction which I have identified. It remains to be seen what effect these contradictions have on what is transmitted and acquired in the art class.

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbs, P., 'Mass Culture and Mimesis', in Tract No. 22, University of Sussex.
- Adams, E. 1981, 'Progress Report: On the Schools Council Art and the Built Environment Project', in The Times Educational Supplement, 19 June, 1981.
- Adams, R. and Biddle, B. 1970, Realities of Teaching: Explorations with Videotape, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: London and N.Y.
- A.E.B. 1978, 'Comments and Replies' of the Standing Joint Committee, for the June Examinations in 'A' Level Arts and Crafts.
- A.E.B. 1980, G.C.E. 'A' Level History of Art examination paper (606/2), June, 1980.
- Alatis, J. (ed.) 1970, Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics, No. 23, Georgetown University Press.
- Albers, J. 1963, Interaction of Colour, Yale University Press: London, 1971.
- Alexander, R. 1977, Educational Criticism of Three Art History Classes, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, School of Education, Stanford University, California.
- Allport, F.H. 1955, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure, N.Y. and London.
- Alquie, F. 1965, The Philosophy of Surrealism, University of Michigan Press.
- Anderson, D.M. 1961, Elements of Design, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: N.Y.
- Antal, F. 1948, Florentine Painting and its Social Background, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Apollinaire, G. 1972, Apollinaire on Art: Essays and Reviews 1902-1918, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Apollonio, U. (ed.) 1973, Futurist Manifestos, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Arnheim, R. 1954, Art and Visual Perception, Faber and Faber: London, 1956.
- Arnheim, R. 1969, Visual Thinking, University of California Press.
- Aschner, M.J. 1956, 'Teaching the Anatomy of Criticism', in The School Review, Vol. 64, No. 7, 317-22.

- Ashwin, C. 1975, Art Education: Documents and Policies 1768-1975, S.R.H.E. London.
- Ashwin, C. 1978, 'Art and Design History: the Parting of the Ways?' in Bishop, T. (ed.), 1978.
- Ashwin, C. 1980, Theoretical Studies and the Foundation Course, Curriculum Centre for the History of Art and Design, Middlesex Polytechnic.
- Bannard, W.D. 1975, 'Activity of Criticism', in Studio International, Vol. 189, No. 974, 84.
- Barber, P.J. and Legge, D. 1976, Perception and Information, Methuen: London.
- Barnes, D. 1971, 'Language and Learning in the Classroom', in the Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1.
- Barnes, D. 1973, Language in the Classroom, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
- Barnes, D. 1975, From Communication to Curriculum, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1976.
- Barnes, D. et al, 1969, Language, the Learner and the School, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Barnes, D. and Todd, F. 1975, 'Frames: How to Understand Conversation', S.S.R.C. Report, Leeds University Institute of Education.
- Barratt, M. 1976, 'Rationales for Art Education', in Athene, No. 64.
- Barron, F. 1955, 'The Disposition Towards Originality', in Vernon, P.E. (ed.), 1970.
- Barthes, R. 1957, Mythologies, Paladin: St. Albans, 1972.
- Barton, D. 1977, Vulnerable Supplicant, Arts Council/Author: London.
- Barton, D. 1979a, Instead of Me, Arts Council/Author: London.
- Barton, D. 1979b, Sequences One, Arts Council/Author: London.
- Battcock, G. 1973, New Ideas in Art Education, Dutton: N.Y.
- Beardsley, M.C. 1968, 'The Classification of Critical Reasons', in the Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 2, No. 3, 55-63.
- Beke, L. 1979, 'Towards a Voluntaristic Art Criticism', in Art Monthly (U.K.), Vol. 26.
- Bell, C. 1914, Art, Chatto and Windus: London.
- Bellack, A. et al, 1966, The Language of the Classroom, Teachers College Press: N.Y.
- Benjamin, W. 1972, 'A Short History of Photography', in Screen, Vol. 13, No. 1.
- Benjamin, W. 1973, Illuminations, Fontana: London.

- Berger, J. 1972, Selected Essays and Articles: The Look of Things, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Berger, J. 1978, Review of Hadjinicolaou (1978), in New Society, 28 Sept., 702-4.
- Berger, P.L. and Luckman, T. 1966, The Social Construction of Reality, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Bernstein, B. 1971, Class, Codes and Control, Vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Bevlin, M.E. 1963, Design Through Discovery, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: N.Y.
- Bishop, T. (ed.) 1978, Design History: Fad or Function?, Design Council: London.
- Blakeslee, T.R. 1980, The Right Brain, Macmillan: London.
- Blom, J-P. and Gumperz, J. 1972, 'Social Meaning in Linguistic Structures' in Gumperz, J. and Hymes, D. (eds.), 1972.
- Bosserman, P. 1968, Dialectical Sociology: An Analysis of the Sociology of Georges Gurvitch, Porter-Sargent: Boston.
- Breunig, L.C. 1970, Introduction to Apollinaire, G. 1972.
- Britton, J. 1969, 'Talking to Learn', in Barnes et al, 1969.
- Britton, J. 1970, Language and Learning, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Broudy, H.S. 1964, 'The Structure of Knowledge in the Arts', in Smith, B.O. (ed.), 1964, 75-106.
- Broudy, H.S. 1968, 'Quality Education and Aesthetic Education', in Pappas, G. (ed.), 1970, 280-290.
- Broudy, H.S. 1970, 'Tacit Knowing and Aesthetic Education', in Smith, R.A. (ed.), 1970, 77-106.
- Bruner, J.S. 1960, The Process of Education, Harvard University Press: Mass. 1977.
- Bruner, J.S. 1962, On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand, Atheneum: N.Y., 1976.
- Bruner, J.S. 1964, 'The Course of Cognitive Growth', in Child, D. 1977, 206-219.
- Bruner, J.S. 1966, Towards a Theory of Instruction, Harvard University Press.
- Bruner, J.S. 1971, Relevance of Education, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Cabanne, P. 1971, Dialogues with Duchamp, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Carline, R. 1968, Draw They Must, Arnold: London; Revised 1975.
- Carpenter, P. and Graham, W. 1971, Art and Ideas, Mills and Boon: London.

- Carr, E.H. 1977, quoted in Marwick, A. 1977.
- Cashdan, A. and Grugeon, E. 1972, Language in Education: A Source Book, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Cassirer, E. 1923-29, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Bruno Cassirer: Berlin.
- Cassirer, E. 1944, An Essay on Man, Yale University Press.
- Cattell, R.B. and Butcher, H.J. 1968, 'Creativity and Personality' in Vernon, P.E. 1970, 312-26.
- Cecil, Lord D. 1969, Visionary and Dreamer: Two Poetic Painters - Samuel Palmer and Edward Burne-Jones, Constable: London.
- Child, D. 1973, Psychology and the Teacher, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: London.
- Child, D. 1977, Readings in Psychology for the Teacher, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: London.
- Chipp, H.B. (ed.) 1968, Theories of Modern Art, University of California Press.
- Chomsky, N. 1957, Syntactic Structures, Mouton: The Hague and N.Y.
- Chomsky, N. 1966, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, Mouton: The Hague and N.Y.
- Chomsky, N. 1971, 'Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas', in Searle, J.R. 1971.
- Chomsky, N. 1976, Reflections on Language, Fontana: London.
- Cicourel, A.V. 1973, Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Interaction, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Collingwood, R.G. 1938, The Principles of Art, Oxford University Press: London, 1974.
- Cork, R. 1976, 'A Survey of Contemporary Art Magazines', in Studio International, Vol. 192, No. 983, 145-86.
- Cork, R. 1977a, 'Outside the Art System: Collaborative Work in Schools' in Studio International, Vol. 193, No. 986, 105-15.
- Cork, R. 1977b, 'Serendipity', B.B.C. Radio 4, 15 August.
- Craib, I. 1976, Existentialism and Sociology: A Study of Jean-Paul Sartre, Cambridge University Press.
- Crittenden, B.S. 1970, 'Persuasion: Aesthetic Argument and the Language of Teaching', in Smith, R.A. 1970, 227-62.
- Croce, B. 1909, Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic, Macmillan: London, 1922.
- Cumming, R. 1980, 'On Learning to Look', The Times Educational Supplement, 2 May, 46.

- Del Renzio, T. 1976, 'Mistaken Identities in the History of Design', in The Times Educational Supplement, 4 February, 7.
- De Sausmarez, M. 1964, Basic Design: The Dynamics of Visual Form, Studio Vista: London.
- Dewey, J. 1925, Experience and Nature, Dover: N.Y., 1958.
- Dewey, J. 1934, Art as Experience, Capricorn: N.Y., 1958.
- Dillard, A. 1974, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, Harpers Magazine Press, N.Y.
- Dreier, S. and Echaurren, M. 1944, 'Duchamp's Glass: La Mariee Mise A Nu Par Ses Celibataires, Meme; An Analytical Reflection', in Masheck, J. (ed.), 1975, 107-9.
- Ducasse, C.J. 1929, The Philosophy of Art, Dover: N.Y., 1966.
- Dunning, R.V. 1974, Community Television: The Constitution of a Medium Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Keele.
- Edwards, A.D. 1976, Language in Culture and Class, Heinemann: London.
- Ehrenzweig, A. 1967, The Hidden Order of Art, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
- Eisner, E.W. and Ecker, D.W. 1966, Readings in Art Education, Ginn/Blaisdell: Mass.
- Eisner, E.W. 1976, 'Educational Connoisseurship and Criticism: Their Form and Functions in Educational Evaluation', in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 10, Nos. 3 and 4, 135-50.
- Eisner, E.W. 1977, 'On the Uses of Educational Connoisseurship and Criticism for Evaluating Classroom Life', in the Teachers College Record, Vol. 78, No. 3, 345-58.
- Eisner, E.W. 1978, 'The Impoverished Mind', in Educational Leadership, May, 1978.
- Elton, W. (ed.) 1954, Aesthetics and Language, Blackwell: Oxford, 1967.
- Esterson, A. 1970, The Leaves of Spring: Schizophrenia, Family and Sacrifice, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Feldman, E.B. 1973, 'The Teacher as Model Critic', in the Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 7, No. 1, 50-57.
- Field, D. and Newick, J. (eds.) 1973, The Study of Education and Art, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Filmer, P. et al. 1972, New Directions in Sociological Theory, Collier Macmillan: London.
- Friedenthal, R. 1963, Letters of the Great Artists, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Fox, R. 1981, 'Fruits of Patronage', in the T.E.S., 20 November.

- Fry, R. 1957, Vision and Design, Chatto and Windus: London.
- Fuller, P. 1976, 'Clearing a Space for Criticism', in Studio International, Vol. 192, No. 983, 119-25.
- Furth, H.C. 1966, Thinking About Language: The Psychological Implications of Deafness, Free Press: N.Y.
- Gallagher, J. and Aschner, M. 1963, 'A Preliminary Report on Analyses of Classroom Interaction', in Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Vol. 9, 183-94.
- Gann, A.S. 1974, Vocational Courses in Art and Design: Report of the Working Group on Vocational Courses in the Design Technician Area, H.M.S.O.
- Garfinkel, H. 1967, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Prentice-Hall: New Jersey.
- Gauss, C.E. 1949, The Aesthetic Theories of French Artists, The John Hopkins Press: Baltimore and London, 1966.
- Getzels, J.W. and Jackson, P.W. 1963, 'The Highly Intelligent and the Highly Creative Adolescent', in Vernon, P.E. 1970, 189-202.
- Ghiberti, L. Excerpts from The Commentaries, in Holt, E. 1947, Vol. 1, 151-167.
- Ghiselin, B. 1952, The Creative Process, Mentor: N.Y.
- Gibson, J.J. 1950, The Perception of the Visual World, Houghton Mifflin: Boston.
- Goldwater, R. and Treves, M. 1945, Artists on Art, Murray: London, 1976.
- Gombrich, E.H. 1960, Art and Illusion, Phaidon: London.
- Gombrich, E.H. 1963, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, Phaidon: London.
- Goodman, N. 1968, Languages of Art, Bobbs Merrill: N.Y.
- Goodman, N. 1971, 'The Epistemological Argument', in Searle, J.R. 1971.
- Green, P. 1978, 'Visual Prompters for a Language of Looking', in The Times Educational Supplement, 17 November.
- Gregory, R.L. 1966, Eye and Brain, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
- Gregory, R.L. 1970, The Intelligent Eye, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
- Gregory, R.L. and Gombrich, E.H. (eds.) 1973, Illusion in Nature and Art, Duckworth: London.
- Gumperz, J. and Hymes, D. 1972, Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: London.
- Haacke, H. 1972, Interviewed in Studio International, Vol. 191, No. 980, 117-23.

- Haas, W. 1968, 'The Theory of Translation', in Parkinson, G.H.R. 1968.
- Hadjinicolaou, N. 1978, Art History and Class Struggle, Pluto Press: London.
- Hagstrum, J.H. 1958, The Sister Arts: The Tradition of Literary Pictorialism and English Poetry from Dryden to Gray, University of Chicago Press.
- Halliday, M. 1971, 'Language in a Social Perspective', in Educational Review, No. 23, 165-88.
- Hamilton, R. et al. 1960, The Bride Stripped Bare By Her Bachelors, Even, Lund Humphries: London.
- Hamilton, R. 1966, The Almost Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp, Arts Council: London.
- Harnoncourt, A. d' and Hopps, W. 1969, 'Etant Donnés: 1. la chute d'eau 2. le gaz d'éclairage: Reflections on a New Work by Marcel Duchamp' in the Bulletin: Philadelphia Museum of Art, Vol. 64, Nos. 299 and 300.
- Hayek, F.A. 1952, The Sensory Order, Chicago and London.
- Hebb, D.O. 1949, The Organisation of Behaviour, Chapman and Hall/Wiley: N.Y. and London.
- Heller, J. 1972, Printmaking Today, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: N.Y.
- Herbert, R.L. 1964, Modern Artists on Art, Prentice Hall: New Jersey.
- Higgins, I. (ed.) 1973, Literature and the Plastic Arts 1880-1930, Scottish Academic Press: Edinburgh and London.
- Hirst, P.H. 1973, 'Literature and the Fine Arts as a Unique Form of Knowledge', in the Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol. 3, No. 3, 118-32.
- Hirst, P.H. 1974a, 'Statements, Language and Art: A Comment in Reply to Mr. Peter Schrimshaw', in the Cambridge Journal of Education, Lent Term, 44-46.
- Hirst, P.H. 1974b, Knowledge and the Curriculum, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Hockney, D. 1976, 'Pictures from the Past', in The Observer, 17 October.
- Hollo, A. (trans.) 1962, Some Poems by Paul Klee, Scorpion Press: London.
- Holt, E.G. (ed.) 1947/1966, A Documentary History of Art, 3 Vols., Anchor: N.Y.
- Hunt, J.D. 1971, Encounters: Essays on Literature and the Visual Arts, Studio Vista: London.

- Hunt, R. 1976, 'For Factography', in Studio International, Vol. 191, No. 980, 96-9.
- Husserl, E. 1913, Ideas, George Allen and Unwin: London, 1931.
- Itten, J. 1970, The Elements of Colour, Van Nostrand Reinhold: N.Y.
- Itten, J. 1975, Design and Form, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Jackson, P.W. 1968, Life in Classrooms, Holt, Rinehart and Winston: N.Y.
- Kaschnitz-Weinberg, G. Von, 1965, Mittelmeerische Kunst, Mann: Berlin.
- Kenedy, R.C. 1970, 'The Humument', in Art and Artists, September, 56-7.
- Klee, F. (ed.) 1964, The Diaries of Paul Klee, University of California Press.
- Klee, P. 1912, Letter to Die Alpen on the occasion of the third exhibition of the New Arts Association at the Thanhauser Gallery in Munich. In Friedenthal, R. 1963, 205-6.
- Klee, P. 1920, 'Creative Credo', in Chipp, H.B. 1968, 182-86.
- Klee, P. 1924, Paul Klee on Modern Art, Faber and Faber: London, 1948.
- Klee, P. 1925, Pedagogical Sketchbook, Faber and Faber: London, 1972.
- Klee, P. 1961, The Thinking Eye, Lund Humphries: London.
- Klee, P. 1973, The Nature of Nature, Lund Humphries: London.
- Klingender, F.D. 1947, Art and the Industrial Revolution, Paladin: St. Albans, 1972.
- Kozloff, M. 1961, Renderings: Critical Essays on a Century of Modern Art, Studio Vista: London.
- Krauss, R. 1975, 'Activity of Criticism', in Studio International, Vol. 189, No. 974, 86.
- Kris, E. 1952, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, International University Press: N.Y.
- Kuenne, M.R. 1946, 'Experimental Investigation of the Relation of Language to Transpositional Behaviour in Young Children', in the Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 36.
- Labov, W. 1969, 'The Logic of Nonstandard English', in Cashdan, A. and Grugeon, E. 1972, 198-212.
- Labov, W. 1971, 'The Study of Language in its Social Context', in Advances in the Sociology of Language, Fishman, J. (ed.), 1971, Mouton: The Hague and N.Y.
- Laing, R.D. and Cooper, D.G. 1964, Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy 1950-1960, Tavistock: London.
- Langer, S.K. 1942, Philosophy in a New Key, Harvard University Press.
- Langer, S.K. 1953, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art, R.K.P. London.

- Lawton, D. 1977, 'Language and Education': One of a series of lectures given by the Curriculum Studies Dept. at London University Institute of Education, in connection with the Diploma in Education Course, 1977-78.
- Linker, K. 1980, 'The Artist's Book as an Alternative Space', in Studio International, Vol. 195, No. 990, 77
- Lippard, L. 1977, 'Art Outdoors: In and Out of the Public Domain' in Studio International, Vol. 193, No. 986, 83-90.
- Lowenfeld, V. and Brittain, W.L. 1970, Creative and Mental Growth, Macmillan: N.Y. and London.
- Lucie-Smith, E. 1968, Thinking About Art, Calder and Boyars: London.
- Luria, A.R. and Yudovich, F. la, 1959, Speech and the Development of Mental Processes in the Child, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Lynton, N. 1964, Klee, Spring Books: London.
- Mackinnon, D.W. 1962, 'The Personality Correlates of Creativity: A Study of American Architects', in Vernon, P.E. 1971, 289-311.
- Madge, C. and Weinberger, B. 1973, Art Students Observed, Faber and Faber: London.
- Male, E. 1910, The Gothic Image, Collins: London, 1961.
- Malraux, A. 1953, The Voices of Silence, Paladin: St. Albans, 1974.
- Maritain, J. 1953, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Pantheon: N.Y.
- Marwick, A. 1970, The Nature of History, Macmillan: London.
- Marwick, A. 1977, Introduction to History, Open University Press: Milton Keynes.
- Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1976, On Literature and Art, Progress: Moscow.
- Mashek, J. (ed.) 1975, Marcel Duchamp in Perspective, Prentice-Hall: New Jersey.
- Metzger, W. 1953, Gesetze Des Sehens, am Main: Frankfurt.
- Meyerhoff, H. (ed.) 1959, The Philosophy of History in Our Time, Doubleday: N.Y.
- Meyers, J. 1975, Painting and the Novel, Manchester University Press.
- Newsom, 1963, Half Our Future: The report of the Central Advisory Council on pupils aged 13-16 of average and less than average ability; H.M.S.O.
- Ogden, C.K. and Richards, I.A. 1923, The Meaning of Meaning, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.: London.
- Osborne, H. 1955, Aesthetics and Criticism, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.

- Osgood, C.E. 1953, Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology, Oxford University Press; London, 1960.
- Osgood, C.E. 1957, The Measurement of Meaning, University of Illinois Press: Urbana.
- Panofsky, E. 1939, Studies in Iconology, Oxford University Press: London.
- Pappas, G. (ed.) 1970, Concepts in Art and Education, Macmillan: London.
- Parkinson, G.H.R. (ed.) 1968, The Theory of Meaning, Oxford University Press: London.
- Phenix, P.H. 1964, Realms of Meaning: A Philosophy of the Curriculum for General Education, McGraw-Hill: N.Y.
- Philips, S. 1970, 'Acquisition of Rules for Appropriate Speech Usage', in Alatis, J. (ed.) 1970.
- Phillips, T. 1980, A Humument, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Phillipson, M. 1972, 'Phenomenological Philosophy and Sociology', in Filmer, P. et al. 1972.
- Piaget, J. 1926, Language and Thought of the Child, Routledge: London, 1952.
- Piaget, J. 1952, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Piaget, J. 1954, The Construction of Reality in the Child, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1955.
- Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B. 1969, The Psychology of the Child, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Pickering, F.P. 1970, Literature and Art in the Middle Ages, Macmillan: London.
- Pincus-Witten, R. 1973, 'Theatre of the Conceptual: Autobiography and Myth', in Mashek, J. 1975, 162-72.
- Popper, K. 1957, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Popper, K. 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London.
- Postman, N. and Weingartner, C. 1971, Teaching as a Subversive Activity, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Praz, M. 1970, Mnemosyne: The Parallel Between Literature and the Visual Arts, Oxford University Press: London.
- Read, H. 1931, The Meaning of Art, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1949.
- Read, H. 1943, Education Through Art, Faber and Faber: London.

- Read, H. 1965, Icon and Idea, Schocken Books: N.Y.
- Reid, L.A. 1931, A Study in Aesthetics, Allen and Unwin: London.
- Reid, L.A. 1961, Ways of Knowledge and Experience, Allen and Unwin: London.
- Reid, L.A. 1962, Philosophy and Education, Heinemann: London.
- Reid, L.A. 1969, Meaning in the Arts, Allen and Unwin: London.
- Reid, L.A. 1970, 'Feeling and Understanding', in Smith, R.A. (ed.) 1970.
- Reid, L.A. 1974, 'The Arts as a Unique Form of Knowledge', in the Cambridge Journal of Education, Michaelmas Term, 153-65.
- Reid, L.A. 1976, 'Feeling and Aesthetic Knowing', in the Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 10, Nos. 3 and 4, 11-27.
- Reynolds, J. 1794, The Discourses, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1907.
- Riegl, A. 1893, Stilfragen, Siemens: Berlin.
- Roe, A. 1952, 'A Psychologist Examines Sixty-four Eminent Scientists', in Vernon, P.E. 1970, 43-51.
- Rosenberg, H. 1965, The Anxious Object, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Rosenberg, H. 1975, 'Activity of Criticism', in Studio International, Vol. 189, No. 974, 87.
- Rosen, H. 1967, 'The Language of Textbooks', in Cashdan, A. and Grugeon, E. (eds.) 1972.
- Rosen, H. 1969, 'Towards a Language Policy Across the Curriculum', in Barnes, D. et al. 1969.
- Roskill, M. 1976, What is Art History? Thames and Hudson: London.
- Ross, M. 1975, Arts and the Adolescent: Schools Council Working Paper 54, Evans/Methuen: London.
- Ross, M. 1978, The Creative Arts, Heinemann: London.
- Rothenstein, M. 1966, Frontiers of Printmaking, Studio Vista: London.
- Rouve, S. 1973, 'Teaching Art History: A Methodical Reappraisal', in Field, D. and Newick, J. 1973, 187-209.
- Rowland, K. 1964-1966, Looking and Seeing, (4 Vols.), Ginn and Co. London.
- Rowland, K. 1968, Educating the Senses, Ginn and Co. London.
- Rowland, K. 1971, Learning to See, (5 Vols.), Ginn and Co. London.
- San Lazzaro, G. di, 1957, Klee, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Sanouillet, M. 1959, Marchand Du Sel: Ecrits de Marcel Duchamp. Reunis et Presentes par Michel Sanouillet, Le Terrain Vague: Paris.
- Sanouillet, M. and Peterson, E. 1975, The Essential Writings of Marcel Duchamp, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Sanders, N. 1966, Classroom Questions: What Kinds? Harper & Row: N.Y.

- Sandler, I. 1970, 'New Ways of Teaching Art History', in Battcock, G. (ed.) 1973, 117-127.
- Santayana, G. 1896, The Sense of Beauty, Charles Scribner's Sons: N.Y.
- Sapir, E. 1966, Culture, Language and Personality, University of California Press.
- Sartre, J-P. 1960, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, N.L.B. London, 1976.
- Sartre, J-P. 1963, Search for a Method, Vintage Books: N.Y.
- Sartre, J-P. 1972, The Psychology of Imagination, Methuen: London.
- Saxl, F. 1957, Heritage of Images, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Schrimshaw, P. 1973, 'Statements, Language and Art: Some Comments on Professor Hirst's Paper', in The Cambridge Journal of Education, Michaelmas Term, 1973.
- Schutz, A. 1964-1971, Collected Papers, Vols. 1-3, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague.
- Searle, J.R. 1971, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press: London.
- Sedlmayr, H. 1929, 'Die Quintessenz Der Lehren Reigls', in Sedlmayr, H. 1958, Kunst Und Wahrheit, Rowohlt: Hamburg.
- Shahn, B. 1974, The Shape of Content, Harvard University Press.
- Shepard, W.O. and Schaeffer, M. 1956, 'The Effect of Concept Knowledge on Discrimination Learning', in Child Development, Vol. 27.
- Sickert, W.R. 1970, 'A Free House', quoted in The Artist, Vol. 78, No. 2, 91, April, 1970.
- Sinclair, J. et al. 1972, 'The English Used by Teachers and Pupils', in Sinclair, J. and Coulthard, R., 1974.
- Sinclair, J. and Coulthard, R. 1974, Towards an Analysis of Discourse: The English Used by Teachers and Pupils, Oxford University Press: London.
- Smith, B.O. 1961, 'The Logic of Teaching in the Arts', in Eisner, E.W. and Ecker, D.W. 1966, 270-279.
- Smith, B.O. (ed.) 1964, Education and the Structure of Knowledge, Rand McNally: Chicago.
- Smith, R.A. 1968, 'Aesthetic Criticism: the Method of Aesthetic Education', in Smith, R.A. (ed.) 1971, 473-484.
- Smith, R.A. (ed.) 1970, Aesthetic Concepts and Education, University of Illinois Press.
- Smith, R.A. (ed.) 1971, Aesthetics and Problems of Education, University of Illinois Press.

- Smith, R.A. 1973, 'Teaching Aesthetic Criticism in the Schools', in The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 7, No. 1.
- Snyder, B. 1971, The Hidden Curriculum, Knopf: N.Y.
- Sorell, W. 1970, The Duality of Vision: Genius and Versatility in the Arts, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Stolnitz, J. 1960, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston.
- Stubbs, M. 1976, Language, Schools and Classrooms, Methuen: London.
- Stubbs, M. and Delamont, S. 1976, Explorations in Classroom Observation, John Wiley and Sons: London.
- Sweeney, J. 1946, 'Eleven Europeans in America', in the Bulletin of the Museum of Modern Art, Vol. 13, Nos. 4-5, 19-21: N.Y.
- Taba, H. et al. 1964, 'Thinking in Elementary School Children', San Francisco State College, Co-operative Research Project.
- Tagg, J. 1978, Review of Hadjinicolaou 1978, in Red Letters, No.8, 77-78.
- Tolman, E.C. and Brunswik, E. 1935, 'The Organism and the Causal Texture of Environment', in the Psychological Review, Vol. 42.
- Tolstoy, L.N. 1898, What is Art?, Oxford University Press: London, 1939.
- Tomkins, C. 1968, Ahead of the Game: Four Versions of the Avant-Garde, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Vasari, G. 1550, Lives of the Artists, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1965.
- Venturi, L. 1936, History of Art Criticism, Dutton: N.Y. 1964.
- Vernon, M.D. 1952, A Further Study of Visual Perception, Cambridge University Press.
- Vernon, M.D. 1962, The Psychology of Perception, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Vernon, P.E. (ed.) 1970, Creativity, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Veron, E. 1878, Aesthetics, Chapman and Hall: London.
- Vygotsky, L.S. 1962, Language and Thought, M.I.T. Press.
- Walker, J.A. 1979, 'Teaching Art History: the Nitty Gritty', in Block, No. 1, 2-4.
- Walker, R. and Adelman, C. 1972, 'Towards a Sociography of the Classroom', Report to SSRC, Mimeo.
- Walker, R. and Adelman, C. 1975a, A Guide to Classroom Observation, Methuen: London.
- Walker, R. and Adelman, C. 1975b 'Interaction Analysis in Informal Classrooms', in the British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 45, No. 1.

- Waimon, M.D. 1969, 'Judging the Effectiveness of Teaching', in the Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3.
- Wallach, A. 1981, 'In Search of a Marxist Theory of Art History', in Block, No. 4, 15-17.
- Wallas, G. 1926, 'The Art of Thought', in Vernon, P.E. 1970, 91-97.
- Watson, L. 1979, Lifetide, Hodder and Stoughton: Sevenoaks.
- Watts, H. (trans.) 1974, Three Painter-Poets: Arp/ Schwitters/ Klee: Selected Poems, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Webber, M.M. 1964, 'Towards a Definition of the Interest Community', in Worsley 1970, 301-303.
- Weitz, M. 1956, 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 15, 27-35.
- Whorf, B.L. 1956, Language, Thought and Reality, M.I.T. Press.
- Wilson, B. 1970, 'Relations Among Art Teachers', Art Critics' and Historians', and Non-Art-Trained Individuals' Statements About Guernica', in Studies in Art Education, Vol. 12, No. 1.
- Witkin, R.W. 1974, The Intelligence of Feeling, Heinemann: London.
- Wolfe, T. 1976, The Painted Word, Bantam: N.Y.
- Wolfflin, H. 1932, Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art, Dover: N.Y. 1950.
- Woods, G. et al. (eds.) 1972, Art Without Boundaries: 1950-1970, Thames and Hudson: London.
- Worsley, P. 1970, Introducing Sociology, Penguin: Harmondsworth.

SELECTED WORKS OF ART REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT

- David, J-L. 1784, The Oath of the Horatii, The Louvre: Paris.
- Delacroix, E. 1830, Liberty Guiding the People: 28th. July, 1830,
The Louvre: Paris.
- Duchamp, M. 1911-12, Nude Descending a Staircase, Nos. 1 and 2,
Louise and Walter Arensberg Collection: Philadelphia Museum of
Art.
- Duchamp, M. 1915-23, The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors Even,
('Large Glass'), Philadelphia Museum of Art.
- Duchamp, M. 1919, L.H.O.O.Q., Mary Sisler Collection: N.Y.
- Duchamp, M. 1920, Fresh Widow, Mary Sisler Collection: N.Y.
- Duchamp, M. 1921, Belle Haleine, Eau de Voilette, ('Sweet breath,
Veilwater'), Carl Frederic Reutersward Collection: Stockholm.
- Duchamp, M. 1946-66, Etant Donnés, Philadelphia Museum of Art.
- Gauguin, P. 1897, Nevermore, Tate Gallery: London.
- Gericault, T. 1819, The Raft of the Medusa, The Louvre: Paris.
- Klee, P. 1918, Once Emerged from the Grey of Night, Klee Foundation:
Berne.
- Klee, P. 1921, Let Him Kiss Me with the Kiss of his Mouth, Angela
Rosengart Collection: Lucerne.
- Klee, P. 1937, The Rhine Near Duisburg, Heinz Berggruen Collection:
Paris
- Klee, P. 1938, Fruit on a Blue Ground, Klee-Stiftung: Berne.
- Madox Brown, F. 1852-63, Work, Manchester City Art Gallery.
- Martini, S. 1333, The Annunciation, Uffizi Gallery: Florence.
- Tilson, J. 1963, Vox Box, Marlborough New London Gallery.

I doubt in the early years that I would have survived the criticism for which my colleagues are justly famed, for the simple reason that I could not even grasp the problem (Bernstein, 1971,2).

Faith in the search dawns only at the end (Kafka, The Trial).

This supplement, written some six months after the completion of my thesis, is by way of a brief review of the process of my research, and an attempt to resolve some of the contradictions which have become apparent with the benefit of hindsight.

It is in the nature of a post-graduate thesis which reports original research that, unlike presentations prepared specially for public consumption, it should reflect the educational process whereby the student develops his thinking, perhaps from a very broad and more or less intuitive position in the beginning to a better defined and more informed position at the end. This is certainly how I viewed the present work while it was in preparation, and this goes a long way towards explaining some of the apparent contradictions it embodies, particularly in respect of methodology. It also helps to explain why certain issues which I might have addressed earlier in the work are not more fully developed. As the work progressed, and as the issues became clearer, certain aspects began to command my attention while others were 'filtered out', as it were, to be taken up again, perhaps, in future studies.

When I applied to the Institute in 1977 to do postgraduate research I had only the flimsiest notion of what it was that I wanted to do. I was motivated by the feeling, rather than the certainty, that an investigation of language in art education would be worth-while; a feeling born out of my own experiences as an art student in the sixties, coupled with my subsequent introduction to socio-linguistic theory. My preliminary enquiries had shown me that there was no established tradition into which such work would fit and that to apply language theory to art educational practices would be a creative and original thing to do.

Given the lack of precedent my first task as a research student was to examine the literature for as many references as I could find to 'art' and 'language', treated together, in order to create a context for my work and a platform on which to build. Much of this material may now be found in Part One of the thesis; it was collected not so much in the spirit of anthropology which characterises the remainder of the work, but in a more projective or prescriptive spirit infused with the need to show the viability of my theoretical presuppositions in the context of art and art education. This Part may be seen, then, as a kind of 'clearing house' for ideas and possibilities not all of which were to prove directly relevant to what was to come, but a necessary stage in the process nonetheless.

While I was still working on the material for Part One I began to consider the empirical work which was to occupy the greater part of the thesis, and which was to generate the more important insights, and to become the more interesting and original contribution to art educational knowledge. I approached this work in a very different spirit from that in Part One; here I was not out to prove anything but to discover what might emerge when real events in actual, arbitrarily selected art classes were viewed in a socio-linguistic perspective. This being so, I was able to allow the material which it was possible to collect by the means at my disposal to dictate, to a large extent, the direction in which the work was to proceed. In the event this was towards a study of the pedagogical interaction in the classrooms, centred mainly on the role of the teacher, rather than towards other equally interesting phenomena such as the specific relations between verbal and visual symbols. These other phenomena may well become the focus of future enquiry, but if this happens then the method of data collection would need to be modified and extended to record visual images as well as the spoken word; and some means of recording the pupils' understanding of, and reactions to what was said would need to be devised.

The ideas in Part Three for extending the work described in Part Two represent another shift in methodology. This arises from my acceptance in retrospect, that the detachment for which I strove as observer in Part Two was not only difficult within the terms of the method I had chosen, but also of limited value if all it could produce were essentially descriptive and interpretive accounts of events in particular classrooms. In an attempt to maintain a degree of detachment, however, while also accepting an active role in the evaluation and development of art educational practices,

I propose in Part Three an extension of the chosen method whereby the researcher may be redefined as something of a 'catalyst' in a process of self evaluation and self development by the teachers under observation. In this way, the researcher would not directly judge the practices observed or influence what changes might occur as a result of his intervention; these would be for the teachers themselves to decide. And the modified method would remain within the spirit of social phenomenology as shown in 10.3.

Finally I must say something about the implications of my work for the supposed creative or developmental view of art generally held within the art educational community, since my attitude toward this may not come across clearly enough due to a degree of 'overkill' in my argument. To suggest, as I have done, that visual perception, and by extension visual art, respond to the verbal environment is not to say that visual images and experience are invariably and uniformly determined by words, or that works of visual art may invariably be reduced to words. What I have tried to say is that perception and art come about under conditions which are to a great extent pervaded by language, and that they are subject, therefore, to the socialising and normative power of the word to a greater or lesser degree. I have also tried to say, however, that the visual and the verbal in experience, thought, knowledge and communication are related dialectically, and that although the verbal may condition the visual, the visual may also react upon the verbal in an endless dialogue. This provides the basis, I believe, for a creative or developmental model of art as a social artifact, and it need not exclude the possibility of personal or ideosyncratic vision and expression. But, having said this, I would add that truly creative art and artists are not the norm, in reality, but the exception. As de Bono has said on more than one occasion in his recent television series on 'lateral thinking', just because artists may see things and express themselves in peculiar or uncommon ways, it does not necessarily mean that they are not as set in their ways as everyone else. Without implying that there may not be other possibilities, my contention is that, whether or not we choose to call ourselves 'artists', we all develop habits of thought and perception, many of which are received from the culture, and under these circumstances, change or creativity comes about through crisis or the intervention of insights formed in alternative symbolic modes. Thus we may come to see things differently as a result of what we hear about them and, as a consequence of this 'expanded' vision we may discover something new to say about these things. And so the process continues. This

idea does find support in the literature; for example, in Koestlers' (1) discussion of creativity as a 'bisociation' of differing matrices of meaning, and in Eisner's (2) views on the 'creative' interplay of the various symbolic modes of experience and expression. How the process might work in specific terms, however, would need to be explored through a much deeper analysis of what is meant by verbal and visual 'symbols' and 'symbolic modes' than has been possible in the present study. Without the benefit of such an analysis I have been careful to use sufficiently broad and relatively unproblematic terms when referring to the proposed verbal/visual dialectic. For example, I have consistently referred to the verbal 'mediating' the visual, and vice-versa.

Doubtless there are other aspects of the work which the reader may feel to be insufficiently explained or developed. If this is the case then I would point out that, had I not been granted an extension to 100,000 words by the University, I should not even have covered those areas which I did choose to focus upon as deeply as I have. Not only this, but with a pioneering work which seeks to establish a new field of study (or at least to bring together previously unrelated fields to create a new 'matrix') it was necessary, I felt, to indicate something of the potential breadth of that field as well as to show my ability to delve deeply into particular aspects. If by so-doing I have appeared to raise issues without sufficiently developing them, then I can only repeat, once again, that these may well suggest subjects for future study in this field.

(1) Koestler, A. 1966, The Act of Creation, Pan : London

(2) See below, 8.33.